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Poona Residency Correspondence

Volume 10

The Treaty of Bassein and the
Anglo-Maratha War in the Deccan
1802-1804

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Poona Residency Correspondence

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FOREWORD

The treaty of Bassein is an important episode of Anglo Indian History. It marks the end of Maratha independence and the establishment of British supremacy in India. As Sidney Owen puts it, "Previously to the treaty of Bassein there existed a British Empire in India; that treaty gave the Company the empire of India." The general outline of this chapter is too well-known to need repetition. Standard histories of the period discuss it at length and a mass of original material has been published in the letters and dispatches of Lord Wellesley and his brother the Duke of Wellington. A few important papers have been given by Forrest in his *Selections from Bombay Records* (Maratha Series). Volumes of Parliamentary papers and the *Asiatic Annual Register* also contain considerable original material, but these works have now become rare. The papers presented in this Volume, consisting of dispatches from Col. Close, Col. Collins, country-news obtained by these Residents, memoranda of meetings and discussions held with the Maratha Chiefs, give the inside story of British diplomacy engaged in bringing about the dissolution of the Maratha confederacy and reveal many new facts.

Lord Wellesley on his arrival in India in 1798 had gauged correctly the political situation, and he made up his mind to bring the entire continent under British domination. He saw that Great Britain could no longer play any but the predominant part in India. Within a year of his arrival he crushed Tipu's power, persuaded the effete Nizam to accept British suzerainty, and then turned his attention to the Marathas in the name of the security and tranquillity of the British possessions in India. He offered defensive alliances to all the Maratha Princes. The Maratha confederacy stretching from the Tungabhadra in the South to Patiala in the North occupied a very formidable position. Its resources in men and money were very great and far superior to those of any other power in India and it stood in little need of protection from outsiders. Naturally the Governor-General's proposals were resented and promptly rejected when first made in 1798. But the Maratha confederacy was a house divided against itself. The bitter hatred, mutual jealousies and feuds of the confederates gave the English the opportunity they needed. The accession of Peshwa Baji Rao II to the Masnad in 1796 started a Civil War which was aggravated by the death of Nana Phadnis in 1798. The decline of the military power of the Poona State threw the Peshwa entirely into the hands of Daulat Rao Sindhia. Sindhia's attempt to crush his rival Holkar added fuel to the fire. When threatened by Holkar's advance on Poona, the Peshwa accepted the

British alliance by the Treaty of Bassein which was signed by him on 31st December 1802. The treaty brought him security against his feudatories, but did not restore him to the dignity and authority of his former position as the head of the Maratha Confederacy.

The war that followed arose out of the unwillingness of the Maratha Chiefs to accept the treaty which dissolved their union. They felt that they had been outwitted by the English and brought to the verge of ruin by the Peshwa's folly. Even in their hour of danger they could not forget their mutual animosities. The attempts made by Holkar and Sindhia to lay aside their differences and put up a united front came to nothing. The war that was forced on the Maratha Chiefs found them unprepared and disunited. In a swift campaign that lasted less than four months, the united armies of Sindhia and Bhonsla were defeated at Assaye, Argaon, Gavilgad; at the same time Sindhia's northern command was shattered at Agra and Laswari. By the treaties concluded in December 1803 at Deogaon and Sarji Anjangaon, Bhonsla and Sindhia concluded peace, abandoning large parts of their conquests in Hindustan and the Deccan and accepting the dissolution of the Maratha Confederacy.

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INTRODUCTION

By the treaty of Bassein the Peshwa Baji Rao II entered into a subsidiary alliance with the British, and "the establishment of the British power in the Maratha Empire" became an accomplished fact. Moreover, the process of the break-up of the Maratha Confederacy, which began in 1773 with the Gaikwad entering into direct treaty-relations with the British, and was accelerated eight years later, now attained to completion on the last day of the year 1802 by the Treaty of Bassein, when the Peshwa not only officially recognised the treaty entered into by the British with the Gaikwad, but also agreed to abide by the decisions of the British in any of his disputes with the Gaikwad. The clauses in their treaties, which enjoined it on Sindhia and Bhonsle to cut themselves off from and not to interfere any more in the affairs of the Peshwa, and to accept the British as the sole mediator and arbiter in any of their disputes even with the Peshwa, are merely the corrolaries of the principle enunciated and accepted in Art. 17 of the Treaty of Bassein.

Hence, early in 1807, Close had to point out in no unmistakable terms to Baji Rao's agent that "by the arrangements lately adjusted in India, Sindhia and Holkar were to be regarded as the heads of independent governments, and that according to the 17th article of the Treaty of Bassein, H. H. (the Peshwa) engaged not to enter into any negotiations with any State whatever without the consent of the British Government." Thus "the ancient relations (between the Peshwa and his former feudatory nobles like Sindhia) had been entirely abolished by the treaty of Bassein and the various treaties since concluded." (*P.R.C.*, Vol. VII, pp. 285-6, 303-4). Similarly five years later, in Aug. 1812, Jenkins explained to the minister of the Bhonsle that "the treaty of Bassein had commenced, and the subsequent treaties between the three great Maratha powers and the British Government and its allies had completed, an entirely new system of international law amongst all the governments of India, which left every State independent within itself, and had virtually dissolved all the former connections of allegiance (before indeed, a mere phantom) which any of the Maratha States owed or pretended to owe to the Peshwa. . . . Although several indirect attempts had been made to revive the old system of considering the Peshwa as the head of the Maratha Empire, the British Government had, and ever would set its face against any attempt to disturb the existing order of things." (*P.R.C.*, Vol. V, pp. 320-1).

Negotiations renewed.

The negotiations for concluding such a defensive and subsidiary engagement with the Peshwa had been going on since 1798, but were given up in Oct. 1800, when on being invited by the Governor General to become a party in the treaty of general defensive alliance concluded with the Nizam, the Peshwa refused to do so. But during the following year Baji Rao's position in Poona and within his own dominions continued to become more precarious every day, and finally on hearing in Oct. 1801, about Sindhia's negotiations with the courts of Hyderabad and Berar, he became very uneasy.

The Peshwa now took the initiative and renewed the negotiations in the last week of Nov. 1801. Just before handing over the charge of the Poona Residency to Close, his successor, Palmer had the satisfaction of communicating to the Governor General the Peshwa's willingness to subsidise a permanent force of the Company and to assign territory in Hindustan in commutation of the necessary subsidy, provided the force was retained within the Company's territories.

The state of affairs in his domain just then made the Peshwa for once quite keen to get the question of such an engagement with the British settled satisfactorily at an early date, and he eagerly awaited the Governor General's instructions to Close on the subject. But the Peshwa was very much dissatisfied with the settlement made by the Gaikwad with the British in respect of the *Chaurasi* district and his own part of the *chauth* on the Surat district. Moreover, the demand of the British for the fulfilment of the treaty of Mahad and his acceptance of the proposed arbitration for the adjustment of differences on the basis of the Nizam's claim to a total exemption from *chauth*, was equally unpalatable to the Peshwa.

In the meanwhile, pressure was being continually brought to bear on the Peshwa by Sindhia not to enter into any treaty arrangements with the British independently of him. Quoting the particular instance of the treaty of Salbai, Sindhia claimed his right of not only being consulted in such negotiations, but also of being the sole negotiator on behalf of the Peshwa. The Peshwa very much resented these efforts of Sindhia to dominate and control his foreign policy. The *rakils* of the Bhonsle, who arrived at the court of the Peshwa in the last week of February, 1802, too opposed the idea of the Peshwa making any treaty with the British.

The Governor General took some time in attending to these overtures of the Peshwa. Finally on June 23, 1802, he issued his detailed instructions to Close indicating the main lines of the policy to be adopted in his negotiations with the Peshwa's government. Discussions now ensued at Poona between Close and the Peshwa.

Even though the latter showed his apparent sincerity and intent keenness for entering into the proposed defensive engagement, he did not consent to any admissible modifications of the propositions put forth by Close in this respect. Palmer had very correctly judged the character of Baji Rao, when he wrote, "I apprehend that nothing short of imminent and certain destruction will induce him (Baji Rao) to make concessions which militate with his deep-rooted jealousy and prejudice, and of which he thinks that he has already made extraordinary sacrifices." And the situation was now fast developing into the requisite serious crisis.

Jaswant Rao Holkar's invasion of Poona: Oct. 1802.

Baji Rao had always opposed the cause sponsored by Jaswant Rao, and thus good-will never prevailed between them. But when on April 16, 1801, under Baji Rao's orders Jaswant Rao Holkar's brother Vithoji was barbarously and ignominiously executed at Poona, Jaswant Rao became wild with rage and vowed vengeance on all those whom he considered guilty of this atrocity.

Moreover, since the middle of 1799, Jaswant Rao Holkar had been fighting single-handed the forces of Sindhia in Khandesh, Malwa and northern India with varying fortunes. As a result of his utter defeat in the battle of Indore (Oct. 14, 1801) Jaswant Rao again became a fugitive. Moreover, on Oct. 29, 1801, Baji Rao reconfiscated the whole of the *saranjam* of the Holkar's family mainly because Kashi Rao had helped Jaswant Rao against Sindhia. Baji Rao sent down Dhondo Pant Godbole soon after to carry out these confiscation orders.

Jaswant Rao decided to first of all try to recover his own *family jagir* in Khandesh. Hence he sent his agent Paraji Pant to Poona to persuade Baji Rao to recall Dhondo Pant Godbole and release those *jagir* lands. But the Peshwa had no wish to accede to Jaswant Rao's request. Hence finally Holkar's forces defeated Dhondo Pant Godbole in the battle of Kheri Kusumba (March 15, 1802), and re-occupied by force all the lands of the Holkar's *saranjam* in Khandesh. Baji Rao did not take any active steps to retrieve this defeat.

Before starting on his Deccan campaign, Jaswant Rao made one more effort to effect a settlement with Sindhia through Perron, who was on a visit to Ujjain in the latter half of March, 1802. Jaswant Rao once again insisted that Sindhia should hand over to him Khandé Rao Holkar, the infant son of Malhar Holkar, whom Sindhia had kept confined in the Asirgarh fort since June, 1801. But Sindhia was least inclined to fulfil this term, and hence nothing came out of these negotiations.

Jaswant Rao left Malwa early in May, 1802, and along with his forces he encamped in the Khandesh districts. He detached many of his commanders to move further down along with their forces and collect money by contribution and plunder. At the same time he sent a very courteous letter to the Peshwa, along with some presents, which arrived in Poona on June 5, 1802. In reply Bajji Rao agreed to send Balaji Kunjar to Malwa to bring about a settlement between Holkar and Sindhia. But Balaji continued at Poona, and the repeated pleadings of Paraji Pant on behalf of Jaswant Rao Holkar went unheeded. With every advance of Jaswant Rao towards Poona, another letter containing similar promises was despatched to him by Bajji Rao, and in every one of them he was asked not to go to Poona. It was impracticable for Bajji Rao to comply with his demands, as no settlement with Jaswant Rao could have been fulfilled without prevailing on Sindhia to carry out its major terms including the release of Khandé Rao Holkar and restoration of the ancient family possessions of the Holkars to Jaswant Rao. Bajji Rao had neither the courage nor the means of enforcing these terms on one, whom he himself had been supplicating all these months for military help and support.

Bajji Rao had not sufficient forces in Poona which could be sent against Holkar with any hope of success, hence he mainly depended on military help from Sindhia for this purpose. Sindhia, then stationed in Ujjain, did not wish to undertake any major expedition at this time. He had done nothing to check Holkar's advance from Malwa, nor had he sent any forces against him while he was stationed in Khandesh during the rainy season. But Sindhia could not evade for long the repeated requests from Poona. He, therefore, took a loan of 10 lakhs of rupees and sent Sadashiv Rao Bhaskar Bakhshi to Poona with 10 regiments and about 10,000 horsemen, who arrived near Poona and encamped at Wanwadi on October 22, 1802.

But long before this the forces of Holkar had already come to grips with those of the Peshwa. Fatch Singh Mané, one of the commanders of Holkar, had completely defeated the forces of the Peshwa near Baramati on Oct. 8, 1802. The long-threatened danger of Holkar's attack on Poona was now becoming a stark reality. Holkar's forces were definitely closing in on the Peshwa's capital. In this hour of danger and distress, Bajji Rao once again turned towards the English.

Edmonstone's despatch of June 23, 1802, containing the Governor General's instructions to Close regarding the terms of the proposed subsidiary alliance with the Peshwa, was received in Poona exactly a month after its dispatch from Calcutta. Close immediately set about to initiate the necessary negotiations with the Peshwa, but another week's delay was caused as one of the two ministers jointly

in charge of the Peshwa's relations with the British was indisposed at this time, and the other one, Raghunath Rao, could not communicate singly with Close. To avoid any further delay Baji Rao had to authorise Raghunath Rao to do so and thus the negotiations finally began on August 1, 1802.

At the very outset Close explained at length to Raghunath Rao and discussed with him in detail the various articles of the proposed subsidiary alliance with the Peshwa as was finally suggested by the Governor General. In spite of the repeated promises of Raghunath Rao and even of the Peshwa himself to communicate to Close as soon as possible the Peshwa's reactions to these proposals, no definite answer was forth-coming till Sept. 20, 1802, and even then without directly giving his comments on the articles proposed by Close, the Peshwa sent down to Close through Raghunath Rao his own propositions for the proposed alliance. While the Peshwa was most anxious to preserve his amity with the English unimpaired, he was also definitely averse to improving it by concluding the proposed subsidiary alliance on the terms suggested by the Governor General. A week later Close handed to Raghunath Rao his replies to the Peshwa's propositions, leaving it again to the Peshwa to make up his mind.

The Peshwa had already begun to realize the dangers threatening him from different quarters. Sadashiv Bhau was hurrying to Poona with Sindhia's forces to assist the Peshwa against Jaswant Rao Holkar. But the Peshwa knew full well that Sindhia too would never approve of the proposed alliance with the British. Hence the Peshwa had definitely provided in his propositions that the fact of his having finally concluded an alliance with the English should be kept a close secret till the Peshwa definitely agreed to its being made public. Therefore, Raghunath Rao pleaded with Close on September 27, that the progress of these negotiations be kept absolutely secret, and during all later discussions every possible ingenuity was shown to suggest how the various terms of the alliance could be implemented without letting any one know about such an alliance having been actually concluded. As Sadashiv Bhau and Jaswant Rao Holkar neared Poona Baji Rao's apprehensions regarding the safety of his own person increased, and Close was ever ready to take the fullest advantage of the "irresolute and timid" disposition of the Peshwa by agreeing to accede to his wishes in that respect.

But Baji Rao had not yet made up his mind when he received the news of the disaster that befell his forces in the battle of Baranati on October 8. Decision could not now be postponed much longer. It was distinctly realised that in the coming struggle between the forces of Sindhia and Holkar, who-so-ever prevailed the Poona State would be exposed to equal difficulties and hazards, and as such an

alliance with the British appeared to Baji Rao to be the only means of gaining any support to his cause. Hence on October 12, Raghunath Rao was sent by the Peshwa to Close with definite proposals for the conclusion of a defensive and subsidiary agreement with the British government. The preliminary propositions of such an alliance were drawn up, and the same were finally agreed to by Raghunath Rao on behalf of the Peshwa; they had, however, left the details to be worked out and adjusted at a later period under the form of a proper definitive treaty. But during the discussions that ensued on the basis of these propositions, particularly relating to the details of the districts to be ceded as *jaidad* to the British to cover their expenses for maintaining the subsidiary force for the Peshwa, Baji Rao continued to be evasive even at that late stage, so as to excite in Close considerable doubts about his sincerity, and on October 22 Close informed Raghunath Rao of his decision to put an end to these unnecessarily prolonged negotiations. Close, however, knew full well that a decision favourable to his cause could not possibly be postponed for more than a few days.

Holkar had, in the meanwhile, left Nasik and was hurrying towards Jejuri with all his forces. Before long he effected a junction with the victorious forces of Fateh Singh Mané, who also was now closing on Poona. On October 23, their combined forces encamped at a distance of only 12 miles from Poona. Once again the Peshwa tried to appease Holkar. On October 24, he sent a deputation consisting of Narayan Vaidya and Raghunath Dhondodev Bhagwat to meet Holkar and effect a settlement with him. But this time Holkar declined to come to terms, and the unavoidable clash of arms followed on the following day near Poona.

Baji Rao had all along been most apprehensive about the final result of such a battle. As early as September 1802, he had transferred all his jewels from Poona to the Singhgarh fort. The ladies of his family including the widows of Sawai Madhav Rao and Nana Fadnavis were sent off to the Raigarh fort in the night of October 8/9th. The apprehensions of Baji Rao regarding the safety of his own person were really great, and every possible preparation had been made to enable him to fly westwards on the occurrence of any serious event. Thus when the battle seemed imminent, in the morning of October 25 the Peshwa, prepared for every event, moved out with all his troops. He had, however, before this signed and executed an instrument (*sanad*) of cession for the proposed *jaidad* in favour of the British, and at the time of marching out he sent it to Close with Raghunath Rao. Raghunath Rao fully assured Close of the Peshwa's positive intention and meaning that a general defensive alliance would be concluded and brought into effect at the earliest possible date. This instrument did not contain the specific

names of any districts to be ceded, yet the Governor General agreed with Close in holding that by executing and delivering this instrument to Close on October 25, 1802, the Peshwa had in fact concluded a defensive alliance with the British Government.

The unexpected suddenness with which the final stages of these long-drawn out preliminary negotiations were crowded into just one single fortnight, and the ease with which even the most far-reaching decisions were now unhesitatingly taken without ever apprehending the full effects of their ultimate operation, make the whole thing a political tragedy. Baji Rao's utter helplessness during the fifteen years that followed his restoration to the *masnad* of Poona by the British simply increases the pathos. The tragedy deepens as years pass by and the climax is reached in the end, when in trying to undo what he had done during this fortnight, Baji Rao not merely lost his entire kingdom, but was also removed from the very land of his birth.

Poona Affairs: October 25, 1802—April 20, 1803.

The story of the flight of Baji Rao from Poona soon after the defeat of the allied forces in the battle of Hadapsar, his voyage to Bassein and his speedy negotiations with the British finally culminating in the conclusion of the Treaty of Bassein, is too well-known to be recounted here over again. In no case can its epoch-making character be doubted. It not only shattered once for all even the make-belief unity among the various Maratha Princes comprising the Maratha Confederacy, but it also marked the beginning of the final advance of the British, which was to be completed sixteen years later after the final overthrow of the power of the house of Holkar at the battle of Mahidpur, with the political settlement of Malwa and Rajputana.

The collapse of the opposition to Baji Rao in Poona was sudden and complete; the British restored Baji Rao to his *masnad* there with unexpected ease without having to encounter resistance of any kind. The Poona affairs during these six crucial months immediately following the battle of Hadapsar deserve the most careful and minute study for ascertaining the real weaknesses of the Maratha polity, which alone can account for these unusual happenings.

With the flight of Baji Rao, Poona lay defenceless and at the mercy of the victorious invader, who took up his quarters in the house of the Sindhia at Wanwadi on October 29. On the following day Holkar sent down a detachment to Junnar to escort Amrit Rao to Poona. This adopted son of Baji Rao's father arrived in Poona on November 7, 1802. Baji Rao had not yet returned to Poona, hence on November 12, Amrit Rao was persuaded to take over the

administration of the Poona government. Holkar continued to be in Poona. Both of them were keen and earnestly tried for the return of Baji Rao to Poona, and even thought of installing a new Peshwa on the *gadi*, if Baji Rao finally declined to respond to their call. Their main aim was to end all possibilities of British encroachment upon the Maratha independence. But all their efforts in this respect simply ended in dismal failure. The ever-changing weak vacillating policy of the new Poona Government was not supported by the necessary strength of a powerful united Maratha army, which had ceased to exist save as independent groups of rival forces within the Maratha Confederacy, fighting among themselves because of their family feuds and internal dissensions. When pitted against the firm and definitely-aimed diplomacy of the British, which was solidly backed by their well-trained ably-led armies, the Marathas failed to score even one solitary success. And the greatest tragedy of the Maratha people lay in the simple fact that at such a crucial moment their entire strength as well as weakness centred in a single person—the timid, weak and vacillating Baji Rao. By one single act, the signing of the instrument during the early hours of October 25, 1802, that irresolute man personally provided the British with the much-needed pivot for the slow yet certain destruction of the Maratha power and the total loss of their independence during the coming decades. The Governor General eagerly grasped the first opportunity Baji Rao thus gave him and he carefully manoeuvred to see that the events following Baji Rao's flight from Poona should definitely develop into the desired pattern to fit in with the policy and plans of the British. The diplomatic superiority of the British on this occasion can not possibly be doubted.

The failure of the new Poona Government established there after Baji Rao's flight was three-fold.

(i) *Its failure to win over the British to their side.* Jaswant Rao Holkar had fully realised the great value of an alliance with the British for the success of his cause and particularly to remove all possibilities of their supporting the cause of Baji Rao. But Close knew full well that the interests of the British lay in supporting and restoring Baji Rao at Poona, if he entered into a subsidiary alliance with them. Hence Close had intimated to Holkar even on October 26 his intention to return to Bombay, and he did not pay any heed to all the friendly overtures of Holkar and Amrit Rao. Their efforts to induce Close to stay on at Poona too naturally failed. They, however, succeeded in detaining him at Poona for another month, but Close remained attached to the cause of Baji Rao, and continued to guide and suitably advise him even from Poona.

In spite of their failure to make Close stay at Poona, the new Poona government did not wholly despair of winning over the

British to their side, and on the eve of his departure from Poona, Close was given three letters addressed to the Governor General by Amrit Rao and his associate ministers 'soliciting the countenance and support of the British Government, by the appointment of a Resident in the place of Close, whose departure from Poona to Bombay being represented by Amrit Rao and his associates to be an abdication of his station of representative of the British Government at the court of Poona.' Again, early in December Amrit Rao and his associates sent down Ramchandra Govind Pandit to Bombay to meet and negotiate on their behalf with the Governor there that the British should not take any part in this private dispute between Baji Rao and Holkar. Ramchandra further informed the Governor that Baji Rao having deserted the *gadi* and left Poona, it was being planned that another person should be installed as the Peshwa instead. But Ramchandra did not gain his point, and he was clearly told by the Governor of Bombay that Baji Rao's leaving Poona could not possibly be taken to amount to an abdication of the Peshwa-ship.

On the other side the Governor General was rapidly planning to take the fullest advantage of the opportunity thus offered to him by Baji Rao and thereby consolidate the power of the British in Maharashtra. On November 16, 1802, he duly ratified the understanding arrived at between Baji Rao and Close, accepted the terms of the instrument executed by Baji Rao, and held that these formed a sufficient basis for the British government to carry into immediate and complete effect their part of the engagement as pledged to by Close. Orders were accordingly issued for keeping necessary forces ready to march into the Maratha dominion for the re-establishment of Baji Rao's authority there. Close continued his negotiations for the conclusion of a definitive treaty between Baji Rao and the British, which finally resulted in the signing of the treaty of Bassein on the last day of that fateful year, 1802.

(ii) *Its failure to establish a settled government within the Peshwa's dominions.*—Jaswant Rao had gained a decisive military victory in the battle of Hadapsar, but politically he failed to gain his main aim in invading Poona, viz. to secure the person of Baji Rao and thereby to compel him to establish an administration which might secure the ascendancy of Jaswant Rao Holkar in Poona to the exclusion of Daulat Rao Sindhia's influence. Baji Rao, however, was still undecided during the early days of his flight from Poona regarding the attitude he should take towards the British. He had been fully assured by them of all possible help, but as yet he had not the necessary confidence in their promises. But when he learnt about the march of Holkar's forces to capture him, he finally made up his mind and on October 30 wrote to the Governor of Bombay

for an assylum with the British. Thus all the efforts of Holkar and his associates to get Baji Rao back in Poona, by persuasion or by force, completely failed and every move of theirs for that purpose only pushed Baji Rao closer to the British.

With Baji Rao away from Poona, the question of establishing a settled government within the Peshwa's dominions assumed greater importance. After Amrit Rao's return to Poona, he was prevailed upon to take charge of the same. He was assisted by Moroba Fadnavis, Baba Rao Phadké and several others of the adherents of Nana Fadnavis. Arthur Wellesley has described Amrit Rao as 'a very able man in the civil and political affairs of the Maratha Empire', but even he found himself unequal to the great task that he was called upon to carry out.

Baji Rao had, however, not yet ceased to be the Peshwa and many Maratha officers were still loyal to him. Hence the political and constitutional position of the newly-established Poona government continued to be very weak and insecure, which greatly increased its difficulties. Holkar had asserted from the very beginning that Baji Rao's flight from Poona amounted to his having virtually abdicated the Peshwaship, and as such a new Peshwa should be installed if Baji Rao did not return to Poona. Amrit Rao continued to delay any decision in this respect till the beginning of December, when all hopes of Baji Rao's possible return to Poona were finally given up. After prolonged discussions for three days (Dec. 4-6) it was finally decided to give Amrit Rao's son, Vinayak Rao, in adoption to Yashoda Bai, to rename him as Balaji Madhav Rao, and to instal him as the new Peshwa. The Chhatrapati Raja of Satara was compelled to issue the investiture dress for Vinayak Rao, who was soon to be installed on an auspicious day suggested by the astrologers.

But the proposed installation of Vinayak Rao was destined never to come off. Without performing the necessary adoption ceremony the installation could not take place, and Yashoda Bai, the widow of Sawai Madhav Rao, was then in the Raigarh fort being successfully guarded by the garrison loyal to Baji Rao, and hence could not possibly be brought to Poona for the ceremony. Moreover, on learning that Baji Rao had concluded the treaty of Bassein, Amrit Rao insisted that in view of this fresh development a major step like the installation of a new Peshwa should not be hurriedly taken, and on January 5, 1803, Vinayak Rao's installation was postponed to an unspecified date.

Baji Rao's right to the title of Peshwa was now no longer being challenged even by the new government at Poona, which all the more weakened the position of Amrit Rao and his associates. Holkar

was greatly disappointed to find that Baji Rao could not be replaced by a new Peshwa and he put the entire blame for the disappointment on Amrit Rao. But this was not the only cause for the disagreement that had been going on between Holkar and Amrit Rao for some time past. Holkar's financial difficulties had been on the increase since his entry into Poona. His early restraint did not last very long and within ten days of his arrival there Holkar began to raise contributions from the city of Poona. Later when Amrit Rao assumed the control of the Poona government, Holkar put before him his claim for one crore of rupees in return for his having put Amrit Rao in power, but neither Amrit Rao nor any of his officers had any cash to pay Holkar. The forces of Holkar were, however, constantly increasing, and these soldiers, old and new, were all causing daily disturbances in the city. Therefore, it was decided to raise the requisite sum by special levies, contributions and fresh taxation. After some time Holkar's officers took over the task of making these collections, and they committed unheard of atrocities and untold horrors to extract money, but even then not more than 50 lakhs of rupees could be collected within three months. More money was still needed for which Holkar had to look elsewhere. Holkar finally left Poona on February 25, 1803. His exorbitant demands had greatly embarrassed Amrit Rao and his associates, and the atrocities committed by his men completely alienated the sympathies and support of the people from this new Poona Government, which proved to be a severe blow to its authority and strength.

The flight of Baji Rao from Poona had let loose all the forces of disorder and unrest in the country, which inflicted unspeakable misery on the Maratha homeland. The financial exhaustion of the country was complete. Under the stress of these adverse circumstances, it was simply impossible for small men like Amrit Rao and his associates to end the anarchy and confusion, which alone could have ensured enthusiastic popular support for them. Loyalties had ever since been divided between Baji Rao and the new Poona government, and now the position of Baji Rao was greatly strengthened because of the support of the British bayonets publicly assured to him. Baji Rao had continued his unceasing intrigues with the various Sardars and *Jagirdars* of the Maratha dominion and had rallied many of them to his side. He had also won over the commanders of a good many Maratha forts. The armed forces, that had decisively defeated Baji Rao in October last, had simply melted away during the following six months. When Arthur Wellesley entered Poona in the afternoon of April 20, 1803, there was none to oppose him; he occupied Poona and established the British supremacy over the Peshwa's dominion without firing a single shot. Amrit Rao had precipitately left Poona that very morning for

Chakan, leaving behind 'a civil letter' addressed to the incoming British General.

(iii) *Its failure to effect a settlement between Holkar and Sindhia.*—But the situation would not have become irretrievable even as late as February 1803, if a suitable satisfactory solution could yet be found to the major political problem of the entire Maratha politica, viz. the Holkar-Sindhia dispute. The Governor General wrote to the Board of Directors in England on February 10, 1803,—

"The knowledge of our arrangements with the Peshwa may induce Daulat Rao Sindhia and Holkar to compromise their differences, and to offer to the Peshwa proposals for restoring his highness to the *masnad* of Poona, which his Highness may be disposed to accept, notwithstanding the actual conclusion of an engagement for that purpose with the British government. In such an event, it is not my intention to compel the Peshwa to adhere to the faith of his engagements, at the hazard of involving the Company in a war with the combined Maratha forces."

The attitude of Holkar towards Sindhia was constantly changing. Having won the battle of Hadapsar, Holkar felt friendly to Sindhia and soon after wrote to him expressing his inclination for peace and suggesting that a settlement be arrived at in respect of the various outstanding issues. But at this crucial hour Sindhia's father-in-law, Sharza Rao Ghatgé, once again gained Sindhia's ear. Ghatgé was bitterly opposed to Jaswant Rao Holkar and bragged of putting him down. Hence at his suggestion Sindhia completely ignored Holkar's letter, which thus remained unanswered. On the other hand, news began to reach Poona about the large scale military preparations by Sindhia. Holkar was not very wrong in guessing that all this was being done mainly to oppose him. Finally, Gopal Rao Chitnis, Sindhia's officer at Burhanpur, was again leading his forces into Holkar's territories in Khandesh and creating disturbances there. Holkar's animosity against Sindhia was once again roused.

But when the news about Baji Rao having concluded the Treaty of Bassein with the British reached Poona, Holkar once again decided to forget his hostility towards Sindhia and determined to make up with him for the greater interests of the Maratha power. He told Amrit Rao and others on January 2, 1803, "Baji Rao has ruined the Maratha power. He has accepted money from the English and given them his territories. . . . We must write to Sindhia to ascertain whether Baji Rao has done all this with his consent. . . . I will despatch a letter (to Sindhia) reporting what has happened and add 'should the English uniting with Baji Rao ascend (the *ghats*), Sindhia and I should accommodate our differences, and jointly oppose the British troops'." So another letter was written to Sindhia by Holkar. Amrit Rao too addressed Sindhia on the subject, but

apparently to no avail. Sindhia did not wish to enter into direct negotiations with either Holkar or Anrit Rao, as such a step would definitely alienate Baji Rao from himself, which Sindhia was most keen to avoid. Sindhia could not yet fully realise the far-reaching effects of the treaty of Bassein on the position of Baji Rao, hence he still entertained distant hopes of regaining his former influence and hold on Baji Rao and the Poona Government.

Jaswant Rao had solicited Ambaji Ingle's mediation as well from the very outset, and Sindhia very much preferred to utilise this channel for such peace-talks, but the progress of the negotiations through Ambaji was very slow and the steps that Ambaji intended to take to bring about the much-needed accommodation, were so dilatory that not much good could possibly result from them. Similarly, having been roused to the danger of the British threat to Maratha independence, Raghuji Bhonslé, the Raja of Berar, too undertook to mediate and bring about an accommodation between Sindhia and Holkar. He enjoyed the confidence of all the other Maratha Princes, and had agreed to guarantee any treaty of peace that might be concluded by means of his mediation, which very much increased the prospects of arriving at some suitable settlement. During the latter half of March, 1803, Bhonslé wrote letters to Sindhia and Holkar inviting both of them to meet him on the bank of the Godavari river for the necessary talks. He himself set out on April 17, 1803, for the venue of the proposed meeting of all the three Maratha princes.

But this joint meeting never came off. Things were already too far advanced on the British side. The Residents at the courts of Baji Rao and Sindhia had kept themselves fully posted with the minutest details of all the secret efforts that were being made to bring about the desired accommodation between Holkar and Sindhia. They were, equally aware of Baji Rao's continued irreconcilable hostility to Holkar. They had also, gone on with their own scheme for the restoration of Baji Rao to his *masnad* at Poona. Wellesley had entered Poona on April 20, and a week later Baji Rao left Bassein duly attended by Close and escorted by the British forces specially deputed for the purpose. He entered Poona on May 13, which had been declared to be a lucky day by the astrologers. In a grand durbar held at Poona that very day Baji Rao resumed his seat on the Peshwa's *masnad* there amidst gun-salutes and shouts of joy. But in fact the gun-shots were only announcing the beginning of the end of the Maratha power and independence. The last possible chance for somehow retaining Maratha independence was thus lost for ever due to the wicked trio, Baji Rao, Daulat Rao Sindhia and Sharzaji Rao Ghatgé, who once again proved to be the bane of the Maratha State.

Baji Rao's restoration to his *masnad* at Poona finally and fully confirmed what the English had gained by the Treaty of Bassein. Baji Rao had already begun to feel the heavy hand of his foreign benefactors, who were now beginning to come out in their true colours of a strong master. With the head of the Maratha Confederacy securely under their overlordship, the subjugation of the other Maratha rulers was bound to follow in due course. Hemmed in on all sides and confined to a very restricted region, the financial stability and military power of the Maratha rulers rapidly declined. Their mutual jealousies and internal dissensions daily multiplied. The forces of disorder and destruction, which they had unleashed and developed for their own profit, now recoiled on themselves with full vengeance within their greatly reduced domains. Taking the fullest advantage of each of these weaknesses of their adversaries, the slow yet sure and steady encroachment of the British went on. The contrast thus presented by the methods and conditions of the two opposing nations has a much deeper significance than can possibly be brought out in the simple narration of a historian. These great lessons of history cannot and should not be ignored, otherwise history would cease to have any meaning at all.

The Plan of the Volume.

It was decided to publish in a separate volume all the correspondence relating to the crisis that led to Baji Rao's flight from Poona, his signing the Treaty of Bassein, and his restoration to the *Gadi* of the Peshwa at Poona. As such the first part of this volume covers the first three years of the term of Close's Residentsip at Poona, and fills up the gap deliberately left in Vol. VII of this series.

The second part begins with the departure of Collins from the camp of Sindhia and continues the tale from the point where it was left at the end of Vol. IX of this series. Even the first phase of the Second Maratha War, which thus began, was not restricted to campaigning and fighting merely in the south, but major battles were fought and won in other parts of India as well, e.g., Lord Lake's campaign in Hindustan. But the contents of the second part of this volume are confined to the campaign in the Deccan. Truce with Sindhia having been signed on Nov. 23, treaties were later concluded with Bhonslé and Sindhia respectively at Deogaon on December 17, 1803, and Sarji Anjangaon on December 29, 1803. The tale is, however, continued even after Malcolm had concluded with Sindhia the treaty of Defensive Alliance on February 27, 1804, and is carried up to the end of April, 1804, from where it has been taken up in Vol. XI of this series.

CHRONOLOGY

1801	Dec.	7 ...	Close takes charge of Poona Residency.
1802	Feb.	22 ...	Vakils of Nagpur Bhonsle reach Poona.
	c. Feb.	28 ...	Jaswant Rao Holkar's wakil, Paraji Pant arrives at Poona.
	March	15 ...	Battle of Kher Kusumba in Khandesh: Jaswant Rao Holkar defeats Peshwa's army under Dhondo Pant Godbolé.
	April	17 ...	Peshwa holds a secret midnight meeting with Resident Close.
	July	1 ...	Baji Rao II. arrests a number of important men in Poona.
	"	29 ...	Separate treaty concluded by the English with the Gaikwad.
	Aug.	1 ...	Close communicates to Raghunath (the Peshwa's minister) the Governor General's proposal for a general defensive alliance between the Peshwa and the English.
	Sept.	11 ...	Jaswant Holkar arrives at Nasik on invasion.
	"	16 ...	Sadashiv Bhaskar with Sindhia's forces arrives near Ahmadnagar.
	Oct.	3 ...	Skirmish at Narayangaon between Holkar's and Sindhia's forces.
	"	8-9 ...	At night the ladies of the Peshwa's family sent to Raigarh fort.
	"	21 ...	Holkar at Jejuri.
	"	22 ...	Sadashiv Bhaskar with Sindhia's army reaches Wanwadi.
	"	23 ...	Holkar with his army reaches Loni.
	"	24 ...	A deputation of Baji Rao's ministers wait on Holkar at Theur, but return baffled.
	"	25 ...	Baji Rao signs the instrument of preliminary proposition of a subsidiary alliance with the English and delivers it to Close.
	"	25 ...	Battle of Hadapsar (Poona.) Baji Rao flees from Poona.
	"	29 ...	Holkar encamps at Wanwadi.
	"	31 ...	Baji Rao reaches Mahad.
	Nov.	7 ...	Amrit Rao is brought from Junnar to Poona.
	"	8 ...	Capt. Kennedy of Bankot meets Baji Rao at Mahad, sent by Governor of Bombay.
	"	12 ...	Amrit Rao takes over Poona administration.
	"	15 ...	Lord Wellesley ratifies the protective agreement made with the Peshwa on October 25.
	"	28 ...	Close leaves Poona for Bombay.
	Dec.	1 ...	Baji Rao embarks in English ship from Suvarndurg for Bassein.
	"	17 ...	Peshwa arrives at Bassein. Close joins him there.
	"	22 ...	Satara Chhatrapati awards investiture dress for Amrit Rao's son Vinayak Rao as the next Peshwa.
	"	31 ...	Treaty of Bassein signed by the Peshwa and Close.
1803	Feb.	12 ...	Governor General ratifies the Treaty of Bassein.
	"	25 ...	Holkar finally leaves Poona.
	"	27 ...	Arthur Wellesley appointed to command the English army marching on Poona. He begins his march from Harihar on March 9.
	April	15 ...	A. Wellesley with army at Akulj. Stevenson with the Hyderabad subsidiary force joins him.
	"	20 ...	Amrit Rao leaves Poona. General Arthur Wellesley reaches Poona in the afternoon.
	"	27 ...	Baji Rao, under British escort, leaves Bassein.
	May	12 ...	Baji Rao reaches Poona. Grand darbar of his restoration.
	June	4 ...	A. Wellesley marches away from Poona towards the Godavari.
	Aug.	1 ...	Daulat Rao Sindhia gives Resident Collins ultimatum of war. Collins leaves Sindhia's camp on the 3rd.
	"	7 ...	General Lake begins his march from Kanpur.
	"	8 ...	A. Wellesley storms the <i>peth</i> of Ahmadnagar. That fort surrenders to him on the 12th.
	"	14 ...	Agreement between Amrit Rao and the English.

1803	Aug.	24 ...	A. Wellesley crosses the Godavari. Sindhia and Bhonsle ascend the Ajantaghat and enter the Nizam's territory.
	..	29 ...	Lake routs Perron's army at Koil. Woodington storms the fort of Broach.
	Sept.	2 ...	Stevenson recaptures Jalna fort from Sindhia.
	..	4 ...	Lake storms Aligarh fort.
	..	7 ...	Perron surrenders to Lake.
	..	11 ...	Lake defeats Sindhia's army at Patparganj (Delhi). His troops enter Delhi on the 14th. Lake visits the Emperor on the 16th.
	..	25 ...	A. Wellesley defeats Sindhia at Assaye.
	Oct.	7 ...	Lake begins attack on Agra fort, which capitulates on the 17th.
	..	15 ...	Stevenson occupies Burhanpur and attacks Asir garh which surrenders on the 21st.
	Nov.	1 ...	Lake defeats Sindhia's army at Laswari.
	..	22 ...	Sindhia signs armistice with the English.
	..	29 ...	Battle of Argaon : A. Wellesley routs Sindhia's cavalry and destroys Bhonsle's infantry.
	Dec.	12 ...	A. Wellesley begins siege of Gawilgarh, which is captured on the 14th.
	..	16 ...	Lake concludes treaty with Ambaji Inglé : Gwalior fort to be ceded to English.
	..	17 ...	Bhonsle concludes Treaty of Devgaon with the English.
	..	23 ...	Vithal Mahadev and Munshi Kamal-nayan (Sindhia's) envoys begin peace parleys with General Wellesley.
	..	30 ...	Treaty of Sarji Anjangaon signed by Sindhia.
1804	Jan.	11 ...	Malcolm arrives in Sindhia's camp to negotiate a treaty of defensive alliance.
	Feb.	5 ...	Gwalior fort surrendered to the English. Holkar's wakil arrives in Sindhia's camp.
	..	27 ...	Malcolm concludes treaty of defensive alliance with Sindhia.
	End of Feb	...	Jaswant Rao Holkar arrives near Ajmer.
	April	16 ...	Governor-General orders war to commence against Holkar.

POONA AFFAIRS

PART I

SECTION 1

The Crisis and the flight of Baji Rao (January 5 to October 30, 1802)

No. 1—List of presents sent from the Persian Office (at Calcutta) to Bombay
with Col. William Kirkpatrick (for the Peshwa).

Calcutta, January 23, 1801.

List of Presents sent with Colonel Kirkpatrick

European Articles.

- 1 Merlin's chair
- 2 Single Barrel Rifles
- 3 Double Barrel Guns
- 3 Single do. do.
- 1 Powder Flask
- 1 Shot Belt
- 3 Large Spying Glasses
- 1 Smaller do. do.
- 4 Smaller do. small size
- 1 Microscope

Cloths.

- 1 Piece superfine blue broad cloth
- 1 Do. Brown do. do.
- 1 Do. Buff do. do.

1	Piece	Stone Colour	broad cloth
1	Do.	Green	do. do.
1	Do.	Saxon Green	do. do.
1	Do.	Double coloured	do. do.

Muslins

6	Pieces	Plain	Muslin
3	Do.	spotted	do.
1	Do.	flowered	do.
4	Do.	Sprigged	do.
3	Do.	do.	do.
3	Do.	do.	do.

No. 2—In this private letter Close informs the Governor-General about the unfavourable attitude of the Peshwa and his advisers to the proposed defensive alliance and adds that he is collecting all the necessary information, and material to combat the objections that might be raised from the side of the Peshwa.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, January 5, 1802.

PRIVATE

Colonel Kirkpatrick has favoured me with a copy of the second memorandum which he has written in continuation of his first, on the secret intelligence procured at Hyderabad.

So short a period has elapsed since my arrival at this station, that for a time I must be cautious as to the persons whom I trust with the conduct of any secret commission. I have employed means, however, for discovering what passes between Sadashiv Mankeshwar and Raghotim Rao and between the former and his *karkoon* here, and the Peshwa's Durbar ; but I cannot be so sanguine as to think that my endeavours will succeed without a considerable share of delay.

The failure of the Poona troops in the attack of Kuwari, [fort] the appearance of Jaswant Rao Holkar being able to maintain himself against Sindhia, and thus have the means hereafter of succouring Amrit Rao, who, in his commerce with the Durbar, indicates strong symptoms of dissatisfaction at his present insignificant situation, and the recent event of Mr. Duncan's success in his negotiations with the Gaikwad government, seem to have made a deep impression on the Peshwa's mind. He has repeated his orders to Amrit Rao to return forthwith to Poona, and for some days past, has been principally engaged in examining the treaties of Seringapatam, Mahad,

and the principal articles contained in your Lordship's last treaty with the Government of Hyderabad. This investigation he has conducted in concert with Balloji Kunjar and Gopal Rao Munshi, and he seems to have entered into the enquiry with the view of discussing fully with these persons the merits of your Lordship's propositions. Balaji Kunjar being attached to Sindhia, and employed for affairs with his Durbar, is firm and strenuous against a further connection between this state and the Company, and Gopal Rao, as decided, though not so bold and active, on the opposite side of the question : and if my intelligence is worthy of credit, I shall have a visit from the latter to-morrow, in order that your Lordship's views at this court may be once more examined and combated on the part of the Peshwa.

I understand that the demand for the fulfilment of the Treaty of Mahad, and the proposed arbitration for the adjustment of difference on the basis of the Nizam's claim to a total exemption from chaauth, is, of all the points offered, the most unpalatable to the Peshwa : I need scarcely assure your Lordship, that in the event of the expected interview it shall be my anxious care to apply every argument which the merits of the subject can suggest to reconcile the Peshwa to this indispensable article.

To be able to combat this Court with hopes of success on the points alluded to, I should possess certain and full information of the transactions to which the subsisting differences refer, with a view to be capable of pointing out the nature, extent, and comparative value of the objects, which under the adjustment of the projected alliance, and the eventual results of the required arbitration, the Peshwa would be obliged to concede.

No. 3—Sindhia asks the Peshwa not to negotiate with the English agent at Poona directly, but to leave such negotiations to him ; this greatly hurts the Peshwa.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, February 14, 1802.

I do myself the honour to communicate the following intelligence, which I have received through a channel that may be deemed authentic.

Daulat Rao has lately acquainted the Peshwa by letter, that your Lordship has dispatched Colonel Collins to his Durbar, charged with propositions for strengthening the friendship which subsists between his state and the Company;* that Colonel Collins had arrived

* Reference to letters No. 38 & 39 in Vol. IX of this series.

at Kota, and would accordingly soon join his court, and that he judged it proper to intimate these circumstances to the Peshwa for his information ; Daulat Rao Sindhia then reminds the Peshwa that it was usual (for him) to take a leading part in the amicable arrangements which had been negotiated between the Company and the Marathas, cites the particular instance of the treaty of Salbai, which was concluded through the mediation and under the guarantee of his predecessor ; observes that he is given to understand that a gentleman from your Lordship has recently arrived at Poona for the purpose of improving the amicable relations which connect the Peshwa's with that of the Company's ; warns the Peshwa to be cautious how he proceeds in further connecting his interests with those of the English, and points out the necessity of his not taking any definite step to such effect without his (Sindhia's) concurrence ; and adds, that he shall have occasion to communicate his sentiments further on these points hereafter, through the channel of his vakil at Poona, Ambaji Bhaskar, to whose representations on such subjects the Peshwa will give full credit.

My information states that this dispatch has given much umbrage to the Peshwa, who considers his authority in the Maratha state as paramount to that of Sindhia.

No. 4—Close informs the G.-G. that the Peshwa is maintaining absolute secrecy in respect of the consultations with the Berar vakils, and adds that as the urgent necessity for the union of the Maratha Empire is being felt, efforts will be made to reconcile Sindhia and Holkar.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, March 22, 1802.

Nothing of much importance has transpired at this Durbar, since I had the honour of addressing your Lordship on the 10th instant.

The Berar vakils have frequent interviews with the Peshwa. For a time they urged the propriety of their being permitted to communicate immediately with his Highness, objecting to both his ministers ; to Balaji Kunjar, on account of his low caste and obscure origin ; and to Gopal Rao, on account of his being the fixed channel of intercourse between his Highness and the British Resident at Poona. With such characters, they maintained that they could not confer with confidence. His Highness, however, invariably resisted their objection, and yesterday succeeded in reconciling the vakils to both his ministers, by causing the latter to bind themselves by an

oath to preserve the strict secrecy on all subjects connected with their conferences on the Berar affairs.

The solicitude shewn by the vakils, to exclude the ministers from all concern in their public communications, seemed to favour the idea that they have come charged with some important propositions to this Durbar. I have been informed, however, through different channels, that in objecting to the ministers, their view was to impress the Peshwa with the expediency of employing Juggur Deo (Chakradeo), formerly the confidential *karkoon* of Nana Fadnavis, and now in confinement in the Konkan.

Although it seems improbable, under present circumstances, that the Peshwa would allow any considerations of a general nature to supersede those of his immediate interests, it is now generally believed here, that he is disposed to facilitate an accommodation between Daulat Rao Sindhia and the Holkars. On the principles that union between the different members of the Maratha Empire is become highly desirable on account of the growing power of the English in India, and the additional resources which the nation may command in consequence of the pacification in Europe.

No. 5—The army sent by the Peshwa under the command of Dhondo Pant Godbole to check Jaswant Rao Holkar is defeated by Holkar in Khandesh. Close gives details of the battle of Kher Kusumba (Mar. 15, 1802) to give the G.-G. an idea of the tactics used by the Marathas in their warfare.

**FROM B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, April 3, 1802.

In October last, when the Peshwa was at Kopergaon, he dispatched Dhondo Pant Godbole, with a considerable detachment, for the purpose of seizing the territory composing the *jagir* of the Holkars in Khandesh. This force having reached the neighbourhood of Chandor, was there met by a corps belonging to Jaswant Rao Holkar. An action immediately followed, and the Peshwa's troops were said to have been worsted. Godbole, however, soon maintaining his ground, soon proceeded to effect the service on which he had been ordered. Jaswant Rao Holkar, being then in Hindustan, received information of what had passed; and, after forming a corps for the protection of his *jagir*, which he placed under one of his relations, called Jaswant Rao, and an officer of note called Ajab Singh, deputed Ragajee (? Paraji) Pandit to this Durbar, with instructions to prevail on the Peshwa, if possible, to recall the detachment under Godbole, and proposing to his Highness, if necessary, the payment of a

considerable sum of money, in return for so indulgent an act of compliance.

Ragajee (Parajee ?) Pandit arriving in this neighbourhood, paid his first visit to Amrit Rao, which displeased the Peshwa so much that he refused to see the vakil, who, sometime after, however, was, through the intercession of Gopal Rao, allowed to pay a visit to the Durbar, but was never permitted to converse on business. Godbole's detachment accordingly continued to operate in Khandesh, levying contributions occasionally in Holkar's territory, without being seriously opposed by the enemy. Some days since, however, it was mentioned in the Poona *Akhbars*, that Dhondo Pant Godbole's detachment has been completely routed by the (troops) under Jaswant Rao and Ajib Sing, Godbole himself having escaped with a few horsemen only, to Malegaon. The particulars of the action having been communicated by a European Officer who took a part in it under Jaswant Rao, I am induced to convey to your Lordship his description of what passed, as it tends to exhibit the mode of warfare at present most generally in use with the principal members of the Maratha Empire.

On the 15th ultimo Dhondo Pant Godbole with two battalions of infantry, fifteen hundred strong, ten pieces of cannon, and four thousand cavalry, occupied a well-chosen position near the village of Kher Kusumba, distant six kos, in a north eastern direction, from Galna*. The force of Jaswant Rao (in which a brigade of infantry, with guns, is particularized) after a march of seven kos, arrived about two p.m. within cannon-shot of Godbole's line; after a few discharges moved on to the attack. Jaswant Rao's troops are said to have advanced in excellent order, and with great firmness, till they got within the distance of grape, when they were charged in a spirited manner by Godbole's cavalry. The artillery from the opposite side, however, obliged the cavalry to disperse, and desert the infantry, who after gallantly maintaining their position, were forced at every point, and routed with considerable loss. Of six Europeans belonging to the Peshwa's battalions, two were killed and three taken prisoners, dangerously wounded. The artillery, stores, camp, and baggage, fell into the hands of the victors. Godbole left upon the field two hundred dead, and about twice that number wounded. On the side of Jaswant Rao, fifteen were killed, and upwards of one hundred and fifty wounded.

On the 22nd ultimo Jaswant Rao's force was encamped before Songarh, a hill fort belonging to the Peshwa, from the *patta* of which it had levied a lac of rupees, and was to move in a few days to attack the army in Khandesh, under Sindhia's general, Gopal Bhau.

* Galna—a hill fort about 14 m.N. of Malegaon.

The Europeans noticed in Godbole's detachment are probably Portuguese from Goa, or some stragglers of other nations, who may have been intercepted by Godbole on their way from the western coast, to seek employment with Sindhia, as it does not appear that the Peshwa is desirous of entertaining either English or French in his service.

His Highness has mentioned his intention of reinforcing Godbole from hence ; but no measures have yet been taken for the purpose.

Daulat Rao Sindhia has lately replied to letters which he has recently received from the Peshwa. He insists that his Highness is engaged in an important negotiation with the British government, as may be conducive to the Maratha interests.

I have not been able to ascertain that any material proposition has been made to this Durbar yet by the Berar vakils ; they have not scrupled to object to the Peshwa's government as being weak and deficient in respectability ; and on his Highness's part every argument has been used to shew that the Berar government should no longer defer settling the demands of this State, founded on the arrangement which transferred to the Berar Sircar the province of Garbhā-Mandlā.

The action of the 17th ultimo with the troops of Malhar Rao Gaikwar, is noticed in the Poona *Akhbar* of this day. No accounts have been received here from Gujrat, of later date than Mr. Duncan's address to your lordship of the 23rd ultimo, by which it seemed rather probable that the enemy might be tempted to try the effect of another attack.

No. 6—Close describes his secret meeting with the Peshwa and explains the possible reasons which made the Peshwa seek this meeting. Having once again talked of the overtures made by the G.G. for a defensive alliance between the English and the Peshwa, he now awaits new advances from the side of the Peshwa.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, April 29, 1802.

PRIVATE

The sequel of this address will explain to your Lordship the motives which induce me to give it a private form.

On the 5th instant I received intimation, through a confidential channel, that the Peshwa was desirous of having a private interview with me, provided I should agree to observe strict secrecy, as well in regard to the meeting itself as the whole of the conversation it might give rise to.

In reply, I desired that his Highness might be acquainted, that nothing could be more flattering to me than to be admitted to the honour of a private or confidential communication with his Highness, but that although I was strongly impressed with the advantage that would naturally result to his Highness's affairs from having the means of conversing with him personally, or communicating with him through a confidential and concealed medium, yet it was evident that the duties of my station did not allow me to hold from your Lordship's knowledge any transaction at this court, *in which I personally took the smallest concern* : that of the *proposed meeting therefore*, and the conversation it might lead to, *I should eventually be obliged to give your Lordship the minutest information* but that in doing so, I should adopt a private mode of address that would induce your Lordship to allow the subject to continue secret till disclosing it should become a matter of indifference, and that his Highness might rely that beyond your Lordship I should observe the most profound secrecy.

A few days afterwards I learned that this reply had been conveyed to the Peshwa, and that he had received it in good part ; that the manner in which I had spoken of the duties of my station appeared to him as a proof of my sincerity and candour ; that he showed himself reconciled to the exception I had made relating to the necessity of my imparting every thing to your Lordship, but by a mode that would ensure secrecy so long as it should be requisite ; and that I should soon hear further from his Highness on the subject.

On the 15th instant I received a message that the Peshwa was desirous that the proposed interview should take place on the night of the 17th.

Having made the arrangements necessary to prevent a knowledge of my trip, I proceeded at the time appointed, attended by a trustworthy servant, and so disguised as not to be readily discovered. I was met on the road by persons from the Peshwa, who conducted me by a private entrance to an apartment in his Highness's dwelling—here I had not remained long when the Peshwa arrived ; the conversation commenced as usual by enquiries of compliment ; and these being ended, his Highness proceeded to enlarge on the desire he felt to preserve the most amicable footing with the British government, observing that his connection with the honourable Company could not be considered at a modern date, as it referred to the transactions engaged in by the father, whose intimate union with the Company was too well known to require any illustration ; that states were in their nature subject to groundless enmities, and the interference of interested or officious characters ; that in my present representative situation I would in course have frequently the means of favouring the friendship he wished to preserve with the British

government, that where difficulties should occur to obstruct it, I would have the means of defeating such difficulties, and that while it was his particular desire to have me as his friend, he could wish me only to act at all times a conciliating part, with the view to prevent asperities and the growth of variances, and promote those objects which should appear consistent with the mutual interests of both states.

Finding him pause a little, I observed that I was well aware of the origin and long standing of his connection with the honourable Company, and that both duty and inclination always led me to pursue that conduct, which I thought best calculated to strengthen it; that it was with a view to this object that your Lordship had, at different periods, charged Colonel Palmer with such overtures as to your Lordship had appeared most suitable for the adjustment of his Highness's affairs, and the prosperity and security of his government; but that the negotiation relating to these overtures had on the side of this court been suffered to languish; that Gopal Rao Munshi had hitherto conferred on the part of his Highness with the British Resident, and that I concluded his Highness was acquainted with the particular state in which the negotiation was allowed to rest.

The Peshwa replied, that the subject of your Lordship's propositions had not been relinquished by this court; that under his orders, Gopal Rao would continue to confer respecting those propositions; that this public subject was to be received apart; that independently of it, various occasions would offer to require from me the conciliating part he had explained and that in giving me the trouble of a secret interview it was his aim chiefly to ascertain whether he might satisfy himself that I was well affected to his person, for that he wished to be able to call me his friend. Here he paused, for an answer, when I referred to what I had said before. I repeated, that the whole of my conduct had shown that I was at all times personally interested in the success of his Highness's government; that I felt myself eminently distinguished by being admitted to a private interview with his Highness, which, I trusted, would lead to consequences highly favourable to his interests, and those of the Honourable Company; that it would be strange, indeed, could I be otherwise than well affected to his Highness's person; but that truth and sincerity called on me to say, that, in my own mind, I should never be able to separate sentiments of friendship for his Highness's person from an anxious solicitude for the safety and prosperity of his government; that possessing for either a feeling, I was necessarily animated by the other, so that, in relation to his Highness, I trusted my public conduct would always afford him sufficient grounds on which to judge of my private

regards ; that points of great importance were stated to be assented to on his Highness's part before there could be any prospect of his connection with the Company being strengthened to the degree that was indispensable to the welfare of his state ; and that I trusted every object connected with the completion of the proposed alliance would be facilitated, now that I should have the means of conversing, personally with his Highness, or communicating with him through a secure medium.

The Peshwa again avoided treating of a public subject, hinting that the meeting was of a nature to be conversant more with topics of personal intimacy. His Highness observed, that when occasions made it necessary, he would be well pleased to receive private and confidential communications from me ; that he had attended to all I had said, and that he should feel great satisfaction in numbering me amongst his friends. Here he presented his hand to me, and I touched it with mine.

At this place I thought it proper to recapitulate briefly what I had previously expressed, closing with the remark, that, as I was confident his Highness's sentiments and mine would now always coincide, I could not feel much solicitude as to the issue of that system of arrangement to which I had repeatedly alluded.

His Highness took no notice of this remark, but continued to discourse by expressing his reliance that he would ever experience the benefit of my friendship, and dwelling on the necessity of the circumstances of the interview being kept a profound secret. To satisfy him on the latter point, I have given him the fullest assurances, that I should mention it to no person but your Lordship, on which the conference ended.

His Highness at first spoke in the Maratha language ; he addressed himself to me direct, in very intelligible Hindustani.

Since the interview took place, I have not received any communication from the Peshwa ; and it is not my intention to adopt any change whatever in my own conduct, in consequence of the interview ; that is, I shall continue to allow your Lordship's overtures to operate, and wait the event of any new advances from this court.

Agreeably to custom I made presents to his Highness at the interview, and he made a return of gifts at parting. To avoid discovery I shall defer the mention of these presents in my public account till a future period. The articles received from his Highness are more valuable than those I presented to him.

In proposing the secret meeting, the Peshwa seems to have had two objects principally in view ; one, that of conciliating my good will so far as to induce me to be temperate and mild in my representations to your Lordship of the transactions of his government, and the conduct of his dependants, which may occasionally affect

the British interests; and the other, that of introducing a secret channel of communicating with me, to answer any particular crisis of affairs, or occasions of pressing emergency.

His anxiety that there should be inviolable secrecy respecting the meeting, proceeds, no doubt, from his apprehension of being exposed to embarrassment, should he by any act betray a want of confidence in his principal servants.

The pressure which the Peshwa seems to be subject to at present, is apparently occasioned by the imperious injunctions of Sindhia. The indisposition of the Berar *vakils*, who not only side with Sindhia, but shew themselves disaffected towards his Highness's ministers, whom they wish to see displaced, and succeeded by Amrit Rao, or some one of the remaining adherents of Nana Fadnavis; and still more by the arrival of Jaswant Rao Holkar in Khandesh with a considerable force.

Both the Holkars have uninterruptedly corresponded with Amrit Rao, who continues absent from Poona in disgust; and is supposed to wait anxiously any opportunity by which he could establish himself in the office and full authority of Dewan.

Jaswant Rao Holkar having reason to attribute to his Highness solely the death of his brother, Paraji Pandit is the only *vakil* here on the part of the Holkars; and although he has been urged of late by the Peshwa to dissuade Jaswant Rao Holkar from advancing in this direction, it does not appear that his Highness's entreaties are likely to be attended with any effect. Jaswant Rao Holkar's operations, however, must depend much upon the degree of opposition given to him by the armies of Sindhia, and other contingencies.

No. 7—The various moves and counter-moves at Poona; the advance of Holkar towards Poona and its threatened consequences.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, June 4, 1802.

In my last address, No. 32, I had the honour to intimate that Jaswant Rao Holkar had arrived in the neighbourhood of Chandor and that appearances were in favour of his coming forward in this direction. On the 31st ultimo it was rumoured here that he had advanced nearer to the Godavari, and that a corps from his army had actually crossed that river, and were levying contributions in the neighbourhood of Kopargoan. However the Peshwa may have regarded this intelligence, he on the following day departed suddenly for Saswad, where he still continues, being accompanied by his brother, Chimna Appa, and attended, only by a small corps of horse and infantry, with a few field-pieces. His object in this trip,

it is universally believed, is to prepare for contingencies, by directing some arrangements for supplying the fort of Purandar with provisions. These arrangements being put into a train of completion, it is supposed he will return to Poona.

Jaswant Rao Holkar's necessities must have increased since the cessation of hostilities in Khandesh. In proposing to visit these parts, his professed purpose is to pay his devotions to the idol at Jejuri. Although he has strong reason to be at (war) with the Peshwa, he has of late sent presents to his Highness, and corresponded with him in terms of friendship and respect. His real intentions, however, may be inferred from his having lately apologized to the Peshwa, for having advanced towards the Godavari with so large a force, stating that no injunctions on his part could induce his adherents to separate from him. If he persists in his design of crossing the Godavari, his movements will probably be slow, that he may have leisure to levy contributions effectually on the adjoining country.

Amrit Rao continues in the neighbourhood of Nasik, and seems to act a guarded part; he gives out, that if Jaswant Rao Holkar approaches he will retire to Poona, and join the Peshwa.

No. 8—Close forwards a statement of the distribution and location of Holkar's forces in the Deccan, and points out the difficulties the Peshwa was experiencing in collecting a suitable force to defend Poona if Holkar were to attack it.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, June 14, 1802.

The enclosed account and distribution of Jaswant Rao Holkar's Force, from an intelligent source, and with some abatement in numbers, may be considered as authentic. Since it came to hands, Jaswant Rao Holkar has advanced to a position on this side of Chandor and his detachments are now levying contributions on both banks of the Godavari. Frequent communications pass between him and the Peshwa, and while he exacts heavy contributions from his Highness' districts and wholly depopulates those of Sindhia there is reason to believe that his immediate object is to prevail on the Peshwa to acknowledge him as head of the Holkar family and heir to its ancient possessions, a point to which His Highness cannot possibly accede without drawing down upon him the serious resentment of Sindhia.

In this embarrassing situation His Highness has requested of Sindhia to divert Jaswant Rao Holkar's operations from this quarter by giving employment for his troops to the northward, and in order

that Poona may not be entirely destitute of protection his Highness is taking measures for collecting a force in this neighbourhood. He has already made some trifling advances for levying cavalry and dispatched an express to Gokhla in the Savanur province, requiring him to repair immediately to the presence with the whole of his party. As his Highness's resources are scanty and his credit by no means good, it is probable that the force he may be able to collect will be very inadequate to the end proposed: and it would appear that under this apprehension, he has arranged for taking refuge in case of extremities in the fort of Purandhar.

A good understanding entirely prevails between the Commander of Songarh, Jaswant Rao Holkar and Amrit Rao, although the latter continues to act with great caution, professing great attachment to the Peshwa, although he prefers residing at a distance from Poona.

Strength of Jaswant Row Holkar's force in the Deccan

At Erandol 40 kos north of the Godavari under the command of Jaswant Rao Holkar in person—25000 cavalry, chiefly Marathas.

600 infantry—No Europeans.

On the southern bank of the Godavari under the command of Fateh Singh Mane.

2500 infantry with 14 guns, a European officer commanding and others attached. 100 Horse with the officer Commanding as a body guard.

6000 cavalry, chiefly Marathas, a few Pathans.

3000 infantry with 16 guns; no European.

In Baglana 32 kos from the Godavari under the command of Shahamat Khan.

6000 cavalry, half Pathans,

2000 infantry, with six guns.

At Malegaon, under the command of Meer Khan.

4000 cavalry—all Pathans.

Total Cavalry—41,000

Total Infantry—13,500

Total Guns—36.

No. 9—Close narrates at length the various demands of Jaswant Rao Holkar and points out the various difficulties that the Peshwa is finding in meeting them. He further gives the moves and reported plans of Amrit Rao who was then at Nasik.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL**

Poona, June 27, 1802.

No material circumstance seems to have occurred here since I had the honour of addressing your Lordship on the 14th instant.

Jaswant Rao Holkar with the main body of his forces, remains in the neighbourhood of Chandor, and his detachments continue to levy contributions on both sides of the Godavari. Communications continue to pass frequently between him and the Peshwa, and with much apparent effect. His demands are said to extend to the following points.

1st. That his Highness shall acknowledge the son of the late Mulhar Rao Holkar at present confined in Asirgarh to be the lawful representative of the Holkar family.

2nd. That this young man shall be released and put in possession of the territories rightfully belonging to the Holkar family on terms which shall exclude Kashi Rao from all interference in the government and vest him, Jaswant Rao, with the office of Dewan under the successor proposed.

3rd. That in order to give immediate effect to this arrangement his Highness shall prevail on Sindhia to make peace with him, Jaswant Rao and the other member of the Holkar family, on a plan by which the son of the late Malhar Rao Holkar shall come to the possession of the ancient family lands, and a portion of territory from Mahadji Sindhia's conquests in Hindustan according to a partition agreement alleged to have taken place between some of the principal members of the Maratha Empire at the time when Mahadji Sindhia proceeded to effect those conquests.

His Highness probably finds it impracticable to comply with these demands and accordingly while he endeavours to conciliate Holkar by soothing messages and disunite his force by secret intrigues he has not failed to supply Purandhar and Sinharh with stores and provisions and to adopt measures for collecting a body of troops to be employed as appearances may suggest. A few thousand Horse are already encamped in this neighbourhood and are soon to be joined by the remains of Dhondur Pant Godbole's detachment and other parties. But at present there is no prospect whatever of his Highness being able to collect a force sufficient to repel even one of Jaswant Rao Holkar's detachments. The principal Jagirdars under the government have been called on to furnish their quotas of troops but they plead inability to comply unless assisted with advances of cash which his Highness seems little disposed to afford.

Amrit Rao continues in the neighbourhood of Nasik. Some districts belonging to him were lately entered by some of Jaswant Rao Holkar's predatory cavalry, but having learnt that they belonged to Amrit Rao, they retired. This Chieftain is attended only by a guard of moderate strength. He professes attachment to the Peshwa and avoids to communicate openly with Jaswant Rao Holkar; nevertheless, his Highness's jealousy of his views is excessive.

Could Amrit Rao, by any means or turn of events indulge his political ambition, it is supposed that his plan would be to elevate his son, to the *Peshwaship* by causing him to be adopted by the widow of the late Sawai Madho Rao who resides in Poona, and then make himself regent, Dewan, during his son's minority. Whatever attention this reputed scheme may have attracted, it is certain that the Peshwa manifests the most anxious solicitude to remove the widow to some place of security. Of late he has urged her with great earnestness to leave Poona, and take up her abode at a situation which he has pointed out, but the family resists all his entreaties repeating her determined resolution to part with her life rather than change her place of residence.

No. 10—Close reports to the Governor General the generally accepted reason for the series of arrests made in Poona and gives his own views on the subject.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, July 3, 1802.

On the 1st instant the Peshwa placed Gopal Rao Munshi, his brother and son in close confinement and appointed Anand Rao and Raghunath Rao to be jointly the channel of communication between His Highness and the British Resident. They accordingly paid me a visit and were received with customary marks of attention. Anand Rao, who is rather advanced in years, appears to be a well-informed man. During Colonel Upton's embassy, he was attached as *karkoon* to Madhav Rao Jadhav Rao, the person who conferred with the Colonel on the part of the Poona Durbar, and was afterwards nominated to the situation of Agent from this Court to reside at Fort St. George, but did not enter on this employment. Raghunath Rao is nephew to the Poona Agent now residing at Madras, where he seems to have been principally educated, and where I recollect having frequently met him. Although a young man and not much experienced in business he seems to have succeeded fully in obtaining the Peshwa's confidence.

Hitherto, I have endeavoured in vain to discover the ground on which the Peshwa has been induced to credit the supposed conspiracy. The leaders of it, he deems to be Moraba Fadnavis. The members of the Fadkia family and Gopal Rao and his immediate connections. At the durbar it is said that they had concerted with Jaswant Rao Holkar and that their plan was to have secured the Peshwa's person and called in the aid of Jaswant Rao Holkar's troops and then have conferred the Peshwaship on Chimaji Appa, or

on the son of Amrit Rao, who whichever succeeded was to have been Dewan. It is further given out by the Darbar, that some of the papers of correspondence, which passed between the accused party, and Jaswant Rao Holkar on the subject of the plot have fallen into the Peshwa's hands, but to this I am not disposed to give any credit ; I rather conceive that if the plot had been really meditated it was by no means ripe for execution ; and that the Peshwa disturbed by the approach of Holkar's troops and the ambiguous conduct of Amrit Row has acted chiefly upon rumour. He nevertheless receives fresh informations daily. This morning two *jamadars* of the *Silledar* horse were seized by his orders ; and his suspicions be against many more, whom he will probably secure successively as favourable opportunities offer.

Jaswant Rao Holkar does not appear to have made any material movement of late. Fateh Singh Mane continues near Jamgaon, his troops, being employed in raising contributions on the surrounding country.

No. 11—In this important despatch Close reports details of the various talks he recently held with the newly-appointed agents of the Peshwa, particularly relating to the relations of the Gaikwad with the Peshwa. He reports the latest military moves and counter-moves of Holkar and Sindhia's forces in Khandesh.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, July 9, 1802.

By the latest accounts from the northward the dissatisfaction, which had prevailed amongst Sindhia's troops at Burhanpur, have been removed by a discharge of their arrears and Sadashiv Bhau talked of moving in quest of Jaswant Rao Holkar who appears to have made a few marches lately in a northern direction and occupied a position on the southern bank of the Tapti, so that if Sindhia's force ventures to cross the river, there will doubtless be an action. One of Jaswant Rao Holkar's commanders, named Shahamat Khan, has lately routed and almost destroyed a corps of fifteen hundred horse that was headed by Narsingh Khande Rao, one of the Peshwa's jagirdars, who to defend his jagir north of the Godavari, hazarded an action in which it is supposed he has lost his life. Fateh Singh Mane continues in the neighbourhood of Ahmadnagar and, as Jaswant Rao Holkar has drawn off to the Tapti, and the Bhima and two other considerable rivers, a little to the southward of it, are swelled by the rains, the apprehensions which prevailed in Poona have nearly subsided. Meanwhile his Highness's camps in

this neighbourhood increase gradually. His Cavalry amount to nearly five thousand and his infantry to upwards of two thousand.

The persons, whom he confined on the charge of conspiracy against his government, are said to be treated with great severity except Moroba, who insists on his being perfectly innocent and protests loudly against the harsh treatment he has experienced.

No. 12—Close reports to the G. G. that the Peshwa is showing indifference to the talks which he might open with him regarding an alliance between the British Government and the Peshwa, and explains it by mentioning at length the efforts that are being made by the vakils of Sindhia and Bhonsla to dissuade him from entering into a close connection with the British.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, July 29, 1802.

Jaswant Rao Holkar, by the latest intelligence from the northward occupies a position near Malegaon, drawing supplies from the whole of the districts belonging to Baglana, north of the Bhima, while he watches and keeps in check the force in Khandesh under Sadashiv Bhau. Fateh Singh Mane, who has lately been reinforced by the troops under Mir Khan is preparing to blockade Ahmadnagar which is said to be slenderly supplied with provisions. This plan being carried out, Jaswant Rao Holkar will probably extend his operations considerably to the southward unless Sindhia's troops should be augmented and assume a position sufficiently menacing to induce him to call in his detachments.

A small corps of the Peshwa's cavalry has advanced to a spot a few kos on this side of Gar-Dond to watch the fort near that village, and a few days since the *Zuree Patka* was erected in this vicinity in charge of Nana Purandhare. Not more than three thousand cavalry attend it at present, and there is no prospect of its being soon joined by any material reinforcements. Amrit Rao continues to profess attachment to the Peshwa but has allowed himself to be surrounded by the troops of Jaswant Rao Holkar, and thus placed at their disposal. The latter chieftain also professes submission to His Highness's commands assuring him that Fateh Singh Mane and the other commanders, who have overrun the northern part of Baglana, act without his orders, and that accordingly it will be pleasing to him to see them repelled and chastised by His Highness's

arms. This show of submission has according to the principles of Maratha politics enabled his Highness to accept lately in a public manner some presents forwarded to him many months since by Holkar consisting of ten pieces of fine texture, an elephant and two horses, and since this ceremony took place the Peshwa has dispatched a *karkun* to reside in Holkar's camp. His Highness was certainly very adverse for a considerable time to receive these presents and it may be conceived that his present intercourse with Holkar can scarcely be acceptable to Sindhia unless he can convince the latter chieftain that it is meant merely to answer some purpose of deception. Balloji Kunjar, Sindhia's, and the Berar vakils continue to urge the Peshwa to abstain from a closer connection with the British Government assuring him that the rains must prevent Jaswant Rao Holkar from pursuing any material operations for some months, and that by the time they terminate, he will be effectually supported by the Berar forces and those of Sindhia, and it would appear that to give further effect to these promises, reports have been spread that Raghoji Bhonsla has resolved to visit this capital after the rains and that Sadashiv Bhau is soon to cross the Tapti.

No. 13—Close informs Collins about the reports of Nagu Pant going down to Gujrat against the territories of Gaikwad and asks him to make representation to Sindhia to obviate such an event.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—JOHN COLLINS, THE RESIDENT AT SINDHIA'S COURT.**

Poona, August 20, 1802.

I lose no time in sending you the accompanying copy translate of a letter from Jadu Rao Bhaskar, Diwan of Daulat Rao Sindhia, to Raoba the Gaikwad minister, by which it would appear that Nagu Pant, one of Sindhia's *sardars* at present employed at Ratlam, is soon to approach the frontier of Gujrat with an armed force, for the purpose of enforcing payment of a sum due to Sindhia's government from his Excellency—the Raja Gaikwad. A copy of the enclosure has been forwarded to his Excellency the Governor General by the Government of Bombay, and it is probable you will soon be honoured with his Excellency's instructions in consequence. Meanwhile, as it is extremely desirable that Sindhia's troops should be prevented from advancing to Gujrat for the purpose above-mentioned, it may probably occur to you to make a representation to Daulat Rao Sindhia calculated to obviate such an event.

No. 14—Close reports to the G. G. the various arrangements the Peshwa is either making or intending to make to meet the danger from Holkar or his generals.

FROM—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, August 25, 1802.

I have the honour to forward for your Lordship's notice copy of a letter with enclosures which I yesterday addressed to the honourable the Governor of Bombay. The despatch which I have forwarded to Jaswant Rao Holkar is most liable to miscarriage or if discovered by the Peshwa may possibly give umbrage to his Highness, but I have thought the emergency to be such as to warrant me in hazarding such a consequence. The Residency is constantly watched so narrowly by the durbar that I have found it extremely difficult to procure a *kasid* to convey my dispatch on this occasion. The letter which I have been induced to address to Daulat Rao Sindhia may tend to obviate the inconvenience that would probably result from the appearance of Nagu Pant in Gujrat and help to preserve a good understanding between the different parties till your Lordship can determine on the measures which the present juncture may demand.

Sadashiv Bhau with Sindhia's force from Burhanpur is advanced considerably on his march towards Ahmadnagar and Jaswant Rao Holkar shows no disposition to molest him. Fateh Singh Mane is encamped near Shrigonda about five or six kos to the northward of the fort Gar-Dond. His infantry consisting of four battalions lately mutinied against their European officers, plundered them, and drove them from their lines. They found protection in Fateh Singh Mane's horse encampment, but appearances indicate that this chief is tired of their services and wishes to be rid of them. This disturbance, however, has not apparently had any effect to obstruct Fateh Singh Mane's operations. He continues to augment his infantry and but a few nights since a detachment of his troops advanced with guns to the northern bank of the Bheema at Gar-Dond and opened a cannonade on the Peshwa's corps that was stationed near that village on this side of the river. His Highness's commander retreated after some loss, to the distance of a few kos and as Mane's troops now cross the river occasionally and skirmishes take place daily, these movements excited much alarm in the Durbar, and with the view of affording some protection to the city, his Highness has at length made such advances to the different *sardars* of the *Mankari* corps as have induced them to move out with the *Zuri Patka* and join the detachment that retreated from Gar-Dond, so that this force may

now amount to about five thousand cavalry, a small corps of infantry and a few field pieces. While his Highness was engaged in these arrangements the elder of the two Rastes, who were formerly captured at Kungwari and were confined in the palace effected his escape by bribing the guards and is supposed to have arrived safe at Pandogarh. This event made such an impression on his Highness that he immediately despatched to different hill-forts the whole of the prisoners of state, who were imprisoned in Poona, except the widow of Madhav Rao Narain and hastily dismissed every person at the Durbar belonging to Jaswant Rao Holkar, except Paraji Pandit, his vakeel. Most of the persons thus suddenly ordered to depart had recently come in from Holkar with propositions to the Peshwa nearly tantamounting to his former demands, that the heir of the Holkar family should be delivered over to him, that the boy should be put in possession of all the family jagirs and that he, (Jaswant Rao) Holkar, should be acknowledged as his Diwan.

By secret intelligence from the Durbar, I learn that the Peshwa's plan at present is by every means possible to keep Fateh Singh Mane in check till circumstances shall allow of his uniting his troops with those under Sadashiv Bhau when this joint corps might be strong enough to repel or entirely defeat the enemy. Of this His Highness is the more sanguine from having reason to hope that Gokhle from Savanur will soon arrive here with a corps of about four thousand cavalry. A small party under Chintaman Rao from Miraj joined his Highness's standard yesterday evening.

No. 15—Having issued strict instructions to his Pindari leaders not to disturb the territories of the English and the Gaikwad, Jaswant Rao Holkar informs Close of his having done so. A copy of the translation of Jaswant Rao Holkar's letter is forwarded by Close to Edmonstone.

Translation of a letter from Jaswant Rao Holkar to the Resident at Poona, (forwarded by B. Close to Secretary N. B. Edmonstone, on 10 Sept. 1802.)

I have received and comprehend your friendly letter informing me that Pindari horse belonging to my army had created disturbances near Surat *bandar* and in districts of that vicinity belonging to Raja Anand Rao, and the English Company Bahadur. Agreeably to the wish you expressed, I despatched positive orders to all the *jamadars* of the Pindari horse requiring them to repair to the Presence. What has happened is to be attributed to the ignorance of these unthinking people, otherwise how is it possible that they should have acted in such a manner seeing that friendship and union subsist between the sarkar of the English Company Bahadur and that of this friend.

The most strict command has now been issued and the countries belonging to the Gaikwad will not be molested in future.

N.B. (by Close).

The original is without date but it was written on the 31st of August at Kokankhed four *kos* east of Chandor.

No. 16—Close reports to the G.G. the plans and moves of some Maratha Rulers to bring about a Maratha Confederacy to oppose the British. He also points out the various factors which made it impossible for them to come together to form such a confederacy.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, September 12, 1802.

I do myself the honour to forward the enclosed paper No. 1* at the suggestion of the honourable the Governor of Bombay who seems to think it tends to corroborate a report that has reached the western side of India that the Nagpur Raja is engaged in endeavours to excite a combination in the Maratha Empire for purposes hostile to the British interests.

The language formerly held at this Durbar by the Berar vakils in relation to the late transaction in Gujrat, I had the honour to detail to your lordship on different occasions, but time, I would hope, begins to soften the impressions at first occasioned at the Maratha Durbars by the event of our cooperation and alliance with the Gaikwad State. Although the Peshwa has shewn some alarm for the safety of his interests in the Ahmedabad province now managed by Raoba, and is evidently desirous of seeing the conduct of those interests vested in a person less independent, he nevertheless looks to the aid of our influence with the Gaikwad Government for the recovery of his demands upon it on account of various articles of arrears. Whatever may be the jealousies of the Nagpur Government, I have not heard that the Berar vakils have agitated of late at this durbar the subject alluded to. A report has prevailed at different times that the Nagpur Raj is to send a force hither, for supporting the Peshwa's interests at the opening of the fair season; but it is probable that the consideration of the demands, which such a measure would impose on his Highness, may in the end be the means of preventing it.

* This enclosure is published as letter No. 19 (pages 22-3) in Vol. VII of this series.

The enclosure No 2 is a copy of a late letter from Nagu Pant to Raoba, from which and other documents received from the same quarter it may be presumed that Sindhia's views in relation to Gujrat are limited at present to the recovery of the debt of five lakhs with interest and other incumbrances. The principal sum, it is hoped, will be soon discharged, and although the adjustment of the equivocal parts of the demand may be attended with some delay and difficulty, there seems to be little cause to apprehend that the discussions which may take place on the occasion will be followed by any serious consequences. But on this subject, some satisfactory lights may be obtained on the arrival of Sindhia's answers to the letter, which I lately addressed to him, and to that from the honourable the Governor of Bombay.

By intelligence which I received yesterday evening Sadashiv Bhau was on the 7th instant on the northern bank of the Godavari a few kos from Paithan on the Nizam's frontier, and had begun to pass his troops over the river. Jaswant Rao Holkar had made a movement towards him from Chandor and Mir Khan and Shahamat Khan waited his approach at a position between Ahmadnagar and the Godavari. Fateh Singh Mane continues to ravage the Peshwa's districts on the northern side of the Bhima near the Hyderabad road and at the distance from Sina of about twenty-five kos. The infantry of his army, that mutinied, continue to encamp separately from him, and it is now found that the mutiny took place at the instance of Jaswant Rao Holkar, who suspected the European officer entertained treacherous intentions towards him, and that Fateh Singh Mane even took part in their designs. Mane and the principal European officer have taken means to justify themselves, but should Holkar still retain his suspicions it is probable that Mane will separate from his army and plunder for himself. His troops have always refrained from molesting his Highness the Nizam's frontier, and as in this they have probably been guided by orders from Holkar. I would hope that the assurances of that Chieftain contained in Jaswant Rao Holkar's late letter to me are sincere.

Although Fateh Singh Mane continues to threaten Poona, no augmentation seems to have been recently made to the troops collected by the Peshwa. Holkar's demands too are urged constantly by his vakils without abatement, and it would appear that his Highness has not the means of complying with them. Sindhia, it is supposed, might be induced to release Khande Rao, the heir to the Holkar possessions, for a large ransom, but to restore to the boy the whole of the family territories, acknowledge Jaswant Rao Holkar to be his guardian and Dewan, to the injury of Kashi Rao Holkar, are points to which Sindhia may long be unwilling to

accede. Under these circumstances, the Peshwa's hopes of being relieved from the menace and destructive proceeding of Jaswant Rao Holkar must principally refer to the exertions of the army under Sadashiv Bhau which, however, does not appear to be of strength or quality to succeed in defeating or running down a force so active and hardy as that headed by Holkar. The Peshwa attributed the hostile conduct of this chieftain in great measure to the secret intrigues of Amrit Rao, whom he is again endeavouring to inveigle to Poona by an offer to confer on him the office of Phadnavis. Moroba, who is intimate with Amrit Rao, has been lately released, and his Highness is now particularly attentive to his family, but there is little prospect of this scheme being more successful than many which have been tried already for the same purpose.

No. 17—Close describes the difficulties that Malcolm had to face due to insubordination of the officers of the Peshwa. After giving the result of the battle of Baramati, Close informs the G.G. that though the Peshwa fully realises that his affairs can be retrieved only by entering into an alliance with the English, he finds it impossible to do so due to the opposition of the agents of Sindhia to such an alliance.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, October 10, 1802.

After the civil and cordial manner in which Major Malcolm was received at this durbar, I had little reason to apprehend that he would meet any interruption or difficulty during the remaining part of his journey. He was furnished, as is usual, with a passport under the Peshwa's signature, and every requisite precaution had been taken to facilitate his progress. Nevertheless, on approaching the head of the Bhore Ghat, he was stopped by the Peshwa's officer on duty there, who, on the most frivolous pretexts, refused to comply with his passport. He immediately dispatched a note to me intimating what had happened, and I lost not a moment in making the necessary representation on the subject to the Durbar. The Peshwa expressed the greatest surprise and concern on the occasion, and sent me a positive order to the officer at the head of the ghat, reproving him for his insolent behaviour in rejecting the passport and enjoining him to obey it. His order I forwarded by express, but unfortunately it, too, failed of effect, and it was not till a part of cavalry from the Peshwa's guard had reached the ghat and seized the offending officer, with the view to bring him to punishment, that Major Malcolm had the means of pursuing his journey. I reckon that he arrived at Bombay in the course of this day.

I cannot account, in any manner, for the vexatious insolence of the officer alluded to, for although the Peshwa's servants are often remiss in their duty, I never witnessed in any of them before so determined an opposition to his commands. But indeed, his Highness's authority declines so rapidly, that he can have little cause to hope that it will meet with much respect.

My address of the 6th instant would inform your Lordship of the positions occupied by the contending armies in his Highness's territories. Nothing material has since taken place to the northward. Sadashiv Bhau's force is still in the vicinity of Naraingarh, surrounded by Holkar's numerous cavalry. Provisions are said to be scarce in both camps but particularly in Sadashiv Bhau's, and the Peshwa is called on by this Commander not only to supply him with grain, but with cash and military stores.

To the southward Fateh Singh Mane was watched by the Peshwa's army under Nana Purandhare with the *Zarri Patka*. On the 8th instant both these commanders were in the vicinity of Baramati, distant from each other but a few kos. Purandhare is said to have meditated an attack, but Mane, anticipating his intention, advanced at 10 in the forenoon and commenced an action. The Peshwa's troops appeared to have behaved with a shameful want of spirit. They were soon put to flight and dispersed. The *Zarri Patka* was torn from the staff and brought off by one of the fugitives. Purandhare has arrived at Jejuri with a few hundred horse, where he waits to collect the scattered parties. Ganpat Rao Phanse, who had charge of the artillery, is badly wounded, and Maloji Raje, an aged *Mankari* of rank and fame, fell in the field. The ordnance, amounting to eighteen pieces, and the whole of the bazar and baggage fell into the hands of Mane. This intelligence was received yesterday and the Durbar has since been apparently employed in equipping a few corps of infantry for the support of Purandhare, but no force which his Highness will now send from hence, could be materially useful for such a purpose. The village of Baramati is but twenty kos from Poona, a distance which to Mane is little more than a forced march.

The posture of affairs your Lordship will suppose must impress the Peshwa with the most serious alarms. Since he called in the aid of Sindhia's troops, the partisans of that chief at the durbar have assumed a bold and commanding tone. Some of them shewed open dissatisfaction at the civilities which the Peshwa paid to Major Malcolm, and Narain Rao Vaidya in particular, who has long acted as minister for Berar affairs proceeded to such length as to menace Raghunath Rao for the part which he took in the civilities alluded to.

Your Lordship will perceive from my last address that Raghunath Rao was soon to pay me a visit on the subject of the negotiation.

He called upon me on the 8th instant, and from his manner of conversing, I soon perceived that he was not prepared to give me a reply to any of the points on which he had promised to bring me the Peshwa's decision at the interview of the 5th instant. I then opened myself sufficiently to let him know that I understood perfectly that the Peshwa was only trifling, and afterwards went into a full explanation of the melancholy mode of distraction into which his Highness had now plunged his affairs. The difficulties and dangers of his present situation, I contrasted with the circumstances of honor and comfort in which he would have been placed, had he accepted of your Lordship's proposals, and then adverted on what his Highness's feelings would necessarily be when he reflected that, instead of attending to the protection and welfare of his subjects, he had deliberately abandoned his dominions to disorder and outrage.

Without expressly coinciding in the remarks, Raghunath Rao allowed me to infer that his opinion of the policy pursued by the Peshwa differed little from mine. He allowed me also to collect from his discourse that the Peshwa felt that his affairs could be retrieved only by meeting your Lordship's proposals, but that he was now so much controlled that he could not take any step to that effect without incurring serious personal hazard. He said, however, that although the present juncture was so very unfavourable, many of the difficulties which now presented themselves might, ere long, be surmounted, that he would labour incessantly to bring the negotiation to a happy conclusion, and that he hoped to be able to bring to me, with little delay, the list of districts to be ceded by his Highness as the *jaidad* for the subsidiary force.

Through private channels I learn that on receipt of the intelligence yesterday concerning Purandhare's defeat, the Peshwa expressed much apprehension respecting his personal safety, and in directing the few corps of infantry about his person to be equipped for marching, his own view was to have them in a state of readiness, should he be obliged to leave Poona. The whole of his jewels have been sent, by degrees, to Sinhgarrh, a strong hill fort in this neighbourhood, and in the course of last night, he sent off to that fortress the ladies of his family, including his brother Chimnaji's wife, and also the widows of Sawai Madhav Rao and Nana Fadnavis.

Fateh Singh Mane's immediate intentions are not known. Should he approach at this juncture, the Peshwa would be obliged to fly, and it is supposed that he would proceed to the Kokan or should Amrit Rao advance with an escort from Holkar's army, his Highness would probably pursue the same measure. If he be driven to this extremity, from whatever cause it will be my duty to attend him.

No. 18—Close acquaints the Governor of Bombay with the movements of Holkar and his associates against Sindhia and the Peshwa.

FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA.

TO—THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.

Poona, October 18, 1802.

I have this moment received your obliging note conveying the late news from Europe. Jaswant Rao Holkar and Fateh Singh Mane have formed a junction at a spot about 15 *kos* from hence, near to the Hyderabad wat (*wat*=route); and some of them, stragglers, have lately stopped and plundered a few of our *dak* runners, but without taking their packets. As the Hyderabad route may be thus infested for some time, I would recommend that all our dispatches for Bengal by this route should be forwarded in duplicate, the latter copy to be sent by Cannanore and Madras. Boats at this season, I suppose, make an easy passage to the southward. The Peshwa's troops appear to be passive since Maunia defeated Nana Purandhare. Jaswant Rao Holkar is likely to be joined by the Raste and Bhau families, who have been a long time in enmity with the Peshwa, and are now in some strength. Sadashiv Bhau's army is at present moving in this direction from Koregaon, meaning to take up a position a few koss from hence, so as to be placed between Holkar's force and the city. The contending armies are now very numerous; and it is impossible to say how long this warfare may last. The Peshwa is endeavouring to raise contributions in the city; but as many of its inhabitants have already disappeared, his collections will probably not be considerable.

His Excellency, I find, has lately written to Sindhia, I suppose, relative to the movements and apparent instruction of Nagu Pant.

No. 19—In this private despatch Close describes in detail the disturbed and melancholy conditions prevailing in the Poona city and the country round and also how the Peshwa was living, under constant alarm from Holkar. The Peshwa, however, was still undecided regarding entering into a subsidiary alliance with the British.

FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, October 21, 1802.

On the 17th instant I was visited by Raghunath Rao. He produced a Marathi paper which, he told me, was written by the Peshwa. The object of it was to determine the different descriptions of services on which it would be allowable to employ the subsidiary forces. I satisfied Raghunath Rao on the point; but observed, that it referred merely to detail, and, therefore, would

naturally occur for adjustment at the conclusion of a definitive treaty and that taking up such minutes at this period, under the present plan of proceeding, was misplaced, and could only retard the progress of the negotiation at a crisis which pressed for its advancement. Raghunath Rao could not give me any satisfactory reply. He remarked only that there was no unnecessary delay, as, time was requisite to determine the *Talukas*, which were to be ceded as the *jaidad*, and that he was obliged to do all that was possible to answer his Highness's objections. From such language I could only infer that the Peshwa still continued undecided, as to the part he should take under the pressure of his embarrassments, which necessarily increase every hour. Raghunath Rao, however, at parting, expressed his confidence that the negotiation would succeed and said that he would manage to visit me again without much delay and that he would then show me the several documents which relate to the subsisting differences between this Durbar and that of Hyderabad.

Some days since Jaswant Rao Holkar formed a junction with the troops under Fateh Singh Mane, and the joint force now occupies a position a little on this side of Jejuri. As a single march would bring him to this neighbourhood, Sadashiv Bhau has, at the instance of the Peshwa, advanced and encamped at a short distance from the City near the Jejuri road. Having received a supply of cash from his Highness, he will probably soon make a movement towards his adversary who, it is said, is now well disposed to put his fortunes to the hazard of an action. The Pindaris of both armies lay waste the adjacent districts, and I am concerned to acquaint your Lordship that the irregularities committed by those belonging to Holkar have interrupted the progress of Mr. Lovett, who, on the 17th instant, was at Jewur* a state forty *kos* from hence and found it difficult to advance, as well from the alarmed state of the country, as from the want of palanquin boys, those posted as relays having either quitted their stations from fear, or being carried off by the Pindaris. Yesterday evening I despatched a letter to Holkar, and one to the senior European Officer in his camp, informing them of Mr. Lovett's situation, and requesting that they would facilitate his journey and give him a safe escort to this neighbourhood, which, I doubt not, will be attended with effect.

I cannot describe to your Lordship the melancholy scenery which this place at present exhibits. The assessments on the city are carried on with so much vigour that the inhabitants fly towards the neighbouring hills, in the hope of securing their property. On the road they are generally met by the Pindaris, who plunder and

* Jewur—Jeur, 20 m.w. of Parenda on the eastern bank of the Bhima. Jeur is now a railway station between Dhond and Sholapur on G.I.P. railway.

abuse them, and send them back empty. These banditti carry their depredations to the very skirts of the city, and, as the cultivation on the ground is unprotected, the ryots are cutting it in an unripe state, as the only means of saving something from the crop. Amidst this general confusion the Peshwa adheres to his dwelling, which is guarded by about 2000 infantry and a party of cavalry. Saddled horses are always ready at the different gates, and every circumstance indicates that he is under constant alarms and prepared to move on the occurrence of any unfavourable event. He even distrusts his own troops and adherents, and, if Holkar gives a check to Sadashiv Bhau his situation will, in all probability, become desperate. The ladies of his family have arrived at Rahiri (Sinhgarh) in the Kokan; and, if he be obliged to fly, he will doubtless take that direction.

No. 20—Close reports to the G.G. in detail the hectic negotiations between Holkar and the Peshwa, and the frantic efforts of Sadashiv Bhau and Nimbaji Bhaskar to ensure that the Peshwa would remain with the forces of Sindhia. Moreover, in view of the continued hesitation of the Peshwa to give any definite answer in the negotiations going between him and the British, Close informed Raghunath Rao that these negotiations should be dropped.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL**

Poona, Oct. 24, 1802.

I had the honor of addressing your Lordship on the 21st instant. I then intimated that the Peshwa was agitated by constant alarms, and that appearances at his dwelling indicated, that he proposed flying to the westward on the occurrence of any serious event.

On the 21st instant, I learned that messengers passed more frequently than usual between the Peshwa and Jaswant Rao Holkar, and that his Highness had given orders that his troops with the *Zuri Patka* should separate from Sadashiv Bhau's camp, and pitch near to the skirts of the city. I was further made acquainted, that Sadashiv Bhau, who had given orders to his troops to be prepared to move, had countermanded those orders, and repairing to the city, had paid a visit to Sindhia's wakil, Nimbaji Bhaskar, and that in consequence of this meeting, the latter had gone to the Durbar, and procured a conference with his Highness.

Having previously received from the Persian Secretary to the government, your Lordship's letter to the Peshwa, I, on the above date, sent a message to Raghunath Rao, intimating my wish to see him as early as his convenience would permit. In reply, he said, that business would not allow of his seeing me in the course of the

day, but that he would have the pleasure of visiting me on the following morning. On the 22nd I had accordingly a meeting with him. Although I had requested the visit, I thought it best to defer mentioning the business, which had induced me to do so, doubting not but he would attribute my wish to see him to anxiety on my part on account of the deleterious conduct of his Highness respecting the negotiation. In this, I was not disappointed, as on taking his seat, he began to apologize for not having brought the list of the districts to compose the *jaidad* and the several documents relative to the difference subsisting between this Durbar and his Highness the Nizam's. Finding that I showed extreme dissatisfaction at such evasive behaviour, he proceeded to tell me that such was the present disturbed state of the Peshwa's government, that his Highness would not venture to cede any territory to the British government as a *jaidad*; that the British troops might advance according to the system of operation before discussed settling the Peshwa's territories as they approached; that his Highness would probably find it necessary to stop the troops at some point in his own territory, where it would be requisite they should remain; and that after matters should be advanced to such a stage, his Highness would agree to the necessary arrangements respecting the *jaidad*. Here I interrupted Raghunath Rao, and pointed out to him that by refusing to grant the *jaidad*, His Highness had receded from every point of consequence which had been formerly discussed and assented to. The indecency of such glaring equivocation, I assured him, would be particularly marked by your Lordship, I should avoid commenting on it myself, I said, as I felt I could not do so with temper. His Highness's insincerity, I added, was now beyond all possibility of doubt, and as future conference would be probably futile, I begged to put a period to the negotiation in order that your Lordship might now pursue such a course as you might judge best calculated to promote the British interests. On hearing this intimation Raghunath Rao appeared to be quite confounded. He continued silent for a time, and then begged that I would not view the conduct of the Durbar in so serious a light. Observing, however, that this made no impression upon me, he insinuated that the Peshwa could not proceed with the negotiation without incurring the most imminent danger. To this I only observed, that it was not possible to mistake his Highness's insincerity which should be minutely explained to your Lordship. He then urged me to delay writing for a time, which I declined, adding, that as the negotiation had ceased I had but one object in view, which, was to present to the Peshwa the letter from your Lordship to his address, and I accordingly requested that a time might be fixed for my having an audience of his Highness for the purpose. Raghunath Rao said, the time

should be fixed, and intimated to me without delay, on which the conference ended.

On the evening of the 22nd, I received intelligence through an authentic channel, that Sadashiv Bhau had visited the city on the preceding day, from apprehension that the Peshwa would suddenly abandon his capital on some hostile scheme, and thus leave the troops destitute of supplies and pay, that he had accordingly urged the Peshwa, through Nimbaji Bhaskar, either to accompany the troops in the field, or accept two of Sindhia's battalions to be stationed at Poona, in the absence of the army for the protection of his Highness's person and the city; that in reply to this proposal, his Highness had disavowed all intention of quitting his capital, and declined accepting the aid of Sindia's battalions, when services were required in Camp; that this answer had made no impression on Sadashiv Bhau, who again deputed Nimbaji Bhaskar to the Durbar to repeat with increased urgency his former proposal; that Nimbaji Bhaskar, on returning to the Durbar, found his Highness engaged in a conference with Paraji Pandit, Jaswant Rao Holkar's wakil; that when the conference ended, Nimbaji Bhaskar delivered Sadashiv Bhau's message to his Highness with great urgency, but with no effect; that Sadashiv Bhau finding his Highness so obstinate, and that he continued to keep measures with Jaswant Rao Holkar, sent a strong remonstrance to the Durbar, and that the subject remained in suspense.

Yesterday I received a message from Raghunath Rao, that he would visit me on this day, and that the Peshwa would give me an audience on the 25th instant.

In the course of yesterday also, concurring accounts were received from Jaswant Rao Holkar's camp, that it was his intention to advance without delay, and take up the ground near Poona usually occupied by the troops of the Holkar family when employed in this vicinity, and reports prevailed, at the same time, that an accommodation was about to take place between Jaswant Rao Holkar and the Peshwa.

This morning it was ascertained, that Holkar's army marched 9 kos yesterday, and encamped at Loni, 4 kos from Sadashiv Bhau's line, and that the senior European officer with Sindhia's troops had given it as his opinion, that Sadashiv Bhau ought to move out and bring Holkar to action. The Bhau is strongly posted, but apparently Holkar, by making a circuit to the northward, may take up the ground he proposed without interfering with his line.

The Peshwa appears to have held conferences with different parties during the whole of last night. Messages continued to pass between him and Holkar, and in the city it is generally believed, that an accommodation has been arranged between them on terms by which

the Peshwa acknowledges Jaswant Rao Holkar as Dewan to Khande Rao Holkar, and grants to him an injunction to Sindhia to deliver over Khande Rao to him (Jaswant Rao Holkar) and restore to the youth all the family possessions in Malwa. Under this plan the Peshwa's aim would seem to be to relieve himself from one of the parties which now press upon him by means of the other, and then to get rid of the remaining party by making a display of his friendship with the English and threatening it with the whole force of the British government. But whatever his Highness's views may be, it is probable, that Sadashiv Bhau, aware of his intrigues, may endeavour to secure his person by obliging him to repair to camp. In any event the Peshwa seems to be caught in a dilemma. If Sindhia's troops prevail over Holkar, his Highness's difficulties can scarcely diminish, and if Holkar prove too strong for his adversary, his Highness will probably be saddled with Amrit Rao as his Dewan an arrangement to which, he has always shown the greatest aversion. The contending armies are now so near as to be in sight of each other, and it is likely, that some event will soon arise to determine the effect of his Highness's intrigues and projects.

I have not heard from Holkar in reply to my dispatch respecting Mr. Lovett, but by a letter just come in from the European officer, who was written to on the same occasion, Holkar had dispatched a party of cavalry to meet Mr. Lovett and conduct him in safety to this neighbourhood.

A few days since I received a letter by the Bombay *dak*, from Nagoji Ghadge, minister of the Raja of Kolhapur intimating that he was desirous of sending a *karkoon* to one for communicating certain matters connected with the state of affairs in that quarter. I propose acknowledging the letter, and recommending that the *karkoon*, whom he is desirous of deputing to me, should be sent to the hon'ble the Governor of Bombay, who will be disposed to give a ready hearing to the matters, he may wish to explain. This I hope your excellency will be pleased to approve.

No. 21—Close forwards to the G.G. a translate of the Sanad of cession of 'jaidad' made by the Peshwa to the British, and adds that in the absence of a more formal instrument it practically amounts to the conclusion of a subsidiary alliance which will be formally concluded as soon as possible.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, Oct. 25, 1802.

My address to your Lordship of yesterday's date has been necessarily detained for this conveyance.

Yesterday evening the Peshwa sent a deputation to Jaswant Rao Holkar with distinct proposals for an accommodation, which, it was supposed, would be accepted. Holkar, however, rejected his Highness's overtures and since 9 o'clock this morning, the troops of that chieftain and those under Sadashiv Bhau have been warmly engaged in this neighbourhood. The Peshwa, to be prepared for every event, moved out this morning attended by the *Zari Patka* and all his troops and at the same time deputed to me his Minister, Raghunath Rao with a *sanad* of cession for the proposed *jaidad*, translate of which I do myself the honor to enclose. The hurry of the occasion would not allow of his Highness subscribing to a more formal or particular instrument but Raghunath Rao has given me the fullest assurance in the presence of Captain DeCourey of this Residency that it is his Highness's positive intentions and meaning that a general defensive alliance shall be concluded and brought into effect as soon as may be between his Highness's Government and the hon'ble Company on the fundamental principles agreeable to the system of operation detailed in my address to your Lordship of the 14th instant.

Intelligence in this instant received that Jaswant Rao Holkar has given Sadashiv Bhau a severe defeat. The confusion here in consequence is not to be described.

I have not yet ascertained what line of measures the Peshwa means to pursue, but I conclude that he will move off immediately to the westward, in which case I shall follow him.

The *sanad* of cession for the proposed *jaidad*.

October 25, 1802.

(Here is placed the Peshwa's Seal).

Instrument.

In order that the English may essentially assist and support the *sarkar* of the Peshwa, and defend his person, the Peshwa hereby subsidizes, from the English aforesaid, a corps of British troops consisting of six native battalions, with their proportion of artillery; and his said Highness, for the purpose of subsisting and bearing the charge of the said corps, doth hereby cede to the English, forts and territories yielding an annual revenue of twenty-five *lakhs* of rupees, to be furnished in part from the province of Gujarat, and part from the Carnatic, or the whole from either of those quarters.

Given under the seal of the Peshwa, at his court in Poona, the 27th day of the month of Jamad-ul-Akhir, &c. &c. &c. agreeing with the 25th October, A.D. 1802.

(Here is placed the Peshwa's Signet).

No. 22—Resident Close describes the battle of Poona in which the army under Sadashiv Bhau was defeated by Holkar. The Peshwa leaves Poona for Sinharh. Holkar was all moderation, and special instructions were given and arrangements made to save the people at the English Residency in Poona from molestation at the hands of the soldiers of Holkar.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, October 26, 1802.

The action of yesterday between Holkar's army, and that under Sadashiv Bhau, commenced with a warm cannonade about half past nine, and lasted with great vivacity till twelve; when the cavalry of the former chieftain, having made a general charge, repulsed the cavalry of the enemy, and cutting in upon the line of infantry, obtained a complete victory. Holkar became master of the whole of Sindhia's baggage, guns, and stores of the four European officers who served with Sindhia's infantry, three are taken wounded; the fourth appears to be missing: the senior European officer of Holkar's infantry was killed by a cannon-shot towards the close of the action.

Sadashiv Bhau is supposed to have escaped with the greater part of his horse; but what direction he has taken is not known. Balaji Kunjar and Nimbaji Bhaskar, Sindhia's wakil, and a few other *sardars* who were in the action, have joined the Peshwa. At about 4 o'clock, a part of Holkar's line pursuing the enemy, came within cannon-shot of the city, but soon retired; and by 6 o'clock, his troops having re-assembled, encamped a little beyond the field of action. About noon I sent a letter to him, requesting that he would not permit his troops to molest any person belonging to the Residency; and although his Pindaris approached our dwellings frequently in the course of the evening, they shewed no disposition to be irregular or troublesome: and I have since learned, that, on receiving my letter, Holkar gave directions to some of his horse to watch the Residency, and permit no person to disturb it.

At the close of the action, the Peshwa retired towards Sinharh, situated south-east of the city; and since then he has continued to correspond with Raghunath Rao, who remains with me. By a letter received from his Highness this morning, dated last night, he was near Sinharh, having it in mind to pursue his march to the Konkan, by his own account. He is attended by the principal persons of his government, and about 7,000 horse, a few infantry, and 5 guns; (I) have recommended to him not to tarry, but to hasten his march, and seizing the Ghats above Mahad, secure his communication with the sea. He seemed anxious about my situation, and desirous that I should retire to Bombay. On this point I have

satisfied him ; adding, that I should lose no time in opening a communication with him in the country. This plan, if executed, will doubtless answer well ; but by intelligence received this morning from the city, it would appear that the party of cavalry with his Highness is but small, and that Holkar has detached different bodies of horse to intercept his march.

The city has suffered less than might have been expected ; it is in charge of Abba Kale, a commandant of infantry belonging to the Peshwa. A few of Holkar's Pindaris made their way into some of the streets yesterday evening ; but they were soon recalled by that chieftain, who has informed Kale, that it is not his intention to disturb the city, but to save it from being molested. Under this moderate plan of proceeding, it is difficult to ascertain what system of measures Holkar means to pursue ; he has carried his first object in the destruction of Sindhia's army ; and being now without an opponent on this side of the Narbada, he might proceed immediately on the intention which has long been ascribed to him, that of placing Amrit Rao's son upon the *masnad*, and making the father Dewan. It is said that he has sent messages to the Peshwa, soliciting him to return to his capital ; and whatever intentions he may harbour respecting Amrit Rao, nothing seems to indicate that the latter has made any arrangement. Much must, no doubt, turn upon the resolutions and movements of the Peshwa, of which I shall endeavour to keep your Lordship regularly informed. The principal characters near his person, it is to be apprehended, are still averse to his improving his connection with the Company ; and this circumstance may seriously obstruct his inclinations, trusting that he will pursue the only plan that can promise to retrieve his affairs. I have informed Holkar of my intention to return to Bombay, conformably to the instructions of my superiors, and requested of him to enjoin his troops to continue to behave in a friendly manner to me on the march.

No. 23—Holkar asks Close to continue to stay at Poona.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.**

Poona, October 29, 1802.

I had the pleasure of writing to you yesterday by express ; the Peshwa has certainly fled to Mahad or Raigarh, and Holkar rules here ; he has desired me not to move from here, and in consequence, the situation of the Residency is become delicate. I write to the Governor General to-day, explaining matters fully : when you write to me, let your letter be in cypher.

No. 24—Despairing of Baji Rao's return to Poona, Holkar thinks of filling the vacant *masnad* of the Peshwa. Close informs the G.G. about the possible proposals of Holkar in that respect.

FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, October 30, 1802.

I had the honour of addressing your Lordship yesterday. Intelligence is just received that the Peshwa has reached Raigarh in the Konkan, from whence he will probably move to some part in communication with the sea. Holkar, despairing of being able to prevail on his Highness to return to his capital, is said to have dispatched a force yesterday to Juner, for the purpose of bringing Amrit Rao hither. It is imagined, however, that the latter will not wait to be surrounded, but fly to some port in the Konkan. The general opinion here is, that he would not act in authority at Poona, unless the Peshwa should be present on the *masnad*; a very short period must determine this. It is now ascertained that Sadashiv Bhau with a remnant of his army, escaped to Ahmadnagar; he has there met with two or three new battalions of infantry belonging to Sindhia; and the corps of dispersed parties of his army assembled daily. The Ujjain *akhbars* mention, that Nago Pant received orders, some time since, to join him; and it may be concluded, that when Sindhia learns the result of the late action, he will order Gopal Bhau, who appears to be troublesome on the Nizam's frontier, to repair to Ahmadnagar without delay, and there assume the command. Holkar continues to behave in a civil manner. It is supposed that if Amrit Rao declines coming hither, he, Holkar will proceed to Satara, on the plan of releasing the Rajah, and placing him on the *masnad*. It is probable, however, that if Sindhia collects a force at Ahmadnagar to retrieve the effects of the late action, Holkar's attention will be called off to the northward; he is supposed to have upwards of thirty thousand good horse; his infantry, mostly new troops, may amount to eight or nine thousand, and his train of artillery is very large; provisions, however, are very dear in his camp. The troops are far in arrears; he has no treasury, and Poona is almost exhausted of cash. A report prevails here, that a detachment of Holkar's consisting of two battalions, and two thousand horse, under Khayal Ram, has joined the Nizam's army near Aurangabad, under the Hussain Yawar-ud-Daulah, and that thirteen days since the joint force was about to attack Gopal Bhau, Sindhia's commander, near Jaluder (?). I have mentioned this report to Major Kirkpatrick.

I am concerned to acquaint your Lordship, that the kiledar of Lohgarh has seized the ghat on the Bombay road, and will not allow the dak to pass ; he, no doubt, acts under the influence of Holkar. Mr. Lovett will now, I hope, return to Hyderabad.

No. 25—The flight of Baji Rao from Sinhgarh towards Mahad.

**FROM—M. KENNEDY, ACTING RESIDENT AT BANKOT,
TO—THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.**

Fort Victoria, Oct. 30, 1802.

I have the honour to acquaint you, that I have this morning received accounts that the Peshwa left Sinhgarh, and is come down the ghat to a place called Dahivad attended only by twenty-five horsemen. He is expected at Mahad ; the inhabitants of which are so terrified at his approach that they are hourly flocking into Dasgaon.

SECTION II

The Treaty of Bassein

(Oct. 30, 1802 to Jan. 20, 1803)

No. 26—The Peshwa asks the Governor of Bombay to give him an asylum within the territories of the Company, and requests that large, well-equipped ships be put at his disposal to carry him away from Mahad.

FROM—BAJI RAO, THE PESHWA,
TO—J. DUNCAN, GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.

Rajab 2 (Oct. 30, 1802).

(Received at Bombay, Nov. 4, 1802.)

My servants, by name Holkar, &c. appear to have entered upon the carrying on of intrigues and misconduct portending the worst confusions, the consideration of which has prevailed on me to repair to Mahad or Mhar ; where perhaps those disobedient servants may cause their troops to descend and prosecute base conduct towards me, the apprehension of which much alarms me ; I have, therefore, resolved to seek an asylum with your honour, on condition, that should any of those rebels demand my person from your honour, it be positively denied ; nor must your honour tell me to go and should these propositions meet with your honour's approbation, provision is to be made by you for my expenses ; and at any time when my inclinations may lead me to quit your place, no hindrance is to be put to my doing so.

In the event of my receiving your Honour's letter agreeing to these terms, under your seal and signature, and that in the meantime the subsisting contest should not have been amicably adjusted, I

will then proceed into your Government, where, on our meeting, your Honour will judge of my case.

The circumstance of my late father, Dada Sahib, having gone to Bombay and Surat, are well known to your Honour, in memory of which ties of friendship, be pleased to send me, as soon as possible, your Honour's letter.

To avoid the difficulty of procuring sea conveyance at such a critical juncture, be pleased to furnish large armed vessels, well-equipped with warlike stores, etc. and order them to be ready in the harbour of Mahad or Mhar, together with an English gentleman of a courteous disposition, courageous in his nature, and who will act conformably to my pleasure. For further particulars on this head I refer your Honour to the bearer of this, Naro Govind Auvatti, with whom the fighting ships are to be forwarded, that I may avail myself of the means they will afford to bring me to you with safety whenever events may find it necessary.

No. 27—Close informs the Governor of Bombay that the Peshwa has agreed in general terms to subsidize six native battalions and to grant a 'jaidad' of 25 lakhs of rupees.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.**

Poona, November 2, 1802.

I had the pleasure of writing to you yesterday; the enclosures will give you some idea of the state of things here and the northward. It is proper I should acquaint you that the Peshwa has agreed, under his seal, in general terms, to subsidize six native battalions, and grant of *Jaidad* for them of twenty-five lakhs of rupees; no detail of any kind, however, is adjusted; we must wait to learn his Excellency's determination. Be so good as to give a copy of this dispatch to Major Malcolm. I need not repeat that the utmost secrecy ought to be observed respecting the whole of our correspondence; you will of course correspond with his Excellency from time to time on the subject of appearances in the Konkan.

No. 28—The Governor General is informed about the difficulties of Holkar, as a result of which he would draw money from the city of Poona. Baji Rao continues undecided, and Close hopes he might be induced to communicate with the Governor of Bombay.

**FROM—E. STRACHEY, SECRETARY TO THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, November 5, 1802.

I had last the honour to address your Lordship on the 2nd instant.

Raghunath Rao proceeded to join the Peshwa on the night of the first instant ; whether he has reached Mahad where His Highness still continues, I have not learned ; had he met any interruption however on the road, I should probably have heard of it. Holkar shewed great anxiety to secure Raghunath Rao before he departed ; strict search was made for him in the city, and had he remained here a day longer he had probably been made prisoner.

No messages seem to have passed between the Peshwa and Holkar for some days, the latter despairing of His Highness's return, seems to pursue his plan of bringing Amrit Rao into authority, but this person too appears to be impressed that he could not repair at the present juncture, without being exposed to great embarrassment and danger. Holkar has dispatched Mir Khan to Juner, to conduct him hither, but he declines the invitation on various pretences ; meanwhile Holkar, in distress for money, has begun to raise contributions on the city, which being in great part deserted, is little capable of meeting his wants ; his army is numerous and in arrears, and his sardars urge him hourly for cash to satisfy their respective quotas of troops.

The Berar Vakils, and a Vakil from Hyderabad visited him yesterday ; the former he received with great attention, conversed with them in private for some time ; the latter he treated with little notice.

The tract of country from hence to Burhanpur is said by every traveller to be in a perfect state of desolation, and if it be resolved by Sindhia to send another army hither, they will probably feel great want of forage on the march. The country round Poona to a considerable distance is already deserted, and unless the Peshwa can manage to preserve it from invasion by Holkar, his capital can scarcely be long inhabited.

Holkar, at the request of Mr. Lovett, politely assisted him with a safeguard. He accordingly arrived here on the night of the 2nd instant, and yesterday evening pursued his journey to Bombay.

No. 29—The Governor of Bombay is acquainted with the recent happenings at Poona ; there is no possibility of any accommodation between the Peshwa, and Holkar and Amrit Rao.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.**

Poona, November 8, 1802.

The enclosed Akhbar will give you the particulars of the meeting yesterday, between Holkar and Amrit Rao. The former was attended by a new *zaripatka*, which may be considered as a symbol

of his views. It is said, that he has detached a party against Raigarh for the purpose of releasing the widow of Madhav Rao [the second] and that he summoned the principal jagirdars of this state to repair to his camp, and written menacing letters to all the sardars who adhere to the Peshwa's interests, requiring their attendance at Poona, so that all his measures indicate that he is bent on effecting a revolution: whether Amrit Rao will go such lengths with him, it may be difficult to determine; he is held to be a discreet, considerate person, though fond of authority, and it is probable he may be restrained by the enmity and power of Sindhia, and the apprehension of giving umbrage to the English: I cannot perceive any prospect of an accommodation; the Peshwa is violently hostile to all the adherents of the late Nana Fadnavis, and these are collecting round Amrit Rao, and must soon be his adversaries. I think it likely therefore, that the Peshwa, rather than accommodate with Holkar and Amrit Rao, will wait the support of Sindhia, or throw himself decidedly into the arms of the English; from his character, it may be concluded, that he will not determine to embark till reduced to the severest extremity.

Poona Akhbar, November 7, 1802.

On Tuesday the 4th, Amrit Rao left Junner and on reaching his place of encampment, informed Sadashiv Pandit the *wagia-navis* who attended his person, that he intended sending him to wait on Baji Rao. The Pandit represented to His Highness the impracticability of this mission, stating his doubts of being able to reach Birwadi on account of the hordes of Holkar's troops, who infested the intervening country.

Friday 5th. His Highness set out from Baodi, which is near fort Junner, and advanced to Peth, a village about fifteen kos from Poona.

Saturday 6th. Advanced to Chakan.

Sunday 7th. Encamped at Bopkhel. Moro Pandit Fadnavis and Baba Phadkia on this day left the castle of Ghur Ghur, and pitched at Bhamburda. Secret intelligence to the following effect was received this morning at 8 o'clock. Jaswant Rao Holkar attended by Shahamat Khan, both on elephants, rode to the plain of Garpeer (Ghorpuri ?) where Moro Pandit and Baba Phadkia came in palanquins to meet him. Holkar descended from his elephant, Shahamat Khan following his example, and waiting their approach on a carpet, sent Harnath Singh to receive these Brahmins. After a short conversation with Moro Pandit, who sent him back towards Holkar, the whole party, consisting besides himself of Baba Phadkia, Trimbak Pandit, minister of the late Appa Balwant, and Naro Pandit, son of Moraba Fadnavis, descended from their palanquins, and were

introduced to the victorious general, who, immediately after the conference, returned as before by the way of the Sungum river.

Moro Pandit and Baba Phadkia halted near the Jahho (?) garden, while Jaswant Rao continued his march to the Chhattri of Tukoji Holkar; hence, after performing a few ceremonies of respect to the memory of the deceased, he dispatched a *shutur* (camel) to Amrit Rao, requesting he would leave his station at the Bopkhel gardens, and cross over to this side of the river, which he did accordingly and halted on the flats of Khadki.

In the Rao's *khawasi*, Bapu Chitnavis, and in that of his son Vinaik Rao Bappu Pandit, Mir Khan Bahadur, a sardar on the part of Holkar, attended; while the general himself advancing in front, halted, descended from his elephant, and seating himself on a carpet, sent forward Kunwar Harnath Singh to make some necessary communications to Amrit Rao.

The Rao accordingly descended from his elephant also and seating himself on a carpet, waited the approach of Holkar's party, who proceeded on foot, and were introduced in the following order: first Jaswant Rao himself, then Shahmat Khan, then Nagu Jiwaji, attended by Kunwar Harnath Singh, who was succeeded as usual by a large portion of the sardars-min-tulba.*

They were next presented to His Highness's son Vinaik Rao Bapu, upon which a discharge of eighty guns announced the completion of this important visit.

Immediately after the ceremony was over, Amrit Rao and Vinaik Rao reascended their elephants, and took post on the right hand of Holkar, in whose *Khawasi* sat Ganpat Rao Narayan. Thence the procession moved to the gardens of Balwant Rao Wanki, where Amrit Rao, descending from his *hauda*, received on a carpet the visit of Baji Rao Barwe.

Shortly after Harnath Singh came with a message from Holkar, saying, that Moro Pandit's party were desirous of paying their respects, and requesting that he would have the goodness to cross the river once more for the purpose of receiving them. This request he accordingly complied with, and received on a carpet the visits of Moro Pandit Fadnavis, Naro Moreshwar, Baba Phadkia, Trimbak and after them of Shridhar Pandit, Krishna Rao Chitnavis and Yesaji Ramchandrar, officers of the Bhonsla government and lastly of Anand Rao, Vakil from His Excellency the Nizam. The distribution of betel-nut concluded the ceremony; upon which Jaswant Rao, Nawab Mir Khan and Shahamat Khan took their leave, the whole party remounted their elephants. Holkar, after drawing up abreast of Amrit Rao, and exchanging a few words, returned to his

* Sardars-min-tulba. The leading men among the personal guards enrolled under household called "*Shagird-Pesha*".

camp. His Highness's equipage proceeded to a summer-house adjoining to the artillery part at Bhamborda where it halted. Moro Pandit, Fadnavis, Baba Phadkia, and Rhawah occupied the house on the righthand side, the Rao's own tents being pitched near the Trimbak Rao band garden.

Hanwant Rao, Durekar, Pilaji Jaghu, Anand Rao Sindhia, Sadashiv Ramchandrar, Balwant Rao Kishan, Ramchandrar Madho, Lakhoda Phadke and Madho Rao Phadke, Kashi Rao and Sham Rao Totnavis, Raghu Pandit Mistari, the servants of the Chitnavis and Majumdar offices, the sons of Dullabh Seth, and many others, were successively introduced, and kept the Durbar, which was literally thronged with all ranks of people, open till evening. At sunset His Highness retired into a private tent to perform the ablutions necessary on the day (of) *Dravesh*, which he concluded with usual form of worship.

It is reported that the fort of Raigarh, where Jasodha Bai and Madho Rao Raste were confined, has revolted from the authority of Baji Rao. The first act of the *Kiledar* and *havildar*, expressive of their devotion to the Bai's interest, has been to release Madhav Rao from his confinement.

No. 30—Close acquaints the G.G. with the recent happenings at Poona, and goes on to mention the possible plans of the ruling party there.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, November 9, 1802.

Amrit Rao arriving here on the 7th instant, took up his residence at the *topkhana* in the district of the city. He was received with great honours by Holkar, who did him obeisance as his lord; and the Berar and Hyderabad vakils paid him the compliment of advancing some distance as he approached; on alighting near the *topkhana* a dispatch was delivered to him from the Peshwa, to which it is said he has forwarded a reply; the adherents of the late Nana collect round him every hour; Moraba Fadnavis and Baba Phadkia seem to be most in his confidence. He corresponds with the *kiledar* of Lohgarh, and it is probable that he will soon be joined by Chakardeo, who formerly acted as Nana's principal *gomasta*. He was yesterday visited by Jaswant Rao Holkar, and there is reason to believe that their view is, if possible, to get possession of the Peshwa's person, place him in confinement, and then establish such arrangements as that the civil business of the state shall be con-

ducted by Amrit Rao, and the command of the forces be held by Holkar. On this plan it would appear Holkar has summoned the principal jagirdars under the Poona government to repair to his camp and employed emissaries to corrupt the Peshwa's garrisons in the different forts, and also the troops near His Highness's person, and the individuals principally in his confidence; the garrison of Raigarh in the Konkan has already proved treacherous, and in consequence the widow of Sawai Madhav Rao, and one of the Raste family, are likely to be liberated from confinement in that fort.

In this case, if the Peshwa eludes the means used to entrap him, Holkar will probably pursue the scheme of giving Amrit Rao's son in adoption to the widow, then place the boy on the masnad, and make his father Dewan.

But whatever measures he may pursue for completing a revolution, he must be subject to a severe pressure at present from want of cash, and be aware that Sindhia will soon make an effort to assist the Peshwa and retrieve the reputation of his arms. From the first difficulty he may possibly be relieved by supplies of cash from some of Nana's adherents; and to enable him to meet the opposition of Sindhia, he probably looks to the co-operation of the Rajah of Berar.

No. 31—Jaswant Rao Holkar asks Close not to leave Poona without first informing him; he also promises to give an escort to Close should he decide to leave Poona.

**FROM—JASWANT RAO HOLKAR,
TO—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA.**

November 10, 1802.

I have been informed of your intention to leave this place for Bombay in the course of a few days. Under the circumstances of sincere and thorough good understanding that subsists between us, you will not surely adopt this step without consulting me. You must be aware of the danger that threatens you from the licentious practices of the Pindaris and other irregular camp-followers in the neighbourhood of great armies.

Should any consideration of real exigency, however urge your return, permit me to suggest the propriety of our consulting in person upon the best modes of effecting this object, and in particular the necessity of a respectable escort, which I propose to send with you.

No. 32—Close reports to the G.G. his own efforts with the party in power at Poona to be permitted to leave for Bombay. He also mentions the details of the situation at Poona.

FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, November 16, 1802.

By this conveyance I forward to the Persian Secretary to the Government, for your Lordship's notice, copies of my Persian correspondence with Jaswant Rao Holkar and Amrit Rao.

Finding that Holkar declined answering my letter in reply to his, wherein he assented to my return to Bombay, attended by an escort from his army, and proposed to pay me a visit previous to my departure, I on the evening of the 14th instant sent him a few lines, noticing his silence, for which I could not account; and remarking that I was guided in all things by the orders of my superiors, who allowed no matters to pass unobserved. He sent me a reply the same night, wherein your Lordship will perceive that he avoids adverting to the proposed interview, and the circumstance of my intended departure, and talks of sending for me shortly, with the view to converse with me on his desire to form a written agreement of friendship with the Honourable Company.

Apprehending that he might have formed an idea that the mode in which I had signified my wish to receive a visit from him was not sufficiently formal, I yesterday morning sent him a note, intimating that a gentleman from the Residency should wait on him to explain my wishes on a particular point. I accordingly deputed Mr. Strachey to him in the forenoon, with a message of compliment concerning the troublesome state of his wounds, and repeating my wish to have the pleasure of a visit from him, as before arranged. Mr. Strachey's report of what passed on the occasion I have the honour to enclose.

In the afternoon Bappu Chitnavis waited upon me, and delivered a message from Amrit Rao, requesting me to do him the pleasure of a visit this evening. I accepted the invitation, and Bappu Chitnavis told me, that Amrit Rao would take the occasion of the meeting to reply to the letter which I had sent him two days before; adding that Jaswant Rao Holkar would be present at the interview.

Amrit Rao is completely in charge of the city, and is regulating the different departments of the government; every person who remained belonging to the Peshwa is removed from this place, and many of his principal servants are in confinement. A safeguard, furnished by Holkar, for the protection of our dwellings, was yester-

day withdrawn, and its place is supplied by a *karkoon* from Amrit Rao, whose troops are encamped close to the Residency.

The troops of Mir Khan and Shahmat Khan were so troublesome two days since from want of pay, that those Chieftains struck their tents and began to march. Holkar, however, by promises of aid of cash, persuaded them to return to their ground ; but such is the want of money in his camp, that disturbances amongst his troops may be daily expected. He urged Shahmat Khan to proceed for subsistence to the Konkan ; but this commander is averse to ascend the ghats, the low country being unfavourable for cavalry.

Amrit Rao still holds out, that the Peshwa will be induced to return to his capital, and recommends that nothing should be done at present towards effecting a revolution. The Peshwa still corresponds with him, and probably favours the above hope, but what His Highness's real intentions are it may be still difficult to determine. He must be informed of the preparations making at Ujjain, and it is not impossible but he may soon explain himself to the honourable the Governor of Bombay.

Amidst the confusion that reigns here, appearances vary so constantly, that it may be difficult to say what event may suddenly arise. I judge it prudent, therefore, to preserve as few papers as possible relative to recent proceedings in connection with the Peshwa's government.

No. 33—The G.G. being fully satisfied with the instrument executed by the Peshwa, instructs Close that every possible step be taken to implement the pledge given to the Peshwa.

**FROM—N. B. EDMONSTONE, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
TO—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA.**

Fort William, November 16, 1802.

I am directed by His Excellency the most noble the Governor General to acknowledge the receipt of your private and public dispatches of the 14th, 24th, 25th, and 26th ultimo.

His Excellency entirely approves the whole of your conduct during the late negotiation, in the course of which His Excellency considers that you have manifested great agility, firmness and zeal, for the public interests. His Excellency will hereafter enter fully into the detail of your late proceedings ; for the present His Excellency confines his communication to you upon the subject of those points which appear to require immediate notice.

His Excellency is satisfied that by the terms of the instrument which the Peshwa has executed and delivered to you, and by the declaration made to you under his authority by Raghunath Rao,

as stated in the 2nd para of your private dispatch of the 25th ultimo, the Peshwa has in fact concluded a defensive alliance with the British government, on the basis specified in your private dispatch of the 14th ultimo, and it is accordingly his Excellency's resolution to carry into immediate and complete effect that part of the engagement to which the British government is pledged. His Excellency, however, deems it to be extremely desirable that the Peshwa should execute, at the earliest practicable period of time, an engagement in the form of preliminary articles, specifically stating the fundamental principles and stipulations of the alliance, to serve as a basis for the conclusion of a definitive treaty as soon as the state of circumstances may admit.

No. 34—Close reports the details of his interview with Amrit Rao and Jaswant Rao Holkar, and adds that both of them pressed him to continue to stay at Poona. Amrit Rao is still undecided as to what steps he should take in respect to the high office of Peshwa-ship.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, November 17, 1802.

Yesterday evening I visited Amrit Rao, agreeably to his invitation; I was accompanied by the gentlemen of the Residency, and Jaswant Rao Holkar, with his principal officers, was present.

Amrit Rao received me with great politeness. After conversing for some time on topics of compliments, he proposed that we should withdraw to an adjoining tent with Jaswant Rao Holkar; we accordingly repaired thither, Mr. Strachery and Khurshedji, my Parsi accountant, also being of the party.

He now reverted to his ancient connection with the honourable Company, detailed the names of the English gentlemen in General Goddard's time, with whom he had been intimately acquainted; and expressed his hopes, that a friendship of such long standing would continue without interruption, and improve. He afterwards, adverted to the present situation of the Peshwa, who, he said, had retired from Poona, owing to the thoughtlessness of youth; that Jaswant Rao Holkar had requested of him to adjust some claims which he had on Sindhia; by requiring that Chieftain to deliver up young Holkar, and restore to the family their jaghir lands; that this request had not met with attention from the Peshwa, who continued in the low country, and though urged to return, declined compliance. In such a state of things, Amrit Rao said he would be happy to be assisted with my advice, having great expectation from my friendship. I replied, that under the circumstances of the

conjuncture, I had but one part to act; that I was under orders to return to Bombay, and that he and Holkar being in power here, I had accordingly notified the circumstances to them, not doubting of obtaining their assent to my departure; and that I still waited for that assent, that I might proceed agreeably to my instructions. Here Amrit Rao addressed a few words to Jaswant Rao Holkar and afterwards turning to me, observed, that the most amicable footing subsisted between them (meaning himself and party) and the honourable Company, and that it would be very pleasing to him, if I would remain at Poona, acquainting your Lordship that I did so at his particular solicitations; here I referred him to his own knowledge of the strict subordination which ever holds under the British government, assuring him, that I could in no instance depart from the orders of my superiors; that were it possible for me to do so on the present occasion, it could not possibly benefit his affairs; that by his assenting cordially to my returning to Bombay, your Lordship's mind would be satisfied of his amicable inclinations, and be disposed to receive any communications from him with attention; but that should I be detained here any longer, your Lordship would have cause of dissatisfaction, and might be led to remonstrate on the subject. Here I begged of him to reflect on the nature of such a result, and the circumstances that would naturally connect with it; that, proceeding to Bombay, I should be particular in explaining to your Lordship the conduct he should observe in assenting cordially to my departure, and should have no objection, under so fair a course of things, to lay before your Lordship any points he might wish to represent, or any dispatches he might be desirous to forward to your Lordship's address. At this place he again alluded to the situation of the Peshwa, with whom, he said, he continued to communicate, and urged me with great earnestness to omit no opportunity that might offer to use my influence with His Highness to induce him to return. In reply, I observed, that your Lordship was informed of His Highness's situation, and that in matters connected with His Highness's affairs, I would act only by your Lordship's instructions; but that returning to Bombay I should have no objection to convey to your Lordship his wishes on this point, or any other he might be desirous to submit. He then expressed a wish to know why your Lordship had directed me to return to Bombay; to which I replied, that it certainly was not for me to ascertain your Lordship's motives; and that adverting to what I had explained, I could not see any cause why he should feel any solicitude at my departure. Turning to Holkar, he again conversed with him for a short time, and then said, that I should have permission to return. Holkar spoke two or three times during the conversation, but not on any very material points. After Amrit Rao

had said that I should be permitted to return, he (Holkar) shewed some anxiety to know, whether all the gentlemen of the Residency were to proceed with me; I observed that they were; but that an establishment of native servants would remain at the Sangam to take care of the place, and attend to the public *dak*.

Through the whole of the interview, Amrit Rao's manner was peculiarly civil, mild, and pleasing; in general his countenance was cheerful, but occasionally it shewed strong marks of care; of late, it is said, that his hopes of being able to persuade the Peshwa to return have increased; but the uncertainty which still attaches to this point, the apprehension that His Highness may yet be led to embark, and the pressure of Holkar's wants, must give him extreme uneasiness. He is so far decided in his conduct, however, that he is taking possession of the Poona government to the utmost extent that circumstances will permit. The different forts and strongholds continue under the Peshwa's authority, and the *kiledars* will probably adhere to his interests so long as he preserves the *Zurripatka*, and remains in his own territory.

Notwithstanding Holkar's wants, his troops increased, a new brigade is in forwardness, and idlers and soldiers of fortune continue to resort to his standard, which favours the idea that he holds out to his troops and followers the prospect of some rich harvest of plunder. Besides the four divisions here under Holkar, Fateh Singh Maunia, Mir Khan and Shahmat Khan, Jiwaji Jaswant Bawan Paga is at the head of a corps to the northward, that is said to be numerous.

In all his deliberations, Holkar shews much indifference about the Peshwa, and adheres to the necessity of Amrit Rao's son or Satara Raja being placed on the *masnad*.

Amrit Rao opposes the elevation of his son, discourages extreme measures for the present and as his views must still be very unsettled, I shall not be surprised if he makes some secret communication to me of a nature not according with the course which he outwardly pursues in concert with Holkar.

No. 35—Close describes at length the main events during last four days of his stay at Poona (Nov. 23-27), and mentions in detail all the efforts made by Jaswant Rao Holkar and Amrit Rao to detain him at Poona.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Panoula, November 28, 1802.

On the 23rd instant Jaswant Rao Holkar shewed a disposition to return my visit, and apparently with this view, sent me a list by his

karkun Appaji Pant of the persons who were to attend him on this occasion, in which were included the name of the European officers commanding his brigades. Struck with surprise, I asked Appaji Pant if he was certain that those names had been inserted by order of Holkar, to which he gave me an affirmative reply; adding that Holkar had been led to include them, in consequence of communications which had passed between him and some of the European officers in question. I now resisted the proposal with great warmth, and maintained, that European officers in the service of native powers were never admitted on occasions of interview with the British Residents; that to include the names alluded to, therefore, was an innovation which I should oppose to the last extreme, at the hazard of all consequences. Appaji Pant did not oppose the statement of the innovation, but observed that Holkar would scarcely be prevailed on to leave the Colonels (as he called them) behind in camp, and particularly after the communications which had taken place.

Late at night I received a civil note from Holkar, acquainting me, that he had learned from Amrit Rao, and Appaji Pant, that I was unwilling that he should be attended by the Colonels of his camps; that he was perfectly disposed to act agreeably to the Rao's sentiments; that what had passed was well, and that Appaji Pant would wait on me, and explain matters verbally to my satisfaction.

Conceiving on the 24th that Holkar was still using pretences for deferring his visit, with a view to protract my departure, I forwarded a message to Amrit Rao, signifying my wish to see Bapu Chitnavis. The messenger found this person prepared to visit me. On his arrival, I remonstrated with him on the subject of my detention.

I then enquired whether Holkar had abandoned the point respecting the European officers, as, in a note which I had received from him the preceding night, he had said that Appaji Pant would wait on me, and explain matters to my satisfaction. In reply he assured me, that Holkar, on being made acquainted with the established practice on such occasions, had readily desired the names of the European officers to be erased from the list, that he thought the difficulty had been completely removed, and that it was only necessary now to fix the time of meeting.

Bapu Chitnavis withdrew, and shortly I received a visit from Appaji Pant. I informed him of the contents of Holkar's note; he said he had not received any instructions to communicate with me on the subject, but that he knew positively that the difficulty about the European officers had been done away. If such was the case, I said, it was only necessary that I should receive a correct list. He then produced the old one, from which the names of the officers, he said, might be erased. I refused to accept it even thus altered,

and recommended it to him to call on Bapu Chitnavis, and in company with him prepare a new list, and bring it to me in the course of the evening. On this he departed.

By this time, I had learned through two secret channels, that the parties in power, namely Holkar, Amrit Rao, Moraba Padnavis, and Baba Phadkia, had resolved not to allow me to leave Poona till after the result of Mir Khan's march against the Peshwa should be ascertained, the Khan had made his way through the ghat, and was advancing to Mahad. In the evening Bapu Chitnavis and Appaji Pant returned to me, and gave me the list I required.

On the 25th, it was settled that Holkar should return my visit on the ensuing day, and in the course of the evening I received a *Dastak* from Holkar, with intimation that he would send a party of cavalry to attend me to the ghat.

On the 26th, Holkar approached at about two o'clock, meaning to call on Amrit Rao before he came to my tents; while he sat in council with the Rao, I learned that intelligence had just come in, that the Peshwa, finding Mir Khan approach in force, had retired in a southern direction, and halted at a small fort called Harnai, on the sea side, near Suvarndurg; that as His Highness could escape to sea at any time from that position, or take refuge in Suvarndurg, the party in power considered the expedition as having entirely failed, and were in consequence much disconcerted.

I received Holkar's visit at four o'clock; his manner was extremely cordial and unaffected; in the course of the interview I took occasion to remark, that I was prepared to move, and that it only remained that I should take my leave of him. That ceremony, he said, might take place soon, but that as Shreemant Amrit Rao had the direction of all things, I would probably be induced to consult his inclinations on the occasion; after the customary formalities, he returned to the camp.

Bapu Chitnavis who had been present during the interview, continued with me after it had closed, and watching an occasion took my Parsi accountant aside, and conversed with him on the subject of the intelligence before noticed, which he mentioned as of a very unfavourable kind. Mir Khan, he said, had lost upwards of 300 men, and entirely failed in the enterprize, the object of which was to secure the Peshwa's person by exciting disaffection and treachery among the troops that guarded him. Seeing me approach, he separated from the Parsi, and after he had sat down, I told him I should send off my baggage early in the morning to a short distance, and that in the course of the forenoon I might take leave of Amrit Rao, and afterwards proceed on my journey. Without paying attention to what I said, he adverted to the result of Mir Khan's expedition; said, that as the Peshwa had retired to the sea coast,

it was clear beyond all doubt that His Highness had finally determined not to return to Poona, or accept the amicable propositions which had been made to him through such a variety of channels. That under these circumstances, Amrit Rao was desirous of having the benefit of my advice, and also of having my opinion as to the manner in which the British Government would regard the events which had lately taken place affecting the Poona State. I replied that it excited my surprize to find this subject renewed, after what I had so often stated to shew that I could take no concern in the present differences; and that if Amrit Rao was desirous of obtaining your Lordship's sentiments on the merits of his cause, his only means of succeeding was to address a letter to your Lordship for the purpose, that my wish was, that he should acquaint Amrit Rao that I should be prepared to visit him on the morrow, in the course of the forenoon, for the purpose of taking my leave, and that I should hope to be favoured with an answer. He then withdrew.

Late at night I received a message from Bapu Chitnavis, that Amrit Rao would be happy to see me on the ensuing day at ten o'clock, and I learned at the same time that a little party of Amrit Rao's cavalry had arrived to attend me on my journey.

On the 27th I waited on Amrit Rao at the time appointed. We retired to a private tent. He was attended by Moroba Fadnavis, Baba Phadkia, and Bapu Chitnavis. Mr. Strachey and my Parsi accomptant accompanied me. After conversing with Baba Phadkia for some time in a low voice, Amrit Rao said, that the Peshwa having declined to communicate with Mir Khan, had retired to Suvarndurg and as it was now clear that he would not be prevailed on to return to Poona, means would be accordingly taken to settle the government. He then spoke, as he had done before, of the friendship so long subsisting between the British government and the Poona State; expressed his hope that it would never diminish; and added, that as it would be very pleasing to him if I would remain at Poona, so he trusted that I would use my endeavours to return as soon as possible. To this I made a civil reply. Baba Phadkia then adverted to the treaty of Salbai, which, he said, united the Company in friendship with the Poona State, and used some expressions tending to draw an assurance from me, that the British government would be punctual in adhering to that treaty. I replied with some earnestness, that I could add nothing to what I had repeatedly explained on such points, both to Amrit Rao personally, and to Bapu Chitnavis, for his information; that all such considerations referred solely to your Lordship, and that did they wish to explain their views to your Lordship, or obtain your Lordship's sentiments on particular subjects, I should not object to forward their dispatch for the purpose. Here Baba Phadkia seemed to

propose something to Amrit Rao in a low voice, which the latter apparently rejected. Three dispatches for your Lordship were then produced, one from Amrit Rao, one from Moroba Fadnavis, and one from Baba Phadkia. They were examined and presented to me by Amrit Rao, and on taking charge of them, I observed, that custom required that I should be furnished with copies of them, which I said, might be sent to me in the course of the evening. Amrit Rao replied that what was usual in such cases should be attended to, and that the Munshi should be instructed accordingly. He afterwards proposed that I should visit Holkar before I departed, to which I assented. We now returned to the outward tent, from whence I took my leave.

Appaji Pant had waited on me in the morning, to say, that Holkar would expect to receive the pleasure of a visit from me before my departure, and it was agreed that I should pay the visit at three in the afternoon ; after my return from Amrit Rao, however, Appaji Pant brought me another message intimating, that if I did not find it absolutely necessary to move on the following morning, Holkar would be happy if I could defer my visit for one day more. In answer, I requested him to acquaint Holkar that I had sent off my baggage, and arranged completely for moving early in the morning, and that in the present state of my health, it would be very convenient for me to reach the first stage before the sun should be high, and that I was accordingly very desirous to pay the visit at the hour which had been agreed on. Appaji Pant replied in terms which gave me reason to believe that Holkar would receive me at the time I wished, and I told him, I should give him notice of my approach by a camel *harkara*.

As the appointed hour approached, I sent off the *harkara*, and was myself prepared to set out, when Bappu Chitnavis arrived in some haste from Amrit Rao to acquaint me, that Holkar's Dewan had just sent him a note to say, that Holkar could not receive my visit till the following day ; I observed only, that I had sent an *harkara* to camp, and should wait his return.

I took this occasion, however, to remind Bappu Chitnavis, that I had not been furnished with copies of the dispatches for your Lordship. He apologized for the delay, which, he said, was owing to the neglect of his Munshi, and dispatched one of his attendants, apparently to remind the Munshi of the delay.

The camel *harkara* now returned from camp, and acquainted me, that Holkar was prepared to receive me ; Bapu Chitnavis expressed much satisfaction that the proposed delay had been avoided, and said he would accompany us.

At this interview, Holkar treated us with peculiar attention in a separate apartment, where Mr. Strachey was present. He spoke

of his wish to accommodate with the Peshwa who, he said, obstinately slighted him and countenanced Sindhia, although his house was as old as Sindhia's and at least, of equal rank. He said repeatedly that he wished to have me as his friend, and consulted me, whether I could not be useful to him in bringing about an accommodation between him and the Peshwa. I told him, that I thought it would be mutually for their interest to accommodate ; but that unless both parties were to agree to refer this difference to me, it would not be possible for me to be of any use to either. He then asked me, whether, if the Peshwa was to agree that I should arbitrate between them, I would return to Poona for the purpose : I said, I certainly could not return to Poona but under your Lordship's instructions ; but that should such an occurrence arise, I should address your Lordship, and take your sentiments on the subject. But should I fail, he said, to adjust with the Peshwa, what was to happen then ? I replied, smiling, that I did not imagine he was at any time very solicitous about future events, which he apparently took as a compliment ; he afterwards conversed with great cheerfulness, told me repeatedly, that he was happy in my acquaintance ; and rising to return to the public room, whispered to me, that Amrit Rao wished him to defer the interview, but that he was resolved it should take place at the time I appointed.

Nothing now remained to retard my departure. I left Poona early this morning, and reached this place in a few hours. I shall move by successive marches to Panvel, if nothing intervenes to interrupt my progress.

Report of Mr. Strachey submitted to Close after the former's visit to Amrit Rao on 23rd Nov. 1802.

Mr. Strachey, on the part of the Resident, acquainted Amrit Rao, that there was a point of etiquette to be settled respecting Holkar's proposed visit at the Sangam. In a list which had been sent of persons, who were to accompany Holkar, the names of several Europeans were included. It never had been customary to receive Europeans on such occasions, and Colonel Close could not on any account think of deviating from the established forms ; with respect to the number of persons it was of no consequence. The Resident wished to part on the best terms with Holkar, and would not raise difficulties about the number of Chiefs to be brought, but with respect to the reception of Europeans, Colonel Close could not allow himself any latitude ; the point was absolutely inadmissible. Amrit Rao sent for Phadkia and conversed a short time with him, and one or two other persons. Phadkia appeared to have some doubts respecting the custom ; Amrit Rao had none ; among other things, he said it was the custom of the English to hang such persons as

ran away from their service. He said he would send a person to Holkar, to explain the matter.

No. 36—Extract of a paper of intelligence from Jaswant Rao Holkar's camp, dated Poona, 5th Shaban, or 1st of December, 1802.

In the morning, Holkar having given directions about ordinary matters, came to Dewan Khana, where he was met by Moroba Fadnavis, Nagu Pant, Bal Chand Seth, and Ganpat Rao Dewan, &c. who advanced and paid their respects to him. He desired Nagu Pant to move and encamp at a spot near the bridge of Kirki, adding, that he would soon be joined there by Nawab Shahmat Khan, and that afterwards they would proceed in conjunction to Baroda in the *zila* of Gujarat. Nagu Pant has accordingly moved with his force, and encamped near the bridge of Kirki. It appears that the sum of twenty *lakhs* of rupees are due by the Gaikwad sarkar to that of the Peshwa Sahib, on account of the *soubah* of Ahmedabad, and that the troops are about to proceed to the *zilla* aforesaid for the purpose of obtaining payment of this debt. At about 9 o'clock, Holkar, having performed his devotions, went forth mounted, and inspected and mustered his different camps of infantry. He was saluted by the guns of each, and it would appear that as cash can be collected for the purpose, the different camps will receive their arrears, and be ordered to Gujarat along with Nagu Pant.

N.B. A copy of the above paper was on the 5th instant, transmitted to the Resident at Baroda, as containing intelligence forwarded by Colonel Close's news-writer at Poona, with notice, that it seemed very possible that the expedition therein said to be projected against Gujarat might not be really intended; but as the contrary was also by no means unlikely, it would (as was added) become the Major to adopt every means in his power for the security of our interest in that quarter.

No. 37—Gen. Arthur Wellesley gives the details of his interview with the vakil of Gokhla, when he discussed the line of action Gokhla will be inclined to take. He also had a general conversation with the vakil regarding the probable line of conduct of all the Maratha Chiefs in the southern parts.

Extract of a letter from Major General the honourable Arthur Wellesley to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated at Seringapatam the 4th December, 1802.

"It gives me great pleasure to be able to give you so immediately a satisfactory account of the sentiments of the Maratha Chiefs on the frontier. I had a conversation again this morning with Gokhla's vakil, the purport of which was as follows. He says, that Bapuji Ganesh Gokhla was the person who arrested the person of Holkar, who was afterwards put to death by order of the Peshwa; that in

consequence thereof he has nothing to expect from Yeshwant Rao Holkar, that he had determined to be faithful to the Peshwa, whose troops he commands, and he wishes to know what orders I have to give him. The vakil appears to think it probable, that his master will be obliged to retreat from his present situation on the Krishna, and he wishes to know whether, in that case, he could be allowed to retreat with his troops into the territories of the Company, or of the Raja of Mysore ; and he promises faithfully, that in case he should receive permission for which he now asks, his troops shall pay for everything they might receive, and no depredations shall be committed. The Vakil also requested that an asylum might be afforded within the territories of the Company, or of the Raja of Mysore, to the families of Bapuji Ganesh Gokhla, and those of some of his principal officers. He also presented me a letter from Gokhla, and another from Lingo Pant, translations of which, I have the honour to enclose. Lingo Pant was the vakil from the father of Bapuji Ganesh, and afterwards from his son to me, during the campaign of 1800. In answer to these verbal requests, I told the vakil, that it would be necessary that I should refer the matter to Government, and I gave him general assurances of friendship and goodwill. I desired him to wait here till I should receive the answers of government to his requests, and I shall be obliged to you, if you will honor me with your orders, as well regarding them as regarding the military conduct of Gokhla hereafter. In the meantime, I propose to write general answers to the letters, translations of which are enclosed".

"I took an opportunity this morning of entering into a general conversation, regarding the views and objects, and probable line of conduct of all the Maratha chiefs in this part of India, in the present crisis of Maratha affairs. It is obvious, that Gokhla must be very decided in his conduct : he has no favour to expect from Holkar ; and this is probably the reason for which so immediately after his success he dispatched this vakil to me. The vakil says, that the Patwardhan (the family of Parsaram Bhau) are exactly in the state in which you could wish them to be, viz., in anxious expectation of future events, and intending to adopt a line of conduct suitable thereto, or in other words, to take part with the strongest. He says, that it is reported, that Holkar intends to place on the Masnad, a son of Amrit Rao, and that, if he adopts that line of conduct, and places some power in the hands of Amrit Rao himself, the minds of the people in general may be more reconciled to him than they are under the existing order of things: for that, at present every man is doubtful and determined to take part with the strongest. He says, that Gokhla although he has no hopes from Holkar, will hold his ground, if power should be thrown into his hands or of

Amrit Rao. I questioned him regarding the strength of the chiefs at present ; he says, that Gokhla's body of troops consists of four thousand horse and three thousand foot, with some guns. He says the horse are 2,000 good, and 2,000 indifferent, that 500 of the good are Pagah, and 1500 silladar, 1000 of the foot are good, commanded by European officers, 1000 are Arabs and Rohillas, and 1000 I believe of the ordinary peons of the country. This state of Gokhla's force, I believe to be true, it is nearly the same as I recollect it to have been in 1800".

"The Patwardhan have four bodies of troops nearly of the same strength and discipline as Gokhla's, and they are situated at present in the neighbourhood of the Krishna, one commanded by Appa Saheb, another by Baba Saheb, and another by Dada Saheb, being three brothers, and sons of Parsaram Bhau, and a fourth by Chintaman, who is the son of Parsaram Bhau's brother, and is in fact the head of the family. I have no doubt all these chiefs will join you forthwith ; but I will send a man into that country to find out their intentions exactly and the strength of their troops, and to discover the intentions of Bapuji Sindhia, the *Kiledar* of Dharwar, and the Raja of Kittur. Both these chiefs have now bodies of troops on foot".

No. 38—The Nizam informs Holkar that Fakhruddin is neither in his pay, nor has he been entrusted by the Nizam to carry on any negotiations.

Translation of a letter from H. H. the Nizam to Jaswant Rao Holkar.
Communicated to the Resident, Dec. 18, 1802.

Fakhr-uddin Husain Khan, originally the Munshi of Sir Charles Warre Malet and also of Colonel Palmer at Poona, on his dismissal by the latter gentleman, quitted that city and proceeded to the district of Parenda, entrusted to the management of his brother Nizam Newaz Jang.

At this time, however, notwithstanding our prohibition, he has departed towards that asylum of valour, and as between the prosperous sarkar and the British Government union and alliance subsist to the exclusion of all manner of difference, it is therefore written that certain interested persons may allege that in consequence of the employment of his brothers, this person also is a dependent of the prosperous sarkar, whereas in fact he has no connection whatever with the prosperous sarkar. Precaution is therefore necessary towards this person and if he should by chance enter into any negotiations in the name of the prosperous sarkar, you must regard them as entirely spurious and not put any faith in them. Nay, the residence of this person with that asylum of valour is not consistent with policy and good counsel ; and as to negotiations whatever may

take place with that asylum of valour, will be conducted by the mutual advice of the allied Government.

No. 39—Shridhar Pandit, the vakil of Bhonsla at Poona, reports to the envoy at Hyderabad about the various conferences held between Jaswant Rao Holkar, Amrit Rao and other influential persons, in which it was finally decided to raise Vinaik Rao, son of Amrit Rao, to the '*masnad*' of the Peshwa-ship, and to seek the consent of the Nizam and the Bhonsla to the scheme. Shridhar Pandit informs the Hyderabad gentleman that the scheme will be acceptable to the Bhonsla, if it has the blessings of the Nizam.

Translation through the medium of the Persian language of a Marathi letter from Shridhar Pandit to Mahado Rao.

Communicated to the Resident at Haidarabad, Dec. 23, 1802.

Previously to this the conferences which took place with Amrit Rao, Jaswant Rao Holkar and Moroba Fadkia were particularly related in our letters dated the 13th of Rajab (November 10th) and the 9th of Shaban (December 5th). Letters were also addressed to Azim-ul-umra and Raja Ragotim Rao. Your communications will have been regulated by our dispatches, and you will have delivered the letters; a considerable period has elapsed without our receiving any answer upon which account we are anxious.

We had separate conferences with the aforesaid (Amrit Rao, with Holkar, with Fadnavis and with Fadkia) and afterwards also general meeting. The result was that Baji Rao having quitted the fort of Severndrug had embarked with Chinnapant for Bassein. That no hope now remained of his return to Poona. That an adjustment of the state for the future became necessary, but that an arrangement could not be effected unless some prince were seated on the Masnad; that Vinaik Madhav should therefore be invested with the *Khilat* of the Peshwaship, and that the succession should be continued among the descendants of the Nana Sahib (the late Madhav Rao), who reposeth in paradise. That such was the plan conceived by Nana Fadnavis, that formerly his Highness the Nizam in the time of Raghunath Rao and at the decease of Madhav Rao during the administration of Nana Fadnavis granted, at the advice of Azim-ul-umra, his aid and assistance for continuing the authority in the family of Nana Sahib. That at this time nothing was to be done without the counsel of his Highness the Nizam and of Azim-ul-umra. That Sena Sahib (Raghoji Bhonsla) was the brother of Pandit Pradhan and that without consulting the aforesaid personages (his Highness the Nizam, Azim-ul-umra and Raghoji Bhonsla) no measures were to be adopted. That if, therefore, it should concur with their united opinions the *khilat* of Peshwaship should be finally

bestowed on Vinaik Rao ; such was the result of the proposals of Amrit Rao.

In reply we observed that if the Bhau and Raste families and the other chieftains concurred in this arrangement and his Highness the Nizam according to their assertions gave his assent, it was well, but that an instrument expressive of the acquiescence of his Highness must first be produced. That when assured on this point we should not show any opposition. That in our anxiety for the interests of the state of Pandit Pradhan, the hesitation which we at present evinced, was produced by the above circumstance, that such was the intimacy of the connection and harmony between Sena Sahib, his Highness the Nizam and Azim-ul-umra, that no affairs whether of detail or magnitude ever were or ever would be transacted without mutual consultation and that if therefore they (Amrit Rao etc.,) could, as they so confidently asserted, procure from his Highness an engagement to the above effect his Highness and Azim-ul-umra from the existing intimacy and union would surely have intimated their intentions to such effect to us. That this, however, was of no material import for that if such really was the pleasure of his Highness and of Azim-ul-umra, Sena Sahib adverting to his connection with his Highness would also concur. But that our doubts would not be removed until the receipt of an engagement from his Highness. Such was purport of the conferences.

Intimation was given to the Karkuns of the Bhau and of the Raste's families who are united in this affair and the following dates were proposed for bestowing the *khilat* of Peshwaship the 17th or the 21st or 23rd of Shaban (12, 16th and 18th December). After selecting a propitious hour Amrit Rao and Holkar will depute on their own part, some confidential person in order to bring the *khilat* from Satara after the receipt of which Vinaik Madhav Rao will be formally invested on one of the aforesaid dates with the authority of Pandit Pradhan. Such are their determinations, we have fully communicated every circumstance to you and you will report them to Azim-ul-umra and Raja Ragotim Rao. Whatever counsel they may give will become our counsel.

Post Script (On a separate paper).

We had concluded our letter to you when we received a dispatch from Sena Sahib at Nagpur the purport of which is that Daulat Rao Sindhia had written a letter to him stating that Pandit Pradhan had quitted his capital and that the affairs of Poona were in disorder. That he (Sindhia) had, therefore, marched out and that he (Raja Raghoji Bhonsla) should do the same, that they should join each other, proceed to Poona and arrange the affairs of that quarter. That an answer should be speedily dispatched and that he, Sindhia, had deputed a Karkun for the purpose of negotiating.

No. 40—The G.G. is informed of the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein with the Peshwa, and also of the latest news from the camp of Jaswant Rao Holkar.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Bassein, Jan. 2, 1803.

By my address of the 30th ultimo, I had the honour to inform your lordship of my resolution to conclude the treaty of general defensive alliance with the Peshwa, provided his Highness should be induced to consent to the whole of my propositions.

By the evening of the 31st, I found his Highness was prepared to confer with me on the different points that remained to be settled. I accordingly waited upon him, and after the two schedules which I had previously proposed had been examined and compared by his Highness, he unexpectedly gave the preference to the one which I had first submitted to him, a copy whereof was transmitted to your lordship, under No. 2. As this schedule was originally recommended by the honourable the Governor of Bombay, as containing the districts from Gujerat and country south thereof, most convenient for the honourable Company, and as he continued to consider it as equal to the one subsequently prepared and forwarded to your lordship in my last address, under No. 3. I judged it proper, after some discussion, to give in to his Highness's wish, to adopt No. 2. and the treaty accordingly was signed, sealed, and delivered, a few minutes before the commencement of the new year.

A copy of the treaty, in English and Persian, I shall have the honour to transmit to your Lordship without loss of time. I have assured the Peshwa, that, under your lordship's approval, it will be ratified as soon as circumstances will permit. The original I propose lodging, for security's sake, with the government of Bombay. A copy of the Schedule, as it now stands, is conveyed herein.

As the Peshwa is resolved not to leave his own territory, and the Subah *Killedar*, lately appointed to this station, has recently descended the Bhore Ghat with seven or eight hundred men, I have, at the earnest solicitation of His Highness, and from a conviction in my own mind of the necessity of the measure, given directions for the detachment at Ghodabandar being moved to this station with all convenient expedition.

Yesterday I received a letter from Holkar conveying his wish, in general terms, to accommodate with the Peshwa, and to-day a vakil is come in from him to his Highness, but with what propositions I have not yet learned. Copies of his address to me, and of my reply, shall be transmitted hereafter for your lordship's notice.

By advices from Poona, he has nearly quarrelled with Amrit Rao, from the latter having proved incapable to supply him with cash. His troops are said to suffer extremely from want of pay, and he has failed to procure the *khilat* of investiture for Vinaik Rao Bappu, whom, in any event, his father would probably prevent from ascending the Masnad.

According to the latest Akhbars, Ambaji Ingle at Ujjain corresponds with Holkar, for the purpose of effecting an accommodation between him and Sindhia. The Pindaries of this Chieftain, however, are plundering near Chandore, and Holkar has lately ordered a detachment against them from his own division at Poona.

No. 41—Translation of Papers of Intelligence,

Poona, January 3, 1803.

Yesterday Jaswant Rao Holkar, attended by Mir Khan and Ganpat Rao Dewan, visited Amrit Rao. They sent for Baba Phadkia and Moraba Chitnavis; having conversed for some time on the necessity of raising cash, the two latter persons retired with Holkar and Amrit Rao, to hold a conference. Holkar said, he had received accounts from Bombay, that Baji Rao had deputed Raghunath Rao to Colonel Close at that Presidency and that his Highness had agreed to cede to the honourable Company the Suba of Bassein and Gujerat: that, on their part, they promised to furnish him with ten battalions, and as much money as he might require; that this arrangement had been submitted to his Excellency the Governor General; that an answer had been received, and that in consequence some money had been advanced to the Peshwa, and two battalions sent to Bassein. Amrit Rao observed, that he had also received the same intelligence, and that Baji Rao would certainly return to Poona under the protection of the British troops.—Holkar replied, "Baji Rao has destroyed the Maratha power. He has taken money from the English, and given them territory. In the [course of] time they will seize the whole, as they have done in Mysore. What do you say to this? We must write to Sindhia to ascertain whether he has done all this with his consent. Do you think this is the case? You (Amrit Rao) must write one letter, and I will dispatch another, reporting what has passed; and saying, 'Should the English, uniting with Baji Rao, ascend, Sindhia and I should accommodate our difference, and jointly oppose the British troops.'—This was agreed to, and they returned to the public Durbar. They afterwards determined to write a letter to the Governor of Bombay by a vakil. Holkar urged for a levy of 20 lakhs of rupees from the town of Poona. It was agreed that Hari Pandit Barath Bhawe should be appointed to collect the contributions.

In the course of the conversation Mir Khan observed, "When I joined Holkar, an agreement was made that we should proceed to devastate the countries, and that all plunder taken, whether guns, stores, cash, or horses, should be equally divided between us ; but he (Holkar) has taken the whole himself, so that he has not acted according to his agreement ; you must see justice done me in this affair". This excited a laugh in the Durbar. Holkar told Mir Khan that this was a private business, which should be settled by themselves ; and taking him by the hand, led him out.

Two spies, who were sent by Amrit Rao to Badami have been intercepted and confined by some of Baji Rao's adherents. Amrit Rao had written to the son of Parsram Bhau at Miraj, desiring his attendance at Poona, to which Appa Sahib has replied, "If I come up, my followers would probably quarrel with Holkar's troops ; they are brave men, and so are mine. I am your servant".

Some time ago Amrit Rao desired Appa Sahib to prevail on Bal Kishan Bonjadir, and the other Manakaries, to join him, which they have done. Pannse and the Jagirdar of Vinchor have separated from the rest of the party, and encamped at a distance of 4 kos.

The instalment of Amrit Rao, which was to have taken place on Thursday, has been postponed for seven days.

News, Poona, January 6, 1803.

I have been honoured with your letter of the 28th December, desiring me to procure and send you a correct list of Holkar's forces and also an account of the property captured by Amrit Rao's troops at Benirie (Wanodi). On this subject I shall make enquiry, and address you hereafter.

They fixed on Thursday for installing the new Peshwa, but yesterday, Holkar and Amrit Rao having met in council, the latter observed—"Authentic intelligence was received that Baji Rao had referred himself to the English, and obtained military assistance from them ; and that as they had written to Sindhia advising him of this event, it was proper to wait for his answer, and not to take any step towards settling the government, till his disposition on the subject should be ascertained". Holkar replied, "I have urged you to complete this business for a considerable time past, but you have constantly dissented. I have nothing to do now ; you have disconcerted every thing. You promised to pay me a crore of rupees, and have not discharged half that amount ; I shall see what can be done."

Holkar's people are extremely rigorous in collecting money. Baba Phadkia has proposed to proceed himself to the Durbar of the Nizam, for the purpose of procuring cash. Not one of his projects has succeeded. He has only used this pretext to enable him to

depart, his real intention being to return only, if the plans of Amrit Rao and Holkar prove successful.

A report prevails, that a body of Sindhia's troops has arrived at Burhanpur; I shall address you again to-morrow.

Proposition from Jaswant Rao Holkar, for an adjustment with his Highness the Peshwa, received the 12th January, 1803.

1. Sawai Khande Rao Holkar to be released together with his relations and dependents.

2. A *khilat* of investiture to be given to Sawai Khande Rao Holkar Bahadur, and Kashi Rao Holkar to be delivered up.

3. The *parganas* of Malwa, Rampura, and Boosnuc, &c. that fell into his* possession after the action at Indore, to be restored. His *parganas* in my possession shall be likewise restored to him.

4. The countries in Hindustan which he has held for a considerable time, and still holds, to be disposed of according to the original† agreement of a threefold division.

5. The fort of Ahmadnagar, and annexed country of ten *lakhs* of rupees, which of late belonged to the sarkar of Shrimant Bahadur, to be restored to the sarkar aforesaid.

6. In as much as through the evil advice of certain short-sighted people, dissention hath been excited between both parties, and had exposed them to mutual loss, it is accordingly proper that the past should not be attended to, and that an adjustment should take place in such a way, as that no retribution should be required for the past.

7. Formerly, and at these times, Kashi Rao hath inadvertently given vouchers to various persons. These documents shall not have weight with me.

8. In the countries of the Rajwadas‡, tribute has been collected from early times by him and me; in regard to the collection of this tribute by us both, let no assistance be given to the different Rajas.

9. Whatever may be adjusted by means of that gentleman§, let no alteration occur therein. I shall communicate a few propositions to the sarkar of Shrimant Bahadur, and hope that the sarkar will consider and approve them.

10. Of late, an action took place at Poona, of the particulars of which that friend is well informed. If any faults have been committed by me, let them be forgiven; and let him¶ regarding

Marginal Notes by Col. B. Close:—

* Here Sindhia is probably referred to.

† This alludes to an agreement said to have been entered into by Maharaja Sindhia, by which a third of his conquests in Hindustan was to be given to the Peshwa, a third to Tukoji Holkar, and the remainder to be held by himself.

‡ This article seems to refer to the territories of the Gaikwad Raja. (No. It refers to the States in Rajputana. R. Sinh).

§ Meaning the British Resident.

¶ The Peshwa.

me with the eye of favour, according to ancient custom, employ me in the service of his government.

11. Whereas various persons having come, adhere to me at present, and I have pledged my faith to them; let them now be cherished according to ancient custom, in like manner as their ancestors were cherished by the government.

No. 42—Close sends a detailed account of the progress of the negotiations carried on between him and the Peshwa after Dec. 12, 1802, to the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, and goes on to add the events upto Jan. 20, 1803.

FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT WITH THE PESHWA,
TO—J. A. GRANT, SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT, BOMBAY.

Bassein, Jan. 20, 1803.

Previous to the receipt of the instructions from his Excellency the most noble the Governor General, dated 22nd November, his Highness the Peshwa had removed from Suvarndurg to Chaul, and given satisfactory assurances relative to his determination to conclude the proposed general defensive alliance. He had also intimated his intention to embark without loss of time for Bassein, in preference to taking up his residence at Bombay; and at his earnest solicitation, it had been resolved, that a British detachment consisting of two native battalions, should be stationed at Bassein for the protection of his person. In this state of things, (on the 12th December) his Excellency's dispatch above noticed was received.

The line of policy which his Excellency was resolved to pursue, as best calculated to facilitate the objects of restoring the Peshwa to his government, and giving tranquillity to India, was now maturely considered; and it occurred, that carrying into execution the plan of stationing a British detachment at Bassein for the protection of the Peshwa, till circumstances should allow of his Highness returning to Poona, might be viewed by Holkar (in the temper in which he then apparently was) as an act of opposition which, laying open the ultimate intentions of the British Government relative to the subsisting contest, might incite him to commence hostilities. Under this impression, the Resident made the necessary explanation to the Peshwa's minister, who readily assented to the inconvenience that might have resulted from pursuing the project abovementioned; on which it was resolved, that the British detachment (instead of being stationed at Bassein) should be posted at Ghodbandar or Salsette, from whence it might be readily conveyed across the water, as occasion might require, for the Peshwa's support. This point adjusted,

his Highness arrived at Bassein ; the detachment occupied the proposed position ; boats were allotted for transporting it, as circumstances should render necessary, and an armed vessel was stationed off Bassein, with the view of affording further accommodation and security to his Highness.

During the course of the foregoing transactions, the Resident took occasion to explain to the Peshwa's minister, for his Highness's information, the pacific system of policy meant to be pursued by his Excellency, the Governor General for the re-establishment of his Highness's government, and laying the foundation of general tranquillity, and also endeavoured to learn from the minister, the nature of the communications which had recently passed between the Peshwa and Daulat Rao Sindhia, and to ascertain whether his Highness had taken any steps to obtain the consent of Sindhia to any permanent arrangement of friendship, which, under his present exigencies he might be induced to conclude with the British Government. With respect to the latter point, the British Resident was informed by the minister that the whole of the sardars who accompanied the Peshwa had agreed to the expediency of his Highness's requesting the aid of two battalions from the British Government, for the protection of his Highness's person ; that Sindhia's vakils, and those of Kashi Rao Holkar, had not only coincided on the occasion, but given it under their signatures to the Peshwa, that in the event of his Highness's concluding an arrangement with the British Government with the view to obtain its support, which require from his Highness a cession of territory to the honourable Company, a third of the cession should be borne by Sindhia, and a third by Kashi Rao Holkar, the remainder to be borne by the Peshwa ; and that it had been resolved, that when his Highness should arrive at Bassein, a confidential person should be dispatched to Ujjain, for the purpose of reconciling Sindhia to the engagement entered into by his vakils, and obtaining his confirmation of it.

The Resident further ascertained from the minister, that Sindhia's vakils knew no more concerning the engagement which had been agreed to between the Peshwa and the honourable Company's Government, than that stipulations were in view of a nature which might require a cession of territory from the Peshwa, yielding a revenue of about 24 *lakhs* of rupees ; that the engagement entered into by the vakils had a reference to an old agreement between the Poona sarkar and that of Sindhia, by which it was stipulated, that conquests made by either state should be equally divided between both ; and losses sustained by either be equally borne by each ; that the Peshwa did not doubt of obtaining Sindhia's assent to the engagement entered into by his vakils, not only from the circumstance of the latter having concluded the transactions, but because Sindhia's

government being extensive and difficult to manage, required the whole of his attention within, and because Holkar was become so formidable, as to make it the interest of Sindhia to assent to the co-operation of the British troops for his destruction ; and further, that in so far as the minister's opinion was deserving of attention, it would not be difficult to reconcile the Peshwa to the delay in the advance of the British troops, which the system of proceeding resolved on by his Excellency required ; and that when the British forces should advance, a body of cavalry belonging to the Peshwa would meet them on the banks of the Krishna, and co-operate with them during the ensuing service.

The foregoing particulars were communicated to his Excellency the Governor General, in a letter to his address from the British Resident, dated 12th December, 1802.

On the 16th of that month, the Resident left Bombay for Bassein, where he arrived on the 17th following ; his intention was to conclude with the Peshwa, if possible, a preliminary or a definitive treaty, agreeably to the tenor of his Excellency the Governor General's detailed instructions. He prepared drafts accordingly, which he had submitted to the Peshwa's minister, who stated, that his Highness would be averse to a preliminary arrangement, but well disposed to conclude a definitive treaty, by which alone he could judge of the terms on which he was to be connected with the honourable Company. The proposed stipulations for a definitive treaty were then discussed, and so far assented to by the minister, as to lead him to say, that he would endeavour to reconcile them to the Peshwa's acceptance.

On the 18th December, the Resident had an interview with the Peshwa, at which the proposed stipulations for a definitive treaty were fully discussed, his Highness having in the end assented verbally to the stipulations contained in draft, (Appendix, No. 1). As it still remained to adjust the Schedule of the districts for the jaidad, the Resident returned to Bombay, where he arrived on the 19th December. He previously arranged, however, that the Residency guard under an European officer should be moved to Bassein, for the satisfaction of his Highness, who notwithstanding the proximity of the British detachment, seemed to consider his situation as by no means secure.

The Peshwa's minister having agreed to follow the Resident to Bombay, arrived there on the 21st. The business of the schedule having now occurred, the minister consented, after much discussion, to submit to the Peshwa a list of districts, (Appendix, No. 2) which was accordingly forwarded to Bassein for his Highness's approval.

At this stage of the negotiation (22nd December) the Resident was honoured with the commands of his Excellency the Governor General, conveyed in Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's dispatch of 29th November.

On the 23rd December, the Resident addressed a letter to his Excellency the Governor General describing the point on which the negotiation had arrived, expressing his fear, that introducing a new demand on the Peshwa's government, for the payment of a fixed sum towards discharging the expense to be incurred in accomplishing the objects in contemplation, might fill his Highness with apprehensions that might produce effects on his mind of a sort which his Excellency would be desirous to prevent; and expressing a wish to be honoured with his Excellency's instructions, whether the demand alluded to was to be considered as a *sine qua non*.

On this occasion the Resident informed his Excellency, that the Peshwa's minister had shewed to him the original writings passed by the vakils of Sindhia and Kashi Rao Holkar, by which they engaged that their masters should each bear a third of the charge of the cession that might be made by the Peshwa, for obtaining support from the honourable Company; that with respect to the Peshwa's views, it was evidently his Highness's wish to preserve a cordial footing with Sindhia and Kashi Rao Holkar, to the prejudice of Jaswant Rao Holkar, towards whom he bore a rooted enmity. That in regard to Holkar's demands of the Peshwa, they seemed to bear strongly against Sindhia, and to be absolutely destructive of the pretensions of Kashi Rao Holkar, who had been always acknowledged and patronized, both by Sindhia and the Peshwa, as the head of the Holkar family and that, adverting to these circumstances, to reconcile Sindhia to the general defensive alliance, and at the same time require him to make concessions to Jaswant Rao Holkar, might be attended with difficulty; that concerning the proceedings of Jaswant Rao Holkar, it could not be a question, that originally his views were to reform the government of Poona, by making a pageant of the Peshwa, placing Amrit Rao in full authority as his Dewan, and procuring for himself (Jaswant Rao Holkar) the command of the forces with the *Zurri Patka*; and that since the Peshwa's retreat, his views had been extended to effecting a revolution, by making a new Peshwa, and thus confirming Amrit Rao and himself respectively in the appointments above-mentioned; that on the basis of one or other of these settlements, he had conceived that he would be able to recover the whole of the Holkar possessions, and assert the claims of the Poona State, whether in respect to tribute and services from the Gaikwad, the receipt of *Chauth* from the Nizam's government, or the recovery of Peshkash from the territories of the ancient Southern Polygars; that in his object of reforming or settling the government of Poona, however, he had already met with great difficulties; that although he had either obtained from the Raja of Satara a *Khilat* of investiture for the office of Peshwa for Vinaik Rao Bappu, Amrit Rao's son, or fabricated one which he produced as genuine, he could

not prevail on Amrit Rao to agree to the elevation of his son, who, from the preparations of Sindhia, and particularly from the arrival of Ambaji Ingle at Ujjain with large reinforcements, he conceived would soon be deposed; and that accordingly, should nothing particular occur to favour Holkar's designs, his embarrassments might increase to such a degree, as to induce him to relax in his demands of the Peshwa, and thus lessen the obstacles which apparently opposed the project of bringing him to an amicable accommodation; that of late he seemed to have collected cash only sufficient to prevent his troops from mutinying, and that although Amrit Rao promised to find him large supplies, he was apparently destitute of the means of performance.

On the evening of the 23rd December, the Resident received accounts from Poona through different channels, that on the 20th preceding, a Suba *killedar* for Bassein had been appointed by Amrit Rao and was to proceed to his destination without loss of time, accompanied by a detachment of cavalry and infantry with guns; conceiving that this information might tend to forward his Excellency's view of bringing the Peshwa to Bombay or Salsette, the Resident instantly dispatched an express to Captain de Courcy (who attended the Peshwa with the Residency guard) detailing the accounts he had received, and desiring him to communicate them to the Peshwa, with his earnest recommendations, that his Highness would not remain longer in [a] situation in which he, and the few persons who adhered to him, were exposed to imminent danger, but take up his residence at Bombay or Salsette, where he would be received with all due honours, and accommodated in a manner suitable to his high rank. The Resident at the same time made a corresponding communication on the above subject to the Peshwa's minister then at Bombay, who said, that he would himself address his Highness on the occasion in terms consistent with the wishes of the Resident and did not doubt but his Highness would acquiesce, if not dissuaded by designing characters near his person. On the 25th, the Resident received an express from Captain de Courcy, detailing the intelligence which he had dispatched to him on the 23rd, and mentioning, that as this intelligence had been received by the Peshwa from authentic sources, his Highness felt considerable alarm, and urged with great anxiety that the troops at Ghodbandar should be instantly ordered to Bassein for his protection. The Resident declined complying for reasons which he assigned to Captain de Courcy and to the Peshwa's minister, who promised to repeat his entreaties to his Highness to meet the Resident's recommendation, and avoid the danger to which he was exposed. There was now a prospect that his Highness would be prevailed on. The honourable the Governor of Bombay directed accommodations to be prepared for him, which were approved by the

minister, and as a further means of persuasion, addressed a letter to his Highness filled with sentiments encouragement and comfort.

By the 26th the minister had received a note from the Peshwa, in reply to his address, which conveyed the list of districts for the jaidad. His Highness expressed great dissatisfaction at the Resident's having proposed that he should cede his share of *Atthavisi*, which district, he said, formed no part of Gujerat, but was always considered as connected with Surat. To this objection, his Highness added no proposal for a substitution of taluka in lieu of his share of *Atthavisi*, but observed that the adjustment of the schedule might be deferred to a future period ; and repeated the inconvenience he was exposed to from the troops at Ghodbandar not being permitted to advance to Bassein for his support. The merits of this reply were examined, and in the course of the discussion, the minister observed, that the *Suba* of Ahmedabad, (managed for the Peshwa by Raoba the Gaikwad minister) might be substituted for the *Atthavisi*, provided the right of *Mulukgiri* which attached to it should be allowed to continue with the Peshwa ; the provision here required was resisted, and the Resident, assisted by the honourable the Governor of Bombay, prepared and afterwards presented to the minister a schedule, (Appendix, No. 3) which after various objections, he at length consented to forward to the Peshwa, as containing a fresh proposition from the Resident, in consequence of his Highness's aversion to part with *Atthavisi*.

The minister at this period took occasion to acquaint the Resident, that according to the latest advices received by the Peshwa, it did not appear that any troops had actually marched from Poona for Bassein ; that his Highness was nevertheless anxious that the detachment at Ghodbandar should be ordered to join him agreeably to his former request ; that he had lately desired him (the minister) by different messages to return to the presence ; and that it was accordingly his intention to embark for Bassein on the ensuing day. The minister further said, that as nothing could be finally adjusted at the Durbar while the Resident was absent, it was hoped he would likewise return to Bassein without delay. The Minister proceeded on his return to the presence on the 27th of December, and the Resident following him on the ensuing day, arrived at Bassein on the 29th of December.

He found on landing, that notwithstanding the explanation made to him by Captain de Courcy and the minister, and the sentiments and assurances contained in the address from the honourable the Governor of Bombay, the Peshwa entertained great uneasiness on account of his request for the troops not having been complied with, and of its having been recommended to him to take up his residence at Bombay ; that from these circumstances, he drew inferences

unfavourable to the British faith, which filled him with alarms ; that perceiving him in this habit of mind, Sindhia's vakils and partisans had urged him with apparent effect to repair, if pressed, to Baroach, in order to join Sindhia, as the troops of that Chieftain should advance into the Deccan ; and that in pressing this scheme upon his Highness's mind, they were aided by a dispatch which he had recently received from Sindhia, assuring him of immediate and powerful support. The Resident now became anxious to close the negotiation ; he renewed the subject of the schedule with the minister, who said at length, that the Peshwa would soon be prepared to confer on the subject of it.

The foregoing particulars the Resident communicated to his Excellency the Governor General in an address dated 30th December, in which he further stated, that in proceeding to meet the Peshwa on the subject of the schedule, he should be subject to great solicitude ; that from the advanced period to which the negotiation had arrived before he was honoured with an expression of his Excellency's wishes relative to a special article, stipulating for the payment of a fixed sum to meet the expenses to be incurred by accomplishing the objects in view, and from the jealousy natural to his Highness's mind, which had held him to a line of conduct that might admit of his prosecuting a course as obstructive of his Excellency's views as injudicious in relation to his own interests, he (the Resident) had avoided to mention to his Highness or to his minister the proposal for the special article alluded to, apprehending that to introduce the subject of it at so late a period would not only fail of success, but be productive of consequences wholly irreparable ; and that to delay the conclusion of the treaty eventually till he should be honoured with his Excellency's instructions in reply to his last address, might be followed by effects not less disadvantageous especially as the influence of Sindhia's partisans would naturally increase as his preparations should advance ; that weighing maturely all these considerations, adverting to the terms of the proposed *jaidad*, which besides being favourable in regard to produce, were calculated to extend the influence if not the power of the British Government over the whole peninsula of Gujarat, and also to the advanced state of the preparations in the Carnatic, and the shortness of the season for action, he should probably deem it most consistent with the spirit of his Excellency's commands, to conclude the treaty with the Peshwa on the ground of all the propositions offered, trusting to the general merits of the treaty, in his Excellency's consideration, to counterbalance the absence of the special article ; and that as the Peshwa would probably not shake off his aversion to repairing to Bombay, he (the Resident) should in such case consider himself as authorized to bring over the troops from Ghodbandar for his Highness's protec-

tion, as well against the direct attempts of his enemies, as the treachery of his own troops ; as, after the conclusion of the treaty, the regret to be occasioned by an accident happening to his person would, if possible be increased, while the contingency of hostilities occurring at so matured a point could not be attended with serious prejudices.

On the evening of the 31st December, the Resident proceeded, by appointment, to visit the Peshwa, for the purpose of finally adjusting the business of the schedule the only article that remained unsettled respecting the treaty. After the two schedules which had been previously submitted had been examined and compared by his Highness, he unexpectedly gave the preference to the one first proposed ; the districts in which had been likewise approved by the honourable the Governor of Bombay, as highly convenient for the honourable Company. The Resident, therefore, finding the Peshwa's choice to be decidedly fixed, and judging the two schedules to be nearly equal, was induced, after some discussion, to give in to his Highness's wish to adopt the first proposed ; and accordingly the treaty, as shewn by (Appendix, No. 1 and 2) was signed, sealed, and delivered, a few minutes before the commencement of the new year.

On the 1st instant the Resident received a letter from Jaswant Rao Holkar, conveying his wish, in general terms, to accommodate with the Peshwa ; and nearly at the same time vakils from Holkar came in to his Highness.

On the 2nd instant the Resident dispatched an address to his Excellency the Governor General, announcing the event of the conclusion of the treaty, and intimating, that as the Peshwa continued fixed in his resolution not to leave his own territory, and it was ascertained that Balwant Rao Pause, the Subah *killedar* appointed to Bassein by Amrit Rao, had descended the *Ghat* with a party of seven or eight hundred men, he (the Resident) had, at the earnest solicitation of the Peshwa, and from a conviction in his own mind of the necessity of the measure, given directions for the detachment at Ghodbandar being moved to Bassein.

The Resident at the same time mentioned to his Excellency the letter which on the preceding day he had received from Holkar, and farther intimated, that by advices from Poona, it appeared that Holkar had nearly quarrelled with Amrit Rao, from the latter having proved incapable to supply him with cash ; that his troops were said to suffer extremely from want of pay ; and that he had failed to procure the *khilat* of investiture for Vinaik Rao Bapu, whom, in any event, his father would probably prevent from ascending the *masnad* ; that by the latest Akhbars from the northward, Ambaji Ingle correspond with Holkar, for the purpose of effecting an accommodation between him and Sindhia, but that nevertheless the Pindari cavalry belonging to the latter Chieftain were plundering near Chandore, and

that Holkar had ordered a detachment against them from his own division at Poona. The Resident also stated in the same address that he had not been favoured with any intimation from Colonel Collins of his having received his Excellency's instructions relative to his return to the court of Sindhia ; that he (the Resident) should wait the arrival of advices from him on that subject, and act on his Excellency's commands, in regard to the intimation which he was to give to Sindhia respecting the treaty with the Peshwa, as circumstances should appear to require ; the Resident added, that as Holkar had expressed a wish to accommodate with the Peshwa, and could have no prospect of receiving aid from his Highness the Nizam, or cash from Amrit Rao, he would probably be slow to break with the British Government, on account of the connection it had formed with his Highness the Peshwa, and the support it was about to afford him ; but that nevertheless the fullest precaution should be used to place the troops about to arrive at Bassein in the greatest security, and give them every means to execute the service for which they were destined.

On the 4th instant the troops from Ghodbandar arrived at Bassein, and took up a position to the east-ward of the town. On the following day the Resident forwarded for his Excellency's notice a copy of a reply he was about to dispatch to Holkar, acknowledging the receipt of his letter, informing him of the defensive engagements which had taken place between the Honourable Company and the Peshwa, and stating, that if from a disposition to accommodate, and consistently with moderation, he should make known the propositions he had in view for an adjustment with the Peshwa to the British Government, it would use its endeavours to effect an agreement between the parties. The Resident at the same time dispatched an address to his Excellency, intimating the arrival of the troops, and the substance of a message which he had received from the Peshwa through his minister, on the subject of the propositions which Holkar's vakils had brought from their master, and which the minister stated to be as follow :

1st. His Highness to give Holkar one crore of rupees for the payment of his troops.

2nd. His Highness to give a fortress to Holkar in the same manner as he gave Ahmadnagar to Sindhia.

3rd. His Highness to cause Sindhia to release Khande Rao Holkar, and place him in possession of the territories of the Holkar family.

4th. The third proposition complied with, his Highness to present Khande Rao Holkar with a *khilat* of investiture, as the heir and representative of the Holkar family.

These propositions, the Resident acquainted his Excellency, were conceived by the Peshwa to be so extravagant as not to merit attention. On this occasion the Resident offered it as his opinion to his Excellency, that to negotiate any agreement between the Peshwa and Holkar, would in all likelihood prove to be a task of time, as well as of great difficulty; that Holkar's demands would probably be regulated in a great degree by the large arrears due to his troops; that his Highness's incompetency to raise any considerable sum, from the exhausted state of his finances, was but too evident and that the degree of influence he might possess with Sindhia, under the present course of things, would be necessarily uncertain; that if a negotiation should commence, and Holkar find that his demands would not succeed, he might wish to procure some honourable employment under the Peshwa's government, but that a person of his character and pursuits could scarcely be suited for any subordinate situation under the Poona State. The Resident added, that by every account Holkar's wants at Poona were become so urgent, that it might be doubted whether he could move the greater part of his army for any service of importance; that the party which he had ordered to Chandore did not appear to have marched; that Holkar's confederate, Fateh Singh Mane, who had been dispatched to Satara, had taken a southern direction, and was said to be plundering near Kolhapur, having declined to comply with Holkar's injunctions to him to return. That the cavalry of Shahmut Khan, another of Holkar's confederates, were so distressed as to be under the necessity of spreading to procure subsistence, a party of them having plundered a detachment of *paga* cavalry belonging to Holkar, who were on their way to join him from Chandore; and that recent intelligence from Poona mentioned that Amrit Rao was so much embarrassed and distracted by Holkar's importunities, that he had been driven to propose to this chieftain to send vakils to Hyderabad, Nagpur, and Baroda, for the purpose of requiring payment of the arrears, under different heads, reputed to be due from these governments to the Poona state. The Resident further observed, that although he had not had the pleasure of hearing from Colonel Collins on the subject of the late instructions to him, it was his intention to forward to Sindhia the intimation respecting the treaty which his Excellency had desired; that he (the Resident) could not be aware of the information which his Excellency might receive of the state of affairs at Sindhia's court, by the time the present address should come to hand. But supposing no circumstances to occur in that quarter particularly unfavourable to such a plan, he would recommend that the troops from the Carnatic and Hyderabad should be ordered to advance towards Poona with all convenient expedition: that the preparations in the Carnatic, and the destination of

the troops were openly talked of at Poona : and that the approach of the army, while it might promote the wished-for negotiation with Holkar, might also have a restraining effect with regard to Sindhia, who might possibly be conciliated by his Excellency's amicable propositions, or at all events could scarcely have the means of reaching Poona so soon as the British troops, if they should move from the Tungabhadra by the middle of February, the time at which it was calculated that they would be ready to enter the Maratha territory ; that a corps of the Peshwa's cavalry was assembled in the neighbourhood of Miraj, and that his Highness had promised to furnish letters to the different sardars, to be forwarded through the channel of the British Commander in the field, directing them to join the British force and co-operate with them during the ensuing service.

The Resident took occasion further to observe, that the happy termination of hostilities at Baroda might with the aid of other arrangements, enable the honourable the Governor of Bombay to reinforce the detachment at Bassein to a degree that might enable the Peshwa, under a favourable combination of circumstances, to ascend the Ghats, with a view to join the army as it should cross the Krishna, near Miraj, or at some more advanced points.

On the 9th instant the Resident forwarded, for his Excellency's notice, copy of a letter which he had that day dispatched to Sindhia, informing that Chieftain, that engagements of a defensive nature had been concluded between the Peshwa and the honourable Company, and inviting him to co-operate with the British Government for the re-establishment of the Peshwa's authority ; and further announcing, that Colonel Collins was instructed to repair to his court, charged with amicable propositions to him from his Excellency the Governor General, tending to promote the welfare and security of both states. On the above date, the Resident also dispatched an address to his Excellency, explaining the considerations which induced him not to defer giving the proposed intimation to Sindhia, and adverting to papers of intelligence recently received, by which it appeared, that Holkar's necessities were extreme ; and that to avert the effects of the Peshwa's alliance with the British Government, he meditated an union of interests between himself and party and Daulat Rao Sindhia ; that Mir Khan, Holkar's most powerful confederate was reduced to such exigency as to have complained of Holkar's conduct to him, in a manner which shewed that these two chieftains originally united with the view to mutually subsist by means of general plunder ; that the party which Holkar ordered to Chandore had not marched from want of pay ; and that two of Holkar's brigades of infantry, under European commanders, were in a state of mutiny from the same cause. The Resident further acquainted his Excellency, that Holkar's vakils continued with the

Peshwa, who, in reply to their demands, urged, that so far from Holkar having a claim on him for a crore of rupees, he possessed full ground for a large demand against Holkar for having entered his territories, and laid them waste without mercy or distinction ; that his having given a fortress to Sindhia, could not furnish a pretext for his being required to give a fortress to any other person. That Kashi Rao Holkar, being the eldest son of Tukoji Holkar, was established by his father as his heir, and that accordingly the *khilat* of investiture from the Poona government was presented to him during the life of his father ; that his conduct had at all times been unexceptionable, and that accordingly there could be no pleas (could there be such a disposition in any quarter) to deprive him of his inheritance for the benefit of any other individual.

That the boy Khande Rao Holkar was in charge of Daulat Rao Sindhia, and would probably be adopted by Kashi Rao Holkar, who had no children ; that he (the Peshwa) was anxious that so desirable an arrangement respecting the family should take place, by which Khande Rao would be put in the way of inheriting, in due time, all the possessions of his ancestors.

The Resident added, that by a private communication from Mr. Duncan, he learnt that dispatches from Ujjain, twelve days old, had been recently received at Baroda, announcing the arrival of Sindhia in Indore, where he halted, in the expectation of being joined by the Peshwa ; that some dispatches had passed lately from Sindhia for the Peshwa, via Broach, and that the former had ordered a *dak* to be laid from Gujerat to his army, with the view of facilitating his correspondence with the Peshwa. That he (the Resident) adverted to this intelligence the more particularly, as there was reason to think that notwithstanding the engagement formerly entered into by Sindhia's vakils, touching the cession by which the Peshwa might obtain succour from the English, they had experienced great disappointment at finding, that the Peshwa had stipulated to receive permanently a subsidiary force, instead of temporary aid ; their hopes having been, that, under an agreement for temporary assistance, the Peshwa would still have joined Sindhia as occasion offered, or at least preserved so close a connection with him, as to admit of the continuance of his influence at the Poona Durbar ; that they had been concerned recently in a plan to draw off Chimnaji, the Peshwa's brother, and that the young man had not shewn himself averse to the scheme. That adverting to the foregoing facts and appearances, he (the Resident) was strongly impressed with the expediency of the British forces being ordered to advance towards Poona, and should be induced to use the latitude he was honoured with for the purpose, did not he find that his Excellency was in the means of receiving the present dispatch, and transmitting consequent

directions to the government of Fort St. George, which would reach that Presidency before the troops could be ready to enter the Maratha territories.

On the 12th instant, the Resident received a message from the Peshwa, informing him, that he was about to forward a letter to Amrit Rao, inviting him to separate from his colleagues at Poona, and join his Highness by any possible means within the period of 15 days from the date of the dispatch, and to bring his son along with him. On the evening of the same day, the Resident received a dispatch from Jaswant Rao Holkar in reply, with a list of propositions from him for an adjustment with the Peshwa.

On the 13th instant the Resident transmitted copies of the foregoing documents, in an address to the Governor General, in which he noticed to his Excellency, that in regard to Holkar's propositions, he appeared to have relinquished the demand for the payment of a crore of rupees, extending his pretensions, however, to other difficult objects; and that propositions 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th, referred solely to Sindhia, and could not be acceded to without great sacrifices, on his part. The Resident also observed, that in so far as the Peshwa's professions could be depended on, he was extremely averse to give in to measures calculated to excite the resentment, or estrange the good disposition of Sindhia; and that with respect to Holkar's demands, his Highness still conceived them to be so ill-founded and extravagant, as not to be deserving of any regard. His Highness having expressed it as his opinion, that if Holkar was sincerely inclined to submit to his authority, he should in the first instance retire with his forces from Poona, the Resident further acquainted his Excellency, that he had prepared a letter for Holkar (Appendix No. 5) which he trusted would operate in some degree to prevent extremities till he should be honoured with his Excellency's instructions consequent of the present address. The Resident further stated, that by authentic advices from Poona, it appeared that Holkar still proceeded on his plan of placing a new Peshwa on the *masnad*, having, notwithstanding the pressure of his wants, and the discontented state of his army, recently managed to dispatch four battalions against Raigarh, for the purpose of releasing from confinement in that fort the widow of the late Sawai Madhav Rao, in order that for the re-establishment of the government, she might receive in adoption the son of Amrit Rao. That although success in this design would probably be of little benefit to Holkar's affairs, the Peshwa's anxiety lest the widow should be released was extreme; and that his Highness was accordingly exceedingly urgent that a British corps should be dispatched to Raigarh, by way of Bankot, for the defence of that port; and that on being told that such a measure at the present period would be totally inconsistent with

the plans of operation resolved on by the British Government, he desired that part of the detachment at Bassein should be embarked for the above service. The Resident further informed his Excellency, that the troops originally ordered to Bassein, had, at his instance, been reinforced by upwards of three hundred men; and that the detachment was healthy, extremely orderly, well supplied, and judiciously posted.

Since the 13th instant, nothing very material has occurred; Balwant Rao Phanse has lately possessed himself of Kalyany, and advanced to a position twelve *kos* distance from Bassein; but his force is not sufficient at present to allow of his forming any immediate design against the place.

No accounts are yet received of the force sent by Holkar against Raigarh, having arrived before that fort. Letters from Poona mention, that an agent has arrived there from Ambaji Ingle with dispatches for Holkar, and that Baba Phadkia was to proceed soon to Hyderabad as *vakil* from the ruling party at Poona to the Nizam's court.

A dispatch from Colonel Collins, dated Fatehgarh, 19th December, mentions, that he was on the eve of commencing his journey to Sindhia's Durbar. By the latest Akhbar, that Chieftain with his army had reached the pass near the northern bank of the Narbada, and had parties employed in clearing it for the passage of his heavy ordnance. He appeared to wait anxiously the arrival of General Perron, who, it was thought, would avoid coming himself to the Deccan; committing the force required by Sindhia from Hindustan to the charge of another officer. His Highness the Nizam appears to be cordially disposed to act in concert with the British Government. His troops are assembling, and their movements, with those of the subsidiary force, will probably be regulated by the motions of the troops from the Carnatic.

The Nagpur government seems to be influenced by Sindhia, and at the same time desirous of preserving the best understanding with the court of Hyderabad. The Peshwa professes to be confident, that Sindhia will side with his interests throughout the present contest, but is apprehensive that this Chieftain may express some displeasure at his having concluded so intimate an alliance with the honourable Company, without consulting him (Sindhia) as guarantee of the treaty of Salbai. Under this apprehension, his Highness has it in contemplation to depute a confidential person to Sindhia with amicable explanations, calculated to reconcile him to the late transactions.

The Resident avoids offering any speculation relative to the present unsettled state of Maratha affairs. He conceives it probable,

however, that Sindhia will, at least, be reconciled to the alliance concluded by the Peshwa ; and that if the British troops advance, Holkar will be obliged to modify his views, and lessen his demands to a degree that may admit of a general accommodation.

SECTION III

Restoration of Baji Rao to Poona, (20 January—13 May 1803.)

No. 43—Edmonstone instructs Kirkpatrick to take the permission of the Nizam and then to direct the subsidiary force at Hyderabad to join the army of the Nizam. He further adds that the commanding officer should act according to the instructions and directions of Close.

FROM—N. B. EDMONSTONE, SECRETARY TO GOVT.,
TO—MAJOR KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT AT HYDRABAD.

Fort William, Feb. 3, 1803.

In conformity to the plan of operations, which his Excellency has resolved to adopt, you will direct the commanding officer of the subsidiary force to march with the whole of that force, for the purpose of forming a junction with the army of his Highness the Nizam, having first obtained his Highness's consent to that measure; for which purpose it will be proper that you should communicate to His Highness the intended plan of operations. You will concert with the Resident at Poona the position which it will be advisable for the combined army to occupy on the Nizam's frontier, preparatory to its actual advance towards Poona.

His Excellency directs, that, in conformity to the tenor of the ninth paragraph of his Excellency's instructions of this date, to the Resident at Poona, you will instruct the commanding officer of the subsidiary force to conform to any suggestions which he may receive from the Resident at Poona, with regard to the time of commencing his march from the Nizam's frontier towards Poona, or to any other

points connected with the objects of the destination of that force ; and you will request his Highness the Nizam to issue orders to the officer in command of his troops, directing him to attend to any suggestions which he may receive from the commanding officer of the subsidiary force, for the regulation of his conduct.

No. 44—Many of the terms proposed by Holkar being inadmissible, Edmonstone asks Close to offer those terms which the Peshwa could grant within his limited powers. Edmonstone further says that the British should make an offer to Sindhia to arbitrate his differences with Holkar, but finally adds that measures be adopted for an early return of the Peshwa to Poona.

**FROM—N. B. EDMONSTONE, SECRETARY TO GOVT.,
TO—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA.**

Fort William, Feb. 11, 1803.

By command of his Excellency the most noble the Governor General, I have now the honour to communicate to you his Excellency's sentiments and instructions on the subject of Jaswant Rao Holkar's propositions. His Excellency concurs in the opinion expressed by his Highness the Peshwa, that Jaswant Rao Holkar's propositions are, for the most part, utterly inadmissible. The rights of Kashi Rao Holkar, as successor to his father the late Tukoji Holkar, are founded on the most indisputable grounds, and could not be abrogated without a gross violation of every principle of honour and justice ; the demand of Jaswant Rao Holkar, therefore, for the surrender of Kashi Rao, and for the investiture of Khande Rao, together with every other demand founded on that claim ought to be decidedly rejected.

His Excellency observes, that, adverting to the independent authority possessed by Daulat Rao Sindhia, under the actual constitution of the Marhatta empire, such of Jaswant Rao Holkar's demands as refer exclusively to Daulat Rao Sindhia, cannot be adjusted by the mediation of the British authority, without the consent of Daulat Rao Sindhia to submit those demands to our arbitration. His Excellency, however, deems it to be both unnecessary and inexpedient to suspend the negotiation with Jaswant Rao Holkar until the determination of Daulat Rao Sindhia upon that point can be ascertained. It is unnecessary, because Jaswant Rao Holkar's refusal to admit the Peshwa's return to Poona, unless his Highness and the British government shall guarantee certain concessions on the part of Sindhia, would indicate, in the actual circumstances of the case, a resolution to reject any terms of accommodation which could be reasonably offered to Holkar by the Peshwa, under the security of the British power.

His Excellency is of opinion, that terms of accommodation between the Peshwa and Holkar, limited to the extent of those which the Peshwa is authorized to grant, and which it may be consistent with the dictates of policy and justice to concede, should be immediately offered to Jaswant Rao Holkar's acceptance. The proffered terms should partake equally of firmness and concession. His Excellency does not possess sufficient information to enable him to suggest the precise nature and extent of the concessions which the Peshwa is authorized to grant to Holkar, and which it might be expedient to yield. This point must necessarily be determined by communications between you and His Highness. His Excellency, is however, of opinion, that it might be advisable for the Peshwa to agree to pay to Holkar a considerable sum of money, on the condition of his immediately withdrawing his army from Poona. His Excellency is aware of the Peshwa's present inability to command resources sufficient for that purpose: his Excellency will, therefore, be disposed to authorize the government of Bombay to guarantee a loan for that purpose, provided that the payment of a sum of money to Holkar should be necessary to secure that chieftain's voluntary departure from Poona. It may also be a matter for your consideration, whether the grant of a fort, with a jaghir, might not be offered with advantage by the Peshwa to Jaswant Rao Holkar; if such an establishment could be secured to him, the tranquillity of the Deccan would be cheaply purchased by their sacrifice.

That part of Holkar's propositions, which stipulates for amnesty on the part of the Peshwa, appears to his Excellency to be unobjectionable. Every assurance should be afforded to Holkar, that the utmost influence of the British government, and the Peshwa, will be exerted to effect an accommodation between Holkar and Sindhia, on terms as favourable to Holkar as may be practicable, consistently with the principles of equity, and with the just rights of Sindhia. It will be proper at the same time to explain to Jaswant Rao Holkar the injustice of his demand for the surrender of Kashi Rao Holkar, and for the investiture of Khande Rao; and the unreasonableness of his requiring as the condition of his submission to the legitimate authority of his sovereign, the guarantee of his Highness for the satisfaction of his demands on Daulat Rao Sindhia.

These propositions and remonstrances should be accompanied by a requisition to Holkar, in the name of the Peshwa and of the British government, to withdraw his troops immediately from Poona, and to refrain from any opposition to the arrangements which have been made for the restoration of the Peshwa to the *masnad* of Poona; and Jashwant Rao Holkar should at the same time be apprized, that, in the event of his rejecting the just and reasonable

terms offered by the Peshwa to his acceptance, under the guarantee of the British government, the allied forces of the Company, the Peshwa, and the Nizam, will be employed to compel his submission to the just authority of his sovereign.

The representations and propositions to be made to Jaswant Rao Holkar should be accompanied with an offer to Sindhia, on the part of the British government, to arbitrate the differences subsisting between him and Jaswant Rao Holkar. You will accordingly be pleased to transmit to Daulat Rao Sindhia, at the period of time above specified, a proposal to that effect, either directly, or through the Resident with Daulat Rao Sindhia, who may be expected shortly to arrive at that chieftain's camp, as may appear to you to be most advisable, apprizing the Resident at the same time of the adoption of that measure.

It does not appear to his Excellency to be probable that Holkar will venture to oppose the united arms of the Company, the Peshwa, and the Nizam, unless assured of the active support and co-operation of Sindhia; his Excellency, therefore, entertains a confident expectation of the peaceable accomplishment of our late arrangements with the Peshwa, by the course of the proceeding suggested in his dispatch.

You were apprized in a former dispatch, that his Excellency was solicitous to act in concert with Daulat Rao Sindhia, in restoring the Peshwa to his dominion. In the present crisis of affairs, however, it would be impolitic to postpone the actual restoration of the Peshwa to the *masnad* of Poona, with a view to that object. In every point of view, therefore, it is expedient that the measures to be adopted for the return of the Peshwa to Poona, under the protection of the British power, should be prosecuted with the least practicable delay.

No. 45—Stuart sends detailed instructions to Maj.-Gen. Wellesley as to how the ensuing campaign is to be conducted, and points out that the early and expeditious advance of his detachment is most essential for the success of the campaign.

**FROM—J. STUART, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MADRAS,
TO—MAJOR GENERAL A. WELLESLEY.**

Head Quarters, Camp at Narsighur [Davangere?], March 9, 1803.

You have already been apprized of your appointment to the command of a detachment destined to advance into the Marhatta territory, and of the description and extent of the force composing that detachment. You have also been furnished with the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General and the Right honour-

able the Governor of Fort St. George, relative to the purposes of its movements, and have been supplied with copies of all the public communications that I have received regarding the present state of affairs in the Marhatta empire, the strength and disposition of Jaswant Rao Holkar's forces, and the probable objects of his designs. The above instructions from government will fully explain to you the plan of proceedings, by which the Governor General has proposed to re-establish the authority of the Peshwa, and fulfil the condition of the defensive alliance concluded with his Highness. The information derived from these papers, together with your extensive knowledge of the state of the subject, has therefore obviated the necessity of furnishing you with detailed instructions from myself on the particular measures to be adopted in pursuit of those objects ; more especially, as the nature of the service upon which you are proceeding, depending on the sentiments of a people whose views and opinions are but imperfectly known at this distance, and on events of a contingent nature, precludes the practicability of ascertaining the exact operations which it may be thought proper to undertake.

Although I have considered it to be expedient to avoid prescribing the particular plan of the operations of your detachment, yet I judge it necessary to state certain principal objects, which, in my judgment, ought to regulate the course of your proceedings:

1. To encourage the southern jagirdars to declare in favour of the Peshwa's cause ; to employ every means to reconcile their mutual animosities ; and to induce them to unite their forces with the advancing detachment, for the purpose of re-establishing his Highness's government.

2. To proceed to Miraj, and form a junction with the Peshwa, or, should that measure be deemed inadvisable on the part of his Highness, with such of his chieftains and troops as may be able to meet you there.

3. To open a communication, and form a junction with the subsidiary force under Colonel Stevenson, and the contingent of his Highness the Nizam.

4. To proceed eventually to Poona, and establish an order of things in that capital favourable to the return of the Peshwa, and the attainment of the ends of the late treaty.

The means of accomplishing those objects must be regulated by your own judgment, in conformity to circumstances. It will require every exertion of your ability to unite the southern jagirdars in an effectual support of the Peshwa's cause, distracted as they are at present by internal dissensions and hostilities. The interests and fears, however, of those chieftains, will render them solicitous to

avert the calamities threatened by the further successes of a power that derives its support from contributions and plunder, and they must be sensible that the retreat or overthrow of that power, and the restoration of a regular government, are the only means by which the dangers to which they are now exposed can be prevented, and the possession of their tranquillity secured. But in encouraging the co-operation of those chieftains, you will carefully abstain from any specific engagements of a nature incompatible with the rule established by his Excellency the Governor General, for the conduct to be observed towards them. You will receive herewith duplicates of the letters stated by Lieutenant Colonel Close, to have been transmitted by the Peshwa, to the chieftains in the neighbourhood of Miraj and the Kistna, who are considered to be attached to his cause, enjoining them to join and cooperate with the British troops on their advance. You will forward those letters to their respective addresses, at such times, and accompanying them with such instructions to the chieftains on the subject of their cooperating with you, as you may find to be most expedient.

The general state of affairs renders the rapidity of your advance of essential advantage, as your early arrival upon the Kistna, and your junction with the Peshwa's troops and the subsidiary force, will materially contribute to frustrate any designs which may be meditated against his Highness's interests, or the arrangements of the late treaty, and to give union and efficacy to your operations. I consider it therefore of importance that you should employ every practicable degree of expedition in collecting the forces of the southern jagirdars, and proceeding in conjunction with them to join the Peshwa and the Nizam's force. I attach the greatest consequence to the latter junction, and I request that you will keep the means of accomplishing it at all times in view.

The detachments under you and Colonel Stevenson, while separated from each other, are exposed to misfortunes from which their united strength would effectually secure them. The subsidiary force in particular, destitute of Europeans, and occupying an advanced position, may be liable to the necessity of acting under very unfavourable circumstances. Every view of our situation appears to me to require that your junction with Colonel Stevenson's force should be effected at the earliest practicable period of time, as that measure will secure, more than any other, the safety of the British troops, and the general success of the plans of government.

I have not noticed in the foregoing orders the conduct to be observed on your part in case of the opposition of any chieftain, and in particular of Jaswant Rao Holkar, from whom we are led to expect most opposition to your proceedings. The instructions of the Governor General and Lord Clive contain no orders, and

afford no positive rule to guide my determination on this important head. I infer, however, from the spirit of those instructions, that if the majority of the southern jagirdars, and the sentiments of the body of the people, are found to declare in favour of the restoration of Baji Rao, the British detachment ought to persevere in the endeavours to reestablish his authority; and should the detachment, during the prosecution of that endeavour encounter the hostility of any individual jagirdar, that they are to employ, in concert with the well-affected jagirdars, every practicable means to overcome his opposition. In the event, therefore, of any single feudatory offering resistance to the restoration of the Peshwa, after you have ascertained that the sentiments of the majority of the chieftains are favourable to that measure, I am of opinion that the instructions which I have received justify me in authorizing you to compel his submission.

This authority must, however, be understood to apply to the case only of your experiencing hostility from any of the Marhatta chiefs, for the principle of his Excellency the Governor General's policy is, to avoid a war; and as his Excellency has directed me to bear this principle in mind as the rule of our conduct on every emergency that may arise, you will carefully forbear from the adoption of any measure that is likely to involve the occurrence of hostilities with any of the parties of the Marhatta empire.

The numerous considerations which recommend the early and expeditious advance of the detachment, render it inadvisable, in my judgment, to undertake the siege of Dharwar.

No. 46—The Governor General is informed about the entry of the English forces in Maratha territory, and of the favourable reception of the English armies by the inhabitants of the country.

**FROM—A. WELLESLEY,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

*Camp at Karijgy, upon the Warda,
March 13, 1803.*

You will be anxious to hear from me as soon as possible, after I have entered the Marhatta territory, and I lose no time in writing to you.

I crossed the Tungbhadra at Havanur yesterday, and marched to this river, and made another march towards Savanur this day. We have been well received by the inhabitants of the country; the villages are full, and the camp is well supplied with forage and provisions; I have no doubt whatever but that I shall be able to

bring forward for the service of the Peshwa, all the jagirdars in the southern part of the empire, and I think that all your plans will be carried into execution.

This detachment of the army is well supplied with provisions, and every thing it can want, and excepting in forage, for which every large body of troops must depend upon the country which is to be the seat of its operations, is nearly independent of the resources of this country. We owe this state of our supplies to the flourishing resources of Mysore, and to the ease with which they are brought forward for the use of the British armies. But any change in the system of government in that country will be felt immediately, and particularly by that body of troops which will be in advance.

I hear nothing of any of Holkar's troops, and I do not know that we have an enemy in the country.

No. 47—Close sent the following translation of a letter from a Brahmin at Poona, in which the Brahmin gives detailed information about the terms of Holkar for a satisfactory settlement of his dispute with Sindhia and of the question of succession to the principality of Indore.

Poona, March 15, 1803.

Anand Rao Vakeel has got no answer yet from the Court of Hyderabad. The guard that was placed on his house, was removed by Holkar when he lately visited this place.

Not long since Jaswant Rao Goreporey and Nagojee Gundoo arriving from Ambaji Ingle, waited on Holkar at Jejuri, and accompanied him hither, after which they had a meeting here with Holkar and Amrit Row, and explained themselves to the following effect. It is agreed that Khande Rao Holkar, shall be heir and master, that Kashi Rao Holkar, shall be his Dewan, and that Jaswant Rao Holkar, shall be established as a Sardar. If these propositions shall be agreed to, the settlement shall be confirmed by a khillat from the Peshwa Baji Rao. Holkar stated in reply it is agreed that, Khande Rao Holkar, shall be heir and master, but I shall be Dewan with full authority, to manage the government. No person shall interfere with me. This you must write to Sindhia's Durbar. The two Vakeels then said they would do so. Two days afterwards they waited on Holkar, and Amrit Rao, when they were engaged at the Holi, and told them that they would not wait for any time at Poona. As Ambaji Ingleah had desired them to ascertain personally their sentiments respecting an accommodation and their return to Burhanpur, that if they (Holkar and Amrit Rao) therefore, would explain what they wished, they would return to Ingleah and communicate

the same. On this, Holkar and Amrit Rao consulted for some time and proposed the following articles.

1st. The Boy Khande Rao Holkar shall be heir and master.

2nd. Sindhia shall restore to the said Khande Rao, money and property which in the course of some years past he has collected from the Holkar territory.

3rd. Sindhia's predecessor borrowed the sum of 17 lacs of rupees on a bond from one of Khande Rao Holkar's ancestors (probably Tukoji) and when Sindhia destroyed Malhar Rao, he recovered the said bond by force from the servants of the deceased. Sindhia must now discharge the sum due on the said bond including interest.

4th. Sindhia violently destroyed Malhar Rao Holkar; satisfaction must be given for this act. Those four articles must be complied with on such grounds, peace may be concluded between the two States. Ambaji Ingleah is a wise man, we have now explained our sentiments and when he replies to them in liberal manner, we shall consider and communicate our final demands.

The above articles having been committed to writing, were delivered to the Vakils who then took their leave. They afterwards returned to Jejuri in company with Holkar, and it is now reported, that they have proceeded on their way back to Sindhia's camp. It is believed here that Jaswant Rao Goreporey and Nagoojee Goondoo were not deputed for the purpose of any negotiation, but merely to ascertain the present temper of Holkar, the strength of his army and whether he was really or only ostensibly disposed to make peace. Indeed Nagoojee Goondoo, who formerly served Nana Furnaveese disclosed so much to one of his friends here.

The Byes (the ladies of the Peshwa's family) reside in the palace. It is said that, on taking leave of them lately Holkar secretly presented them with five lacs of rupees and besides gave them 5 elephants which he had recently got from Amrit Rao.

The news by Sindhia's dak is that this chieftain is at Burhanpur with 30,000 horse, and 3 brigades of infantry amounting each to about 5000 men—Gopal Bhau is at Jalnapur, with about 20,000 cavalry mostly beids (?); at Ahmadnagar, Sindhia has 200 horse, and 1000 Arabs, and 2000 dismounted cavalry.

Achumlah Sing, one of Holkar's Sardars, was encamped lately with 2000 infantry, 2000 horse, and 10 guns, five koss on this side of Ahmadnagar, when the troops belonging to that post, advancing by night attacked and put them completely to the rout. Achumlah Sing has not been heard of since.

Meer Khan with his troops is at a spot 10 kos south of Pandharpur. The Pratinidhi and other sardars moved to attack him by night, but finding his camp about to draw off, they returned again without

making any attempt. Shahmat Khan is at Pangaon and Fateh Singh Mania at a place 10 kos southerly of Karad. Holkar is at Jejuri. Moraba Fadnavis, it is reported, has had a meeting with Raste at Wahye and is now on his way to Miraj.

Baba Fadkia (Ramchandra Hari Fadkia) being at Hyderabad, has written to his brother Lachman Rao Fadkia, who resides here, desiring him to repair to Hyderabad with all the women, children, and property belonging to Fadkia family. Lachman Rao Fadkia, will accordingly set out for Hyderabad in a few days.

Amrit Rao, is still here and he talks of marching in about 10 days. He sent a party of 1000 men against Ratnagiri which was attacked on its march lately by troops from Sevagarh and Satara and entirely dispersed. Amrit Rao's people still continue to plunder the city. The brigade of Holkar's that served here, has marched to join him at Jejuri.

No. 48--Gen. Wellesley discusses at length why he deemed it necessary to advise Appa Saheb Patwardhan to take into pay the Pindaris, who had so long been in his service, and requests Lord Clive to confirm the necessary arrangements which have been made in that connection.

FROM—A. WELLESLEY,
TO—LORD CLIVE, GOVR. OF MADRAS.

Camp, 12 miles N. of the Gutpurba, March 29, 1803.

I have written to Colonel Stevenson and Colonel Close, but I cannot say whether my letters have reached them. I apprized Colonel Stevenson exactly of my intended movements; but it was impossible for me to give him any orders, and is so still. Those which you sent him provided for his safety till I should reach him, and it will not be proper to order him to move till that time, or till I shall ascertain exactly the position of Holkar.

It is reported, that Holkar is gone towards Ahmadnagar and Chandore; and if that report be true, there will be no inconvenience in Colonel Stevenson's making a movement towards the Bheema, on the road to Poona, as I shall advance towards Jejuri. But till I shall approach Jejuri, or till it is ascertained that Holkar is gone off towards Chandore, it will not be proper that Colonel Stevenson should quit his position at Parenda.

I enclose the translation of a paper, which, with the concurrence and advice of Major Malcolm, I have given to Appa Sahib's vakil.

He has had 3,000 Pindaris in his service, to whom he gave no pay, and who subsisted by plundering the Raja of Kolapoor. In order

that all those chiefs may come forward in the service of the Peshwa at the present crisis, I have prevailed upon them to cease hostilities, and of course, Appa Sahib's Pindaris can no longer subsist on plunder they might acquire in the territory of the Raja of Kolhapoor. If they had been dismissed from Appa Sahib's service, which would have been the natural consequence of a cessation of hostilities between him and the Raja, they would have gone into the service of Holkar, or of some of his chiefs, and would have increased the number of that description of troops which have always been found to do our armies most injury; and as these particular Pindaris were in Tippoo's service, they know us, the mode in which we carry on our operations, and that by which they can injure us, much better than that description of people in Holkar's army who are come from Hindustan. If they had not gone into Holkar's service, they would have set up for themselves under some independent chief, and would have plundered the Savanur and Dharwar countries, and would have entirely interrupted our communication with your army. It appeared to me, therefore, and to Major Malcolm, to be absolutely necessary that Appa Sahib should retain them in his service.

It is impossible, however, that they should be retained on the footing upon which they have served hitherto, *viz.*, to subsist by the plunder of the country. We shall pass through the countries of the Peshwa, or of his friends and adherents, and it would be very inconvenient that they should plunder there; indeed I doubt whether Appa Sahib could venture to lead this description of troops into those countries. Under these circumstances, the only measure that could be adopted was, that Appa Sahib should take them into pay; but as none of the chiefs have much confidence in the Peshwa's gratitude for their services, he was unwilling to adopt that measure without our guarantee that the Peshwa would allow of the muster of those troops, and that his Highness would reimburse the expense of their maintenance while they should be employed in this manner.

This measure, of which I now request your confirmation, may draw after it a necessity to advise their employment, and to guarantee the payment by the Peshwa of troops of this description, in the service, at present, of other Sirdars; but I do not believe that the number will exceed 1,000. It may also occasion a necessity to give an advance of money for their pay; but this sum, under present circumstances can be afforded. The expense to the Company will be trifling in comparison with the benefit which this detachment must derive from keeping out of Holkar's service, or from cutting off our communication with the army, this body of Pindaris.

No. 49—Malcolm accompanies Gen. Wellesley on his march to Poona. He submits a detailed Memorandum about the Sardars and chiefs of the southern parts of the Maratha dominion, and goes on to describe the policy adopted by Gen. Wellesley in respect of those sardars. He also points out that great success has been achieved in restraining them from committing depredations in the territories through which the army was passing.

FROM—J. MALCOLM,
TO—LORD CLIVE.

Camp near Miraj, April 3, 1803.

When I had the honour to inform your Lordship of my intention to join the honourable Major General Wellesley, for the purpose of communicating with the officer on a variety of subjects intimately connected with the present service, it was not my intention to proceed further than a few marches with the British force under his command, and my letter of the 15th ultimo must therefore have conveyed that impression to your lordship's mind. Circumstances have, however, since occurred, which have made me determine to accompany this detachment to Poona; and, in adopting this resolution, I trust I have not acted contrary to the spirit of your Lordship's instructions.

As political questions of a serious magnitude seemed likely to arise, and to press for decision as this force approximated to Poona, it was suggested to me by the honourable Major General Wellesley, that the information I possessed of his Excellency the Governor General's sentiments as applicable to the present crisis of affairs in the Marhatta empire, and to the general system of politics in India, might be more required in this quarter than in any other; and that considerable advantage to the public service might eventually be derived from my accompanying him to Poona; a circumstance which would also enable him to take measures, in communication and concert with me, for the conciliation of the southern Sirdars and Jagirdars of the Maratha empire who were expected to join his corps as he advanced.

As this suggestion of the honourable Major General Wellesley entirely corresponded with the dictates of my own judgment, as to the mode in which my exertions would best conduce to the promotion of the public interests on the present important occasion, I readily acquiesced in his wishes; and in doing so, I am assured my conduct will be honoured by the approbation of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, whose flattering and liberal confidence has left me unrestrained to pursue in this particular, and in all others, the line of conduct which circumstances of the moment lead

me to think most likely to contribute to the success of the service in which we are engaged.

I have the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information, a memorandum of the state of the southern Rajahs, Sardars, and Jagirdars of the Maratha empire ;* which, though perhaps full of small errors, is correct in the leading facts ; and will convey to your Lordship a tolerably just idea of the state of the country through which this corps has passed, and in which it still continues.

The march of a British force through this distracted country has had the happy effect of reconciling its contending chiefs, and of giving confidence to its oppressed inhabitants ; and the union of all ranks in a sentiment of respect for the English name, has occasioned an abundance of supplies of every description, which will enable the detachment to leave the banks of the Krishna with more provisions than it did those of the Toombudra.

The discipline and conduct of the English troops who have before served in this quarter, have, no doubt, contributed much to this favourable general impression. But the confidence and respect of every class in the province to the south of the Krishna, is in a very great degree personal to the honourable Major General Wellesley, and to the admiration which the Marhatta chiefs entertain of that officer's military character, and the firm reliance which the inhabitants place on his justice and protection, the extraordinary success which has hitherto attended the progress of this force must be principally attributed.

No specific engagements have been entered into with any of the Sardars or jagirdars :—they have received general assurances that they shall be recommended in the strongest manner to the Peshwa, if their conduct is such as to merit that mark of favour and friendship.

Several of the chiefs who were under the Peshwa's displeasure, have been excited to action by a promise of the British influence being exerted to restore them to the confidence of their sovereign ; and there is reason to expect some of this class will serve with much zeal and activity, as they cannot but view the present opportunity as the only one which could have occurred to afford them a prospect of regaining that favour which their conduct had justly alienated.

Every means has been taken which could be devised to prevent the Jagirdars plundering the districts of each other while the British troops are in this quarter, as it was obvious, that, unless this could be effectually checked, we could neither expect supplies from the adjacent country, or aid from the different chiefs whom it was so essential to combine in one general cause. The success of the measures which have been adopted with this view have exceeded

* The memorandum has been omitted.

expectation ; and there is good reason to hope these provinces will enjoy, during the present season, a comparative tranquillity to what they have known for many years.

For the purpose of securing this important object, and of preventing an accession to the strength of Holkar, General Wellesley has engaged both to the chiefs of the Patwardhan family, and to Gokhla, that his Highness the Peshwa will admit on their returns, and pay all the troops (including Pindaris) extra of their quota, with which they accompany the army on the present service ; and by this measure prevented the dismissal of that part of their horse, which is above all other calculated to destroy a country, and to distress and harass an army.

I inclose for your Lordship's information a list of the Chiefs, and the number of their troops, who have joined the British forces.* There is reason to expect that their numbers will be considerably increased in a very few days ; they are all professedly warm in their attachment to the Peshwa, but most of them only view the general cause as a means of advancing their particular interest.

The Rajah of Kolhapur, and several others of the chiefs of this part of the country, are under the influence of Sindhia, and likely to act as he dictates ; and I am concerned to observe from the last dispatch from Colonel Collins, there is little prospect of this chief being brought to take a favourable view of our present connection with the Peshwa.

Your Lordship will observe in the Memorandum which I have the honour to inclose, that Abdul Khan, the Nawab of Savanur, is in a state of the extremest misery. He has represented his situation through a vakil to General Wellesley, and pressed the General to oblige Bappu Gokla to pay him part of the arrears of his pension, to prevent him and his family perishing from absolute want. The difficulty and distress which Gokla has to pay his troops upon the present service made it impossible to urge him upon a point of this nature ; and the General has therefore, in attention to my suggestion, relieved the distresses of the Nawab of Savanur, by a present of 5,000 rupees in the name of the honourable Company.

This act of charity will, I am sure, be honoured by your Lordship's approbation.—It relieves from severe distress the representative of a noble family, and the brother-in-law of the late Sultan ; and is calculated to raise the reputation of the British Government.

It was stated some time ago to General Wellesley and myself, by the vakil of Appa Sahib, that Moraba Fadnavis, the cousin of Nana Fadnavis, would join the British army, provided he was assured

* The list has been omitted.

of protection ; and that he should hereafter be permitted to retire to Benares, or where else he chose, without molestation, in the event of his not coming to a satisfactory accommodation with the Peshwa. As Moraba was at liberty to proceed where he chose when he made this overture, his conduct shewed a desire to be restored to favour by his Master ; and as his junction, from his rank and respectability, was an object of importance, and was considered as such by the chiefs who were co-operating with the British army, the assurance he required was given ; and I am happy to inform your Lordship, he is in Meritch and will probably join in a few days, and proceed with the British force to Poona.

From a general view of the disposition of the Marhatta chiefs in this quarter, of the actual state of the British detachments under the honourable Major General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson, and the present distribution of Holkar's force, I am satisfied the great object of reinstating his Highness on the *masnad* in Poona will be speedily effected ; and that measure once accomplished, it will be easy to form a disposition of the troops in this quarter which will defy the efforts of any combination which can possibly be formed with the view of defeating the important ends of the present arrangement.

No. 50—Gen. Wellesley now on his way to Pandharpur reports his own movements as well as those of Stevenson. Holkar's army is moving northward.

**FROM—A. WELLESLEY,
TO—LORD CLIVE.**

*Camp at Doondewarry, eight miles N. E. from Miraj,
April 4, 1803.*

I heard yesterday that Fateh Singh Mania, who had been for some time on the road between Miraj and Poona, about 20 miles to the northward of Tasgon, had moved to the eastward, it is supposed, with an intention to join Meer Khan. As I could not expect that any of the chiefs assembled upon the Krishna would move from the neighbourhood of Miraj, while Fateh Singh, should remain in his station on the road to Poona, I was rather embarrassed until he marched. I am, however, now upon my road to Pandharpur, at which place I shall arrive on the 11th. My junction with Colonel Stevenson, in two or three days afterwards, then becomes certain.

I have received two letters from Colonel Stevenson, the last dated the 20th. He had arrived at Parenda, and had been joined by 6,000 horse and 5,000 infantry, with 40 guns, of the Nizam's army. The harkaras who had been in Holkar's camp, reported, that it was eight

or ten *kos* from Ahmadnagar about the 20th of March, his army moving to the northward, but not with great celerity.

I have apprised Colonel Stevenson of my movement towards him, and shall send him orders regarding the mode in which he is to join me, as soon as I shall see what is done by Fateh Singh and Meer Khan when they will be joined. I think that they will follow their master to the north, and will leave the game in our hands.

Everything here goes on well. The Banjaras have had a little dispute with their *muttsaddi*, which has given me some trouble; but after sitting up a great part of last night with them, I have settled it to the satisfaction of all parties. They have desired to have an officer to reside in the Golah with them, and on this account, as well as because by the enquiry it appears that a more active superintendence is necessary than could be given by the superintendent of the Bazars, I have appointed Captain Baynes to do this duty under Captain Barclay. He will reside in the Golah; but whenever his corps is wanted for service he is to join it, which will not be attended with inconvenience.

No. 51—The G.G. is informed about the details of movements of General Wellesley, Holkar and his associates. The plans of the various armies are also put down for the information of the G.G.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Bassein, April 10, 1803.

By advices from the honourable General Wellesley of the 2nd instant, I find that on the following day he was to pursue his march from the neighbourhood of Miraj, in order to form a junction with Colonel Stevenson. He had been joined by the Marhatta sardars on the Krishna, and had sent a polite message to Fateh Sing Mania, recommending it to him to fall back to the northward of Poona, and there wait the instructions of his master; and he proposed to convey a similar message to Meer Khan, &c.

By an Akhbar from Holkar's camp of the 2nd instant, he had reached a position twelve *kos* beyond Ahmadnagar, and was still destined for Chandore. He had dispatched on the above date the most pressing directions to Meer Khan and others to join him with all possible speed, earnestly entreating them not to allow any subordinate object to divert their attention or impede their march. According to advices received from Poona, through different channels, he has recommended it to Amrit Rao to watch the approach of the British forces, and when they draw nigh to Poona to set fire to city, and then retire in all haste towards the Godavari.

As General Wellesley proceeds upon the original plan of forming a junction with Colonel Stevenson, I conclude that on approaching Poona, he will occupy a position to the northward of the city and as near to it as attention to the articles of forage and water will permit. In such a position he will be enabled to secure his communication with the Bhore Ghat, for the safety of his convoys from Panvel, and for covering, if necessary, the Peshwa's return to his capital.

Although his Majesty's 78th regiment has joined Colonel Murray, some of the cattle requisite for equipping the corps have not yet arrived from Bombay. They will probably be here in the course of two or three days, and then Colonel Murray, with his detachment, will proceed to Kalyan, which is still occupied by a party belonging to Amrit Rao, who will doubtless retire as the British troops approach, so soon as the Colonel shall have taken possession of Kalyan, the Peshwa will proceed from hence to join him, and his Highness's movements with the detachment will afterwards be regulated by the progress of the troops under the honourable Major General Wellesley.

No. 52—After noting down the movements of his own force and that of Stevenson, Wellesley goes on to mention his future plans.

FROM—A. WELLESLEY,

TO—THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

Camp at Akloos [Akluj], April 15, 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you, that Colonel Stevenson came to this camp this morning. His detachment is encamped near the junction of the Bhima and Nira rivers, and would have formed, only that owing to a mistake their baggage missed the road on the 13th, and had not joined till late yesterday evening.

The Scotch Brigade, with a third part of the provisions, remaining with this detachment, will join Colonel Stevenson's detachment to-morrow morning.

The next objects of my attention are to secure the march of the Peshwa from Bassein to Poona, and to open a communication with the coast, so as to draw from thence the supplies which I may require. I have already arranged with Lieutenant Colonel Close a plan for the Peshwa's march, and in order to secure the execution of it I shall move immediately towards Poona, and from thence towards the Bhore Ghat. I shall reach the head of the Ghat before the Peshwa will be at the foot of it.

Holkar himself is near Chandore, about 300 miles from Poona, and the officers and troops in his service have all followed in that

same direction. Amrit Rao alone remains at Poona with about 1,500 men and I have no doubt but that he also will go off as I shall advance. Under these circumstances, it has appeared to me to be unnecessary to bring to Poona all the troops ; and as the country is much exhausted, and there is but little forage in any place, I have thought it best to dispose of them in such situation as that the whole will procure forage and subsistence, and they may join with facility and celerity in case that measure should appear to be advisable. Accordingly, I have desired Colonel Stevenson to march from his present position up the Bhima to Gardand ; to leave near that place, within the Nizam's frontier, all his Highness's troops, and to place himself, with the Company's troops, further up that river towards Poona, near its junction with the Mota Mula.

Hereafter, when the Peshwa will have arrived at Poona, and I shall have received supplies from Bombay, it will be equally convenient and consistent with the safety of all the troops to make a movement to the eastward, and to place more of them within the Nizam's frontier, and I shall accordingly adopt this measure when I shall find that circumstances will permit it.

No. 53—General Wellesley informs the G.G. of his having reached Poona with the British Cavalry, and of finding the city unburnt. He goes on to add that even if the war with the Maratha Chiefs were to begin now, the scene of action will be at a distance from the territories of the Company. The utter desolation caused by Holkar's raids.

**FROM—A. WELLESLEY,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, April 21, 1803.

I arrived here yesterday with the cavalry of my division, and the Maratha troops under Appa Sahib, Gokhla, and others of the Peshwa's officers.

I had received repeated intimation from Colonel Close, that Amrit Rao, who still remained at Poona, intended to burn that city when I should approach with the British troops ; and at last a request from the Peshwa, that I would detach some of his officers, with their troops, to provide for the safety of his family. It was obvious, that even if I could have prevailed upon these officers to go to Poona, their force was not of the description, or of such strength as to prevent the execution of Amrit Rao's design, and I therefore determined to march forward with the British cavalry and the Marathas, as soon as I should arrive within a long forced march from Poona. In the mean time, I received intelligence that Amrit Rao was still

in the neighbourhood on the 18th, and that he had removed the Peshwa's family to Sevagarh, a measure which was generally supposed to be preparatory to the burning [of] the town ; and I marched since the 19th in the morning about 60 miles.

Amrit Rao heard of our march yesterday morning, and marched off with some precipitation, leaving the town in safety. It is generally believed here, that he intended to burn it, and that it was saved only by our arrival. The infantry will come here to-morrow. I received a very civil letter from Amrit Rao in answer to one which I wrote him. He says, that he will send a person to talk to me upon his business. I consider it to be very important that he should be brought in, and I will do every thing in my power to induce him to submit to the Peshwa's government.

Matters in general have a good appearance. I think that all will end as you wish. The combined chiefs, of whom we have heard so much, have allowed us to come quietly and take our station at this place, and, notwithstanding their threats, have taken no one step to impede our march, or to divert our attention to other objects. Here we are now in force, in a position from which nothing can drive us, and in which we shall gain strength daily. On the other hand, they have not yet made peace among themselves, much less have they agreed to attack us, or in any particular plan of attack.

If I should be mistaken, and that in opposition to the conclusions of reasoning upon the state of our affairs with each of the Marhatta chiefs, who, we are told, were to combine to attack us ; and upon a comparison of our means of annoying each and all of them, with theirs of annoying the Nizam, (which is all that they can do) we should still have a war with them, you will have the satisfaction of reflecting, that in consequence of the course of measures which you have already pursued, you have removed the seat of the war to a distance from the Company's territories, and that you have the means of carrying it on in such a state of preparation, as to insure its speedy and successful termination. I declare, that from what I have seen of the state of this country, it would have been impossible for Holkar to maintain an army in the Deccan without invading the Nizam's territory. They have not left a stick standing at the distance of 150 miles from Poona ; they have eaten the forage and grain ; have pulled down the houses, and have used the materials as firewood ; and the inhabitants are fled with their cattle. Excepting in one village, I have not seen a human creature since I quitted the neighbourhood of Miraj ; so that the result of your omitting to make some arrangement for the Peshwa, which was to occasion the re-establishment of his power, must have been the invasion of the Nizam's territories, if only for the subsistence of those multitudes in Holkar's suite, or their march to the countries to the southward

of the Krishna. This last course might have procrastinated the evil, as they might in those countries have found subsistence for another year; but then their next step would have been to seek for it in the Company's territories, the very sources from which we should have been obliged to draw our supplies in the contest which must have ensued.

No. 54—The Governor General's Instructions to Close for regulating his conduct in the crisis.

FROM—N. B. EDMONSTONE, SECRETARY TO GOVT.,

TO—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA.

Fort William, May 7, 1803.

1. On the arrival of the Peshwa at Poona, the Resident will of course, under his former instructions, have manifested every degree of respect to his Highness, in restoring him to the *masnad*.

2. The greatest pains must be employed to satisfy the Peshwa of our intention to abstain from all interference in the details of his government, and to maintain his dignity and independence.

3. This object, however, may be difficult of attainment, when combined with the absolute necessity of soliciting the Peshwa's favour for many of the jagirdars, and of endeavouring to place the power of the British government in the situation of mediator between the Peshwa and the jagirdars, as well as of guarantee for their respective rights. The stability, however, of the whole system, under the treaty of Bassein, will depend upon the address with which the British government shall assume the protection of all the contending parties, without exciting the jealousy of any one.

4. Early endeavours must be used to mitigate the Peshwa towards Holkar and Amrit Rao, and to conciliate each of those chieftains by moderate concessions, properly secured.

5. The subsidiary force must be established as soon as possible, in exact conformity to the treaty: it would certainly be very desirable to extend it, and to compose it in a manner precisely similar to the subsidiary force at Hyderabad. General Wellesley will, for the present, appoint the officer to command the subsidiary force at Poona. The commands at Poona and Hyderabad will henceforth be filled directly under the authority of the Governor General in Council.

6. The proceedings of Major General Wellesley must be regulated, in a great measure, by the information which he may receive from the Resident with Daulat Rao Sindhia, with respect to the effect produced on Sindhia by the representations which Colonel Collins was instructed to make to that chieftain by the

orders of the 5th instant. With a view to a speedy communication between Colonels Close and Collins, and General Wellesley every effort should be made, without delay, to accelerate the dak from Poona to Sindhia's camp; and Holkar and Amrit Rao, or other chiefs whose forces may be stationed in the intermediate country, must be compelled to allow a free passage to the dak.

7. It is extremely desirable that the British troops employed for the restoration of the Peshwa (with the exception of the subsidiary force) should return within the British territories at the earliest period of time in which circumstances will admit of the separation of the army.

8. Whenever the troops shall separate, they must be so posted as to possess the power of effecting a speedy junction (if necessary) with the subsidiary forces of Poona and Hyderabad. For this purpose the north-western frontier of Mysore, the districts ceded by his Highness the Nizam, and the Nizam's northern frontier, ought to be maintained in strength. A considerable body of Europeans, and a sufficient train of ordnance, should remain at Bombay, in order to join the subsidiary force at Poona.

9. Of the detachment from Lieutenant General Stuart's army now under General Wellesley's command, six battalions of infantry, and a due proportion of artillery, &c. to be stationed at Poona, to form the subsidiary force. The Europeans and ordnance to retire to Bombay; the cavalry to retire into the ceded districts, to the force at Hyderabad, if necessary. The troops under Major Ireton to return into the Company's territories, whenever the government of Fort Saint George shall direct. The army under Lieutenant General Stuart to separate as soon as Major General Wellesley shall have signified to Lieutenant General Stuart, that the state of affairs at Poona will admit of the separation of the army. Proper posts to be occupied on the frontier of Mysore, and in the districts southward of Poona, ceded by the Peshwa.

10. It will not be prudent to separate the army, unless Sindhia shall have either crossed the Narbada, on the suggestion of Colonel Collins, or shall have afforded some unequivocal proof, of his intention to refrain from any attempt to disturb the execution of the treaty of Bassein.

11. In the event of Sindhia's return to the northward of the Narbada, it may still be necessary to retain the army in the field, for the purpose of preventing the return of Holkar's troops to Poona, and of enforcing the complete acknowledgment of the Peshwa's authority throughout his immediate possessions, and of precluding any attempt of the adherents of Sindhia and Holkar to obtain possession of his Highness's person.

12 and 13. If no accommodation shall take place between Sindhia and Holkar, the dissension of those chiefs will afford security to the Peshwa. If, however, the disputes of Sindhia and Holkar should be amicably adjusted, Holkar will necessarily disband a great part of his army (which he is now unable to pay) unless he should meditate offensive measures against the Nizam or against the Peshwa, and provision must accordingly be made to defeat such attempts.

14. The determination of the question respecting the separation of the army must depend on the future proceedings of Sindhia and Holkar. If the troops can be separated with safety, the early adoption of that measure would undoubtedly be productive of considerable advantage, as it would satisfy the principal Marhatta jagirdars that the British government had no views beyond the express stipulations of the treaty of Bassein.

15. If Sindhia should proceed to Poona, in opposition to Colonel Collins's remonstrances, the British force at that city must be as strong as possible.

16. Some of the Peshwa's immediate dependents or aumils may refuse to submit to his authority. In that event, measures must be adopted to compel submission.

17. A force to be detached from Gujarat, if practicable, for the purpose of occupying the districts ceded to the Company in that province.

18. If the condition of Gujarat should not permit the adoption of this arrangement, a sufficient force should be detached either from Surat or Bombay, to be replaced by a part of the force under the Honourable Major General Wellesley or Colonel Stevenson.

19. Part of the troops, in returning to the Carnatic or to Mysore, may occupy the cessions to the southward of Poona.

20. Colonel Close is supposed to have obtained from the Peshwa the necessary orders for the cession of the districts, under the stipulation of the treaty.

21. The government of Bombay, in concert with General Wellesley and Colonel Close, will appoint the proper officers of collection in the ceded districts in Gujarat.

22. The government of Fort Saint George to pursue the same course with respect to the ceded districts to the southward of Poona.

23. Proper measures will be taken to reinforce Midnapur, and to collect a force on the north-western frontier of Oudh, in the direction of Agra.

24. If Major General Wellesley and Colonel Close should be convinced of the hostile intentions of Sindhia or Holkar, the army must be properly employed to disperse Holkar's forces, and to drive Sindhia beyond the Narbada. In such an event, the earliest notification should be sent to General Lake at Fatehgarh, who will be

ordered to seize Agra, Mathura, Koil, and Delhi with other places (probably Kalpi) and to take or disperse Sindhia's troops in those quarters.

25. These suggestions are stated ; but no reason exists to countenance an apprehension that Sindhia, Holkar, the Raja of Berar, or any other power, will now attempt to frustrate the treaty by hostilities.

SECTION IV

Poona Affairs Under Restored Peshwa (May 13, 1803 to Jan. 21, 1804).

No. 55—Close describes in detail the efforts of Gen. Wellesley to bring about a reconciliation between the Peshwa and his sardars, and hopes that the case of the Patwardhan family will also be favourably settled soon.

FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, May 21, 1803.

1. Agreeably to the arrangement which had been previously adjusted, the honourable Major General Wellesley visited his Highness the Peshwa on the 14th instant, in Poona. At this meeting the General recapitulated what he had formerly stated, and, with the view to inspire his Highness with confidence, went into an explanation of the principles which should invariably govern his conduct in prosecuting the objects committed to his charge, connected with the interests of his Highness's government. He observed, that although he felt it to be his duty to recommend to his Highness's notice and favour such of his sardars as were distinguished by their attachment to the Poona state, he had yet been careful not to make any promises to them from himself, assuring them only, that he should represent their conduct respectively to his Highness, in order to their being rewarded, or discountenanced, according to their merits; that he was certainly anxious that his Highness should afford relief to such of his meritorious servants as suffered from want, and adopt measures for conciliating others, who, from different circumstances,

might require encouragement and confidence ; but that whatever his feelings might be in those respects, he would strictly adhere to the rule he had hitherto followed, by avoiding to make promises to any of the sardars, and contenting himself with stating their merits to his Highness.

2. This declaration from the honourable Major General Wellesley appeared to afford the Peshwa the highest satisfaction. He said, that nothing could be more just or pleasing to him than the principle which the General resolved to follow ; and added, that he should be ever attentive to the recommendations of the General in favour of his Sirdars, and indisposed towards those who, from misconduct, should incur the General's displeasure ; and that on these principles, it would be with the General to direct their efforts, and represent their services, and, with the Poona state to favour or discourage them according to his report.

3. His Highness went on to observe, that a few of the southern jagirdars were still backward in affording their services ; that as it was requisite to call forth the whole force of the state, he would repeat his summons to those jagirdars to attend, and would be happy if the General also would address them to the same effect. To this the General expressed his acquiescence, adding, that obedience to his Highness's authority from the subordinate sardars of the state was indispensably necessary, and that in time it would be only proper to coerce such of them as should be obstinately refractory.

4. The General now observed that he should soon be prepared to march, and that he looked to be accompanied by his Highness's troops ; that the Gokhla and the Vinchur jagirdars stood in need of most aid from his Highness to enable them to satisfy their troops and that he would give in a memorandum respecting the claims of those sardars, which, he trusted, would soon be satisfied. His Highness replied, that the wants of those sardars should be immediately relieved, and that he would so adjust with the whole of the sardars, as that they should encamp near the General by the time he should be ready to move, and willingly proceed on service under his orders.

5. A conversation now took place concerning the Patwardhan family, of whom Appa Sahib in particular has been averse to visit the Peshwa. After his claims had been discussed, it was agreed that an assurance should be given to him, that on the Poona affairs being finally settled, his Highness the Peshwa would examine into his claims, and proceed to arrange matters permanently on fair grounds between him and the Raja of Kolhapoor, who has gradually stripped the Patwardhan family of a large part of their possessions.

6. At every stage of the interview it was observable that his Highness's manner was less formal than usual. He shewed no disinclination to converse largely on the business of his government, and at

the close of the conference he told the honourable Major General Wellesley, with great cordiality, that he could not permit him to march till he should have the pleasure of giving him an entertainment.

7. It would not appear that the Peshwa derived the happiest impressions from the foregoing conference. His confidence has increased so much, that he does not hesitate to avail himself of the influence which the honourable Major General Wellesley has, from a variety of causes, acquired over the sardars and jagirdars of the state ; his orders to them on points of importance are generally transmitted through the General, who enforces them by dispatches from himself, a mode of proceeding which can scarcely fail of efficient operation.

8. His Highness having arranged with Gokhla, paid him a visit yesterday evening, and there is reason to believe that he has satisfied the jagirdar of Vinchur. Chintamani Rao, of the Patwardhan family, has visited the Peshwa second time, but was received by his Highness with some reserve. Appa Sahib, it is hoped, will be prevailed on to pay his first visit in the course of a few days.

9. Balkrishna Gangadhar, and the two Pansés are arrived at a stage on this side of Pandharpur. They are increasing their troops at his Highness's desire, and wait his further orders. At this period the only absentees of consequence are the Pratinidhi, Raja Bhonsla of Akalkot, and Raja Bahadur of Malegaon, and it is probable they will either attend in person, or furnish their respective quotas of troops.

10. The honourable Major General Wellesley talks of marching in five or six days, and there is every prospect that he will be accompanied by an handsome corps of Maratha horse.

11. The Peshwa has received a letter from Balloji Kunjar, dated 23rd Moharrum (16th May) in which he says confidently, that Sindhia's mind is amicably disposed towards the Peshwa's government, but that the councils of his Durbar are of a different tendency ; that Ingle has acquired great influence over Sindhia ; being the only person of real power at his court ; that Sindhia and the Berar Raja are moving towards each other, with the intention of having an interview ; that he (Balloji Kunjar) is reserved in his communications at the Durbar, and will continue so till the return of Jadú Rao Bhaskar, with whom he will have a full conference, and report to his Highness the result. Balloji Kunjar adds, that he is in communication with Colonel Collins, from whom he has received great civilities and assurances of all aid and support.

12. From Balloji Kunjar I have a cordial note of the same date. Copy of a letter which I had previously addressed to him is inclosed for your Lordship's notice. The Peshwa has lately addressed a letter to Sindhia, discouraging him from visiting Poona, and directing his

attention to the mischievous and refractory, who have offered such violence to his government.

13. By the latest advices from the northward, Holkar lies at a position a few marches distant from Aurangabad, in the direction of Chandore, and Meer Khan continued at the former city, with the greatest part of his force.

14. Amrit Rao has a party of troops at Sangamner, on this side of the Godavari; and the Peshwa has intelligence that a corps in his interest has lately invested the fort of Kotul, held by his Highness, and situated south-west of Sangamner.

No. 56—Close informs the Governor General about the Poona affairs; he states how all his efforts failed to induce the Peshwa to come to an amicable settlement with Amrit Rao.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, June 25, 1803.

1. On the 21st instant I had a meeting with Ragonaut Rao, the ceremonies attendant on his marriage having prevented him from visiting me at an earlier period. The points which I was most anxious to adjust with the Durbar were first to procure, under the influence of the Peshwa's government, the 4,000 bullocks which the head Banjara brought to me at his Highness's desire by Ragonaut Rao, had promised to furnish at the charge of the Honourable Company, for service with the troops under the Honourable Major General Wellesley; 2ndly to procure from the Durbar, a person of consideration to reside with the General, and represent the Peshwa's authority in the countries frequented by the British army; and 3rdly, to procure from his Highness an answer to a communication received from Amrit Rao by General Wellesley, shewing that he was willing to separate from the Peshwa's enemies, and accept a provision from his Highness's government.

2. I had recently received a letter from the honourable General Wellesley, respecting Amrit Rao, from which I have the honour to inclose an extract.

3. On the first point I explained to Raghunath Rao that if the bullocks should not be produced without further delay, General Wellesley might be exposed to serious difficulty; that he might be fully impressed on this, I read to him different letters which I had received from him, shewing the necessity of his being furnished with the bullocks without delay; and then reasoned with him on the strange appearance it would have with your Lordship, should his Highness's government at such a crisis shew itself incapable of

supplying a few bullocks at the honourable Company's charge, to save the British army from a situation of difficulty that might oblige it to recross the Bhima, and return to Poona. Major Malcolm being present at the meeting, assisted me in remonstrating on the extreme want of zeal and energy in the Durbar at so urgent a moment, and the serious effects that were likely to ensue from it. From Raghunath Rao, however, we obtained nothing on this point but vague excuses and promises, which we saw were not to be performed.

4. On the second point, Raghunath Rao had made no difficulty ; he gave us readily the strongest assurances that a proper person would be immediately selected to reside with General Wellesley for the purpose I had mentioned, and would be sent to camp.

5. Previously to entering on any statement connected with the 3rd point, I judged it necessary to enquire of Raghunath Rao, whether his Highness the Peshwa had received any late advices from the northward ; he replied in the negative, adding, that for the last nine days his Highness had not received any dispatches or intelligence respecting the proceedings of Sindhia and Raghuji Bhonsla. This appearing very extraordinary, we were led to repeat our question with some earnestness, observing, that so much ignorance on his Highness's part of what passed at the Durbars of those chieftains, would be certainly singular at any period less critical or interesting than the present. Raghunath Rao, however, persisted in his first reply ; adding, that in consequence of the report which had prevailed, that Balaji Kunjar had taken upon him to cede to Sindhia, Kalpi, and other provinces in Hindustan, belonging to the Peshwa, his Highness was preparing a dispatch for Kunjar, reproofing his presumption, and disavowing his having any authority for such an act from the Poona state ; and that I should be furnished with a copy of the dispatch so soon as it should be finished.

6. We then judged it proper to advert to the contents of the latest packets from Colonel Collins, and proceeded to explain, sentence by sentence, to Raghunath Rao, the conversation that passed between Raghuji Bhonsla and Mirza Baker on the 14th instant, wherein the former went so far as to state that he possessed hereditary claims to the Poona government ; the whole tenor of the paper seemed to excite great surprize in Raghunath Rao, but particularly the passage just noticed. The paper, he said, would be acceptable for the perusal of his Highness ; and it was agreed that it should be literally translated, and sent to the Durbar as quickly as possible.

7. Major Malcolm and I now proceeded to review the state of things to the northward ; spoke of the obstinacy of Sindhia and Raghuji Bhonsla, in hitherto refusing to be influenced by the ami-

cable and candid explanations of Colonel Collins ; particularized the schemes pursued by those chieftains for conciliating Jaswant Rao Holkar, with a view to obstructing the alliance concluded by the treaty of Bassein ; and dwelt with much force on the necessity of some rational policy being adopted for the purpose of defeating their schemes, and preventing the menaced combination from reaching any point of maturity, or acquiring any accession of strength ; that your lordship's measures had from an early period manifested an anxious desire, on your lordship's part, to conciliate and lessen the number of his Highness's enemies ; that accordingly, as General Wellesley advanced to Poona, he maintained an amicable correspondence with Amrit Rao, the whole of which had been regularly communicated to his Highness ; that the last letter from Amrit Rao contained propositions which required being noticed, and that accordingly his Highness had been long since requested to explain what answer should be given to it ; that hitherto his Highness had been since silent on the subject ; but as Amrit Rao's vakil in camp was urgent to obtain a reply, General Wellesley had lately sent me a letter on the subject, which it was proper I should communicate. The letter was then explained to Raghunath Rao ; and it was pointed out to him how necessary it was that your lordship's view to conciliate Amrit Rao, and detach him completely from all connection with his Highness's enemies, should at the present conjuncture be realized.

8. On receiving a communication of the letter, Raghunath Rao discovered some uneasiness, but requested to have a translation of it, which was agreed to ; he afterwards insinuated that the Peshwa had been ever adverse to any reconciliation with Amrit Rao, whose conduct towards him had been so singularly inveterate ; and at length gave us to understand that his Highness happy in his alliance with the English, would rely on their friendship and support for the maintenance of his honour, and the disgrace and ruin of his enemies.

9. The absurdity of such feelings on his Highness's part was now pressed upon Raghunath Rao ; that he might be accurately impressed respecting your Lordship's sentiments towards the Peshwa, and resolution to maintain the alliance in a manner conducive to his personal comfort and dignity, the good of his subjects, and the stability of his state, appropriate passages from your Lordship's commands to me of the 30th May were read, and explained to Raghunath Rao, who did not hesitate to acknowledge the great effect of your Lordship's exertion to save his Highness's dominions from ruin, and the purity and warmth of your Lordship's sentiments in resolving to uphold it on honourable principles. After a further discussion, it appeared 'that he would not be averse to submit a proposition to the Durbar in favour of Amrit Rao's professions, on

which we presented him with the inclosed Memorandum, which he rendered into the Marhatta language, saying, that it should be submitted to his Highness's consideration.

10. Finding him so far reconciled, we again pointed out to him the vast importance of seizing the present moment to attach to the state a branch of his Highness's family, whose rank and pretensions had already promoted such serious events; and closed the subject by demonstrating, that acquiescence on his Highness's part could only be viewed as an act of necessity, and not choice.

11. It was afterwards mentioned to Raghunath Rao, that as Major Malcolm's health was happily restored, it was his intention to proceed to camp, and that on returning to General Wellesley, it would be highly satisfactory to him to be enabled to convey to that officer the proposed memorandum respecting Amrit Rao, with his Highness's seal affixed; that as a conference with his Highness on the subject might be productive of good effect, we were desirous of waiting on him on the following day, at any hour his Highness might be pleased to appoint. Raghunath Rao assured us, that our message should be delivered to his Highness, together with a faithful report of what had passed at the interview; and then took his leave.

12. On the 22nd in the morning, the translations requested by Raghunath Rao were forwarded to him and shortly after I received a note from him, saying, that the Peshwa, informed of what had passed at the conference with us on the preceding day, was desirous that we should have a meeting with him, Raghunath Rao, and Sadashiv Mankeshwar, in the course of the evening, at the house of the latter, for the purpose of discussing fully the point in suspense; but that should this be inconvenient to us, both would pay us a visit on the ensuing day: we acquiesced in the proposition, and visited at the appointed time.

13. The conference opened with a request from me to be satisfied concerning the bullocks promised for conveying supplies for the British troops. I soon found that no progress had been made in collecting them. Raghunath Rao expressed his apprehensions, that no means within the reach of the Poona government could enable it to collect bullocks but with some delay, as the Banjaras had driven their cattle to a considerable distance, in different directions, for the benefit of pasture during the rains; that the person who farmed the customs of Poona, however, had engaged to procure the number required, and that every possible measure would be used to force him to a performance of his agreement; that till the bullocks should be produced, coolies for carrying provisions to camp might be procured in the city in some number, and that these he hoped, might be

employed in the present exigency with advantage on our part. The necessity of having the bullocks to enable the troops to operate in advance was still insisted on, and the subject ended in assurances from the minister, that every possible exertion would be made by the Poona government to collect them.

14. In regard to the next point in suspense, we were told that his Highness would determine immediately on a sardar of consideration and experience to serve with General Wellesley, and that he should be ready to proceed with Major Malcolm to camp.

15. We now came to the remaining point respecting Amrit Rao, the translation of Mirza Baker's paper, General Wellesley's letter, and the memorandum were read, and, we were happy to perceive, perfectly understood, as well by Sadashiv Mankeshwar as Raghunath Rao; and we collected, that all those papers had been submitted to the consideration of the Peshwa.

16. To the memorandum, we saw Sadashaiv Mankeshwar was prepared to object. He observed, that his Highness had always foreseen, that engaging his government in an alliance with the English would be a cause of dissatisfaction to the sardars, and that many of them would make it a ground for commencing hostility against him; that he had been but too well assured on this point; but that with this prospect before him, he had confidently relied on the friendship and power of his ally to guard his honour, and chastise the rebellious servants of his state; that his Highness was happy in the alliance, and resolved to adhere to it, and trusted that he had a resource in the British support which placed him beyond the necessity of proceeding to accommodate with an enemy, that went so far as to meditate and threaten the destruction of his capital, when he had left nothing else to destroy. This statement contained nothing more than what had been formerly opposed by Raghunath Rao. The absurdity and ruinous tendency of prosecuting, under all circumstances, private resentments against public enemies, were again urged and demonstrated. The passages from your Lordship's instructions, formerly resorted to, were again introduced, and every possible argument used to prove, that Amrit Rao, though chargeable with serious offences, yet being now repentant, should be pardoned, and that such was the present exigency, that the measure should be regarded as indispensable and not optional. Sadashiv Mankeshwar had no new matter to offer, and he at length agreed to submit the memorandum again to the Peshwa, promising to send to us, in the course of the following day, his Highness's reply. Major Malcolm informed the ministers, that he had sent off his baggage, intending to proceed to join the Honourable Major-General Wellesley on the following morning, but rather than proceed without the memorandum, he would defer moving for one day. After which the meeting broke up.

17. On the 23rd, in the morning, I received a note from Raghunath Rao, intimating, that it was found impossible to collect bullocks in any number at the present juncture; that coolies would be procurable to carry grain to camp by the trip, and that in regard to the memorandum, I should receive in the evening by Bapujee Naik (the superintendent of Marcarahs attached to the Presidency by the Durbar) a Marhathi paper containing his Highness's answer.

18. In the evening, Bapuji Naik arrived, and read to me the promised Marhatta paper, of which a liberal translation is inclosed. After a mature deliberation on the feelings and expectations which the Peshwa has expressed in his paper, Major Malcolm and I conceived that it would be consistent with your Lordship's intentions, and with the instructions which I have on different occasions received from your Lordship, applicable to eventual cases, to reply to the Peshwa's paper in terms calculated to awaken in him some sense of the prospect presented to him by the present crisis; of the obligations imposed on him by his sovereign situation by the events accomplished in his behalf by the British exertions and resources, and by his positive engagements.

19. Under these impressions we prepared the accompanying Memorial, which having been translated into the Marhathi language, was delivered to Raghunath Rao this morning.

20. Major Malcolm, apparently fully restored to health, proceeded to camp yesterday forenoon.

21. I cannot expect to procure any cattle by means of the Durbar to serve with General Wellesley's army, for some time, which is the more unfortunate, as his bullocks have suffered much from the heavy rains that have fallen since the opening of the monsoon; and it appears from his latest letters, that the rice he took from hence has suffered a material diminution, owing to the misconduct of his Banjaras; a fresh supply of this article, therefore, has been forwarded to him by means of coolies, this description of people being procurable here in numbers.

22. Although Holkar's intention of proceeding to Gujrat has been rumoured for some time, the latest advices from his camp state the probability of his wintering on the northern bank of the Tapti; it appears that his equipment has suffered extremely since the commencement of the rains, and that provisions in camp were very dear.

23. Gokhla marched yesterday from this neighbourhood, in order to join General Wellesley. Appa Desai will soon follow him, but the patwardhans remain here, though urged by the Durbar to proceed to camp, no coolness whatever subsists now between them and the Peshwa, but all the sardars use the plea of want of cash to justify their delaying here.

Enclosure A.—Extract of a Letter from the Honourable Major General Wellesley to Lieutenant Colonel Close ; dated Camp, June, 15, 1803.

Amrit Rao's Vakil has just been with me, and has expressed a most anxious wish to have an answer to his letter. He says that Amrit Rao has seen a letter from Anand Rao Holkar to Jaswant Rao, in which the former states that the Peshwa had informed him that Amrit Rao was in treaty with the English, and his Highness recommended, that Jaswant Rao Holkar should seize him ; Amrit Rao, therefore, pretends to apprehend that he is in some danger in his present situation at Nasik, and he has desired to have a letter from me, authorizing him to come to Sangamner, or even to his camp, for protection, or that I should consent to his increasing his forces so as to provide for his own safety.

In answer I told him, that I saw clearly that Amrit Rao's situation was delicate, but that I could do no more than urge the Peshwa to state what answer should be given to this letter ; that if I advised him to go to Sangamner, he might be disturbed by the Peshwa's troops ; that if I advised him to come here, I might be obliged to reduce him to the alternative of staying without a provision from the Peshwa, or of going off again, if his Highness should not consent to pardon him ; and that besides, his Highness might have some reason to complain if I was to receive into my camp as a friend, a person whom he should consider as an enemy.

In respect to this proposal, that I would consent to his increasing his forces, I could not recommend that measure, as I knew that he must provide for them by the plunder of the country, which would only bring him into fresh difficulties.

The vakil then urged the state in which Amrit Rao's servants were plundered at Poona, and in all places within the Peshwa's reach, in which they reside. In answer to this, I observed, that this misfortune was the consequence of the state of enmity in which the brothers were, and that their reconciliation would be the only remedy for it. In answer to this request, that we should interfere in their favour, I observed, that would produce no good, and might probably draw from the Peshwa an observation, that we made friends of his enemies. The vakil then said, we can retaliate, and have people in our power on whom we can be revenged. I answered, I could not recommend this, because it would be a breach of Amrit Rao's engagements with me, in consequence of which I had undertaken to make his peace with the Peshwa ; that the principle of that measure was a desire on his part to be forgiven by his Sovereign, which desire would be but ill manifested by his attack on his servants and adherents. It is very desirable, on many accounts, that this man should have an answer

soon ; and I shall be obliged to you, if you will urge the Peshwa to come to a decision.

Enclosure B.—His Highness the Peshwa having been made acquainted with the substance of the correspondence between Amrit Rao and Major General Wellesley, is satisfied that his brother is disposed to return to his family, and to abandon the rebellious. The Peshwa, therefore, is inclined, from motives of mercy, to forget what has passed, and it is his intention to allow Amrit Rao (on his returning to the path of his duty) country to the amount of 4 *lakhs* per annum, as long as he continues to obey the Peshwa's orders, and resides wherever he may be directed. This offer will be made to Amrit Rao by Major General Wellesley, who will inform him at the same time, that he must come to camp in ten days after the receipt of this offer, or else it will not be considered as valid, and he will be then treated as a rebel, and an enemy to the state.

No. 57—The Peshwa proposes exchange of territory in Bundel Khand for cessions in Karnatak and Gujarat. Close thinks the exchange of benefit to the Company.

FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, August 3, 1803.

Raghunath Rao paid me a visit this forenoon ; on proceeding to converse on business, he told me the particulars which passed at our meeting on the 10th instant had been minutely reported to his Highness the Peshwa, who, having attentively considered the different points I had represented and urged, had determined on the following measures: 1st. To dispatch a letter of recall to Balloji Kunjar and Narain Rao Vaidya: 2nd. To give the appointment of Meer Buckshee to Vitthal Shiv Dev, the Jagirdar of Vinchur, and adopt all possible means for collecting under his command a corps of 5,000 horse, to be employed for the protection of Poona and its vicinity, or eventually for other service: 3rd. To propose an arrangement to your lordship respecting the province of Bundelkhund, founded on the statements, and every argument which I had offered on the subject, at my last meeting with the ministers ; that with respect to the first measure the letters were preparing and would be dispatched soon, when I should be furnished with copies of them ; that regarding the second measure, his Highness trusted to be able to collect the proposed number of horse without much delay, at the same time that success in this point would depend much on the success of the proposition respecting Bundelkhund, in which Vitthal Shiv Dev's prospects were materially concerned.

2. Raghunath Rao then went on to detail the proposition in question, which, he said, was contained in the following articles:— Article 1. That the southern cession of 16 lakhs should revert to his Highness's government. 2. That the district of Olpad near Surat, estimated at the annual revenue of 3,16,000 rupees, should revert to his Highness's government, in order to be restored to Vitthal Shivdev. 3. That a regiment of native cavalry, of the same strength and complement as the cavalry regiments belonging to the Hyderabad subsidiary force, should be added to the Poona subsidiary force. 4. That military force to be furnished by the Peshwa's government in time of war, by present agreement, should be reduced to 5,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry; his Highness's government, however, to furnish as large a number over and above this quota as its means may be able to admit. 5. That the British government should maintain a corps of Marhatta cavalry amounting to 5,000 during the present war, besides the troops under Gokhla and Appa Desai, who would continue to be subsisted at the charge of the Peshwa. 6. The Peshwa shall cede in perpetuity to the honourable English East India Company, from Bundelkhand, territory yielding an estimated annual revenue of 36,16,000 rupees, agreeably to the following detail.

3. In lieu of the cession of the districts of Olpad mentioned in article 2 territory equal to an estimated annual revenue of 3 lakhs 16, 000 rupees to be at the entire expense of the regiment of cavalry, mentioned in article 3 : a territory yielding an estimated annual revenue of 7 lakhs and 5,000 rupees, to serve as an equivalent for the expense to be incurred by the British Government in paying and maintaining, during the present war, the 5,000 Marhatta horse mentioned in article 4 : territory equal to an estimated annual revenue of 5 lakhs of rupees, to meet the extraordinary expense which the British government must be subject to in establishing its authority in Bundelkhand and preserving the territory in obedience : territory equal to an estimated annual revenue of 4 lakhs of rupees. Total estimated annual revenue 36,16,000. The whole of the territory to be ceded from Bundelkhand to be taken from those parts of the province most contiguous to the British possessions, and in every sense most convenient for the British government; and the proposition itself if agreed to by the British Government to be understood as clearing the Peshwa of the imputation of all failure on his Highness's part, in regard to his engagements under the treaty of Bassein, on account of not having shewn himself capable of furnishing the quota of troops required from his government in time of war by the 15th article of the treaty.

4. In detailing the foregoing proposition under the several heads, Raghunath Rao explained to me, that in offering it, his Highness the Peshwa was actuated chiefly by the following considerations :—

1. To manifest to your Lordship how much he is disposed to attend to your Lordship's wishes, as communicated to his Durbar by the British Resident.

2. To demonstrate to your Lordship his sincere desire to adhere to his engagements, and to afford the alliance his most cordial support : And,

3rdly. To have the means of conciliating and restoring to the ancient possessions of his family Vitthal Seo Dev. the most faithful adherent of the Poona state. I told Raghunath Rao that I might venture to assure his Highness, that his motives for making the proposition would be highly satisfactory to your Lordship.

5. I then discussed the several heads of the proposition with Raghunath Rao, and at length it was mutually agreed, that the proposition should be submitted to your Lordship in the above shape, with this difference only (to which Raghunath Rao specially assented on his Highness's part) that the quota of troops to be furnished in time of war by the Peshwa, according to the proposition, should be 6,000 horse and 4,000 infantry, instead of 5,000 horse and 3,000 infantry, as before stated.

6. After this Raghunath Rao said, that in the event of the proposition being accepted by your Lordship the territory that would then be ceded to the honourable Company would be very extensive; that this circumstance, on every principle, would warrant himself and some of the principal officers of the Durbar, to hope with confidence that your Lordship would consider them as having a strong claim to the indulgence of receiving a gratuity from the British Government, under the head of *Durbar-Kharch*, or disbursement, and that without making any comparisons, he would beg permission to say, that about one *lakh* and 50,000 rupees annually would about meet the said claims. In reply, I told him, that I should cheerfully represent what he had said to your Lordship, in the hope that it would be favourably regarded; adding at the same time, that I could not flatter him with any anticipation that the proposition itself would be judged worthy of your Lordship's acceptance.

7. I now made the remark, that I should consider the proposition so far binding on his Highness the Peshwa, as to allow your Lordship to act on it in every respect, in the event of acceptance of it by the British Government, so as to prevent the inconvenience that might result from the delay of a formal settlement of the proposition, which in the said event might be adjusted formally at

leisure, by a supplemental article to the Treaty of Bassein : to this Raghunath Rao agreed on the part of his Highness.

8. I shall now trouble your Lordship with a few observations on the foregoing part of this address; though sensible of the benefit to result from the restitution of Olpad, yet in discussing the several articles of the proposition from his Highness, I used every possible endeavour to preserve this valuable district for the honourable Company. The south end of it is close to Surat, and the honourable the Governor of Bombay has lately informed me, that as part of it is waste at present, it may be expected to rise to the annual revenue of five lakhs of rupees in a few years. Unfortunately Vitthal Shivdev conceives that the safety of the honour of his house depends upon his being restored to its ancient possession; and though devoted to the Peshwa, has declared his ultimate determination to refuse any piece of territory in his Highness's gift as an equivalent or substitute for it.

9. The expense of maintaining a corps of 5,000 Marhatta horse must no doubt be considerable, amounting to not less, perhaps, than 15 lakhs of rupees per annum. I was naturally desirous that the British Government should not be subjected to this burthen for any length of period; finding, however, that the Peshwa would not recede from this article, or allow it to be modified, it occurred to me that a certain interval would necessarily elapse before orders could be received here for proceeding on this article, and that, under the favour of Providence, the present war might not be of long continuance.

10. The proposed reduction in the force to be furnished by his Highness in case of future wars, I trust your Lordship will not think of much importance. On the return of peace I hope the Jagirdars and Sirdars of the Poona state will be brought to full obedience, and under regulations which will oblige them to have each a quota of horse constantly at Poona. Under this prospect I would hope, that in case of future wars, the Peshwa will be able, without incurring much expense, to send to the field, at a short notice, a much larger corps of cavalry than the reduced number now proposed. The proposed reduction in the infantry must be of still less consequence, as this description of troops in his Highness's service can never be of much use in the field. His Highness's wish is, that the 5,000 cavalry to be maintained by the British Government during the war, should be in charge of his most attached *mankaris* and other Sardars, who will be ready to join the army when called on; in this his Highness's view seems to be to give employment to the Sardars of his government, who from indigence, are at present dismounted, and incapable of rendering any service to the state; and further, that there should be some respectable visible object with

the British army in the field to represent the Poona state. His Highness also entertains the expectation, that if his proposition be accepted, the vicinity of the British troops may be of use to his government in re-establishing his authority in the residue of Bundelkhand and the neighbouring territory of Kalpee.

11. After the above subject had been discussed, Raghunath Rao told me from his Highness, that on the night of the 10th instant, Appa Sahib Putwurdhan was, at his request, admitted to a visit to the Durbar; that his object was to obtain leave from the Peshwa to return to his Jagir; that finding the Peshwa determined not to comply with his solicitation, and anxious that he should proceed according to former orders to join the British army, he spoke in a very disrespectful manner, and even expostulated with his Highness for having connected himself with the British government; that his Highness endeavoured in vain to impress him with the propriety of his shewing his attachment to the Poona state at the present crisis, and that shortly after he withdrew, apparently much ruffled; and that since the visit took place, he has withdrawn from this vicinity to Jejuri. Raghunath Rao added, that the Peshwa had been desirous to have the services of Gokhla and Appa Desai to recover and settle the country near Sangamner; but that orders had been recently sent to those Sardars to pay the most implicit obedience to the honourable Major General Wellesley, and if absent from his camp, to join it forthwith. Raghunath Rao further took occasion to advert to the operations of the troops, under the honourable Major General Wellesley, and observed, that Ahmednagar had the reputation of being almost impregnable; but that he had great confidence in the skill of the British general, and the valour of the British troops; and then shewed some curiosity to know how the above fortress, if taken, could be disposed of. I told him that General Wellesley would of course occupy it by a British Garrison, use it as a magazine for the support of his operations, and hold it for the use of the allies; with this he appeared to be satisfied.

12. I propose sending copies of this address to the honourable the Governor of Bombay, and the Honourable Major General Wellesley, in order that they may address your Lordship on such parts of his Highness's propositions as they may be disposed to observe on.

I omitted to acquaint your Lordship, that in the Poona registers, Bundelkhand is rated at the annual revenue of 62 lakhs of rupees. P.S. I have the pleasure to annex a contrasted Statement, shewing the gain to the Company by accepting the Peshwa's proposition.

Enclosure.

*His Highness the Peshwa with the Honourable Company.**Dt.....Ct.*

To the following Cessions viz.			
In Savanor	16,00,000	By the amount
In Gujrat	3,16,000	of a Cession
To the annual charge of			of territory
Cavalry.	4,00,000	in Bundel-
Estimated Expende for main-			khand ...
taining 5,000 Maratha Ca-			36,16,000
valry during the war. on the			
calculation the war may			
last one year, and that land			
in India is worth five years			
purchase	3,00,000	
	Rupees	26,16,000	
Balance in favour of the			
Company	10,00,000	
	Rupees	36,16,000	Rupees 36,16,000

Exclusive of the advantage of adding one regiment of cavalry to the Poona subsidiary force.

N.B.—The benefit to be derived to the Peshwa's government by the proposition is a fine territory, yielding an annual revenue of 19,16,000 rupees, as he owes on account 3,16,000 to the Vinchor Jagirdar, and will be enabled, it is not doubted, to regulate and realize the revenue of Savanor under his alliance with the Company; and especially as the Putwurdan family, from their disobedience, seem to have forfeited all claim which they might be supposed to have had on that province.

PART II

SECTION V

The War in the Deccan
(4th August to 9th November 1803)

No. 58.—Collins' march is greatly hampered by heavy rains.

FROM—J. COLLINS, RESIDENT WITH SINDHIA,
TO—GENERAL ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Camp near Nizamabad, 4th Aug. 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo and to apprise you of my arrival at Nizamabad, a walled town appertaining to his Highness the Nizam, and situated three miles south of the Ajanta Ghat.

It will not be possible for me to proceed on my journey towards Aurangabad until the 6th instant, as the escort and all my baggage are still in the pass, and cannot reach this ground before one or two o'clock to-morrow morning. It has rained incessantly, and most violently, from sun-rise till sunset to-day, which unlucky event has tended greatly to retard the march of my detachment.

P. S.—It was half after four o'clock when the escort marched from Tondapur this morning.

No. 59—Gen. Wellesley orders an attack on the fort of Broach which was then in the hands of Sindhia.

FROM—A. WELLESLEY

TO—THE OFFICER COMMANDING THE TROOPS IN THE TERRITORIES OF ANAND RAO GAIKWAD, BARODA.

Camp, 6th August, 1803.

Upon the receipt of this letter, you will be so kind as to commence your operations against Daulat Rao Sindhia's fort of Broach.

You will be so kind as not to suffer these operations to be interrupted or delayed by any negotiation whatever. You will send the Governor of Bombay a copy of the report which you will transmit to me, of the measures which you will have adopted in consequence of this order.

No. 60—Gen. Wellesley is informed about the steps taken to re-inforce and provision the fort of Songarh, and also about the instructions given to the military officer at Surat.

FROM—J. DUNCAN, GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY,

TO—A. WELLESLEY.

Bombay Castle, 8th August, 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 31st ultimo.

It appears by the proceedings of the secret Committee of the 21st instant, which Colonel Close will have no doubt transmitted to you, that on the 13th of July the then immediate commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Callander, having required report of his wants from the officer in Songarh, measures had on the receipt of Lieutenant Colonel Edmonstone's answer been taken to supply them, accompanied by a reinforcement of 180 European rank and file, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Watson of His Majesty's 75th regiment, who were to carry out a stock of two months provisions for themselves, and for the native detachment already there; and Colonel Watson having further suggested, that provisions should be found for his men by a contract with the Quarter-master; this proposal is now before the Military Board for their opinion.

The reinforcement of Songarh not having taken place at a more early period, is probably connected with the intermediate equipment of a considerable detachment to reduce the fort of Parnera; but on this head I shall call on the Committee for an explanation, which I will forward to you, as well as concerning the other points that you have adverted to in their conduct.

The fort of Songarh has always been esteemed a post of great importance, in which view it was that the Resident at Baroda obtained the consent of the Gaikwad Government to a British auxiliary force being stationed therein ; but the ostensible command of the place still remains with Raja Anand Rao's officer. As for us directly to assume it, could not probably have been rendered quite palatable at the time to the native administration at Baroda. The larger reinforcements since ordered to Songarh, as per the accompanying copy of Mr. Secretary Grant's letter to the Committee of the 21st ultimo, will afford an additional proof of the anxiety I have all along felt for its security.

Your command, as conferred by the order of his Excellency the most noble Governor General, under date the 26th June, having been signified to General Nicolls, the commanding Officer of the forces here on the 23rd of July (the day subsequent to my receipt of his Excellency's commands) and thereafter published in general orders on the 1st August immediately on the arrival of his Excellency the Governor General's further directions to that effect, I apprehend that the conduct of Captain Bates bearing reference to a period anterior to either of these dates, might render questionable the regularity of any investigation into it, founded on such orders as you might now issue, independent of the further consideration as to locality ; since Bardoli, the post whence Captain Bates so hastily retired, forms no part of the Gaikwad's territory, but is one of the towns lately ceded to the honourable Company by the treaty of Bassein ; which last circumstance, might, however, be perhaps sufficiently obviated by his Excellency the Governor General having requested General Nicolls to signify (as he has, I hear, done accordingly) that all detached parties from the troops under this Presidency should be subject to your orders ; which may be deemed to comprehend all the military doing duty beyond the garrisons of Surat and Parnera, and the Island of Bombay, and its contiguous Isles inclusive, and perhaps of Bankot ; besides which, the Committee at Surat have, in the view of giving the fullest possible effect to his Excellency's intentions of uniting under your direction, all the British force susceptible of being affected by the expected course of hostilities, been instructed to conform to whatever communication you may from time to time think fit to make to them.

Under the preceding explanation, I have instructed General Jones, the Officer in permanent command at Surat (though now and then happening to be at the Presidency) to report to General Nicolls the circumstances, as they shall appear to him, of the conduct of Captain Bates ; and it will in consequence rest with our commanding officer of the forces to pass such orders thereon as he may deem most proper.

The *Kildar* of Songarh has been, on a former occasion, written to by me to the effect adverted to in your last paragraph, as he shall again in conformity to your present intimation.

That *Kildar's* object has long been to retire to this place, under the circumstances adverted to in his correspondence with me, when I was last year at Cambay, of which I have now the pleasure to forward copies as then communicated to the Resident at Poona; but I am unapprized of the sentiments of his Highness the Peshwa on the proposal thus suggested.

No. 61—Collins is requested to transmit the letters addressed by Gen. Wellesley to Sindhia and Bhonsla.

**FROM—GEN. ARTHUR WELLESLEY,
TO—J. COLLINS, RESIDENT WITH SINDHIA.**

Camp at Ahmednagar, 8th August, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose letters for Daulat Rao Sindhia, and the Raja of Berar, which I request you to transmit to those Chiefs as soon as possible. I likewise enclose a translation of those letters.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I this day took by storm the *Pettah* of Ahmednagar, and I hope to have possession of the fort in a few days.

This is an ultimatum delivered to Sindhia.

Translation of a letter from the Honourable Major General Wellesley to Daulat Rao Sindhia, dated 6th August, 1803.

You will recollect that the British Government did not threaten to commence hostilities against you, but you threatened to commence hostilities against the British Government and its allies, and when called upon to explain your intentions, you declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war, and in conformity with your threats and your declared doubts you assembled a large army in a station contiguous to the Nizam's frontier.

On this ground I called upon you to withdraw that army to its usual stations, if your subsequent pacific declarations were sincere. But instead of complying with this reasonable requisition you have proposed that I should withdraw the troops which are intended to defend the territories of the allies against your designs, and that you and the Raja of Berar should be suffered to remain with your troops assembled in readiness to take advantage of their absence.

This proposition is unreasonable and inadmissible, and you must stand the consequences of the measures which I find myself obliged to adopt in order to repel your aggressions.

I offered you peace upon terms of equality, and honourable to all parties. You have chosen war, and are responsible for all the consequences.

No. 62—Gen. Wellesley is congratulated on his taking the pettah of Ahmednagar.

**FROM—J. COLLINS, RESIDENT WITH SINDHIA,
TO—GEN. ARTHUR WELLESLEY.**

Camp near Chaukey pass, 10th August, 1803.

I have this moment received your letter of the 8th instant, communicating the pleasing information of the fall of the *Pettah* of Ahmadnagar, and beg leave to offer you my sincere congratulations on this happy commencement of your military operations.

Your letters for Daulat Rao Sindhia, and the Berar Raja, shall be immediately forwarded by express.

No. 63—The G. G. is informed about the movements of Sindhia and Bhonsla. It is further stated that Jaswant Rao Holkar has agreed to join Sindhia if the latter was attacked by the English.

**FROM—J. COLLINS, RESIDENT WITH SINDHIA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Camp near Aurangabad, 11th August, 1803.

I have the honor to apprise your Excellency that I arrived this morning at Aurangabad, where I purpose halting until I receive further instructions from the honourable General Wellesley.

Yesterday I had an interview with Colonel Stevenson who is proceeding towards the Ajanta Ghat with the subsidiary force. I have furnished the Colonel with a statement of the number and position of the troops with Daulat Rao Sindhia, and Raja Raghoji Bhonsla, together with such information as I have been able to collect respecting the intentions of those chieftains who will not, I believe, attempt to ascend the Ajanta Ghat, as they are already apprized of the movements of the subsidiary force towards that place.

My last advices from the Camp of Sindhia, under date of the 8th instant, mention that the Maharaja had received intelligence of the design of the honourable General Wellesley to commence an immediate attack on the fortress of Ahmadnagar. In consequence of this information, Daulat Rao Sindhia and the Raja of Berar have written to their respective Sardars to join them with all the cavalry

they can collect. On the 8th of this month these Chiefs retained their former positions, near Jalgaon, but on the following day they were to meet for the purpose of concerting a plan for their future operations, and movements.

I understand Jaswant Rao Holkar is arrived at the city of Maheshwar. The greatest part of his army, however, still continues to maintain positions to the south of the Narbada. This Chieftain has promised to join Sindhia should the latter be attacked by the English; but it is by no means impossible that Holkar may have given the Maharaja this assurance with a view of encouraging him to pursue measures which would involve him in hostilities with the British Government—an event that might afford Jaswant Rao Holkar the means of gratifying, at once, his enmity and ambition.

It is with concern I inform your Excellency of the sickly condition of my escort of which fifty-six men are now in the hospital, and so unwell, that it was not without difficulty I could bring them on to this place. The inclemency of the weather has, likewise, affected a large proportion of my camp followers, and deprived me of their services.

No. 64—The Governor of Bombay promises to carry out fully the instructions of General Wellesley in respect to the arrangements in Gujarat and Baroda.

**FROM—J. DUNCAN,
TO—A. WELLESLEY.**

Bombay Castle, 12th August, 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter, in answer to mine of the 23rd, in which, having entered into a full explanatory detail of our circumstances in Gujrat, under the yet immature and (more especially under the recent death of our firmest friend in that country, the late Gaikwad's Dewan) very peculiar and complicated, though not unpromising system, by which our interference has hitherto been regulated in the territories of Raja Anand Rao; I have only to assure you of the entire acquiescence and sincere and ready co-operation of this government in the alterations that, under the control and direction with which you stand by the highest authority fully vested, you have, in discharge of the duty thence incumbent on you, seen necessary to point out the expediency of; in consequence of which, the appointment of Colonel Murray will be put in orders whenever your ultimate recommendation of that officer (of whose professional qualifications there can be but one, and that a very favourable opinion) shall be received; and the discontinuance of the local military authority hitherto exercised by

the civil authority at Surat, and by the Resident at Baroda, may, I presume, most conveniently be announced at the same period.

General Jones being at the Presidency, will of course remain here under the present arrangement.

No. 65—The Resident at Baroda puts forth to General Wellesley his own military arrangements for the attack on Broach and to carry out offensive operations in Gujarat after the declaration of war.

**FROM—A. WALKER, THE RESIDENT AT BARODA,
TO—A. WELLESLEY.**

Baroda, 12th August, 1802.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 26th ultimo ; I have communicated to Lieutenant Colonel Woodington the strong probability of war with Sindhia and Bhonsla.

In expectation of this event, preparations had been previously made for the attacking [of] Broach, and transporting thitherto the equipments necessary for the siege.

The report of the Engineer Officer contains the best account of the state of the defences of that fortress ; and, from native information, the strength of the garrison does not exceed 600 men.

It seems doubtful from Captain Cliff's report, whether heavy artillery can move between this and Broach during the violence of the rains.

These doubts exist at present, and it would be advisable to obtain battering guns from Surat or Bombay by sea, at the same time to avoid, as much as possible, any danger from delay ; notwithstanding the apparent difficulty at this season, we shall also attempt from hence to move forward with guns.

It would be very desirable to invest the place as soon as possible after the declaration of hostilities, and for this purpose it is proposed to advance a detachment, lightly equipped, which may be done from the weakness of the garrison, without any hazard.

The most important question that remains for consideration is the force that may be sufficient to besiege and take Broach, and what part of that force can be spared from Baroda without endangering other objects.

You are acquainted with the strength, designs, and position of Kanhoji, and with all the political relations of this government, to form a judgment on this question.

It is necessary to recollect besides, that the late change in the Gaikwad administration requires more than usual precautions, both to protect this capital, and to guard against the designs of its enemies.

It appears to Lieutenant Colonel Woodington and me, from a full consideration of all these circumstances, that it would be imprudent to detach from Baroda above 500 Europeans, and one native corps.

At present it is the commanding-officer's opinion, that this force is sufficient for the service for which it is intended ; but that there may be no disappointment, an application will be preferred to Surat to hold a reinforcement of Europeans in readiness in case they should be required.

While this service is going forward, it will be of consequence to assume all the appearance that circumstances will admit of offensive operations.

The duties of the parganahs may be nearly taken by one corps, and it is proposed that Major Holmes, with his battalion, or such part of it as can be withdrawn, shall march in the first instance to Ahmadabad. Afterwards he may take up a position at Kapperbanj, or on the banks of the Mahi, in conjunction with the Gaikwad forces appointed to watch and check Kanhoji, who must be expected to make his attempt to enter Gujrat from that quarter.

It will be extremely flattering if these arrangements are honoured with your approbation ; and I beg leave to repeat an assurance, which I have already made to the honourable the Governor in Council of Bombay, that every attention will be paid in this quarter to meet your wishes, and no exertion omitted to accomplish such objects of public service as you may be pleased to direct.

No. 66—General Wellesley informs the Governor General of his having captured the fort of Ahmednagar, and gives details of the attack.

**FROM—MAJOR GENERAL WELLESLEY,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Camp near Ahmednagar, 12th August, 1803.

The weather cleared up so much on the 7th instant as to allow me to march to this place on the 8th ; I had in the morning dispatched a message to the *Kiledar* of Ahmadnagar, to require his surrender of the fort, and on my arrival in the neighbourhood of the *Pettah* I offered *Cowle** to the inhabitants. This was refused, as the *Pettah* was held by a body of Arabs, who were supported by a battalion of Sindhia's regular infantry, and a body of horse encamped in an open space between the *Pettah* and the fort.

I immediately attacked the *Pettah* with the picquets of the infantry, reinforced by the flank companies of the 78th regiment,

* *Koul* = A writing of assurance, safeguard.

under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Harness ; in another place with the 74th regiment and 1st of the 8th, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Wallace ; and a third with the flank companies of the 74th and the 1st battalion 3rd regiment, under the command of Captain Bisey. The *Pettah* wall was very lofty, and defended by towers, and had no rampart, so that when the troops had ascended to the attack, they had no ground on which they could stand ; and the Arabs, who occupied the towers, defended their post with their usual obstinacy. At length they were obliged to quit the wall, and fled to the houses, from which they continued a destructive fire upon the troops. Sindhia's regular infantry attacked our troops after they had entered the *Pettah*. In a short time, however, after a brisk and gallant contest, we were completely masters of it, but with the loss of some brave officers and soldiers, as your Excellency will perceive by the inclosed return. The enemy's loss was, from the nature of the contest, necessarily much greater than ours ; and on the night of the 8th, all the part of their force went off to the northward which was not required for the defence of the fort, including all the Arabs who survived the contest in the *Pettah* excepting a small number who attended one of the their wounded Chiefs, who could not be removed further than the fort.

On the 9th, I reconnoitred the ground in the neighbourhood of the fort ; and on that evening Lieutenant Colonel Wallace, with five companies of the 74th regiment, and the 2nd battalion 12th regiment, seized a position within 400 yards of it, on which, in the course of that night, a battery was constructed for four guns, to take off the defences on the side on which I proposed to make the attack. This opened at day-light on the 10th and it was so advantageously placed, and fired with such effect, as to induce the *Kiledar* to desire that I should cease firing, in order that he might send a person to treat for his surrender. In my answer, I told him that I should not cease firing till I should have taken the fort, or he should have surrendered it, but that I should listen to whatever he was desirous to communicate.

Yesterday morning he sent out two vakils to propose to surrender the fort, on condition that he should be allowed to depart with his garrison, and that he should have his private property. Although I consented to this proposal, it was five in the evening before the hostages arrived in camp, without whose presence I refused to stop the fire from the British batteries. According to his engagement, however, the *Kiledar* marched out of the fort this morning with a garrison consisting of 1,400 men ; and the troops under my command took possession of it.

In this manner has this fort fallen into our hands ; our loss since the 8th has been trifling, which I attribute much to the spirit with which our attacks on that day were carried on.

I have to draw your Excellency's notice towards the conduct of the troops particularly on that occasion, and towards Lieutenant Colonel Harness, Wallace and Maxwell, who commanded in the trenches, Captain Beauman commanding the artillery, Captain Johnson the engineer, and Captain Heitland of the pioneers, in the short subsequent siege.

Your Excellency must be well acquainted with the advantageous situation of Ahmadnagar, on the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, covering Poona, and as an important point of support to all our future operations to the northward. It is considered in this country as one of its strongest forts; and, excepting Vellore in the Carnatic, is the strongest country fort that I have seen. It is in excellent repair, excepting in the part exposed to the fire of the British troops.

I shall hereafter have the honour of transmitting to your Excellency an account of the ordnance, stores, and grain, which it contains.

I propose to cross the Godavari immediately, and I shall in a future dispatch lay before your Excellency the measures which I have in contemplation for getting possession of Sindhia's possessions south of that river, depending upon Ahmadnagar, and for securing their resources for the use of the British troops.

No. 67—Gen. Wellesley doubts the news about the march of Holkar to Sindhia's aid, and asserts that the predatory warfare of the Marathas will not succeed against the English.

**FROM—GEN. A WELLESLEY,
TO—J. COLLINS, THE RESIDENT WITH SINDHIA.**

Camp at Ahmednagar, 15th August, 1803.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 13th. It is not true that the *daks* of Daulat Rao Sindhia have received the smallest interruption from me or from any person acting by my orders. But he may depend upon it that if he should interrupt your *dak*, I will not allow his to pass through any part of the country south of the Godavari.

Colonel Stevenson has my directions to watch closely the movements of Sindhia and the Raja of Berar, and to attack immediately the troops of either of those Chiefs which may move towards him. He will of course move towards the Badouly Ghat, if he should find that they intend to penetrate by that road.

It is impossible for me to say that Holkar is not on his march to join those Chiefs; but if Raja Mohiput Ram is the *Subahdar* of Aurangabad, and you received that intelligence from him I think it is to be doubted. But even if it should be true, as my cavalry commenced their march from hence yesterday, and the infantry will arrive upon the river before the cavalry will have passed it, I expect that I shall have joined Colonel Stevenson at least as soon as Holkar will have joined the other Chiefs.

The Marathas have long boasted that they would carry on a predatory war against us; they will find that mode of warfare not very practicable at the present moment, and at all events supposing that they can carry their designs into execution, unless they find the British officers and soldiers to be in the same corrupted and enervated state in which their predecessors found the Mussulmans in the last century, they cannot expect much success from them. A system of predatory war must have some foundation in strength of some kind or other. But when the Chiefs avow that they cannot meet us in the field, when they are obliged to send the principal strength of their armies, that upon which the remainder depend, to a distance lest they should fall into our hands, they must have little knowledge of human nature if they suppose that their lighter bodies will act; and still less of the British Officers if they imagine that with such instruments they can do the smallest injury, provided only that the allies who are first exposed to their attacks are true to their own interests.

No. 68—Sindhia moving towards the Badauli pass; Bhonsla joins him on the way.

FROM—J. COLLINS, THE RESIDENT WITH SINDHIA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Camp Aurangabad, 21st August, 1803.

On the 18th instant Daulat Rao Sindhia made a movement towards the Badouli Ghat, and on the same day joined the Raja of Berar at a place which is distant about eight Kos from that pass. Sindhia was, at this time, apprized of the surrender of Ahmadnagar; he has not however, dismissed my news-writer from his camp, nor do I understand that my *dak harkaras*, who are stationed in the territory of the Maharaja have been molested.

This morning I received a letter from the honourable Major General Wellesley apprizing me that the *daks* of Daulat Rao Sindhia had suffered no interruption, either from the honourable General, or from any person acting under his orders, which information I

have directed my agent, in the Maratha camp, to communicate to Daulat Rao Sindhia, or to Munshi Kavalnayan without delay.

P.S.—Your Excellency has most probably heard of the demise of Partab Singh, the Raja of Jaipur. He died on the 1st of this month, and will, I imagine, be succeeded by his only son, a young man twenty years old.

No. 69—Duncan acquaints Gen. Wellesley with his objections to the latter's proposal to put Col. Murray immediately in command of the forces to be sent to Surat and Gujrat.

**FROM—J. DUNCAN,
TO—A. WELLESLEY.**

Bombay Castle, 23rd August, 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th instant, in answer to mine of the 12th, in which it was my intention to convey the impression of my full acquiescence, and sincere co-operation (as my inclination and the rules of the service equally induce and prescribe) in the alterations of our existing system to the northward, without, however, annexing my approbation to modifications which my previous communications, as again referred to in my last answer, must, I thought, have sufficiently indicated that I could not concur in; at the same time, that under the high political and military powers with which you stand vested, it appeared clearly to be your part to adopt, and mine to submit, to your system, without reinsisting on details already before you, on which it was to be presumed that you had, previously to writing to me on the 2nd of August, formed your judgment. My only objection, therefore, to putting Colonel Murray immediately in orders lies in the consideration, that such an act on my part would have for one of its bases a supposition of the measure's according with my sentiments; whereas had you, merely in acknowledgment of my letter, repeated the recommendation of Colonel Murray, that officer would have been already in orders; but unattended as I conceive with any responsibility in my station, such as your taking my approbation for granted, necessarily involves to a degree which, however reluctantly, precludes me from authorizing the Colonel to proceed to his intended command with the powers you wish to assign to him, until you shall be pleased to take the measure wholly on yourself; when not a moment's delay shall ensue in my giving it every effect depending on me: and meanwhile all your commands will be punctually obeyed under the still subsisting local authorities.

Although on points of this nature my opinions may be entitled to very little weight, yet considering the course of agitation which this question has assumed, I think it my duty to enter in this place into some more precise detail of the reasons, as they appear to me, for judging the system you have proposed as in some respects dangerous, and in others unnecessary. First then, I deemed it dangerous in leaving it to the discretion of the local commanding officer how far he shall comply with Major Walker, the Resident at Baroda's requisitions, and in leaving the movements of the subsidized force independent of and unconnected with the said Resident's approbation; and thereby subverting the system which has hitherto had the approbation of the supreme government, and continues, I conceive, essentially requisite to preserve and improve our growing ascendancy, and to protect the large pecuniary territorial and other interests which the honourable Company have at stake in the Gaikwad dominions to the northward of the Narbada, the actual political connections of which are only held together by the constant watchfulness of government, exercised through the agency of their Resident; by degrading or weakening whose local powers the fabric which our present influence there has thus reared, and is in progress of ultimately cementing to the national credit and advantage, may suddenly dissolve; a risk which would not, I think, be incurred by your being pleased to consider Major Walker, as he has hitherto been, both by this Presidency and the supreme government, in the light of the effective commanding officer of Gujrat, and sending to him your orders either through this government, or directly from yourself, accordingly, as you might from time to time deem most convenient, in which case the Major would, as he has, I observe, already had the honour of assuring you, enjoy the satisfaction of fulfilling all your objects in a way the least likely to prove not only fully effective, but concurrent also with, and corroborative of the local circumstances which must also in my opinion be consulted, to lead to a successful issue our affairs in that part of India, whether in peace or war.

Secondly, I deem the proposed alteration at Surat unnecessary, because the superiority of the civil over the military authority at that station, is a principle established (as I have already had the honour of noticing to you in my letter of the 23rd July) by the express authority of his Excellency the most noble the Governor General in Council, which, with his Excellency's knowledge, has been for some time past exercised by a commission, composed of the superior civil and military officers on the spot; to whose joint co-operation I chiefly attribute our having obtained (with the single exception of one extraordinary instance of rebellious obstinacy)

such easy, prompt, and quiet possession of the districts ceded by his Highness the Peshwa, after a part of them had even fallen into the occupancy of Sindhia's officers ; and I think it probable, that with a commanding officer possessed of the experience and local knowledge of General Jones, who would, I understand, have no objection to continue to act in this department, all your orders addressed to the Committee would experience prompt and punctual execution, and that officer thus be saved from the mortification of a supercession ; which, on general principles, it is desirable to avoid, whenever compatible with the superior interests of the public service.

Thirdly, I am not satisfied that, especially as a mere system of defence is in contemplation, the uniting of the two present distinct local commands in the Atthavisi and in Gujrat proper, can be attended with advantages commensurate to some of the opposite consequences, which I have above stated as likely to be induced by it. The great extent and the topography of the country seem to me naturally to indicate the general expediency of two distinct commands, combined with the precautionary injunctions already in force, for ensuring reciprocal aid in case of need ; the head-quarters of each being divided by two large rivers, which must always render the access from one to the other a business of time and delay rather inapplicable, perhaps to repress from the timely junction of both, an attack on either : especially such predatory ones as we have chiefly reason to apprehend ; besides which, there is probably more than one inlet into the Atthavisi, as well as into Gujrat proper : nor were it otherwise, will Songarh alone prevent, I believe, full ingress to an enemy in force, unless it have a garrison equal to meet them as they pass it in the field ; and on the whole, I conceive the existing system to be, under your orders, in point of execution, all things considered, the most eligible ; but whilst I state this in discharge of my duty, I have no doubt, Sir, that (as above observed), it is equally yours to follow your own judgment in discharge of the high trust reposed in you, in which case you will certainly find a correspondent anxiety on my part to render the line you may adopt conducive to the greatest good, and to the least evil, of which in its nature, it may be susceptible.

P. S.—Although on the occasion of this exposition of my sentiments, I have given them under all the three heads, into which the subject seemed naturally to divide itself, yet as the 2nd and 3rd comprehend points of relative indifference in proportion to the 1st, I will readily and cordially coincide with you in the whole proposed system if you can modify the first so as to preserve the necessary consequence of the Resident at Baroda.

No. 70—Money is sent from Mysore to Poona for the use of Gen. Wellesley's division.

**FROM—SECRETARY TO THE RESIDENT AT MYSORE,
TO—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT AT POONA.**

Harihar, 26th August, 1803.

I have the honour to apprise you, that a party of his Highness the Rajah's troops, consisting of 75 horse, and 650 armed peons under the command of Shriniwas Rao, having under their charge treasure to the amount of one lakh of Star Pagodas, intended for the use of Major General Wellesley's division, have this day been ordered to proceed, by the way of Poona, to join that officer. The money is carried by the peons and horsemen composing the escort.

After the party shall have arrived at Poona, I have to request your good offices in affording them whatever assistance may appear to you requisite, to enable them to complete the object of their mission, with safety and dispatch.

No. 71—Gen. Wellesley informs Duncan that in the circumstances pointed out by the Governor he would not persist in his own view. He also adds that because of the long distances it would be advisable for the military authorities in Gujarat and Atthavisi to act without any reference to him.

**FROM—A. WELLESLEY,
TO—J. DUNCAN, GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.**

Camp, 29th August, 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 23rd instant.

When I proposed for your consideration a plan for the military organisation of the troops in Gujrat proper and the Atthavisi, and for the defence of those provinces, I did not intend to lessen the authority of, or the respect due to, the Resident at Baroda; and I proposed the plan for the subsidiary force in Gujrat which is at this moment in force in respect to the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

It appeared to me from your letter of the 12th that you approved of that plan, and you desired that I would recommend Colonel Murray for the situation which I proposed he should fill, if you should adopt it; but I learn by your letter of the 23rd, that you dis-

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approve of it. and you lay it upon my responsibility to carry it into execution.

I certainly am ready and willing to be responsible for any measure which I adopt, and to incur all personal risks for the public service. But the measures in question are of a general nature, and have been recommended as being applicable to our military situation in the Atthavisi and Gujrat. You, who must have a better knowledge of the local circumstances of those districts, are of opinion that they are not, and you object to them in principle as well as in detail. I should be presumptuous indeed, if, after such an opinion, I were to persist to order the adoption of those measures, and I should well deserve to incur the severest responsibility for any misfortune that might happen.

At the same time I have to observe to you, that the communication between me and the troops in those provinces is necessarily very long; that circumstances may render it longer, and may prevent it entirely; and therefore, I request that you will be so kind as to desire the military authorities in Gujrat and Atthavisi to act for the public service without any reference to me.

In case the circumstances of the war should hereafter enable me to approach nearer those provinces, I will apprise the authorities there of the manner in which I may be of opinion that they can co-operate with me in forwarding the public service.

No. 72—Collins informs the Governor General about the terms on which Ambaji Ingle was willing to become tributary to the British Government.

**FROM—J. COLLINS, THE RESIDENT WITH SINDHIA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Camp Aurangabad, 31st August, 1803.

Since I had the honour to address your Excellency on the 21st instant, I have received no advices from my Agent whom I left in the camp of Daulat Rao Sindhia, and although I have sent many *harkaras* in various directions in order to learn the fate of this man, yet hitherto I have obtained no accounts whatever respecting him.

My latest intelligence from Fatehgarh is dated the 7th of this month, at which time my *dak harkaras* had not been driven away from their respective stations in the territory of Sindhia. But my writer at Fatehgarh apprizes me that the *amil* of Firozabad had

declared an intention of detaining all despatches directed either to, or from the honourable Company's provinces.

Your Lordship being duly informed of all transactions in the Deccan by the honourable Major General Wellesley, it would be an useless intrusion on your Excellency's time were I to detail the important events which have recently occurred in this quarter. Nor have I any political intelligence to communicate, as I am now cut off from all correspondence with my native agents, as well in the Deccan, as in Hindustan. Thus situated I wait in anxious expectation of your Lordship's commands relative to my future proceedings, and which I shortly hope to receive at this place.

Some time previous to my departure from the camp of Daulat Rao Sindhia, Kamgar Khan sent to request that one of my Munshis named Makhan Lal, might be permitted to repair secretly to the tent of Ambaji Ingle. Accordingly my Munshi went there at night, when Kamgar Khan, in the presence of his master, told Makhan Lal that Ambaji was now more desirous than ever of obtaining the protection of the British Government. That he had been scandalously plundered by the ministers of the Maharaja and, in consequence, was endeavouring to get away to Hindustan. That on his arrival there, in the event of war between the English and Sindhia, he would willingly consent to become tributary to the British Government, provided the following concessions were made to him. Namely that the districts which he now held should remain in his possession, and no money be demanded from him by the English for the next two years, after which period he would regularly pay the same revenues to the British Government as he formerly did to Daulat Rao Sindhia. That should he require the assistance of a body of English troops it should be granted him free of all charges. Ambaji after confirming what Kamgar Khan had proposed, made my Munshi take a most solemn oath that no part of the foregoing discourse should be written either to your Excellency, or to any other English Sardar, until he was returned to Hindustan, declaring that should General Perron, or any of the European Officers in the service of Sindhia doing duty in the Deccan, open my despatches, and discover his intentions, that he should inevitably suffer death.

The faithless character of Ambaji being well known to me, my reply to his propositions was guarded and to the following effect. That although the conduct of Daulat Rao Sindhia afforded strong grounds to suspect that he entertained hostile designs against the British Government, yet that it would be unbecoming the dignity of the English character were I to enter into any intrigues with the servants of the Maharaja for the purpose of undermining his authority, so long as I continued to reside at his Court in the capacity of Vakil. That a few days however, would most probably, determine

whether there should be peace or war between our respective States, and that in the latter event, I should not fail to apprise your Excellency of his proposals. In the meanwhile, I assured him they should be kept secret, and that my communication of them to your Lordship, should be delayed until he was arrived in a place of security. As Ambaji Ingle has now left Daulat Rao Sindhia, and consequently has no personal danger to apprehend, I deem it my duty to inform your Excellency of the advances which he made to me, the sincerity of which may at once be ascertained on his return to his possessions in Hindustan.

On the 29th instant I had the honour of an interview with Major General Wellesley at Aurangabad. Although I should be most happy to render myself useful, yet it does not seem likely that the honourable General will have any occasion for my services in the present situation of affairs in this part of India.

No. 73—This is the famous letter from Perron wherein he exhorted Pedron to hold the fort of Aligarh while one stone remained upon another.

FROM—GENERAL PERRON,

TO—COLONEL PEDRON, COMMANDING AT ALIGARH.

Date [1st September, 1803?].

You will have received the answer you are to make to the propositions of General Lake. I never could have believed that for an instant you could have thought of a capitulation. Upon you perhaps depends the fortune of all this country ; either liberty or slavery.

Remember you are a Frenchman ; and let no action of yours tarnish the character of your nation.

I hope in a few days to send back the English General as fast, or perhaps faster than he came ; make yourself perfectly easy on this subject. Either the Emperor's army, or the army of General Lake, shall find a grave before the fort of Aligarh, if the General does not find it necessary to take his departure before our arrival, in order to guard his own country.

Ranjit Singh, the Raja of Lahore, has passed the Satlaj with an army of 25,000 men, and will join me in fourteen or fifteen days.

Nizam Ali Khan is dead ; his son has withdrawn his army, and declared war against the English. There is nothing to fear. Do your duty ; and defend the fort while one stone remains upon another ! Once more : Remember your nation ! The eyes of millions are fixed upon you.

No. 74.—General Wellesley asks Close to urge the Peshwa that rich and respectable persons related to or connected with Sindhia or Bhonsla residing in Poona be secured and delivered to the British officer as an act of retaliation.

FROM—GENERAL WELLESLEY,
TO—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT WITH THE PESHWA.

Camp at Rakasbaum, 3rd September, 1803.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Mr. Duncan in which I have requested that certain persons belonging to Daulat Rao Sindhia, and residing in Gujrat, the Atthavisi and at Broach, may be seized and detained in retaliation of injuries of a similar nature done to persons residing in the territories of the Subah of the Deccan.

As there may be some persons of riches and respectability belonging to Daulat Rao Sindhia and the Raja of Berar residing at Poona, I request you to urge the Peshwa to have their persons secured and delivered over to the officer commanding the British troops.

This mode of warfare is most unjustifiable. In passing through the country as a freebooter Daulat Rao Sindhia may seize the property he can find and take away; but he has no right to seize the persons of the inhabitants in order thereby to secure the property, which he cannot otherwise touch. There is no mode of guarding against this evil, or of relieving the Suba's government from its consequences excepting by retaliating upon persons connected with his government.

On this ground I request that if there should be any such persons at Poona, you will urge the Peshwa that they may be delivered up.

*Letter from General Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay,
dated Rakhesbaum, 3rd September, 1803.*

The enemy having found it impossible to seize any of the districts belonging to the Suba of the Deccan, or to plunder them to any extent, have seized the persons of some of the principal inhabitants of the towns near which they have passed, and have detained them as securities for the payment of certain sums which they have required from the districts.

In order to put a stop to this practice it is necessary to retaliate upon them; accordingly I request you will be so kind as to give directions that the mother and relations of Yadav Rao Bhaskar may be seized, and that they may be informed that they will be detained as securities for the persons of the hostages seized in this unjustifiable manner by D. R. Sindhia.

In case there should be at Broach, or in Gujrat or the Atthavisi, or in any of the countries which may come into the hands of the honourable Company's troops any other persons of consequence or responsibility related to or connected with Sindhia's Ministers, or belonging to that Chief, I request that they also may be seized and detained for the same reasons.

No. 75—Hostilities between Great Britain and France are renewed.

**FROM—THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT (SECRET DEPT.),
TO—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA.**

Fort St. George, 4th September, 1803.

The right honourable the Governor in Council deems it to be probable that you will before the receipt of this letter, have received intelligence of the renewal of hostilities between Great Britain and France; but in case that information should not have reached you, his Lordship in Council has directed me to enclose for your information a copy of His Majesty's gracious message to Parliament announcing that event under date the 17th of May last.

Enclosure.—His Majesty's message to Parliament, May, 1803.

His Majesty thinks it proper to acquaint the House of Commons that the discussions which he announced to them in his message of the 8th of March last as then subsisting between His Majesty and the French Government, have been terminated, that the conduct of the French Government has obliged His Majesty to recall his ambassador from Paris, and that the ambassador from the French Republic has left London.

His Majesty has given directions for laying before the House of Commons with as little delay as possible, copies of such papers as will afford the fullest information to his Parliament at this important conjuncture.

It is a consolation to His Majesty to reflect that no endeavours have been wanting on his part to preserve to his subjects the blessings of peace, but under the circumstances which have occurred to disappoint his just expectations His Majesty relies with confidence on the zeal and public spirit of his faithful Commons and the exertions of his brave and loyal subjects to support him in his determination to employ the power and resources of the nation, in opposing the spirit of ambition and encroachment which at present actuates the councils of France in upholding the dignity of his crown, and in asserting and maintaining the right and interests of his people.

No. 76—The Bombay President's minute discusses the difficulties in following Gen. Wellesley's plan in its entirety, and goes on to lay down the final plan of action to be followed in Gujarat. In drawing up the plan the advice of Major Malcolm, then in Bombay, is also fully availed of.

PRESIDENT'S MINUTE.

Bombay, 5th September, 1803.

In my letter to the Honourable Major General Wellesley of the 23rd of last month, after pointing out the danger that I thought to be connected with his idea of leaving the assistance to be granted to the Resident at Baroda to the mere discretion of the commanding officer; and stating two other heads, of less serious cause for hesitation, respecting the plan in question, as far as regarded the then constituted authorities at Surat, I proposed to wave the two latter, if the General would be pleased to modify his propositions, so far as to preserve the consequence of the Resident at Baroda, with which I deemed so many essential interests to be connected.

In the Honourable General's reply of the 29th of August (wherein he appears to decline the enforcing of his own plan farther than this Government shall approve) he observes, that "it was not his intention to lessen the authority of, or the respect due to, the Resident at Baroda; and that he had proposed the same plan for the subsidiary troops in Gujrat that is now in force in respect to the corps of like description serving with the Nizam".

It must, I think, be nevertheless admitted, that the authority of the Resident of Baroda would be very much lessened by the operation of the General's plan of the 2nd of August, when it is considered, that besides the ordinary privilege of requisition to the officer in command, as generally incident to all civil officers, the stations and posts to be permanently occupied by the several corps of the subsidized force, were, as well as, their consequent reliefs, required by my original instructions of the 7th of June 1802 to the officer in command, to take place either by the Resident's desire, or under his approbation, which superintending authority was further corroborated and confirmed by the Supreme Government's letter of the 12th of September following; that expressly entrusted to the Resident, Major Walker, "the making of such a disposition of the subsidiary force as might appear to him the best calculated for the defence of Gujrat," against an invasion then apprehended from Daulat Rao Sindhia.

With respect to the plan laid down by the Honourable General Wellesley for the respective departments of the commanding officer and the Resident, being the same as now in force at Hyderabad, I confess I had otherwise conceived of the system there, having more

than once heard that the British force at the capital of Hyderabad, were subject to the orders, or at least to the instructions of the Resident, except in points of military practicable detail, which must of course be in all cases out of the question.

But admitting my having been misinformed on this point, it will not, as I conceive, materially affect the merits of the present question : for the territory of the Nizam is a settled dominion, wherein we neither possess territories, nor do we interfere in the interior details of the administration of its government ; whereas the Gaikwad state, having for its present native ruler a Chieftain of avowedly weak intellects, is otherwise still liable to be convulsed by the effect of its civil contentions and the competitions of some of the present Sovereign's own family to usurp upon his authority, which he and his ministers could not probably long resist the consequence of but for our support, that must, under the local circumstances in that quarter, be extended for all the operations of its government, holding as we also do the immediate charge of the Gaikwad Chieftain's own guard, and dividing with his troops the garrison of his capital, at the same time that we ourselves possess in the centre of his country several large tracts of territory, the quiet and tranquillity of which depend altogether on the judicious exertion of our own force, as must in no small degree that of the principality in general, on the respect shewn to the Resident, and the influence he is thereby enabled to exert for the common good.

Under these circumstances, it was deemed by this government a dangerous step to degrade the Resident's authority, from possessing in fact the preponderating direction of the state in every thing, to the single privilege of making military requisitions to the officer in command, with which it was to rest in the latter's discretion whether or not, or how far to comply.

This government has, in the appointment of Colonel Murray on the 28th ultimo, carried into execution, without waiting for the honourable General Wellesley's reply, that part of his plan which in my letter to him of the 23rd I had proposed to give full effect to, as well as the purport of the intermediate intimation with which we were favoured by the General, under date the 13th ultimo, that the disposable troops in the Atthabisi should move towards the river Narbada, as has been accordingly ordered under date the 19th ; since which, in another letter from the Major General of the 26th of August, he is pleased to notice, that "every thing points out the expediency of collecting the troops north of the Narbada ;" by which expression, taken in connection with the recommendation in the General's above-mentioned communication of the 13th, I understand that he desires the field force in the Atthavisi to cross the Narbada, and to join that to the northward of it, which is also in concurrence

with the local views of expediency entertained by Major Walker, the Resident of Baroda, as per the following extract from his official letter to the Resident at Poona of the 28th of last month ; "After the reduction of Broach, I imagine the same detachment should proceed against Pavagarh. The possession of this post will be of great importance ; it is to Baroda what Songarh is to the Atthavisi and Surat : it affords, besides, the means of a direct attack on Sindhia's paternal dominions. The possession of Pavagarh would certainly alarm him, and be at the same time a great security to the internal tranquillity of Gujrat. We may advance from thence to Godhra, where we should probably meet with no resistance ; but it would bring us to a convenient point for prosecuting a campaign against Kanhoji. Could the troops that are now advancing towards the Narbada be ordered to cross that river, and join the battalion and the Gaikwad forces that are on their route to oppose Kanhoji, I think that a series of operations might be concerted between the two detachments that would soon extinguish this rebellion. The detachment at Godhra might join or establish a plan of co-operation with the other, which would either bring Kanhoji to action or deprive him of his present resources, which would also deprive him of his followers. It is in favour of this plan that the troops, while prosecuting operations against Kanhoji, would not be too far removed for the defence of Gujrat in case it should be attacked, and would at the same time be in a situation to pursue any measures that may be judged expedient against Sindhia. Our last accounts left Kanhoji on the southern banks of the Mahi, but he has shewn indications of crossing it : other accounts, however, mention that he intended coming to Godhra. The account we receive of his force varies from 6,000 to 14,000, but I fancy the first number comes nearest the truth."

The plan of operations thus suggested by Major Walker is entirely in unison with the views of the honourable General Wellesley, as far as regards the proceedings against Pavagarh, and any other possessions which Sindhia may have in Gujrat ; nor is it entirely irreconcilable with them in the instance of the Major's having desired Lieutenant Colonel Woodington to detach a battalion of Sepoys to act with the quota of the Gaikwad's force destined to oppose the more immediately threatened invasion of Kanhoji, since the period proposed by the General for collecting all the force together is after the intended reduction of Pavagarh, and this government has by its orders of the 30th ultimo, on the occasion of sanctioning the Resident's destination to his urgent purpose of one of the native battalions, desired, that in the measures he might find it necessary to pursue for opposing and frustrating the attempts of Kanhoji, as alarmingly adverted to in the Major's letter of the 23rd preceding, he should keep in view the plan of general defence indicated in the

17th and following paragraphs of the honourable Major General's letter of the 22nd of August ; viz., that after the reduction of Broach and Pavagarh as aforesaid, our force should be kept in a collected and prepared state, with one month's provisions, and a good proportion of stores, to the end that so collected they might be ready to fall at once with their whole strength upon the strongest of the parties expected to invade Gujrat, whenever the invasion may take place, the General observing, that when employed in this service, some of the weaker enemies may invade the country, and may do some mischief ; "but that". (the General adds) "is a temporary evil, one trifling in its nature, and which cannot be avoided ;" in which last conclusion lies the only but yet material point of difference deducible from the official correspondence of the General and the Resident ; the latter thinking it worth attempting by our force acting in two directions, but not far asunder to obtain possession of Pavagarh, whilst we also guard the country from the invasion of Kanhoji ; for with respect to Malhar Rao, it seems taken for granted by the Resident that Bapuji will, with the Gaikwad force under his command on the present Mulkigiri service, be able sufficiently to restrain that Chieftain's operations.

It has accordingly been in the hope of being able to combine the object of a general defence with the eventual reduction of Broach and Pavagarh (the former of which has taken place) and a sufficient opposition to the approach of Kanhoji, that we have, during the interval of uncertainty as to what plan the General might adopt in consequence of my letter of the 23rd instant, thought it our duty to sanction the defensive measures so urgently represented to us by the Resident as called for against Kanhoji ; and it devolves to us at present to consider how far, and in what respect, farther resolutions and orders may be necessary, now that we are in possession of the honourable Major General's reply to the letter in question.

Just too as we have arrived at this critical stage of our proceedings, the advices received today from the Resident at Baroda, under date the 30th of August, announce that Malhar Rao is proceeding with a reduced force in a direction through the Kathiawad country, that leaves us but little to apprehend from any efforts he can probably make ; but Kanhoji is said to have assembled a force of ten thousand men, and to be waiting with them in the vicinity of Lunawada (a place without the Gaikwad limits) for the junction of Jaswant Rao, whose arrival was reported to be shortly expected, with a view to join Kanhoji ; and although I consider such a junction as improbable, yet since it is certainly within the bounds of possibility, it is our duty to guard against it by every means in our power.

Under these circumstances, and the earnest wish I entertain to adopt such a line of conduct as may, in general consonance to my

own judgment, meet also the sentiments of the Supreme Government, I have availed myself of the accidental presence here of Major Malcolm, late private Secretary to his Excellency the most noble the Governor General (whose minute acquaintance with all the military objects at issue, joined to his accurate information of our political circumstances in Guzerat, enables him so well to afford advice on the present occasion) to confer with him on the subject ; the result of which has been our concurrence in the accompanying draft of instructions, which, if agreed to by the Board, may, I propose, be without delay issued through the commanding officer of the forces to Colonel Murray, in the present military command of both divisions of the province of Gujrat ; at the same time that a copy thereof be transmitted by the Secretary to the Resident at Baroda, for the information, guidance, and co-operation of that officer.

No. 77—These are the detailed instructions given by the Bombay Government to the officer in general command of the troops in Gujarat. Every important point of detail in respect of the plan of action is noted carefully.

Instructions to the Officer in general command of the troops in Gujrat from J. A. Grant.

Bombay Castle, 6th September, 1803.

After referring to the transmission under yesterday's date, of the two paragraphs (5 and 6) of General Wellesley's letter of the 29th ultimo, General Nicolls is to inform Colonel Murray, that the instructions he may receive from government will be chiefly regulated by the nature of the communications that may be received from General Wellesley. The officer in general command will nevertheless report all his proceedings to General Wellesley, and send him returns of the numbers and disposition of the forces in the province.

The chief objects of attention for the disposable force in Gujrat, are.

1. The immediate reduction of Pavagarh and the district of Champaner, being (now that Broach has fallen) the only remaining possession of Sindhia in that province.

2. That keeping the force under his command as collected as possible, in order that he may be able to repel an invasion of Jaswant Rao Holkar, Daulat Rao Sindhia, or from any other inimical quarter, if such should be attempted, or to advance for the purpose of threatening or attacking the hereditary possessions of Daulat Rao Sindhia, if such an operation should eventually be judged prudent or necessary ; to act against Kanhoji. Malhar Rao, or any other rebel or insurgent that may invade the province ; but to endeavour to

conduct such operations (if they become indispensable) in a manner that may not infringe the primary principle of keeping his force collected for the important purposes before stated.

3. As the present season, as well as the situation of affairs, make any immediate serious attack of the Athavisi very improbable, he is to place the complement of troops recommended in Major General Wellesley's letter of the 2nd ultimo to this government, in Surat, Songarh, and Parnera, and to move with the remaining disposable force under his command to the north of the Narbada, where he will be joined by the detachment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Woodington.

4. The nature of the political connection with the Gaikwad Government, and the present extreme delicacy of that connection from the character of the Raja, and the recent death of the minister Raoba, make it peculiarly necessary that he should attend to the suggestions, and comply, as far as he has the power, with the requisitions of the political Resident, who will be advised of the urgent and paramount reasons which require the present application of the whole or the greater part of the subsidiary force, for the general purposes of the war in which both states are now engaged ; a circumstance which must of course involve the temporary alienation of that corps from the usual duties in which it has hitherto been employed. It will become, under these circumstances, Major Walker's duty to reconcile the Gaikwad Government to the inconvenience or even loss of revenue that it may suffer from this temporary application of the troops which it has subsidized, to the general purposes of the war, which he will use every exertion, and probably succeed in satisfying that government, is a measure not only necessary for its present security, but indispensable to the permanent establishment of its power and tranquillity. The consideration of this necessity will of course induce Major Walker not to make any requisitions which can interfere with the military principles recommended by General Wellesley for the military operations in Gujrat, unless in cases of the extremest urgency.

5. All communications with the Gaikwad Government to be conducted through the Resident ; every possible attention to be paid to the officers and troops of the Gaikwad Government, and every protection extended to the inhabitants of the country ; any communications with those Gaikwad officers or troops, which the British Officer in general command may have, to be regularly stated to the political Resident, that he may be always able to satisfy the Gaikwad court of the spirit of friendship and conciliation, which regulates even the most minute actions of the British Government.

6. To maintain a constant correspondence with the Resident, and to apprise him of all operations whatever, as such information must

be indispensable to enable him to satisfy the court at which he resides, and to persuade them to adopt corresponding measures.

7. To pay every possible attention to the requisitions of the civil authority in Surat and the Atthavisi, and to comply with all their requisitions, as far as he can consistently with the spirit of these instructions. It is expected that the requisition of the civil authorities for military aid will not be extensive, as it has been resolved to raise *sebandi* corps for the exclusive purpose of the support and maintenance of their authority. He is to consider himself entrusted with a discretionary power with respect to any change in the number and quality of the troops in the different garrisons, from that established at the recommendation of General Wellesley, as circumstances may occur (which can only be judged of by those on the spot) to render expedient the increase or diminution of these garrisons, either in respect to numbers or locality. He may also furnish a garrison for any other fort, when, on the requisition of the Resident, or otherwise, he may judge the measure indispensable for the defence of the province. But in the exercise of this discretionary power, he is carefully to remember, that the primary principles of all his operations is to keep as large a force as possible collected, for the purposes of repelling an invasion of the country, or eventually invading that of the enemy.

8. In the instructions to the different garrisons under his command, he will desire the officers in charge to attend to every requisition they may eventually receive from the political Resident at Baroda, or from the civil authority at Surat and in the Atthavisi, as far as practicable, consistently with the safety of the posts or forts under their command.

9. In all orders the officer in general command may give to the commanding officers of forts, he will take care to observe the necessary distinctions between such as belong in sovereignty to the Gaikwad State, the authority in which of our commanding officers extends only, in strictness, over the quotas of British troops acting as auxiliaries therein, although with due discretion, and a conciliatory conduct on the part of such officers, their influence will, as hitherto, be sufficient for the purposes of their command, and the security of the posts in question, which are at present Baroda, Sunkheira, Kurry and Songarh.

10. Lieutenant Colonel Woodington to be considered as commanding the subsidiary force, and though strictly and exclusively under his (Colonel Murray's) orders and directions on all military points (as long as the nature of the present service shall require that force to be employed for the general purposes of the war) he will nevertheless continue to regulate its internal details, and to correspond as heretofore with the Political Resident, in all points bearing reference thereto, and which may be necessary for the information or regulation of the Gaikwad Government.

11. The nature of our political interests at Baroda requires, that whatever troops may be left there should be placed in the same relation to the Political Resident which the subsidiary force has heretofore been. The senior officer left at that capital must be directed to comply with the requisitions, and to attend to the instructions he may receive from the Resident ; and the officer, vested with the present command of both divisions of Gujrat, is required to communicate on all subjects that relate to the disposition or removal of the troops at that place, through the channel of Major Walker, and to pay great attention to any suggestions he may offer upon that subject, rules rendered indispensable not more from the nature of our connection than from the personal character of some of the chief parties of the government, and a departure from which might involve consequences at once dangerous to our security, and fatal to our interests.

12. Any parties or small detachments of troops employed near Baroda, or in the territories of the Gaikwad State, such as the guard of the Resident, guard over prisoners of state, or guards aiding the Gaikwad troops in the maintenance or establishment of internal tranquillity, or any others which are indispensable for these purposes, as they can not be accounted among the number of disposable troops for service in the field, should stand in the same predicament respecting the authority of the Political Resident as the garrison of Baroda ; an attention to the leading principle of having as many men in the field as possible, points out the necessity of making every practicable reduction of the number of the troops in such parties and detachments.

13. Major Walker will be instructed to endeavour to obtain the services of a well-paid and well-appointed corps of Gaikwad cavalry to accompany the British troops, and to act under the commanding officer's orders ; he will also be directed to make every exertion to furnish the troops with all supplies which may be required from the Gaikwad Government.

14. In any communications the commanding officer may have with the hill or jungle Rajas, and their dependents the Kolis or Bhils, he is to endeavour, by every means in his power, to conciliate them, and to make them the friends of the English Government, taking care also to advise the Resident at Baroda, and the Agent of Government and Collector at Surat, of all his proceedings regarding these people in the two divisions respectively, and keeping in view to act as far as possible in concurrence with the measures these officers are already pursuing to the same end in consequence of the previous instructions of government.

15. On cases occurring not provided for by these instructions, Colonel Murray's conduct will be regulated by the principles which have been laid down for his guidance in this letter.

16. A copy of these orders and instructions to be communicated to Major Walker for his information and guidance.

17. Finally, it is expected that Colonel Murray as the Officer in command, and Major Walker as the Resident at Baroda, will cultivate towards each other a spirit of harmony, and maintain in their respective departments an unreserved and cordial correspondence, for the fullest possible promotion of the important public objects above adverted to.

No. 78—Collins informs the Governor General about his own start from Aurangabad, and mentions in detail the incident of Lt. Simpson being imprisoned and carried away by the Pindaris.

**FROM—J. COLLINS, RESIDENT WITH SINDHIA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL**

Camp near Chettagaon, 9th September, 1803.

It having been recommended by the honourable Major General Wellesley that I should leave Aurangabad, I, accordingly, marched from that city this morning and purpose proceeding to the Ghat of Rakaisbom, where the honourable General was encamped on the 4th instant, when I last had the pleasure of hearing from him.

Sindhia and the Bhonsla seem determined to persevere in a predatory war. Several flying parties of Pindaris have, of late, been plundering in the vicinity of Aurangabad. One of these parties fell in with Lieut. Simpson of my escort, as he was taking a morning's ride, not three miles distant from the walls of that city. The Pindaris seized and carried off this officer to Gopal Bhau, who is at present posted near the Ajanta pass.

As soon as I was apprized of the above unlucky accident, I lost not a moment in detaching the few horse belonging to my escort and a party of sepoy, in the hope of recovering Lieutenant Simpson. Raja Mohipat Ram, also, sent a body of the Nawab Nizam's cavalry for the same purpose, but all to no effect, the Pindaris having had time sufficient to convey that unfortunate officer beyond the utmost reach of our efforts.

I have, however, little doubt but that Mr. Simpson will be humanely treated by Gopal Bhau, whose character is respectable. In a letter which I addressed to the Bhau, on this occasion, I particularly pointed out that Lieut. Simpson was returning with me to the hon'ble Company's provinces, from the court of Daulat Rao Sindhia to which I had been deputed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor General, consequently that Mr. Simpson should not, and indeed

could not, without a violation of faith, be detained as a prisoner. I, therefore, requested of Gopal Bhau to deliver up that officer immediately to Colonel Stevenson, or should his present situation render such a measure impracticable, at the instant, that I at least expected he would treat Lieutenant Simpson with kindness and respect, until a favourable opportunity occurred of restoring him to liberty.

P. S.—Lt. Simpson was made prisoner on the 7th of this month.

No. 79—Collins mentions his own difficulties with his followers, who all came from Hindustan, and explains his reasons for deciding to go to Hyderabad and not to Bombay as suggested before.

FROM—J. COLLINS, RESIDENT WITH SINDHIA,
TO—GENERAL ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Camp Rakasban, 12th September, 1803.

On my arrival here this morning I was greatly disappointed to learn that you had marched hence on the 5th instant. The European officer, who has charge of the boats at this place, informs me you were at [Hadgaon] yesterday, and as your movements are generally rapid there would be little chance of my overtaking you, even if I knew, which I do not, the course that you intend to pursue, as the present situation of my people obliges me to make short marches.

The fact is my sepoys and camp-followers are extremely sickly, and moreover the latter are obstinately determined on returning to Hindustan as soon as possible. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that I should repair to some place where the sick may obtain rest, and my followers their discharge.

It was my design, at one time, to have left the sick of my escort at Aurangabad, but Colonel Stevenson having apprized me it was his intention shortly to move his hospital from that city, I was obliged to bring my invalids along with me. There are now a fifth of my escort totally unfit for duty, and since my departure from Fatehgarh I have lost twenty-six sepoys by casualties so that had not Raja Mohipat Ram granted me fifty rank and file from one of the Nawab Nizam's battalions, I should not have had a sufficient guard to protect my guns and baggage on my march hither.

In a private letter, under date the 2nd instant, I did myself the honour to mention to you my purpose of proceeding to Bombay after an interview with you at this place, but when my followers heard of the route I meant to pursue they insisted on their immediate discharge, urging that they had already travelled so far from their homes, that they almost despaired of ever seeing their families again, and

that if I went to Bombay, I should go round to Bengal by sea, leaving them destitute of all hope of returning, with safety, to Hindustan. In consequence of these apprehensions forty of my bearers left me at once. The whole of Captain Bradshaw's, likewise, ran away the day before our march from Aurangabad, and every one of mine would, I sincerely believe, have followed their example had I not promised them to proceed straight to Hyderabad and on my arrival there to give them a sufficient sum of money to defray the expenses of their journey to their respective homes.

However, if it be the intention of his Excellency the most noble the Governor General that I should remain in the Deccan, it will at all events be indispensably requisite that I should entertain followers who are natives of this part of India, and men of this description I can only procure at Hyderabad by means of the assistance of Major Kirkpatrick.

I have the honour to enclose copy of my last address to his Excellency the most Noble the Governor General, containing an account of the situation of Lieutenant Simpson, of whose misfortune I have already apprized you.

P. S.—I shall halt here tomorrow in order to obtain correct information respecting the route hence to Hyderabad and on the day following I purpose prosecuting my journey towards that City.

No. 80—Murray reports the surrender of Pavagarh, and mentions the meritorious services of Sergeant Moor in the assault of Broach.

**FROM—COL. J. MURRAY,
TO—MAJOR GENERAL NICOLLS.**

Head Quarters Baroda, 21st September, 1803.

I have the honour to inclose a letter which I received this morning from Lieutenant Colonel Woodington. It is necessary to inform you, that the delay of this important communication arises from the miscarriage of the Colonel's letter, although sent in duplicate. Colonel Woodington highly praises the zeal and activity of the troops under his command, and to judge by their success, the praise is well merited.

Colonel Woodington has in a most particular manner requested that I should lay the meritorious services of Serjeant Moor, of His Majesty's 86th regiment, before you. He led the forlorn hope at the assault of Broach, and behaved with the utmost gallantry on that occasion. Major Cuyler speaks highly in favour of his general character.

No. 81—Woodington reports the surrender of the fort of Pavagarh to the English force on the 17th September.

**FROM—LT. COL. H. WOODINGTON,
TO—COL. MURRAY.**

Baroda, 21st September, 1803.

In consequence of your communication to me last night, that you had not received my official communication on the surrender of Pavagarh by capitulation, I have the honour to address you again on the subject.

After a breach had been effected in the wall of the inner fort, as also that another was almost practicable in a tower at the angle of the outer fort, the garrison offered to capitulate on the morning of the 17th, on condition of being protected in their persons and private property.

To these terms I agreed, on condition of immediately taking possession of the breach in the inner wall with a company of Sepoys ; they however tacked other stipulations to the capitulation, viz., that I should agree to pay them the arrears due from Sindhia, and that two of the commanders of the Gaikwad cavalry with me (amounting to about 300 horse) should sign the agreement. To these latter articles I would on no account agree ; and it was until four p.m. when they found from our continuing to batter that I would admit of no delay, that they agreed to the original terms, which were immediately carried into full effect by their evacuation of the fort and mountain, of which we took possession.

If this had not taken place, I had made the necessary arrangements for storming both breaches on the morning of the 18th, and I conceive that the garrison were intimidated from a knowledge that if they opposed us on our entering the breaches, their communication with the upper fort would be cut off, and they had no other way to escape than the road which led down by our battery.

Could they have obtained possession of the upper Fort, or Balla Killa, at the top of the mountain, I am inclined to think it utterly impregnable.

I have left Captain Cliffe of the Engineers to take a plan and view of the forts and works on the mountain, which, I doubt not, from his known abilities, will be ably executed.

It is with the greatest pleasure that I embrace this opportunity of submitting for your notice, the merits, zeal, and great exertions of all ranks on this service.

No. 82—Gen. Wellesley reports to the Governor General, the details of the battle and his victory over the Marathas won at Assaye on September 23, 1803.*

FROM—A. WELLESLEY,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Camp at Assye, 24th September, 1803.

I was joined by Major Hill with the last of the convoys expected from the river Krishna, on the 18th and 20th; and was enabled to move forward towards the enemy, who had been joined in the course of the last seven or eight days by the infantry under Colonel Pohlman, by that belonging to Begam Samru, and another brigade of infantry, the name of whose commander I have not ascertained. The enemy's army was collected about Bhokardan, and between that place and Jaffarabad.

I was near Colonel Stevenson's corps on the 21st, and had a conference with that officer, in which we concerted a plan to attack the enemy's army with the divisions under our command on the 24th in the morning, and we marched on the 22nd; Colonel Stevenson by the western route, and I by the eastern route, round the hills between Badnapur and Jaulna.

On the 23rd I arrived at Naulniah, and there received a report that Sindhia and the Raja of Berar had moved off in the morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, but were still in camp, at the distance of about six miles from the ground on which I intended to encamp. It was obvious that the attack was no longer to be delayed, and having provided for the security of my baggage and stores at Naulniah, I marched on to attack the enemy.

I found the whole combined army of Sindhia and the Raja of Berar encamped on the bank of the Kaitna river, nearly on the ground which I had been informed that they occupied; their right, which consisted entirely of cavalry, was about Bhokardan, and expected to join their corps of infantry, which were encamped in the neighbourhood of Assye.† Although I came first in front of their right, I determined to attack their left, as the defeat of their corps of infantry was most likely to be effectual; accordingly I marched round to their left flank, covering the march of the columns of infantry by the British cavalry in the road, and by the Marhatta and Mysore cavalry on the right flank.

We passed the river Kaitna at a ford beyond the enemy's left flank, and I formed the infantry immediately in two lines, with the British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an open space between that river

* (Printed in Sidney Owen's *Selections*, Pp. 299-302).

† In the Nizam's territory 76°E, 20°5'N.

and a *nala* running parallel to it. The Marhatta and Mysore cavalry occupied the ground beyond the Kaitna on our left flank, and kept in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry, which had followed our march from the right of their own position.

The enemy had altered the position of their infantry previous to our attack ; it was no longer, as at first, along the Kaitna, but extended from that river across to the village of Assye, upon the *nala* which was upon our right. We attacked them immediately, and the troops advanced under a very hot fire from cannon, the execution of which was terrible.

The picquets of the infantry of the 74th regiment, which were on the right of the first and second lines, suffered particularly from the fire of the guns on the left of the enemy's position near Assye. The enemy's cavalry also made an attempt to charge the 74th regiment at the moment when they were most exposed to the fire, but they were cut up by the British cavalry, which moved on at that moment. At length, the enemy's line gave way in all directions, and the British cavalry cut in among their broken infantry, but some of their corps went off in good order ; and a fire was kept up on our troops from many of the guns from which the enemy had been first driven, by individuals who had been passed by the line under the supposition that they were dead.

Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, with the British cavalry, charged a large body of infantry which had retired, and was formed again, in which operation he was killed ; and some time elapsed before we could put an end to the straggling fire, which was kept by individuals from the guns from which the enemy were driven ; the enemy's cavalry also, which had been hovering round us throughout the action, was still near us. At length, when the last formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, and left in our hands 90 pieces of cannon.

This victory, which was certainly complete, has, however, cost us dear ; your Excellency will perceive, by the inclosed return, that our loss in officers and men has been very great, and in that of Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell and other Officers, whose names are therein included, greatly to be regretted.

I cannot write in too strong terms of the conduct of the troops ; they advanced in the best order, and with the greatest steadiness, under a most destructive fire, against a body of infantry far superior in number, who appeared determined to contend with them to the last, and who were driven from their guns only by the bayonet ; and notwithstanding the numbers of the enemy's cavalry, and the repeated demonstrations they made of an intention to charge, they were kept at a distance by the infantry.

I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Harness and Lieutenant Colonel Wallis* for the manner in which they conducted their brigades, and to all the officers of the Staff, for the assistance I received from them.

The officers commanding brigades, nearly all those of the Staff, and the mounted officers of the infantry, had their horses shot under them.

I have also to draw your Excellency's notice to the conduct of the cavalry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, particularly that of the 19th dragoons.

The enemy are gone off towards the Ajanta Ghat, and I propose to follow them as soon as I can place my captured guns and the wounded in security.

P.S.—Colonel Stevenson arrived this morning at Bhokardan, and I imagine that he will be here this evening.

No. 83—In this private letter Close gives a review of the military movements of Sindhia and the English armies opposing him up to September 20, 1803.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—J. WEBBE, THE RESIDENT WITH BHONSLA.**

Poona, 6th October, 1803.

It is scarcely possible not to make a few reflections on the events which have been lately passing. Within a short space we have seen a variety of military movements, which on a review, I think, will appear to exhibit great judgment and skill.

From former papers you will have observed that when Colonel Collins left Sindhia's camp, the force present with this Chieftain consisted 26 battalions supported by a train of 250 pieces of cannon. That Sindhia resolved from an early period to exert his utmost strength to defeat the Treaty of Bassein, cannot be doubted, and that he saw he would be obstinately opposed in attempting this object may be received as equally certain. When hostilities commenced, he could not proceed on his object of penetrating by a different [?] pass, which was guarded in a manner by a respectable British division. With so cumbersome a train, to endeavour to force the pass under such circumstances would evidently be hazardous to an extreme. His mode of manoeuvring therefore to avert this difficulty is well worthy of inspection. When appearances became serious he ordered two of

* Parliamentary papers give this name: Gurwood and Martin, however, give this name as "Wallace", which is correct.

his brigades (Dudrenec's and Brownrigg's) to march back to Malwa to quell some disturbances in that province, and on Colonel Collins' coming off, he directed Pohlman's brigade to return to Burhanpur on the plea that the country was too deep for the march of the cannon. After these movements Sumroo's brigade only remained in camp with perhaps four independent battalions. He now began to arrange a light army of Cavalry (Cherry Fauje). In completing this arrangement he made a particular parade. All the *harkarahs*, who came in from his camp said he was light to a degree, that he was on the predatory, the genuine Maratha plan, and that his marches would be long and rapid.

About thus time (8th August) hostilities commenced. He shortly after approached the Ajanta Pass and found it guarded. He made a run to the south-east as if meaning to enter by the Badowli Pass. Here Colonel Stevenson opposed him by corresponding movements, but hastily returning to Ajanta he stole a march on the Colonel and came through the Pass unnoticed. His party consisted almost wholly of cavalry lightly equipped. He gave out that he was destined for Hyderabad, and making rapid marches passed Aurangabad and suddenly showed himself near to the Godavary on the Hyderabad road at a point nearly south-west of Jafferabad where Colonel Stevenson having heard of his intention, had halted. General Wellesley had by this period taken Ahmednagar and arrived at Aurangabad. He had ascertained the movements of the enemy, and finding that the Godavary had been fordable hurried to the vicinity of [Toka] on the bank of the river, as well to be near the enemy should they cross to the southward as to cover convoys approaching through the Nizam's territory from the Krishna. Some of the enemy's cavalry began to show themselves to Colonel Stevenson, who feeling want of cash and supplies, marched in an eastern direction, from Jafferabad, seized the post of Jalna and pursued his march to Badnapore with the view of placing himself in communication with Gen. Wellesley, and being conveniently situated for taking up a convoy that was approaching towards him from Aurangabad. Here there was a lull. General Wellesley waited quietly on the northern bank of the Godavary. The river was fordable, but the enemy did not proceed to cross it. On the contrary Sindhia changing his course, followed Colonel Stevenson, made an unsuccessful attack on Jalna and afterwards fell back towards Jafferabad, leaving a body of cavalry to annoy Colonel Stevenson as occasion might offer. Sindhia had by this time lost Ahmadnagar and Broach, and Jalna. Reports began to circulate that he had sent for Sumroo's brigade and afterwards for Pohlman's also. The rumours of his being destined against Hyderabad began to die away. The actual arrival of the infantry on this side of the pass began to be spoken of, and at length the cavalry that watched Colonel

Stevenson rejoined Sindhia at Jafferabad. By the eighteenth of September, General Wellesley had been joined by his southern convoys and two native battalions that escorted the treasure and provisions. These corps he ordered to Poona by the route of Ahmednagar, and then moved with his army towards Badnapore. On the 21st he reached the vicinity of the place and then had a meeting with Colonel Stevenson. Concerning [?] accounts had been previously received in camp, of the enemy having been joined by Pohlman's and Sumroo's brigades, and it was said in quarter [? particular] that the enemy intended to fight at the Dussara which was near at hand. What happened from the 21st to the 24th September is detailed by Gen. Wellesley's correspondence in your possession and further illustrated by the plan which I have transmitted to you.

It may be now seen, I think, that Sindhia never meant to pursue a predatory mode of warfare, for which indeed the greater part of his cavalry is not fitted, that in pursuing [? passing] through the pass with his cavalry, circulating the reports which he did, and running to the south of our troops, his real design was to draw off our attention from the pass by making us tenacious of Hyderabad and of Poona, and afford leisure to his numerous infantries and cumbrous train to come uninterrupted and unnoticed through the ghats. Ordering his brigades back to Burhanpur and Malwa was a fact [? trick]; and when the infantry joined him, he became less jealous of being seen; he then withdrew from Colonel Stevenson's front the cavalry that masked his movements. It is further obvious, I think, that Sindhia had arranged to engage the united forces of the General and Colonel Stevenson. He had drawn forward a third brigade without the knowledge of any one on our side, and from the manner in which the ammunition of his train was disposed, particularly in the second line, it appears that he was not prepared for a movement. The post he occupied seems to have been selected with the intention of using it for an action. It was particularly secure and was well situated to allow of his retreating eventually with some convenience, through the pass, when the two British divisions separated. It does not appear that he made any movement to bring one of them separately to action, but keeping his ground at all hazards throughout as a lure to bring one of them into action. If these observations be found [true], they may impress the notion that Sindhia's army, in general, is not equal to the ancient hardy mode of Maratha predatory warfare, that the main part of his troops have adopted entirely the European style of carrying on war, and that consequently, although his army may comparatively be powerful, it must yet be more tangible and more liable to defeat by the British troops than if it were composed principally of the thrifty hardy cavalry which originally raised the Marathas into a commanding nation.

No. 84—Close recommends to the Governor General the case of Mr. Stuart, who has taken his discharge from Sindhia's army. He also forwards a report received from the said Stuart.

**FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Poona, 16th October 1803.

I do myself the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information, a copy of a report received yesterday from Mr. Stuart who arrived here on the 14th instant direct from Burhanpur. Mr. Stuart has brought his discharge from Sindhia's service, signed by Colonel Pohlman, in whose brigade he served.

I had an opportunity of being acquainted with Mr. Stuart at Bombay, and as I knew he had joined Sindhia's army at Burhanpur, I made two attempts to get a copy of your Lordship's Proclamation conveyed to him, but without effect. The men who had charge of it, were both times stopped by the enemy's Pindaris and obliged to return.

Mr. Stuart is a very respectable character, has a brother an officer on the Bombay establishment, and as in extricating himself from Sindhia's service he has been actuated by the purest feelings of patriotism, I would hope that your Lordship will be pleased to admit him to the indulgence held forth by your Lordship's Proclamation.

*Report taken down from Mr. Stuart by Colonel Close on the
15th of October 1803.*

Mr. Stuart arrived in Sindhia's camp at Edilabad on the 1st of June 1803. About 25 days after, he was appointed to do duty with the Burhanpur Battalion of the 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel Pohlman. The Bhonsla's army was then, Mr. S. believes, at Malkapur. The force at Edilabad was then as follows:—

8 Battalions of the 1st Brigade.

4 Battalions of Samru Begam's.

4 Battalions (of the Brigade of late Filose) commanded by M. Dupont, a person of Dutch extraction born at Ceylon.

4 or 5 Battalions of the 5th Brigade, commanded by Major Brownrigg.

6 or 7 Battalions of the 4th Brigade, commanded by the Chevalier Dudrenec.

Sindhia, with this cavalry, was, at this time not in sight, probably at Malkapur. The Ordnance is as follows:—

With the 1st Brigade, there were five guns to each battalion, besides a park to the Brigade, consisting of 8 or 10 pieces, 18 and 12 seers. The Ordnance of the other brigades, Mr. Stuart imagines, was not

quite so numerous, probably about three to each battalion. Besides which, was Daulat Rao Sindhia's own park, called the Jinsee, under Man Singh Chaudhari about 40 or 50 pieces. This was the whole force in infantry and Ordnance when Mr. S. joined. The cavalry was very numerous. There were about [] cavalry attached to the three brigades. In the month of July, the whole force moved on towards Ajanta, the 1st Brigade having halted within 6 *kos* of that pass.

After a halt of some days, the 4th and 5th Brigades under Brownrigg and Dudrenec, were ordered to Hindustan. They accordingly marched towards Ujjain. The 1st Brigade received orders to march back to Burhanpur, the same night that Colonel Collins left Sindhia's camp. They accordingly marched to Burhanpur. Two of the battalions crossed the Tapti, when the whole brigade was remanded to Sindhia's camp. Sindhia himself having by this time, penetrated through the Ajanta pass, with his cavalry, the Begam's battalions, and the four under Monsr. Dupont. The 1st Brigade marched to Ajanta, where it encamped, Samru's and Dupont's being encamped in the neighbourhood.

When Colonel Collins left camp, Mr. Stuart asked Colonel Pohlman to give him his discharge. Colonel Pohlman said, that he could have his discharge from General Perron only. Mr. Stuart continued to press Colonel P. for his discharge, telling him, that hostilities might commence before he could hear from the General Perron and that, if Colonel P. persists in refusing him his discharge, that he was determined to go and in the best manner he could. At length, on the 12th of September Colonel P. was induced to give him his discharge, and Mr. Stuart immediately quitted camp and went to Burhanpur. Mr. Grant and Mr. MacCullough obtained their discharge at the same time, and went back with Mr. Stuart to Burhanpur.

In the Ghat, Mr. Stuart met Sindhia's Jinsee park.

The morning after Mr. Stuart received his discharge, the enemy marched in a southern direction. Mr. Stuart reached Burhanpur without any material occurrence ; at Burhanpur there were no troops. Mr. Stuart, after remaining a short time at Burhanpur to procure some people for his protection on the journey, set off intending to go by the Unkitunki Ghat, but at Erundole, hearing that there was a nearer route by Antura Ghat proceeded that way to Daulatabad and from thence to Poona, where he arrived on the 14th October.

Just before Mr. Stuart left Burhanpur, he heard a report of an action having taken place and Sindhia's army was said to have been defeated. On the road Mr. Stuart heard that the battle was very severe, and that, there was great loss on both sides, that all the 1st Brigade was cut up except one battalion which was with the baggage, that all Sindhia's guns had been taken, and that Major Dorson was

killed. Mr. Stuart thinks, that Major Dorson must have commanded the brigade on the day of the action. He was the officer next in rank to Colonel Pohlman, and Mr. Stuart knows that Colonel Pohlman had insisted on having his discharge, and used every endeavour to procure it from Sindhia, but to no purpose. That though Colonel Pohlman was induced to march, Mr. Stuart knows that it was not Colonel Pohlman's intention to fight, and that he had sent his resignation to General Perron. Mr. Stuart also heard a report that Colonel Pohlman was not in the action. The reports which Mr. Stuart heard of the action, were so vague, that no dependence can be placed on them, but he understood, that all the brigade, except one battalion was in the action. That, that battalion and Begam Samru's, and Dupont's brigades, were with the baggage. Mr. Stuart does not know of any British subjects in these two last mentioned brigades. In the 1st brigade there were only Mr. Stuart and the two gentlemen abovementioned, and Mr. Marrs, and a Sergeant and a gunner. The Sergeant asked Mr. Stuart's advice about the best means for quitting camp, and said, he saw that the brigade was going to march forward; that he should have gone off before had he not been apprehensive that his departure would occasion a suspicion against the English officers, and that they would be seized in consequence. Mr. Stuart advised the Sergeant to go over to General Wellesley's army which he would easily reach, though Mr. Stuart could not; at length the Sergeant said he should take the first opportunity to slip off on the line of march and Mr. Stuart understood that the gunner had the same intention.

When Mr. Stuart left camp Mr. Marrs was out on a foraging party and Mr. Stuart does not know what became of him. Mr. Stuart knows that he, as well as the other, made many endeavours to get his discharge. The other Europeans in the brigades which were with Sindhia were chiefly French and Portuguese.

Foreign European Officers of the 1st Brigade.

Colonel Pohlman	Hanoverian.
Major Dorson	French.
Captain Gautier	French.
Captain Lieutenant Honore	French.
Captain Lieutenant Mercier	French.
Ensign Perrin	French.
Ensign Manual de Ball	Portuguese.
Ensign Joseph Carolus	Portuguese.
Signor Cambro or Camro	Portuguese.

Besides the above there were 4 or 5 Europeans, sergeants or gunners and 20 or 30 half-caste and native Portuguese, gunners and Topasses. There is also a Mr. Wroughton, a person of a very dark

complexion—a native of Bengal—He was an ensign or a cadet—and a Mr. Brown an Englishman—an ensign or cadet. These two last mentioned persons were not associated with Mr. Stuart who knows nothing about them.

The artillery men are chiefly Mohammadans. They are divided into two classes—one called *golandaz*, the other *gurnell*. The latter carrying a sort of a carabine or blunderbuss, they are clothed in blue turned up with red—Ensign Cambro had charge of the Parks.

Mr. Stuart has reason to believe that Gautier, Honore and Mercier were very averse to the war and would have got their discharge if they could. Dupont too was very anxious to go away and was in fact for some time prisoner in his own camp. Dorson was very inimical to the English and he was so apprehensive of Pohlman's leaving camp from his unwillingness to serve against the English, that he surrounded his tent at night with Mewatis and other people to prevent his getting away. Mr. Stuart knows nothing further of the Europeans whose names are here mentioned.

Mr. Stuart thinks there must have been 60 guns attached to the 1st brigade and on a rough calculation that not less than 150 or 160 pieces of cannon were brought up the Ghat.

Mr. Stuart thinks that there must be a good many guns in Asseer, but he has no reason to think that they are mounted on field carriages.

When Mr. Stuart was near Ajanta he saw a letter from General Perron to Colonel Pohlman, in which General Perron mentioned that in consequence of the apprehensions which were entertained of a war breaking out, his English officers had taken their discharge. That he, therefore, wished Colonel Pohlman would send him 3 French officers namely Honore, Mercier and Perrin. Mr. Stuart says that Honore and Mercier positively refused to go, but he thinks Perrin would go willing. It was in consequence of this letter that Colonel Pohlman was induced at the urgent request of Mr. Stuart and the other English officers to give them their discharge. Mr. Stuart heard that Major Brownrigg and Major Smith and all the other English officers of Brownrigg's Brigads has left Kotah and gone over to the British stations.

In Dudrenec's brigade the only English officer was Major Smith, the other officers in that brigade to the best of Mr. Stuart's recollections are as follows:—

Chevalier Dudrenec	Frenchman.
Monsr. Gernier	Frenchman.
Chaublet	Frenchman.
Permentier	Frenchman.
Dela Fouchard	Frenchman.
Pepin	Frenchman.

and 3 other French officers whose names Mr. Stuart does not remember. The officers of Brownrigg's brigade are—

Major Brownrigg.
Captain Marshall.
Captain Harriet.
Captain Lieutenant Atkins.

Mr. Stuart knows nothing of Sindhia's plans, but at Ajanta it was reported that he was going to Hyderabad.

Mr. Stuart heard a report that the Bhonsla's people had done nothing in the action; some said that the Bhonsla had gone over to the English. The Bhonsla was said to have had Infantry as well as cavalry—and that the infantry had been sent back to Nagpur.

Mr. Stuart understands that Sindhia is forming a brigade at Ujjain under the command of an Armenian named Jacob to whom a *jaidad* has been assigned. Ujjain is a large walled town, the wall in bad repair, Sindhia has an arsenal and foundery there, some of the guns of the 1st brigade having been cast there.

Mr. Stuart knows no particulars of Holkar, but understands that he has 4 or 5 brigades of infantry and about 200 pieces of cannon and an immense number of horse.

Ambaji's brigade marched towards Hindustan the day after Mr. Stuart joined at Edilabad.

Near Ujjain is the remainder of Filose's brigade consisting of 6 or 7 battalions under John Baptiste, country-born of French extraction—so that if Jacob's brigade is completed there are 2 brigades for the protection of Ujjain.

Mr. Stuart first heard of the Proclamation by His Excellency the Governor General on the 14th of October when he arrived at Poona. He regrets that the Proclamation did not reach Sindhia's camp, because he thinks it would have had very good effects as well among natives as Europeans.

Mr. Stuart adds that when he was in the vicinity of Ajanta a despatch was received from General Perron accompanied by the articles of war, which the several officers were desired to take a copy of, and at the same time to take an oath that they would serve in or out of the Maratha territory. The officers however declined taking this oath, which was not noticed particularly by Colonel Pohlman.

When Mr. Stuart left Sindhia's camp, the troops were four months in arrears—a circumstance which was very unusual—it having been customary for the troops to receive their pay regularly on the beginning of each month.

With respect to Burhanpur Mr. Stuart thinks that the wall of the place, which is of stone and brick, is about as high as the wall of the Fort of [Ahmad]nagar, and would consequently be difficult to escalate.

although not capable of standing against cannon. Mr. Stuart did not observe that any scarcity prevailed in Sindhia's camp. The cavalry used to plunder the neighbouring country and bring grain to the bazars; and besides *Banjaras* used to frequent the army in great numbers.

No. 85—Close informs the Governor General about the unsuccessful conference he had with Sadashiv Mankeshwar to impress on him the necessity of the Peshwa's being reconciled to his brother, Amrit Rao.*

FROM—B. CLOSE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 13th October, 1803.

The detachment here has been lately reinforced by Lieutenant Colonel Griffin's Battalion from camp, with the exception of three Companies of the corps on duty for the present at Almadnagar.

In consequence of a late communication† from the Honourable General Wellesley, in which he suggested, that an arrangement might possibly be effected with Amrit Rao should 3,000 cavalry in his service be taken into the Honourable Company's pay during the war, as part of the 5,000 Maratha horse to be maintained by the British Government, under the late cession in Bundelkhand, and the assent of this Durbar be obtained to Amrit Rao's continuing in quiet possession of his jagir lands at Sangamner, I yesterday procured a meeting with Sadashiv Mankeshwar, and renewed my endeavours to impress him with the necessity of the Peshwa's being reconciled to accommodate with his brother, who was now at the head of a considerable corps that might greatly interfere with General Wellesley's operations. It is with pain that I have to acquaint your Lordship, that Sadashiv Mankeshwar combated all my statements to the foregoing effect with the greatest perseverance, and in the most arbitrary style, the whole of his arguments and expressions having tended to show that the Peshwa was more exasperated against his brother than ever, and that his Highness now entertained the hope of being able to reduce him by force.

Whilst Mankeshwar held this extravagant strain, I did not fail to remind him of the contents of my former memorandum which had no other effect than to induce him at length to say, that he would communicate all I had stated to the Peshwa, and inform me of the result.

* This letter has been printed in an incomplete form in vol. VII of this series, pages 87-88, with a wrong conjectural date.

† This reference is to Gen. Wellesley's letter to Close, dated 3rd October, 1803.

The substance of this unsuccessful conference I have conveyed to the honourable General Wellesley, who, in his future conversation, with Amrit Rao's Vakil, I conclude, will be guided solely by a consideration of what is best for the British interests, leaving any points that may refer to this Durbar to be settled at a future period.

From General Wellesley's correspondence, your Lordship would perceive, that Balaji Kunjar shewed little disposition to return to Poona, having assumed, in a manner, the office of minister to Daulat Rao Sindhia.* Krishnaji Bowannic, however, and Dajiba Deshmukh having separated from Sindhia's camp, have arrived in this vicinity and will probably have a meeting with the Peshwa in the course of tomorrow. It is probable they are charged with something similar to the proposition which General Wellesley received from Balaji Kunjar.

No. 86—The movements of Bhonsla and his other associate Maratha generals are reported. With the approach of the Marathas the kamavisdars of the neighbouring villages are flying.

**FROM—BALWANT RAO RAGHUNATH AT PAITHAN,
TO—CAPTAIN GRAHAM, COLLECTOR AT AHMADNAGAR.**

Paithan, 22nd October, 1803.

To the 6th of Rajab [22nd October 1803] I am attentive to the affairs of Government.

The Bhonsla with an army of 50,000 men, and Sindhia's army and Phadkia's army are come, and they have halted at Medee Bhalgaon which is in the Gangapur Pargana. Gangapur is a kos from the Shivnadi. Amrit Rao is at Toka, in the Parganna Newasa, and this day which is the 6th he is to meet the army. The said army is 15 kos from Paithan, and Parasram Pandit, who was the Kamavisdar at Gangapur, left his *thana* on the 6th and came to Shendurwada, and a letter has come to the same effect from the Kamavisdar of Shendurwada to Mahipat Rao Tantia, the Kamavisdar of Paithan. I send you a copy of that letter, I expect your orders. The late Kamavisdar of the pargana is gone today to Bhir.

Enclosure—From Gopal Vithal to Mahipat Rao Tantia, dated Saturday, 22nd October, (1803), 9 o'clock at night.

On Friday the Bhonsla was at Kali Pipalgaon. I heard this news this morning and sent a man immediately to the army. The man has returned with intelligence. He says that the Bhonsla has with him 40,000 men, and on Saturday, the 22nd he halted at Medi

* The reference is to Gen. Wellesley's Letter addressed to the Governor General, dated October 6, 1803.

Jalgaon, 9 *kos* from Bhalgaon on the banks of the Shiv naddi. Amrit Rao is at Toka, and is to have a meeting with him tomorrow, and it is not known where he will go next. It is reported that they are to go to Paitan or to Aurangabad. This news is certain. Do whatever you think proper on the occasion. From Gangapur all the villages are deserted, a thousand men have gone away from their villages and others with them, and the rest of the inhabitants are going also. They will not stay where they are desired, but they have no spirit and they run away. The terror is near, and for that reason nobody will remain. The enemy are 8 *kos* and if there was spirit, there would be no place to remain. The inhabitants of this place being alarmed have dispersed. Besides there is no rain. If we have God's mercy on us soon, it will be well, otherwise this place will be quite desolate. Take care and attend to this news, for it is true. The Company's thana which was at Gangapur, has left that place and fled hither today. They will not stay here, but retreat further on. Ballaji Yeshwant has established his post at Gangapur. Phadkia is with the Bhonsla. If you do not make some arrangement for sending troops we shall be in great difficulty. Ballaji Yeshwant is with the army, and I intend to go to him tomorrow for an escort.

No. 87.—Close acquaints the G.G. with the reports about the movements of Sindhia and Bhonsla.

FROM—B. CLOSE, THE RESIDENT WITH THE PESHWA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Poona, 26th October, 1803.

1. Agreeably to your Lordship's commands conveyed in Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's dispatch of the 30th August I yesterday delivered to Anand Rao, for his Highness the Peshwa's inspection, and for circulation, several copies of your Excellency's proclamation, to which had been added a literal translation in the Marathi language. I, at the same time, imparted to Anand Rao, your Lordship's recommendation, that His Highness should circulate similar proclamations, for the purpose of recalling to his dominions such of his subjects as may be in employment with any of the enemies of his State. In the propriety of this measure Anand Rao expressed his fullest assent, adding that he should make the communication to his Highness which I had desired, and make me acquainted with his Highness's sentiments in reply.

2. By private letters from camp, it appears, that the honourable Major General Wellesley, having occupied the Fort of Ajanta and lodged his sick and wounded there, advanced through the pass bearing that name on the 19th instant. His immediate object in this

movement I have not learned, but it was probably to occupy the *attention of the enemy on this side of the Tapti, while Colonel Stevenson should prosecute operations to the northward of that river, which he probably crossed, some time since at the ford near Burhanpur.*

3. Yesterday evening I received information from an intelligent person of the city, that Sindhia with his own force had marched from a position north of the Kasarbari ghaut, towards, Burhanpur, and that the Rajah of Berar, and Baba Phadkia advancing with their divisions, had arrived on the Godavari a little to the westward of Toka, and were to have a meeting immediately with Amrit Rao in that vicinity. This morning I have received an express from Captain Graham, which goes to confirm the foregoing intelligence, and of which a copy is accordingly enclosed for your Lordship's notice. Supposing that the Bhonsla has really advanced through the Kasarbari Pass, it is probable General Wellesley may adopt some measures to counteract such movements.

4. Lieutenant Colonel Coleman is encamped with three corps, and a large train, on a commanding spot to the north-east of Poona, and although the intelligence before stated is current in the city it does not seem to have occasioned much alarm.

5. No *dak* is come in today from Camp.

SECTION VI

Sindhia and Bhonsla Negotiate Peace Treaties

10 November—30 December 1803

[General Editor's Note]

As Generals Lake in Hindustan and Wellesley in the Deccan dealt their crushing blows at the armies of Sindhia, and the British plan of carrying the war into Sindhia's own territory by attacking Gawil-garh was unfolded, that Maratha chief opened negotiations for making peace. His first envoy, Jaswant Rao Ghorpade, waited on General Arthur Wellesley on 10th November, 1803, but the treaty of peace was actually signed at Sarji Anjangaon on 30th December. Minutes of these long negotiations (called "Memorandum of the Conferences with the vakils of Daulat Rao Sindhia", and a subsequent one on the peace parleys with the diplomatic agents of the Bhonsla Raja of Berar, were written by General Wellesley immediately after each conference, and are preserved in his handwriting among his family archives. These have been printed in the *Supplementary Despatches of Arthur Duke of Wellington*, edited by his son, India, vol. IV, pages 221-274 (Sindhia, with the text of his Treaty) and pp. 274-287 (Bhonsla, with the text of the Treaty of Deogaon.)

As Kaye writes in his *Life of Sir John Malcolm* (who assisted Arthur Wellesley at these conferences),—"Sindhia's vakils had been in attendance upon General Wellesley [since the 10th of November], but the negotiations made but little progress until Vital Pant, the Maharajah's Prime Minister made his appearance on the 23rd of

December,—attended by Munshi Kamal-Nayan. Vital Pant's self-command was wonderful He wore indeed an impenetrable mask. The most startling demand, or the most unexpected concession alike was received [by him] without the motion of a muscle Vital Pant was known by the name of "Old Brag" in the British camp. And years afterwards when Malcolm met General Wellesley, then Duke of Wellington, in Europe, the latter when questioned regarding Talleyrand, replied that he was a good deal like "Old Brag"—but *not so clever*. (i. p. 241.)

A man whom Wellington regarded as "cleverer than Talleyrand" deserves to have his diplomatic performances preserved. Hence, we have reprinted here in full the notes of his conferences with General Wellesley (No. 90), and included only the first day's negotiations conducted by his futile predecessor, Jaswant Rao Ghorpade (No. 89) as a sample.

The notes of the conferences held by the British General with the agents of the Bhonsla Rajah have been here printed (No. 91), as these are not included in the *Selections from the Nagpur Residency Records, volume I.*, edited by Dr. H. N. Sinha on behalf of the Madhya Pradesh Government, (1950), nor in vol. V of our series, "Nagpur Affairs", ed. by Y. M. Kale, (1938.)

We here see that the negotiations were long drawn out not only owing to the conflicting interests of the two sides,—which is natural everywhere, but chiefly because the British and Indian envoys differed widely in their intellectual equipment and notions of diplomatic procedure. Arthur Wellesley insisted on the correct rules and practice of ambassadors in Europe being followed, while Sindhia's vakils at first behaved in the slack, irregular, "eastern" manner, like Zulu or Bantu chiefs holding a palaver with white men. But the British boa constrictor exerted a slow and relentless pressure, till his prey ceased to struggle, gave up his higgling, and ended by making an abject appeal for the mercy of the British Government as the only means of preserving Daulat Rao Sindhia's State.

Sindhia expected that as the fruit of his new friendship with the English they would employ their army to crush Jaswant Rao Holkar and compel him to cede all the lands that he had usurped from Sindhia and pay full indemnity for the immeasurable ravage done by him to the Sindhian dominions. But Wellesley saw no reason for pulling Daulat Rao's chestnuts out of the fire; he declined to embark on a new war, because a war with Holkar would not be a defensive war for the English at that stage. Daulat Rao then bowed to the inevitable, after some futile shilly-shallying on the subject of an armistice. [Jadunath Sarkar.]

No. 88—Amrit Rao joins Wellesley in the British camp. The necessary equipment for the siege of Gawilgarh having been completed, the operations against that fort are to begin soon.

**FROM—A. WELLESLEY,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Camp at Jam, 13th November, 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency, that Amrit Rao joined me yesterday and that I had a meeting with him in the neighbourhood of this camp. I am to visit him this day.

I have lately received a letter from Parashuram Pant *Pratinidhi* in which that chief informs me, that he proposes to send to Poona immediately the quota of troops, which he ought to furnish for the service of the Peshwa.

The Chiefs to the southward are in tranquillity, and have no extraordinary numbers of troops about them; the *polygars* alone situated between the rivers Mulpurba and Gutpurba, have been guilty of committing some outrages, encouraged I believe, by Sarja Rao Ghatge.

Raghoji Bhonsle is gone towards the Basim ghat on the road of Nagpur; and Sindhia was, by the last accounts, with a body of cavalry to the eastward of Malkapur, likewise on his road towards the Berar country.

Colonel Stevenson has by this time completed his equipments for the siege of Gawilgarh, and I hope that we shall now be able to carry on that operation, and to make the Berar country the seat of the war in the Deccan.

I have the honour to enclose a memorandum of the Conference which I have had with Jaswant Rao Ghorpade, and Naro Pant Nana, and Appah Dessai, on the subject of peace.

No. 89—Memorandum of the conferences held between Maj Gen. Wellesley and the first ambassador of Daulat Rao Sindhia.

21st November, 1803.

Jaswant Rao Ghorpade and Naro Pant Nana, came to Major General Wellesley's tent in the evening, letters having been received from Daulat Rao Sindhia, which gave them and Appa Desai, the regular appointment of vakils.

Appa Desai did not come, because Major General Wellesley had intimated to him, through the medium of Mr. Elphinstone, in the morning, that he did not conceive it was regular, that one of the Peshwa's *sardars* should have, and exercise, the appointment of a vakil from Daulat Rao Sindhia; and that Major General Wellesley conceived, that if he did exercise it, the Company could no longer

consider him in the service of the Peshwa. On the other hand, Mr. Elphinstone informed him, that Major General Wellesley would not consent to his being present at the conferences between him and Jaswant Rao Ghorpade, unless he appeared there in the character of an authorized vakil from one of the parties concerned in the war. There were present at the meeting of this day, Jaswant Rao Ghorpade, Naro Pant Nana, Mr. Elphinstone, Govind Rao, and Major General Wellesley.

Major General Wellesley said, that now that the Maharaja had written, that they were persons in whom he confided and whom he had employed to confer with him, he was desirous that they should lose no time, but should inform him what the object of their mission was. Jaswant Rao answered, that they were instructed to state the wish of Daulat Rao Sindhia, that there should be peace between the two governments ; to ascertain Major General Wellesley's wishes upon this subject, and to return to camp bringing with them an officer, having full powers from Major General Wellesley to conclude a treaty. Major General Wellesley said, that he had hoped that they would have brought forward some plan for a treaty of peace, which he might have considered, and upon which he might have given his opinion ; but that as they had not done so, he would open his mind regarding a peace.

Major General Wellesley then related all the principal transactions which had taken place between the British Government, and the Maharaja, from the period of Holkar's victory near Poona to that of the breaking out of the war ; and he pointed out that the war was one of aggression, on the part of Daulat Rao Sindhia ; and that the British Government had done every thing that was consistent with honour to avoid it.

He particularly noticed the conduct of Daulat Rao Sindhia in first calling upon the British Government to come forward to assist the Peshwa against Holkar ; and afterwards his making peace with Holkar, and sacrificing to him the vast territories which he had conquered from the Holkar family, only to induce him to become a party in the war against the British Government. In this war, Major General Wellesley said, thus begun in consequence of the aggressions and unjustifiable conduct of Daulat Rao Sindhia, in assembling his troops on the frontier of our ally, the operations of the British troops had been most successful, and the Maharaja had lost nearly the whole of his territories ; and his government hung only by a thread. The Maharaja now wishes for peace ; but Major General Wellesley said, it must be recollected, that he began the war, and had been the occasion of vast expenses incurred by the British Government, of the loss of many brave officers and men of the British army, and of great damage done to the territories of the Subah of the Deccan. Under

these circumstances, and considering the successes of the British troops, Major General Wellesley said, that the Maharaja must not expect peace, and the British Government would not make it, unless the Maharaja's government should give compensation for what had passed, and security that the allies would not be liable to such unjust attacks in future.

In respect to the sending a Sirdar to the Camp of the Maharaja, Major General Wellesley said, that he had no objection to adopt that measure if it was necessary, but he did not see what end it was to answer. The Company had in their hands the possessions of the Maharaja, by means of which, the peace was to be made. The British Government had nothing to ask from Daulat Rao Sindhia, although he had much to ask from the British Government; and therefore, it appeared, that this camp was the proper place to negotiate the terms on which peace should be made.

In reply to this discourse, Jaswant Rao Ghorpade recapitulated the various expenses, injuries, and losses which the British Government and their allies had sustained by the war, and said that Daulat Rao Sindhia had sustained them equally. He said that Daulat Rao Sindhia had been obliged to assemble large armies; and that he had lost them, and all his artillery; that his country, instead of being overrun, had been taken from him; that he had lost Holkars's territories by the war; and he particularly expatiated upon the loss of power and profit which his government had sustained by the establishment of the British influence at Poona. He said, that the Peshwa's power had been in his hands, and now it was in the hands of the British Government. He said, that for all these losses, surely Daulat Rao Sindhia ought to have some compensation.

Major General Wellesley observed, in reply, that if all these losses had not been brought on the Maharaja by his own act, and his violent aggression and hostility towards the British Government, there might be some claim for compensation for losses; at least justice would be on his side. But the case was entirely different: Sindhia's losses were occasioned by his own act, and those which the British Government had sustained, were in defending itself, and its allies. Major General Wellesley then observed, that in respect to the claim of compensation brought forward for the loss of Holkar's territories, the fact was, that these territories had been sacrificed in order to increase the number of the enemies of the British Government; and it would be a curious arrangement to set off against the claim of the British Government to compensation for an aggression, the loss of these very territories by the powers, which had sacrificed them in order to increase the number of our enemies, and if possible, to insure the success of the confederates, united in a war of aggression.

In respect to the Peshwa, Major General Wellesley denied that his power was identified with that of Daulat Rao Sindhia ; or that the latter was any thing but the subject of the former ; and in respect to the alliance between the British Government and the Peshwa, Major General Wellesley said, that he would not allow it to be brought forward at all as a grievance which occasioned the war, as the Maharaja and Raghujee Bhonsle had both written to the Governor General, and had expressed their acquiescence in the justice and propriety of the treaty of Bassein before the war broke out.

Major General Wellesley then said, that having, as he thought, established the right of the Company and of their allies, to have compensation for the injuries they had received, and security against such wanton attacks in future, he wished to know whether Jaswant Rao Ghorpade and Naro Pant Nana were prepared and authorized to admit that principle as the basis of the terms of the peace. A long conversation then ensued, in which the vakils declared, that the Maharaja was desirous to renew the old friendship upon the old footing, and to owe the re-establishment of his State (which they avowed was gone) to the British Government.

Major General Wellesley replied, that the re-establishment of the state of Daulat Rao Sindhia on the old footing was out of the question. That supposing the British Government and their allies were willing to forego the advantages which their successes in the war had given them a right to expect, engagements had been entered into with different chiefs, by which they had been taken under the protection of the Company, and had promised, that they would assist the Company against their enemies ; and that these treaties would never be departed from.

Major General Wellesley said, that the British Government had no desire to destroy the State of Daulat Rao Sindhia ; on the contrary, Major General Wellesley said, it was their wish to preserve it. But from what he had already said, the Major General observed, that the vakils must see clearly, that unless Daulat Rao Sindhia soon made peace, he would have no State left. The vakils pressed to know the extent of the compensation, which Major General Wellesley would require. Major General Wellesley said, that he could not enter into details till he knew whether they were authorized to grant compensation. . . . They said they were not.

No. 90—Memorandum of the conference held between Maj. Gen. Wellesley and Vital Pant, the ambassador of Daulat Rao Sindhia.

24th December, 1803.

Sindhia's vakils came to Major General Wellesley's tent, and a conference ensued ; at which were present, Vithal Pant, Munshi

Kamalnayan, Jaswant Rao Ghorpade, and Naro Pant Nana, Major General Wellesley, Major Malcolm, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao. Vithal Pant began to explain, that the Maharaja had always been desirous to procure peace with the Company, and that it was not his fault, that the war had commenced, which he had done every thing in his power to avoid.

Major General Wellesley interrupted him, and said, that it was useless to commence over again this discussion, which had been already well canvassed. That it was impossible for Vithal Pant to say more upon that subject than Ghorpade had said already, every word of which had been answered: and that it would be better to break up the meeting, and for the vakils to retire with Ghorpade, and learn from him, what had passed on this subject, than to take up Major General Wellesley's time by renewing the discussion. The Major General said, that the Company's right to compensation had been admitted as a principle of the negotiation, and he had made certain demands which had been referred to the Maharaja; he understood that these new ministers had brought the answers to those demands, and certain propositions which the Maharaja wished to make; and the Major General said, that it would save time, if they would at once enter upon the object of their mission.

After a long preamble upon the subject of the ancient alliance between the Company and Mahadji Sindhia*, Vithal Pant at length said, that the Maharaja was desirous of connecting himself more closely with the Company, and of establishing an alliance, which should be lasting, and highly advantageous to both parties, and should occasion the jealousy of all the other powers of Hindustan.

He was pressed in answer, to specify what he meant, and was told, that it was impossible to conclude any arrangement upon such general terms. He then said, that the Maharaja wished that the friends and enemies of one state should be the friends and enemies of the other; and that there should be no difference between them, and that the aggrandizement of one should be proportionate to the aggrandizement of the other.

In reply, Major General Wellesley said, that he understood his meaning to be a general guarantee of both states of their mutual territories; and an engagement, that they should defend each other. Vithal Pant assented to this.

Major General Wellesley said, that the Company's government were bound by such engagements with other states in India, and that he did not know that to make engagements in a similar manner with Sindhia, would be inconsistent with its interests. But there were some points, with which it was desirable, that the vakils should be first apprized, before they should make these engagements.

* Uncle and predecessor to Daulat Rao Sindhia.

In the first place, the Company's government could not make a war of aggression, consistently either with the laws of Great Britain, or the rules of their own policy. Secondly, they could not make an offensive alliance with any power, to attack another power, with which their government may be at peace, and which may not demonstrate any intention to attack them, or their allies. Thirdly, the alliance which they would make, therefore, would be only defensive ; and confined entirely to the defence of the rights and territories of their own government, and those of their allies.

From these facts, it followed, that when the British Government entered into an alliance with any power in India, not perhaps so strictly bound by laws and principles of policy, it was necessary, that it should take care in the very treaty of alliance, to provide, that it should not run the risk of being engaged in a war of aggression, or on futile or insufficient grounds ; and therefore, if the Maharaja should make this proposed treaty with the Company, it would be necessary, that he should bind himself to make the Company's government acquainted with all his relations with foreign powers, and attend to the advice of the Company's government in all his foreign concerns.

Major General Wellesley observed, that he might do this without any risk to his honour. That what had occurred lately, was sufficient proof of the attention of the British Government to the interests of its allies ; and that the war in which they were then engaged, was in defence of the Nizam's government. Major General Wellesley then said, that if the Maharaja wished to ally himself with the British Government for the support, and in the defence of the just rights and interests of both governments, such an arrangement might be made ; but if the object was offensive war against any power, it would not.

The vakils replied, that what Major General Wellesley had said, appeared very just and proper. But Kamalnayan observed, that the government of Sindhia had always been one of violence ; that he had raised and maintained himself by force and usurpation, and if he was to be made to give up all that he had ever taken in that manner, his power and state would be much diminished indeed.

Major General Wellesley said, that he did not mean to enquire into the Maharaja's title to all his territories. By the treaty of peace, it would be provide, that he should have nothing to do with the Nizam, and that there should be an equitable mode of settling what countries in Sindhia's possession belonged to the Peshwa : that he would be obliged to give up those ; he must also give up all claims upon the Rajas, and others with whom the Company may have made treaties ; and he must not press upon others unauthorized demands.

Major General Wellesley also said, that he understood the Maharaja had formerly seized the whole of the Holkar territory, and that he

had lately made a treaty with Jaswant Rao Holkar to restore it. This treaty with Holkar, whatever it might be, must be carried into execution ; the Company's government could never support the Maharaja in any war, caused by a breach of the treaty by him.

The vakils paid particular attention to this part of Major General Wellesley's discourse, and asked many questions to draw explanations in respect to Jaswant Rao Holkar. They complained bitterly of his conduct towards the Maharaja, declared that he had been the cause of the war, of the misfortunes of the Peshwa's government, and of those of Sindhia, and that he had contrived to keep himself out of the scrape. They also said that he had lately plundered Sindhia to the amount of twenty lakhs of rupees.

They asked what it was intended to do respecting Holkar.

Major General Wellesley replied, that he did not think it necessary to disclose his intentions in answer to such a question. That if Holkar attacked either the Company, the Peshwa, the Nizam, or Ahmad [*Anand*] Rao Gaikwad, he must be considered as an enemy and be destroyed ; otherwise, there was no ground for attacking him.

Major General Wellesley said that before this proposed treaty should be made, it would be necessary to furnish the British Government with a copy of the treaty with Holkar. The vakils then said, that when this treaty should be concluded, there would be no difference between the Company and Sindhia, and it was supposed that he might go to Poona.

Major General Wellesley said, that in respect to his going to Poona, he would not allow him to go there with an army. That he did not see any objection to his going to pay his respects to the Peshwa, without one, provided His Highness made no objection : but Major General Wellesley observed, that he thought it would be more advantageous to him to go to Ujjain and settle the affairs of his own government. The vakils said, that it would be difficult, if not impossible to make this arrangement without the consent of the Peshwa, as Sindhia was His Highness's servant.

Major General Wellesley replied, that he would answer for the Peshwa's consent ; but observed that he had hitherto talked to them under the notion that Sindhia was the head of a state ; and if instead of being considered in that light, he wished to be considered as the Peshwa's servant, the case was so much altered, as to render a different system necessary ; and he hinted, that in that case, the Maharajah was now in rebellion. The vakils gave up this point.

26th December, 1803.

Sindhia's vakils came to Major General Wellesley's tent, and a conference ensued, at which were present Major General Wellesley,

Major Malcolm, Vithal Pant, Munshi Kamalnayan, Jaswant Rao Ghorpade, Naro Pant Nana, and Govind Rao.

Major General Wellesley said, that when conversing with Jaswant Rao Ghorpade upon a former occasion upon the subject of the terms of the peace, Ghorpade had expressed the great desire of the Maharaja to retain certain districts and villages in Ahmadnagar, to which Major General Wellesley had objected. He wished now to know whether the Maharaja was determined upon this point. In reply the vakils explained that these lands were in fact the *inam* lands, or family estate of the Maharaja, and that he was very desirous to retain them.

Major General Wellesley explained the principle upon which he was desirous that they should be given up ; namely, that as long as the Maharaja had claims in those parts of the country, it was in vain to hope, that the Peshwa would be able to settle his country. That his object in this peace was, that it should leave no further ground for war ; and that this could not be the case, as long as the different powers engaged, had their territories intermixed and concurrent claims in many instances to the same village. In reply, the vakils urged, that these were *inam* lands, respecting which there never had been, and never could be, any questions ; and they said they were willing to leave the decision of the point to the ministers of the Nizam, or of the Peshwa.

Major General Wellesley said, that he knew these lands were *inam* ; but the fact was, the Marathas were in the habit of urging and establishing their claims to benefits of these descriptions at the head of large armies, which are thus introduced into the heart of the territories of the Company's allies. Major General Wellesley said, that at all events he must insist upon it, that no armed force should ever be introduced into these territories on any pretence whatever.

After a long dispute upon this point, in the course of which the vakils repeatedly declared their readiness to appeal to the Peshwa's or the Nizam's ministers, and the fear of the Maharaja that he should be degraded by this cession, Major General Wellesley at last agreed, that they should have Chumargoonda*, &c. &c. provided that no armed men were ever to be introduced in these parts, whether with a view to the collection of the revenue, or under any pretence whatever.

Major General Wellesley said, that upon a former occasion, he had been told, that the Peshwa and Holkar had claims to the territories in Hindustan, which he had demanded and he wished to have an account what those claims were. In answer, Vithal Pant said,

* See the eighth article of the Treaty of Sarje Anjengaum. [Chumargonda—correct form Chambbargonda, is now known as Shrigonda. 18° 41' N. 74° 44' E. —R.S.]

that the old arrangement among the Marathas was, that of every conquest, the Peshwa, Holkar, Sindhia, and the Pawar* family, should each have a fourth, provided each party co-operated equally in the conquest, and paid an equal share of the expense. That in the conquest of Hindustan, the Peshwa and the Pawar family had done nothing, and had contributed no part of the expense; and that Holkar not only had not assisted, but had opposed Mahadji Sindhia; that under these circumstances, Mahadji Sindhia had referred his claims to the Peshwa, had represented the expenses he had incurred, and the losses (of his whole family) which he had sustained in this conquest; and that in consideration of them, Nana Fadnavis had informed him by the Peshwa's desire, that His Highness consented to his holding those territories free from the claims of the other parties. That notwithstanding this, Mahadji Sindhia had admitted the claim of Tukoji Holkar to a share, and had delivered to his *amildars*, territories of the value of ten lakhs annually.

Major General Wellesley asked, whether the Holkar family were at this moment in possession of these territories. The vakils answered, No.--Major General Wellesley said, that he understood that the Maharaja had lately made a treaty with Jaswant Rao Holkar, and he wished to know whether any thing was granted to the Holkar family by the treaty.

In answer Vithal Pant said, that Holkar's right to a share in Hindustan was admitted by that treaty, but that he had not performed its conditions, and that he, therefore, could derive no rights from it. Jaswant Rao Ghorpade said, "the conditions may" as well be acknowledged; they were, that he should join in the "attack of the British Government,† which he has never done." Vithal Pant

* *The Pawar Family* formed one of the original members of the Maratha Confederacy. The capital of their territories was established at Dhar, a place in Malwa, about forty miles distant south-west from Ujjain. In course of time, the possessions of this family have been seized by the more powerful chieftains, and are now principally included in the territories of Sindhia.

† This extraordinary and voluntary declaration, constitutes the most positive, distinct, and irrefragable proof of the original hostile designs of the Raja of Berar, and of Daulat Rao Sindhia against the British Government, and their real intentions in maintaining their armies united upon the Nizam's frontier, until repelled by the British forces under the command of Major General Wellesley. The declaration to Major General Wellesley of Sindhia's ministers, by which it was acknowledged *that the conditions under which Holkar's right was admitted to the benefit of the treaty concluded by him with Daulat Rao Sindhia and the Raja of Berar, were that he should join with those Chieftains in "ATTACKING" the British Government*, deserves the most serious attention. This statement was afterwards confirmed by the minister of Daulat Rao Sindhia, in a conference with Major Malcolm, who was deputed after the conclusion of peace on a mission to Sindhia's camp. A copy of the treaty concluded with Holkar was given to Major Malcolm, and transmitted to the Governor General, who forwarded it to the Secret Committee in a letter under date the 5th June 1804. The Treaty itself contains evidence of its conclusion, not only before the junction of the armies of Daulat Rao Sindhia, and the Raja of Berar, at Malkapur, on the 14th June 1803, and consequently before the commencement of the negotiation with those chieftains, for the return of those forces within their respective

said, "That Raghuji Bhonsle mediated the treaty, and was the guarantee ; and that he had it at that moment in his possessions."

Major General Wellesley asked, what might be the share allotted to the Holkar family by the treaty in question. The vakils said one fourth of the revenues, after payment of the expenses of the King, and of the Peshwa's government and certain other expenses. The vakils then delivered in an account of the revenues in Hindustan, formerly in the hands of Monsieur Perron, as managed by other *amildars*, or *Saranjami** to *sardars* in Sindhia's service, or *jagirs*. Major General Wellesley said, that he had taken into consideration, the Maharaja's wish to be allied more closely with the Company, and all the circumstances attending the situation of the ladies of Mahadji Sindhia's family, and the *sardars* in his service, who had lands in those parts.

The Major General then informed the vakils, that he was willing to make the following arrangement: namely, that provided all the territories north of Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Gohad, were ceded ; first, that the Maharaja should not be called upon to incur any further expense in consequence of the treaty of defensive alliance ; but that all such expense should be defrayed by the Honorable Company.

Secondly. That the ladies and others who held *Jagirs*, should keep them.

Thirdly. The *jagirs* should be granted to other of Sindhia's *sardars*, provided that the whole amount granted, including the *jagirs* of the ladies, &c. should not exceed fifteen lakhs of rupees per annum.

The vakils asked whether the lands would be granted. Major General Wellesley replied, that that point would remain at the option of the Honorable Company. The vakils said, that the Maharaja possessed three districts also to the northward of Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Gohad, which had been given in *inam* to his family by the Kings of Hindustan, and were not included in the *Daftars*,† their names were Dholpur, Bari, and Raja-Khera.

Major General Wellesley replied, that those also should remain to him in *inam* under the Company's protection, on the same conditions as the *inam* lands about Ahmadnagar. Major General Wellesley then said, that there remained only one point for discussion, and that related to the treaties negotiated by other officers empowered by His Excellency the Governor General ; and he repeated what he

dominions ; but before the Raja of Berar commenced his march from Nagpur. The treaty in its preamble is stated to have been prepared at that city by Jadu Rao Bhaskar, (killed at the Battle of Assye,) at that time Sindhia's Prime Minister, and Agent to the Court of Berar.

* *Saranjami*—A certain yearly allowance made to the collector of a district out of the gross rental, for the purpose of enabling him to defray all incidental charges and expenses connected with the collection of revenue.

† *Daftars* or offices of Records.

had explained on a former occasion on this subject. In reply Kamalnayan said, that it was very proper those treaties should be confirmed, provided the parties with whom they had been made, performed all their conditions.

Major General Wellesley said, that this was a point for the British Government to decide, and not the Maharaja. He was called upon to confirm the treaties; if those with whom they had been made, should have broke them, the British Government would have no difficulty in finding a mode of settling that point. The vakils said, that after having ceded such extensive territories, they hoped that they would not be called upon to cede more by these treaties; and that no treaty would have been made with any Raja, by which, those parts of the Maharaja's territory which remained, would be ceded.

Jaswant Rao Ghorpade said, that in talking upon this subject before, Major General Wellesley had explained to him, that the treaties would go only to deprive the Maharaja of *peshkash* and other payments by Rajas; that the treaties with *sardars* would not dispose of territory, and that if any territory were disposed of, it would be within the Company's bound.

Major General Wellesley said, that he perfectly recollected what he had said. That he had not intended to apply it to Rajas, but only to *sardars*; and he said, that it was not intended to ask the Maharaja for territory for any of them beyond what had been already granted; but he had no objection to go still further, and to say, that none of the Maharaja's remaining territories, (such as were really his,) should be granted away by any treaty, made with any Raja or other person.

The article of the treaty regarding the defensive alliance, was then explained to the vakils, particularly that this article was inserted, in order to leave it at the option of the Maharajah to form the alliance with the Company, or not, as he might think proper, and to prove to him that there was no desire to force him to enter into it. The vakils listened to it with great attention; and asked where the force prepared was to be stationed. Major General Wellesley replied, that, that was a point which the future treaty would settle, according to the convenience and benefit of the contracting parties.

28th December 1803.

Sindhia's vakils came to Major General Wellesley's tent; present Major General Wellesley, Major Malcolm, Govind Rao, Vital Pant, Munshi Kamalnayan, Jaswant Rao Ghorpade and Naro Hari.*

* The same as Naro Pant Nana.

The treaty of peace (drawn out according to the terms agreed upon at the last meeting,) was first read over ; and afterwards read article by article, in order that the vakils might have an opportunity of making their objections to any article, of which they did not approve.

They objected to the introduction of the territories of Jodhpur as the boundary in the second article. They said that the Maharajah had territories to the north of Jodhpur, which they had not intended to cede ; and that by the article as then drawn, they would give up their claims upon Jaipur and Gohad. Major General Wellesley contended against this assertion, and called upon the vakils to name the districts which they supposed they should lose. He then produced the map, and sketched the relative situation of Gohad, Jaipur, and Jodhpur, for their examination ; and pointed out, that the possessions of the two former were not at all affected by having the latter as the boundary of the Company's territories.

The vakils in reply said, that Ajmere was between Jodhpur and Jaipur, and would still belong to Sindhia ; and they repeated their fear, that they would lose Jaipur and Gohad by this article. They then proposed the Chambal river should be the boundary, that every thing to the northward should belong to the Company, and every thing to the south to Sindhia.

Major General Wellesley replied, that they positively would not lose Jaipur and Gohad by the second article of the treaty, although they might by another ; and he positively refused to insert any thing in the treaty, which should tend to defeat the arrangements, which might have been made by General Lake with the Rajas of Jaipur and Gohad, or others.

The ministers repeated their old fears and objections, and pretended, that they did not understand the article, or the boundary which was intended. At last after much argument they were satisfied with the addition to the article of the following words :—“Such countries formerly in the possession of the Maharaja,” situated between Jaipur and Jodhpur, and to the southward “of the former, are to belong to the Maharaja.”

In the course of this dispute, they were repeatedly called upon to state, what were their remaining territories, in order to discover whether they had claims to any countries approaching the right bank of the Jamuna, south of Gohad. They particularly said, that Bundelkhand belonged to Ali Bahadur,* and Jhansi and Kalpi to the Peshwa.

Upon the perusal of the third article, they repeated what Ghorpade had said before upon the cession of Broach ; and said, that as the

* Son of Shamsher Bahadur, the natural son of Baji Rao the first (Peshwa;) he conquered a great part of Bundelkhand under a commission from the Peshwa. See Printed Notes on Maratha Affairs, Page 89.

Company had given that place to Mahadji Sindhia, the Maharaja had expected that it would have been restored to him. Major General Wellesley replied, that it was unfortunate that the Maharaja had ever risked the loss of Broach, by forgetting the friendship for Mahadji Sindhia, which had occasioned the gift ; as it was now, the Company must have the place.

The vakils desired to know, what territory was to be given with Broach. Major General Wellesley replied, all the territory, and produced a list of one hundred and seventy-four villages, which he said he must have.

Upon the perusal of the fourth article, Ghorpade said, that there was a village called Sindhkhed, between the hills and Jalnapur, which had been an old gift to Mahadji Sindhia, which the Maharaja was desirous to retain. Major General Wellesley said, that village was too near the frontier to be given up in that manner. At all events, he said, that as well as he recollected, instead of being held in *inam*, it was at that moment the harbour of a noted band of thieves, and he positively should not consent to Sindhia's keeping it.

Upon the perusal of the fifth article, the vakils said, that Sindhia had claims upon the Peshwa to the amount of crores of rupees, and other claims upon Anand Rao Gaikwad. Major General Wellesley called upon the vakils to state particularly the nature of these claims. He observed however, that by the article of the treaty of peace, a mode of settling the Peshwa's claims was provided ; and he proposed that the question of Sindhia's claims upon the Peshwa should be deferred till that article should be discussed ; that then, that article should be new modelled, if the vakils should wish it, and an exception should be added to the fifth article of the claims therein stated to exist upon the Peshwa, and the Gaikwad.¹ This was agreed to.

Upon the perusal of the seventh article, the vakils begged, that as the cession of territory was so very large, the amount given in *jagirs* or pensions might be larger. Major General Wellesley replied, that he had taken the subject fully into consideration, and he showed that after striking out Begum Sumroo² and the Rajah of Bharatpur³ from the list of *jagirdars*, the amount he had consented to give in pensions, was nearly equal to that given in *jagirs* by the Maharaja. He said that after such a war, such a gift was unexampled ; and he had hoped, that the vakils would have been satisfied.

¹ There is a subsidiary and defensive alliance concluded by Lord Wellesley between the Company and the Gaikwad.

² This person's name is Zeb-ul-Nisa Begum, but she is generally called Sumroo's Begum. She held a considerable *jagir* under the Maratha Government, in the Doab of the Ganges and Jamuna, and in the centre of the territory formerly possessed by Monsieur Perron.

³ The Raja of Bharatpur, is one of the principal chieftains of the tribe of Jats. His territory is situated on the south-west or right bank of the Jamuna in the vicinity of Agra. Under instructions from the Governor General, the Commander-in-Chief concluded a treaty with this chieftain on the 9th October, 1803.

The vakils then begged to have fifteen lakhs besides the landed *jagirs*. At last Major General Wellesley agreed to make the grant of seventeen lakhs, including the landed *jagirs*.

The vakils then objected to the claim restricting Sindhia from having armed men in Dholpur, and said, that the revenue could not be collected without such assistance. Major General Wellesley replied, that he never would consent to the introduction of a single Maratha soldier to the north-ward of the line, laid down in the second article, as the Company's boundary.

Upon the perusal of the eighth article, the vakils said, that there were other villages which had belonged to Sindhia, which they were desirous to possess, the names of which and of the *parganas* in which they were situated, they had forgotten. Major General Wellesley said, that there was no intention to deprive Sindhia of his personal property; but that it was impossible to enter in a treaty any thing so indefinite, as the claim just stated. He said, however, that he had no objection to write them a letter, in which he should engage to them, that they should have the villages in question, provided they were really Sindhia's private property, and provided all the stipulations of the eighth article were carried into execution respecting them, as well as respecting the villages named in the treaty.

The ninth article was examined very closely; but the objections to it were not repeated.

When the eleventh article was read, Major General Wellesley proposed, that the vakils should say what claims they had upon the Peshwa, and upon the Gaikwad; and he proposed to new model the article, and have a general arbitration of rights and claims on both sides.

The vakils said, the claims upon the Peshwa and Gaikwad were of no consequence, and not worth detailing; but they said, they feared that this article respecting Malwa would destroy the treaty. They said the Peshwa had no rights in Malwa. Major General Wellesley explained it; and pointed out, that the article did not assert that the Peshwa had any rights in Malwa; but only, that his rights, whatever they were, should stand as heretofore. He observed, however, that if the Peshwa had no rights, his servants had, and mentioned particularly the right of Narsingh Khande Rao, to a district which Sindhia had seized. The vakils replied, that the whole of Malwa had been seized by the Peshwa's order, and that district among others. Major General Wellesley replied, that if they could produce that order, it would be sufficient; but he said, that he never would suffer the Peshwa's rights to be seized without further enquiry. Major General Wellesley offered to new model the article, if the

vakils thought it would create any alarm in Sindhia's mind ; but he said, that the substance of it must be retained.

Upon the perusal of the twelfth article, the vakils asked what was to become of Sindhia's office of *Vakil-i-Mutalaq*?* Major General Wellesley replied, that he must resign it, or His Majesty must appoint another person to it ; but that Sindhia must have nothing to do with His Majesty's affairs.

The vakils said that Sindhia held that office, the Peshwa that of *Bakhshi*,¹ Sadat Ali² that of *Vazir*, &c. &c.

Major General Wellesley replied, all that did not affect the question. These appeared to be nominal offices only ; but none of the persons holding them must interfere in His Majesty's business.

No objection was made to any other articles, excepting to the time of delivering up the posts ; Major General Wellesley said, that this was the customary mode of delivering back conquests, and he must insist upon adopting it. Vithal Pant then desired, that Major General Wellesley would give him an order for the immediate delivery of Burhanpur, which was refused, till the treaty should be ratified by Sindhia.

Munshi Kamalnayan said, that the Maharaja was very desirous to preserve some property in the neighbourhood of Muttra in the same manner as Dholpur, the revenue of which property, he said, was applied to religious purposes ; Major General Wellesley said, that the best mode of obtaining this property would be for the Maharaja to apply to the Governor General ; and Major General Wellesley said, that they would find His Excellency well disposed to oblige him. That at present the treaty was drawn out, and it would not answer to alter it. Munshee Kamalnayan, then said, that there were some guns and stores in three forts not yet taken in Hindustan which Sindhia was desirous to have.

Major General Wellesley said, that it was usual to give over forts with all their equipments of stores, &c. However, that in the course of this war, the Company's troops had taken vast numbers of guns of the Maharaja and he might be distressed for the means of defending himself unless he should get the guns and stores in question ; Major General Wellesley promised therefore to write upon the subject to the Commander-in Chief, and to request that Sindhia might have the guns in these forts, provided they should not have been taken possession of before the Commander-in-Chief should receive the treaty, and Major General Wellesley's letter.

* An office similar to that of regent or of Viceroy, exercising almost independent powers of sovereignty under the Great Moghul or Emperor of Hindustan.

¹ *Bakhshi* or Commander-in-Chief of the army.

² Sadat Ali (son of Shuja-ud-daulah) the present Nawab of Oudh.

29th December, 1803.

The treaty having been copied, the vakil came to Major General Wellesley's tent at night ; present Major General Wellesley, Captain Barclay, Govind Rao, Vithal Pant, Munshi Kamalnayan, Jaswant Rao Ghorpade, and Naro Hari. The copies of the treaty and of the schedules were read and compared, and they were signed at about one in the morning of the 30th December.

Naro Hari said, that Bapuji Sindhia had a village in Broach, which they wished that he should keep under the British Government. Major General Wellesley replied, that they would always find the British Government disposed to attend to their wishes ; and he did not doubt, but that upon an application to His Excellency the Governor General, this wish would be attended to.

No. 91—Memorandum of the conferences held between Maj. Gen. Wellesley and the ambassador of the Raja of Berar.

30th November, 1803.

Jaswant Rao Ramchandrar brought a letter from the Rajah of Berar, and desired to have a meeting with Major General Wellesley. He came in the evening, and had a conference with Major General Wellesley, at which were present Major General Wellesley, Govind Rao, and Mr. Elphinstone.

He began by saying that the Rajah of Berar was the ancient ally of the Company, and he went through a long history of his arrival at Sindhia's camp, of his conversation with Colonel Collins, and of Colonel Collins' departure from the camp, because the Rajah would not obey his orders to return to his own country. Jaswant Rao then said, that Ahmadnagar and Broach were taken, the war commenced, and he was sent here to endeavour to put an end to it.

Major General Wellesley replied, that it certainly was material to the cause of the Rajah of Berar, that it should be proved, that he had not been the aggressor in the war ; as, if he should prove that, however successful the British troops had been, the justice of the cause would be on the side of the Rajah, and he certainly would be entitled to some consideration. But Major General Wellesley observed, the justice of the British cause had been as clear, as the valour of the British troops had been conspicuous, and their exertions successful.

He then related the facts as they had occurred, from the time the Rajah marched from Nagpur to the period of the breaking out of the war ; he alluded particularly to the letter written by the Rajah to Azim-ul-Umra*, and to the notoriety of the reports that the

* Prime minister to the late Nizam.

Maratha Chieftains were confederated to attack the British Government; and he concluded by asserting the right of the British Government to call for explanations in assembling their armies on the frontiers of the Nizam, or to disperse them if those explanations were not satisfactory, and to go to war if they refused to disperse the formidable armaments, for the assembling of which, no cause could be assigned, excepting to attack the British Government.

Major General Wellesley denied that Colonel Collins had quitted Sindhia's camp because his orders were not obeyed; but he quitted it, because no satisfactory explanation was given of the intentions of the Chiefs in assembling their armies, and they refused to separate them. The vakil replied, that the countries in which the armies had been assembled, belonged to the Rajah of Berar; that he had gone there for the purpose of meeting Sindhia, and of settling a dispute between him and Holkar. That the Peshwa had made a treaty with the English, and contrary to the custom of the Maratha Empire, had not previously communicated with the other Maratha chiefs; and that the letter which had been written to Azim-ul-Umra alluded only to that treaty, and that he had no intention of making war when he wrote that letter. Major General Wellesley, in reply, asked what business the Rajah of Berar had to interfere between Sindhia and Holkar? and, if he did interfere, why he should bring his army to that particular part of his territories?

In reply, the vakils said, that the Rajah interfered between Sindhia and Holkar, because those chiefs had for many years been at war, and had plundered each other; and had destroyed the whole of Hindustan; and that lately, the English had obliged Holkar to quit Poona, and that the Rajah had been desirous to make peace between them; as, if he did not, they would have fallen upon his country. He said, that these chiefs were great men with large armies, and that it was impossible to mediate between them without an army.

Major General Wellesley replied, that he believed the vakil had stated the true cause of the mediation, which was to save the Raja's country, and to form a confederacy which should cause an invasion of that of the Nizam, but the Major General observed, that it was a curious mode of conducting a mediation for a Prince to go with a smaller army, and seat himself in the camp of one with a more powerful one; that if he had mediated with an army at Nagpur the excuse might be admitted; otherwise, it could not.

The vakils then said, that the reason for which he had joined Sindhia was, the Holkar was strong, and Sindhia was weak, and would have been overpowered without the Rajah's assistance. In reply, Major General Wellesley observed, that the contrary was the fact;

that Sindhia had driven Holkar out of Hindustan, and had seized all the possessions of his family ; but that supposing the fact to be as the vakil had represented it, a curious mode had been adopted of strengthening Sindhia and weakening Holkar ; namely, by transferring to the latter all the territories of his family. He concluded by observing, that these futile arguments and misrepresentations of facts would certainly do no good to the Rajah's cause, and only tended to prove more clearly the fact, that the Rajah had been the original cause of the war.

In respect to the treaty of Bassein, Major General Wellesley observed, that the Rajah had stated that he had no objection to that treaty, and he would not allow that ever to be brought forward as the cause of the war, or of assembling the armies. At all events the Major General said, he denied the right of the Maratha chiefs to be consulted by the Peshwa before he should make a treaty, by which His Highness's Government alone was to be bound.

A long argument then ensued upon the subject of the letters written by Daulat Rao Sindhia and the Rajah to Major General Wellesley immediately previous to the war, which was to the same purport, as in the conference with Sindhia's vakils ; and the facts were equally misrepresented. Major General Wellesley replied to this argument by relating what passed in the Rajah's tent, as stated in Colonel Collins's dispatch.

The vakils then said, that the Rajah was now desirous of peace, whatever might have been the cause of the war. Major General Wellesley asked what powers he had, and in what manner he proposed, that peace should be brought about.

In reply, the vakil said, that he had been ordered by the Raja to learn Major General Wellesley's wishes upon that subject, and to act in conformity thereto. In reply, Major General Wellesley recapitulated the injuries received from, and the various acts of aggression committed by the Rajah ; the losses sustained and expenses incurred by the Company in the war, and their astonishing and rapid success ; for all which the Major General said, that compensation would be required as the price of the peace ; and he asked the vakil, whether he was empowered to treat on that basis.

In reply, the vakil said he was not, and used the old arguments regarding the injuries the Raja had received, which were overturned in the same manner as before.

Major General Wellesley said, that if the vakil had no powers, it was necessary that he should apply for sufficient powers, and that in the mean-time he might remain in some of the towns in the neighbourhood of the camp.

The vakil then expressed an anxious desire, that hostilities should be suspended, and that he should be allowed to remain in camp.

In reply, Major General Wellesley positively refused to suspend hostilities till peace should be concluded ; and as to his remaining, Major General Wellesley observed, that it could answer no purpose, and that it was very inconvenient to him to have any body in his camp belonging to the enemy, who did not possess full powers to settle a peace. He, therefore, recommended that the vakil should go to Elichpur, or any other place he might choose in the neighbourhood.

9th December, 1803.

Raghuji Bhonsle's vakil, Jaswant Rao Ramchandrar, came to Major General Wellesley's tent, at which were present Major General Wellesley, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao. After some conversation, Jaswant Rao produced two letters from Raghuji Bhonsle, in both of which, that chief expressed his consent to give compensation to the Company in a peace for the injuries they had received, and he wished that Major General Wellesley would state what would be required. Major General Wellesley answered, that he should require for the Nizam, that his boundary should be extended to the hills, on which are, Gawilgarh and Nernullah to the Northward, and to the Wardha river to the Eastward. That besides this, Raghuji Bhonsle should renounce all claims of every description on all the Nizam's territories within his new boundary.

For the Company, Major General Wellesley said, he should require the province of Cuttack, and the port of Balasore, to be connected by a convenient frontier with the Company's other territories. Jaswant Rao Ramchandrar said in reply, that Major General Wellesley was master of the country, and might take what he pleased ; but that if the Raja lost all that had been demanded, nothing would remain. He added that there was no occasion to take so much for the Nizam's Government, and he wished that less were taken for the Nizam, and more for the Company.

Major General Wellesley replied, that the Raja was a great politician, and ought to have calculated rather better his chances of success before he commenced the war ; but that having commenced it, it was proper that he should suffer, before he should get out of the scrape.

In respect to the Nizam, Major General Wellesley said, that he was the ancient ally of the Company ; and the British Government would never give him up ; and it was peculiarly necessary to provide compensation for him to be taken from Raghuji Bhonsle, because the Raja had in the most barbarous manner plundered his country. Major General Wellesley added, that indeed had been the only mode of carrying on the war which the Raja had adopted ; and it was perfectly consistent with justice, that at the peace, he should make sacrifices correspondent to the injuries he had done. Jaswant Rao

then said, that he hoped the demands were confined to Cuttack and the countries west of the Wardha, and that the Company would not interfere between the Raja and the Peshwa in Garha Mandala. Major General Wellesley replied, that all that he should require for the Peshwa, would be a fair and just mode of settling the joint claims of His Highness and Raghuj Bhonsle, to any territory, the revenues of which they might collect jointly.

Major General Wellesley said, that another demand he had to make was that treaties made with dependants of Raghuj's should be confirmed. Jaswant Rao asked, what treaties, and with what chiefs? Major General Wellesley replied, that he should be informed in due time.

Major General Wellesley said, that another demand he had to make was, that Raghuj Bhonsle should never take any Frenchman into his service, or any European subject of a government which should be at war with the British Government, or any British subject, whether European or native of India, without the consent of the British Government.

Jaswant Rao answered, that he had no objection to this article ; that the Raja had no Europeans in his service, and never intended to have any.

Major General Wellesley said, that another demand he should make would be, that each government should have at the court of the other, an authorized envoy. To this Jaswant Rao replied that, that was a natural consequence of the peace.

A conversation then ensued upon the demands, which Jaswant Rao canvassed particularly, and among other things declared, that if Major General Wellesley took those territories from the Raja, and the fort of Gawilgarh, nothing would remain of his former state. He then said, that the Raja had old claims for grass and gram upon certain territories of the Nizam, and asked whether those were to be relinquished. In reply, Major General Wellesley said, every claim of every description must be entirely relinquished. He said that these trifling claims were the cause of constant quarrels, and the enforcing them had been the source of all the evils which the Nizam's Government had suffered ; and that till they were entirely relinquished, there could be no peace.

Jaswant Rao then desired that Major General Wellesley would consent to a cessation of hostilities. Major General Wellesley replied, that he could not. He recommended to Jaswant Rao Ramchandrar, if he was authorized to do so, to sign the peace immediately, and to send it off to the Raja to be ratified.

Major General Wellesley said, that he did not wish to do the Raja more injury than he had done him already, and hinted that delays were dangerous. He said that four days must elapse before

the Raja's sentiments upon the proposed peace could be known, and supposing that he should desire his minister to sign it, four days more must elapse before the treaty could be ratified. Jaswant Rao then said, that three or four days could not possibly make any difference, and he wished to refer the subject to the Raja. Major General Wellesley begged that Jaswant Rao would recollect what he had said to him upon this point.

A long conversation ensued upon the suspension of hostilities, in the course of which, Jaswant Rao begged that Major General Wellesley would fix a place where the Raja should remain, if he would not agree to stop hostilities. This, Major General Wellesley declined, as he said that by doing that, he would actually engage to cease hostilities, which he was determined not to do, till the Raja should have signed the peace, and the ratification should have been given into his hands.

When Jaswant Rao was going away, Major General Wellesley said, that the peace which he was about to make with the Raja, must be really a sincere one ; that it had long been a favourite object with the Raja to form a confederacy against the British Government and that he thought he had succeeded lately.

Major General Wellesley said, it was true that the confederacy had failed to produce any one of the objects for which it had been formed, and that he knew it no longer existed. But it was necessary that the Raja should formally declare that he no longer adhered to it, and as the war with some of the other confederates might still continue, notwithstanding the peace with the Raja, Major General Wellesley said that he should require that a hostage should reside with him, as a security for the performance of this engagement, until peace should be concluded with the other confederates ; Major General Wellesley particularly explained, that the person who should be sent as an hostage, must be informed for what purpose he is sent. Jaswant Rao made no objection to this demand.

12th December, 1803.

Jaswant Rao Ramchandar came to Major General Wellesley's tent, at which were present Major General Wellesley, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao. He presented a letter from the Raja of Berar. He then entreated General Wellesley to moderate his demand for the *Subah* of the Deccan. He quoted many instances in which the two states had been at war, and sometimes the Raja, and sometimes the Nizam had the advantage ; but he said, that they had never made demands of territory. He then said, that it would be better that Major General Wellesley should allow the Raja to settle his peace with the *Subah*, and that he was convinced he would not make such a demand.

Major General Wellesley said, that he had made that demand on the behalf of the allies ; and he did not deny that he intended that territory for the Subah of the Deccan, as a small compensation for the losses he had sustained by the war, in consequence of the plunder of the Raja. That he should not relinquish that demand, and that he must insist upon the country being delivered over to the government of the allies. Afterwards, if the Raja could prevail by fair means on the *Subah* to restore it, that would be another consideration, in which, Major General Wellesley said, he did not see at that moment, that the British Government would have any concern.

A long conversation followed in which the same arguments were repeated, and the vakil denied that the Raja had plundered the Nizam's territory ; Maj. Gen. Wellesley replied, that he knew that the Raja had marched from the Tapti for the purpose of plundering these territories ; and that he knew that the Raja had done as he intended, for that it had fallen to his lot to follow the Raja and drive him out, and that he had been a witness of the Raja's conduct.

16th December, 1803.

Jaswant Rao Ramchandrar came to Major General Wellesley's tent, at which were present Major General Wellesley, Major Malcolm, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao.

Major General Wellesley asked, whether any answer had been received from the Raja, to the letter written, containing the terms on which Major General Wellesley thought it possible to conclude a peace. The vakil replied, that an answer had been received ; and he would give it in detail on each particular demand. He then said that the Raja had no objection to giving the compensation required to the Company ; but that he hoped they would not ask for more than half the province of Cuttack. That Jagannath was his own pagoda, and he was desirous to retain it. That his honor was involved in this point, and he was hopeful it would not be insisted on.

Major General Wellesley replied, that the whole province of Cuttack was absolutely necessary, that the Company had long been desirous to obtain this Province, in order that there might not be a break in the communication between Calcutta and Madras, and that to take only half of it, or to allow the Raja to retain that part in which was situated the pagoda, would entirely defeat that great object. That in respect to the pagoda it was well known, that no power in India paid so much attention to buildings of that description as the British Government ; that every body had access to them as they pleased, in the utmost safety, for the purposes of religion ; and that nothing would prevent the Raja from using that pagoda hereafter, as he had done heretofore.

After some conversation, this point was given up.

The vakil then said that the Raja had but two possessions, Cuttack and Berar. That he had granted the former, and he could not consent to cede the latter. That he would give a compensation to the Subah of the Deccan in money. Major General Wellesley replied, that money would not compensate for the injuries the Subah had received, and the risks he had incurred ; that territory was absolutely necessary, and territory must be given, if the Raja wanted peace.

The vakil repeated his objection, and said that the whole of Berar to the Wardha could not be given without a sacrifice of the Raja's State. Major General Wellesley replied, that it was not wished to destroy the Raja's State, and he asked what proportion of the country the Raja was willing to give. The answer was one-quarter of their revenues which he enjoyed, which might amount to five lakhs of rupees annually. Major General Wellesley replied, that, that would not answer ; that he was not desirous to ruin the Raja, but that the Subah of Deccan must have at least thirty lakhs of rupees annually from the Raja ; or if the whole of the country claimed was not equal to that, the Wardha river for a boundary.

This point was at last ceded, and it was agreed, that the Suba should have the Wardha for a boundary.

In defining the northern boundary, Major General Wellesley said that the Raja should have back the forts of Gawilgah and Nernulla. The vakil asked for country to support the garrisons of Nernulla and Gawilgah, and Major General Wellesley agreed that the Raja should have districts contiguous to the forts, which he would have hereafter, to the amount of four lakhs of rupees annually.

The vakil then demanded that the Raja should retain the claims of *Sardeshmukhi*, which he said, he held by a grant from the Peshwa, and grass and other trifling claims and privileges in the countries ceded.

Major General Wellesley replied, that all claims of every description on these and all the territories of the allies must be entirely renounced. That in respect to the Peshwa's claim of *Sardeshmukhi*, that would easily be settled by the British Government, between His Highness and the Subah' of the Deccan. The vakil then said, that having ceded these extensive countries, he hoped that the Raja would be free from all claims of the Peshwa and the Nizam on his territories ; and that all the *Sanads* and treaties of the Peshwa would be held good. After much argument upon this point, it was agreed, that the British Government should mediate and arbitrate, according to the principles of justice, between its allies on the one hand, and the Raja on the other.

The vakil said, that the Raja must depend upon the justice and generosity of the Company ; otherwise, the Peshwa would lay claim

to all his remaining territories. The vakil said, that the Raja had no objection to the demand respecting Europeans, or to that respecting vakils, but he did not understand that demand respecting treaties made with other chiefs.

Major General Wellesley stated the reasons for which officers in different situations had been authorized to make treaties with the subjects and feudatories of the confederated Maratha chiefs ; those for which it was absolutely necessary to adhere to these engagements ; and those for which it was impossible to state the names of the feudatories at the present moment. He said the demand was indispensable, and must be complied with ; at the same time, he declared, there was no intention to injure the Raja's State, and that he might rely with security on the honor of the British Government, that no engagement should be entered into, after it should be known, that the peace had been concluded.

The vakil said, the Raja had no objection to renounce the confederacy, and that he would give no assistance to the Company's enemies. In respect to an hostage which it was explained to him, it was necessary to give for the Raja's sincerity, till the war should be concluded, the vakil said, that excepting the Raja's brother, his son, and his nephew, any other *sardar* in the state that might be demanded should be sent. In reply, Major General Wellesley said, that as this treaty appeared to be made in the spirit of friendship, and a desire of peace, he would not insist on having any hostage ; but would rely on the Raja's honor and his sense of his own interest, in adhering to it.

The vakil then desired, that the treaty should be put into writing, which was done immediately.

Major General Wellesley left the tent, and in the evening returned to it again, with Major Malcolm, to sign the treaty. The vakil proposed, that an article should be inserted, providing for the Raja's rights under grants from the Peshwa ; and said, that he feared that the British Government would be induced to attend to the importunities of the Peshwa, to assist to deprive the Raja of them.

Major General Wellesley replied, that he would not agree to guarantee rights, the nature and extent of which he did not know ; and that it appeared to him, that the Raja could have no better security than the justice of the British Government. He pointed out particularly, that to attend to importunities, was not to decide according to the rules of justice. The vakil was satisfied with the explanation.

He then said, that he wished a clause should be added to the 8th article, providing that the British Government should not give countenance or protection to the enemies of the Raja's state. To

which, Major General Wellesley consented ; and it was added to the treaty.

The vakil then complained of the 10th article, and said that in fact it laid the whole of the Raja's state at the feet of the British Government. That his whole territory had been conquered from zamindars and others, and that if treaties had been made with them, he had nothing left. Major General Wellesley replied, that the article was indispensable, and must stand as it was. He said that it never was intended to destroy the Raja's state, or to increase the acquisitions of the allies by means of that article. That if he had had such a wish, he would have made the demand without further ceremony.

Major General Wellesley also observed, that if there had been a wish to destroy the Raja's state, he would not have made peace with him ; but that at all events he promised him, that the article should be as little injurious to him as possible, and that so far from increasing the numbers of those who should be the objects of it, Major General Wellesley promised, that as far as it could be done consistently with the honor and good faith of the British Government, it should have no operation at all. The vakil declared, that he was satisfied with this declaration, which Major General Wellesley desired him to communicate to the Raja.

The Treaty could not be prepared this night.

In the course of this day's conference, the vakil frequently expressed a wish to draw more closely the ties between the Raja and the Company, and said, that by these means, he hoped that the Raja's territories would be again increased. He received encouraging answers, and was told that whatever propositions he had to make on that subject, would be communicated to the Governor General, who would probably receive them favourably.

17th December, 1803.

The treaties having been prepared during the night, were signed in the morning by Major General Wellesley, and Jaswant Rao Ramchandrar.

No. 92—Clarification of the Treaty of Sarji Anjangaon.—Memorandum of the conference held between Maj. Gen. Wellesley and the ambassador of Daulat Rao Sindhia on January 5th 1804.

After delivering the treaty of peace ratified by Daulat Rao Sindhia to Major General Wellesley, Vithal Pant said, that he was desirous of speaking to the General, who retired with him to his tent, accompanied by Major Malcolm and Govind Rao.

Vithal Pant began by asking, what were the Company's intentions respecting Holkar? He said that Sindhia was then at peace with the British Government, and it was natural, that he should be anxious upon this subject.

In reply, Major General Wellesley said, that Holkar had not attacked the Company, or their allies; that on the contrary, he had cautiously refrained from approaching them; and that of course, as long as he continued in that line of conduct the Company would not interfere with him.

Vithal Pant said, "But do you mean to allow him to destroy us? Since the commencement of the war, of which he was the cause, he has plundered Sindhia of about twenty lakhs of rupees: he is now employed in the attack of Ajmcre, a part of the Maharaja's territories, and there is no doubt, but the Maharaja must defend himself."

Major General Wellesley replied, that after this peace should have been established, there was every reason to hope, that it would last, and that the unfortunate inhabitants would be allowed some repose; that the Company's government would certainly view with displeasure any fresh war, and could not consider as a friend, the person who should commence it. That in particular, they would view with the greatest dissatisfaction, the destruction of Sindhia's government, or any injury done to it; but Major General Wellesley said, he could say no more.

Major General Wellesley then observed, that Sindhia's government had been much weakened by the war; that his army was scattered, and in disorder; and supposing a renewal of the contest with Holkar to be necessary, it appeared to him to be adviseable to delay it, till he should have gained some strength, and ascertained the real state of his government and resources.

Vithal Pant replied, Major General Wellesley's last observation was very correct; but that Holkar was not a man likely to lose an opportunity. That he knew the state of Sindhia's affairs, and that he was likely to attack him at this moment, because the flower of his army was destroyed, and the troops he had left, dispersed and disorganized. Vithal Pant then said, that the only chance Sindhia had, was the support of the Company, which he hoped would be given to him.

Major General Wellesley replied, that the Company would not support Sindhia in a war of aggression, in any case whatever. He said, that by the treaty of peace, the Maharaja had an option of becoming a party to the treaty of general defensive* alliance with the Company, the Peshwa and the *Subah* of the Deccan, and if he should accept the offer, it would follow, that he would be entitled to participation in all the benefits resulting from it, to all the parties.

* Accomplished by the Treaties of Hyderabad, concluded on the 12th of October 1800, and of Bassein on the 31st December 1802.

That one of these benefits would certainly be security against the invasion of Holkar. That even in this case, however, the Company would not enter at once into a war with Holkar, to revenge the injuries the Maharaja might have received, in the course of the war. That in every case it would be necessary first to proceed by the way of amicable remonstrance and negotiation, and that if that should fail, then to have recourse to arms.

Vithal Pant said, in case the Maharaja should agree to the proposed treaty, and the consequence should be a war between the Company and Holkar, and the Company's arms should be attended with their usual success, what share of the conquests would fall to Sindhia's lot?

Major General Wellesley replied that, that was a point which might easily be settled in the negotiation of the treaty; and referred Sindhia to Major Malcolm upon it.

In the course of this conversation, which Vithal Pant intended, should be between Major General Wellesley and him, Jaswant Rao Ghorpade first came in, and at last Munshi Kamalnayan and Naro Hari; and then Vithal Pant broke it off, and turned to the articles of a Memorandum from Sindhia, which he had in his hand, a translation of a copy of which paper (received since from Naro Hari,) is annexed to this Memorandum. [See Enclosure].

The first article relates to demands of money, from the Gaikwad Government.

Major General Wellesley said, that one of the articles of the Treaty provided, that all claims whatever of every description upon the Gaikwad Government should be given up. However, that it was not intended to apply this article to debts, bona-fide dues by the Gaikwad Government to Sindhia, which Major General Wellesley said, that he understood that the Government of Bombay had allowed to be just; and therefore he wished that Sindhia would state the amount of the demands to Major Malcolm,* who would forward them to Major Walker,† and thus put the matter in a train of being adjusted.

Upon the second and third articles, relating to claims upon General Perron, and Colonel Hessian, Major General Wellesley said, that the first point for consideration would be the nature of the arrangements made with General Perron and Colonel Hessian, by the Commander-in-Chief, when those officers delivered themselves up; and the degree of protection which the British Government might think it proper to give them; the second point for considera-

* Major Malcolm was deputed by General Wellesley to proceed to the camp of Daulat Rao Sindhia, for the purpose of negotiating the Defensive Alliance proposed by the 15th article of the Treaty of Peace.

† Major Walker is the British Resident at the Court of the Gaikwad.

tion was the degree of power which the British Government might think it proper to exercise over the property of those gentlemen ; and here Major General Wellesley observed, that the British Government never interfered with private property.

Munshi Kamalnayan said, that supposing there had been no agreement made with General Perron, all that was wished was that the Courts of Justice should be open to Sindhia as well as to other persons.

Major General Wellesley replied, that the best thing to do, would be to refer this point to the Governor General, through Major Malcolm.

Upon the fourth article relative to the attack of the Sikhs, Major General Wellesley said, that the British Government never would attack the Sikhs, unless the Sikhs should attack them or their allies.

The vakils asked, whether there would be any objection to Sindhia's levying tribute from them?

Major General Wellesley replied, that, that would depend upon the fact, whether they were in alliance with the Company, or not: but this point ought also to be referred to the Governor General.

The fifth article in the annexed Memorandum, regarding money, was not mentioned in the conference.

Upon the desire in the sixth article, that Sindhia should have Hardwar and Jalnapur, Major General Wellesley referred the vakils to future negotiations with Major Malcolm.

Upon the seventh article in the Memorandum, namely, Holkar's and the Peshwa's claims in Hindustan, Major General Wellesley observed, that he had repeatedly told the vakils, that they had no right to negotiate for Holkar, or any other power or State excepting their own master ; and that of course Holkar had nothing to say to their master. That if Holkar had any claims in Hindustan, the Company would give him an answer.

In talking upon this article of Memorandum, the vakils said, that the Peshwa, Holkar, and all the Marathas would be highly displeased with Sindhia for having made this peace. As to Raghuji Bhonsle, he had no reason to complain, as he had been the first to make peace ; but he attributed the necessity under which he laboured to make the peace, to Sindhia's having sent vakils.

Upon this speech Major General Wellesley observed, that nobody had any right to find fault with the peace, who had taken no part in the war ; and that as to the Peshwa, he was a party against Sindhia, and was not likely to cavil at this Peace.

The eighth article in the Memorandum was not alluded to in the conference.

Upon the subject of the ninth article, namely, that no assistance or asylum should be given to criminals, Major General Wellesley

observed, that, what was proposed was reasonable ; he referred the subject to Major Malcolm, to be laid before the Governor General.

Major General Wellesley said, that he would take care that the persons mentioned in the tenth and eleventh articles, should retain their *jagirs*, &c. and *inams*.

Major General Wellesley gave an answer in the affirmative to the twelfth article.

Major General Wellesley referred the persons mentioned in the thirteenth article to the *Adalat* at Benares. In the mean time he said, that Major Malcolm would address a letter regarding them to the person in authority in that city.

The fourteenth article was not alluded to in the conference.

Upon the fifteenth article, Major General Wellesley said, that the British Government were known never to be behind hand in acts of charity : and that Sindhia's recommendation of the persons in question would certainly be attended to.

It is believed, that the paper received from Narroo Hurry is not a copy of that from which the vakils read the Memorandum in this conference.

Besides the points abovementioned, the vakils likewise again claimed Sindhkhed as a part of Sindhia's family property, and Pectuly and Dumauly in Dewal-ghat, and Bir, Paithan, and other districts in the territories of the *Subah* of the Deccan.

Major General Wellesley repeated the objections he had made to restore Sindhkhed, and declared that he positively would not give up that district.

In respect to Pectuly, Dumauly, &c. Major General Wellesley said, that these trifling claims gave constant cause of quarrel ; and that they must be relinquished, according to the treaty.

During this conference, an account came, that the Pindaris had attacked Malkapur, which Major General Wellesley shewed to the vakils. He then declared that there must be either Peace or War.

That if Sindhia chose the former, every man must be withdrawn from the territories of the *Subah* of the Deccan, but if they were not, he (Major General Wellesley) should choose the latter ; and he declared, that if Sindhia did not keep the treaty, he would march the army to Burhanpur, and would not cease the pursuit of him, as long as he had two men together.

Vithal Pant begged that Major General Wellesley would allow only four days time to draw off the Pandaris. He declared, that they were a description of troops entirely unmanageable, and that now, that he was out of camp, and nobody to settle with them, they were worse than ever they had been before.

Major General Wellesley then adverted to the conduct of Malwa Dada,* in the Nizam's territories ; and explained, that in the orders he had given to the person in charge of Chamargunda, &c. to deliver these places to the Maharaja, he had particularly desired, that none of the places might be delivered up, till Malwa Dada should have quitted the country with his banditti.

The vakils then denied that Malwa Dada belonged to Sindhia.

In answer, Major General Wellesley said, that they formerly said he did ; and recalled to their recollection, the orders which Jaswant Rao Ghorpade had delivered to the Major General from Sindhia, addressed to Malwa Dada to cease hostilities ; and the request they had made, that he might not be treated as a common thief.

The vakils then said, that they would send Huzzoories to Malwa Dada, to order him out of the country, and tell him in the face of all his followers, that if he disobeyed, they would all be treated as thieves ; after that, they must leave the punishment of him to Major General Wellesley.

Memorandum from Daulat Rao Sindhia mentioned in the conference of the 5th January, 1804.

1. The Peshwa has given Sindhia drafts upon the Gaikwad Government for certain sums of money on account of expenses at the feast of the Dasherah, on account of which draft, money is still due, which Sindhia is desirous to have.

2. General Perron owes Sindhia money on account of *nazaranah*† and his *jaidad*‡ lands, and of *peshkash* received, and other sums, on account of other claims of Sindhia upon him. It is wished that enquiry might be made into these claims, and an adjustment made.

3. Colonel George Hessing had lands for the payment of his troops, the annual value of which was greater than the sum required for their payment, and the surplus was paid to Sindhia. It is desired that this matter should be arranged.

4. Sindhia had claims upon the Sikhs and the Hoonsy Harari ; the Company's territories are now between Sindhia and these people. It is proposed that the armies of Sindhia and the Company should join to levy tribute from these people, and that each government should have a share of what should be levied.

5. It is settled by the treaty, that Sindhia is to have seventeen lakhs of rupees in Hindustan, or money in lieu thereof. Some time will elapse before this point can be adjusted ; in the mean time, it is requested, that something may be given on account, as Sindhia is in great distress.

* Malwa Dada—A predatory chief, whose band of robbers was afterwards destroyed by Major General Wellesley, near Parenda.

† An offering on presentation to office, and on grand festivals.

‡ Land held by a military tenure.

6. Hardwar and Jalnapur are places of Hindu religious worship, and Sindhia is desirous to be allowed to retain them.

7. Sindhia has consented to all the arrangements proposed for the treaty of peace in respect to Hindustan ; and he is desirous, that he should not be answerable to the Peshwa, or to Holkar for what he has ceded by the treaty.

8. It is written in the treaty, that Sindhia is to have no claims upon the Peshwa ; Sindhia desires also, that the Peshwa may make no claims upon him.

9. The boundaries of the territories of the Company, and of Sindhia will join ; and each will be in peace in their own territories. It is desirable that the Company should give no asylum or assistance to any person, who may be guilty of crimes in Sindhia's territories, and may fly to those of the Company.

10. Salu Bai Sindhia, Ahilya Bai Ghorpade, Ramji Jadu, Kanhojee Jadu, are persons belonging to Sindhia, who have had *jagirs* in the territories of the Peshwa ; to which in consequence of the war some injury has been done. It is requested, that they may retain their *jagirs* without being molested.

11. Shree Saheb (Mansur Saheb) has some villages as charitable donations, or *inam* in the province of Bir ; which it is requested that he may be allowed to keep.

12. Is Sindhia to send vakils to the Nizam and the Peshwa?

13. Hari Ambaji Chitnavis, and Aberdan Sevaram, have houses and property in Benares, to which it is requested that no injury may be done.

14. Some inhabitants of Paithan, (Devnath Naik, &c.) are in confinement at Hyderabad. It is requested that the Nawab [Sikandar Jah, Nizam] may be applied to to release these people.

15. Money was given in charity for fakirs and Brahmins in Hindustan, which it is hoped will be continued.

SECTION VII

Residency of John Malcolm (12th January—29th April 1804)

No. 93—General Wellesley deposes Malcolm to Sindhia's camp, where he is received and treated with the fullest attention and respect.

**FROM—JOHN MALCOLM,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Camp Tandulwadi, 12th January 1804.

The honourable Major General Wellesley has informed your Excellency of his having judged it expedient to depute me on a mission to the court of Daulat Rao Sindhia and I have now the honour to acquaint your Excellency of my being in the camp of that Chief where I arrived yesterday evening, and I have the satisfaction to add that my reception has been every way consistent with those sentiments of peace and friendship which this court has lately professed. * * *

No. 94—Malcolm reports the details of his conference with Kamalnayan, and mentions the alternate proposal made by him to the latter's objection for stationing the subsidiary force in the territories of Sindhia.

**FROM—J. MALCOLM,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Camp near Burhanpur, 30th January 1804.

After the conference with Munshi Kamalnayan (the particulars of which I had the honor to state in my last despatch) some days passed before I had any further communications with the Durbar upon the

subject of the defensive alliance ; this delay was not unexpected, as I knew the attention of the Maharaja and his ministers was wholly engrossed by the Pindaris, from whom part of the fine (which was originally imposed) has been collected ; but with whom, it evidently was every moment more necessary, to adopt measures of vigor and precaution, as these freebooters became violent in proportion as the collections advanced, and oftener than once shewed a disposition to the adoption of the most desperate courses, from which in fact they were only restrained by a consideration for their families, who were all with their camp, and who they naturally apprehended must suffer in the event of extremities.

To this cause of delay another was added of a most serious nature ; the Maharaja was seized with a fever and all business was in consequence interrupted for a few days. As soon as I understood that his health was in some degree restored, I urged the ministers to commence the negotiation if their master was really serious in the wish he had expressed of connecting himself more closely with the British Government, and I further hinted to them, that any procrastination on their part at so critical a period, might perhaps have the unfavourable effect of diminishing your Excellency's desire to improve the alliance with the Maharaja's Government, as it could not fail of conveying an impression that Daulat Rao Sindhia still entertained doubts of the benefits which his dominions would derive from his entering into a general defensive alliance with the British nation. The consequence of this message was a visit next day (the 28th instant) from Munshi Kamalnayan, who, after stating the various causes of delay which had occurred, told me that it was the wish of Vitthal Mahadev that I should give him a rough draft in Persian of the treaty of defensive alliance, in order that such points as appeared objectionable might be adjusted previous to the subject being brought before the Maharaja, as the minister was most desirous for several reasons that the negotiation should meet with no impediment whatever after that step was taken. I told the Munshi I could have no possible objection to the mode which Vitthal Mahadev proposed and that I had so far anticipated his wishes, that I had prepared an abstract in the Persian and the Marathi languages of the different articles of the Treaty.

The Munshi said he had done the same, and I was happy to find on comparing the papers that there was no essential difference except on the point of the perpetual residence of the subsidiary force within the territories of Daulat Rao Sindhia. On this subject I repeated all the arguments which I had urged at our former conference, and added such others as appeared to me calculated to show the many bad consequences which might result from having the subsidiary force at a distance from the Maharaja's capital. The

Munshi acknowledged the force of all that I had stated, but said this was the only point upon which there was a difference of opinion among the ministers of Daulat Rao Sindhia and in the present situation of the Maharaja's affairs it became an object of the first importance to preserve unanimity in his councils; and that, he feared, could not be done, if I persisted on this condition. I told him in reply that being perfectly aware of the consequences of not disturbing at a moment like the present that unanimity (which I was happy to learn prevailed in the Maharaja's councils) it was a matter of extreme difficulty for me to consent to a modification of the treaty, which was of a nature that might eventually defeat the principal object of the alliance. That there was only one expedient that I could suggest that was likely to reconcile opinions upon this point, which was that Daulat Rao Sindhia should cede to the English Government, in consideration of an equivalent in country or of an augmentation of the subsidiary force, the districts of Champaner, Godhra and Dohad in Gujrat which had been lately restored to his authority by the treaty of peace and the subsidiary force should be stationed at Dohad or its vicinity. Though this arrangement, I concluded, would not remedy all the evils which might arise from the corps not being posted in the Maharaja's territories, it was likely (from the proximity of Dohad to Ujjain) to guard against the most serious [evil], which was that of a sudden invasion of a powerful enemy.

The Munshi said he would recapitulate all the arguments I had used, in support of the policy of the subsidiary corps being stationed in the dominions of the Maharaja to Bapu Vitthal, and then state the proposition I had made respecting Champaner, Dohad, etc., and he trusted that as so little real difference existed the treaty of alliance would be soon concluded.

In the abstract which I gave the Munshi at this conference, all the stipulations of the treaty of Hyderabad were included and the secret article of that treaty respecting eventual partition was added in consequence of my having found from every communication with the ministers of Daulat Rao Sindhia, that they considered the right of their master to equal participation in any future conquests which might be made (in consequence of the contracting parties being forced by aggression into war) being expressly admitted as one of the most indispensable articles of the Treaty.

At the close of this conference I told Kamalnayan, that I thought the present state of the negotiation entitled me to request a sight of the treaty which was lately concluded between Sindhia and Jashwant Rao Holkar, as it was of consequence that I should furnish your Excellency with complete information respecting the relative state in which these chiefs stood to each other. The Munshi said

that he would state my request to the Maharaja, and had no doubt but that it would be complied with, as there could be no possible object answered by concealing the stipulations of that engagement from the English Government.

The return of the Maharaja's fever has prevented me from any further communication since my conferences with Munshi Kamalnayan, but as I learn its violence has again abated, I hope, I shall in a few days be able to give your Excellency satisfactory information of the progress of the negotiation.

No. 95—In this important dispatch Malcolm submits a detailed statement of the returns of Sindhia's army in the Deccan, Malwa and Hindustan, and goes on to state his own observations about Sindhia's character and ability. He also discusses the affairs of Sindhia and their possible future trend.

**FROM—J. MALCOLM, RESIDENT,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Camp near Burhanpur, February 6, 1804.

I have in attention to the instructions of the honourable Major General Wellesley made every endeavour to ascertain the number of the troops with Daulat Rao Sindhia, and I have now the honor to enclose for your Excellency's information a return which I believe, contains a pretty correct statement of that part of the Maharaja's army which is in the Deccan. I have subjoined a list of the Chiefs of Daulat Rao Sindhia and an estimate of the forces employed under their command in Malwa and Hindustan, but I am inclined to believe that little reliance is to be placed on the exactness of this general estimate, though it is the best that I could obtain. I have annexed to this return a list of the principal officers of government and of the officers of the Presence and of the household and have occasionally made such remarks opposite their names and those of the officers of the army as seemed necessary to explain the nature of their respective stations, to show the period at which they attained their present rank, or the causes which have led to their promotion, and I have also added some short explanatory notes and an account of the Bais of the late Mahadji Patil and those of Daulat Rao Sindhia.

2. This document is I am aware very incomplete, but its purpose will be fully answered if it conveys a tolerably just idea of the present state of the army of Daulat Rao Sindhia and affords your Excellency general information of the names and stations of the principal Civil and Military Officers of that Chief's Government.

3. I have yet been too short a period at this court to state with any confidence, my sentiments of its character or to offer any positive opinions upon the conduct of the administration of the Maharaja's Government, but I am too sensible of the importance which must attach (at the present moment) to every information, however defective, upon these subjects to hesitate in communicating to your Excellency the observations I have made since my arrival in this camp.

4. It is difficult to discover the real character of a Prince who like Daulat Rao Sindhia, succeeded to power before he had reached the years of maturity, and who still continues with the habits of youth to prefer indulgence in pleasures to occupation in business and the pursuit of amusements to the cares of government, and consequently leaves the administration of all public affairs in the hands of ministers, agreeably to whose acts he at one time appears mild and generous, and at another cruel and adamant. But as it is an allowed fact that this Chief is more deficient in application than in ability, it may be expected that he will ere long see the necessity of a personal attention to his own interests as the only possible means by which he can hope to restore his dominions to a state of peace and prosperity.

5. The pride of Daulat Rao Sindhia has been severely wounded by the events of the late war and he has been willing to attribute his want of success to every cause but the real one, the superior skill and valor of those to whom he was opposed. He has at one time expressed suspicions of the fidelity of his ministers and at another loaded his army with reproaches and went so far after the action of Assye (at which his personal gallantry was conspicuous) as to beat with his own hand one of his principal sardars whom he accused of cowardice, and he has subsequently treated the leaders of his *siledar* horse on several occasions with great haughtiness and contempt, and by this conduct alienated many from their attachment and increased the spirit of mutiny and disaffection which had long pervaded the majority of that part of his army who are at present upwards of fifteen months in arrears.

6. To this violence in the conduct of Daulat Rao Sindhia the defection of the Hindustani Chiefs, Mahomad Khan Afridi, Bahadur Khan, Kamar-ud-din Khan and others who left his army with fifteen thousand horse a few days after the battle of Assye, may perhaps in some degree be attributed, though this defection has been generally imputed to the impression which the success of that action made upon these Chiefs and to the fall of the Prime Minister Jadu Rao Bhaskar whose personal influence and authority was very great, and whose death caused a derangement in the affairs of Daulat Rao which is yet far from being remedied.

7. The arrears of the army are neither paid nor put into any train of liquidation. The infantry receive (in small advances on account) sufficient for their subsistence and the same attention is paid to such of the horse as are immediately attached to the person of the Maharaja, but the others are neglected except when the loudness of their clamors, or the violence of their actions forces them into notice, when temporary expedients are used to pacify them for the moment, but no plan of final adjustment is ever adopted.

8. The *siledar* leaders who remain with Sindhia, are bold in their remonstrances in proportion as they see that Chief dependent on their services, and they are no longer kept in check as they were formerly by the regular brigades (as there is only a skeleton of one of those brigades with the army) and they will in all likelihood succeed in extorting some attention to their claims, though it is highly probable that their conduct on this occasion will alienate the mind of the Maharaja more than ever from this class of troops and make him adopt early measures to restore the strength of his *pagah* and regular infantry; the latter will however never reach its former excellence if he perseveres in his present intention of admitting no European and having all its officers either Hindus or Musalmans.

9. I am persuaded that Daulat Rao Sindhia does not possess the means of paying the whole of the arrears of his army, and the consequence must be that numbers of the *siledar* horse now in his service will disperse. He will, however, manage by making grants of land-assignment of revenue and other expedients to retain most of the Chiefs, and the men can be easily collected again if required. The only immediate danger he has to fear is that of an attack from Holkar before he has had time to reform his army or to recruit his resources.

10. If the military affairs of Daulat Sindhia are in confusion those of his civil administration are equally so—not from any division of councils or from any existing intrigues against his government; for unanimity prevails among his ministers, and the Bais of the late Mahadji Sindhia who were the source of all former intrigues, are in his camp and every way submissive to his authority; but few of the members of the present temporary administration possess either influence or power and having no hope of long retaining their authority they find it difficult to carry on the common duties of their offices, far less to attempt any of those energetic measures which appear so indispensable to extricate this government from the state of distress in which it is involved.

11. The relations of Jadu Rao Bhaskar still continue to hold the offices they filled during the life of that minister (with the exception of Annah, the brother of the deceased, who has lost his station of Bakhshi but who yet retains the honorable post of *sikka-navis* or

keeper of the Seal). They, however, no longer possess the power that should vest in their stations or meet with that support which is necessary to a performance of their duties and the consequence is that the business of some of the chief offices of the state is neglected and will continue to be so until an arrangement is made by which power is taken out of the hands of all in whom confidence is no longer placed.

12. Babu Vitthal Mahadev, the present Prime Minister, though a very old and attached servant of the Maharaja, had neither from rank or ability any pretensions to the high office to which he has been raised. He was always a personal favourite with Daulat Rao, but during the life of Jadu Rao was no more than *khas-navis* or Controller of the household, an office of great trust, but not of high rank. He seems to have been promoted at a moment of emergency from considerations which referred more to the ineligibility of others than to his superior fitness for the office. He is esteemed a good man and possesses the entire confidence of the Maharaja, but his advanced age, the inferior state of his health and his want of family-rank and consequently powerful of adherents are all serious obstacles against the successful execution of the arduous duties of his present station. He has, however, raised his reputation by the negotiation of the treaty of peace and it is not unlikely that he looks to the cultivation of the friendship of the British nation as means of securing his personal authority as well as of advancing the interests of his master's government.

13. It is the intention of the Maharaja to bring several of the friends and relations of the ministers whom he executed at Poona in 1800, again into office—Whether he is impelled to this measure by motives of policy or of superstition, I know not. It is said by some that he has an opinion of the ability of those he means to employ, while others affirm that it is deep contrition for the inexpiable crime of putting Brahmins to death which he now considers as the remote cause of all his misfortunes, that has made him adopt this resolution, and that he is determined by heaping favors on the friends and relations of the deceased to make all the atonement in his power for his former guilt. Whatever be the motive, the fact is certain Yesuba, the *karkun* of the late Jeeba Dada, is appointed *peshkar* of the Bakhshi and has received charge of that high office from Annah, the duties of which he is directed to perform as *peshkar* till the arrival of Krishna Rao, the son of the unfortunate Narain Rao Bakhshi who was put to death at Poona and the grandson of Jeeba Dada who was Bakhshi during the life of Mahadji Sindhia, and for some time after the accession of Daulat Rao. Krishna Rao (who is quite a youth) is now in the Konkan, but he has been ordered to hasten to Burhanpur and the Maharaja has requested me to write

to the Resident at Poona to facilitate his journey: Jagoba, (a Shenavi Brahmin), the tribe to which all the ministers that were put to death belonged and who held office when they were in power, is now on his way to this court from Nagpur, while a brother of the late Lakwa Dada who was nearly connected with the same party, is I am told, expected from Hindustan.

14. It was sometime ago reported that the Maharaja had an intention of recalling Serji Rao Ghatge to the administration of his affairs and the partiality of Daulat Rao to his younger wife (Baiza Bai) who is the daughter of that Chief, made the fact not improbable: but this intention, if ever it existed, is certainly at this moment abandoned or the friends and relations of the former ministers would never have been sent for, as they cannot but consider Serji Rao (under whose influence Sindhia acted when those ministers were put to death) as the immediate cause of all their misfortunes. The return of Serji Rao Ghatge to power would also be opposed by the adherents of the late Jadu Rao Bhaskar as he was a personal enemy of that minister, and they would be joined by all the Brahmins who hold employment under this government, who speak of the cruelty of Sirji Rao's disposition and the turbulence of his conduct with horror; yet in spite of these serious obstacles men well-acquainted with this court think it not impossible that the influence of Baiza Bai (assisted by some of the Maratha Chiefs) may at a future period effect the restoration of her father to power and whenever that event occurs, it will be attended with a change in many of the principal and almost all the subordinate officers of government.

15. The consequences of the insubordinacy of the military and of the unsettled state of the civil administration of the government of Daulat Rao Sindhia are ruinous to the dominions of that Chief. Those who have military power direct it to the attainment of plunder, while those who have civil authority are exclusively engaged in schemes for the promotion of their own interests and make no efforts to restore the affairs of the state to order and prosperity, because they expect to derive no personal advantage from that object being effected.

16. From every information I have received the territories of Daulat Rao Sindhia in Malwa are in a very desolate state. Of the condition of those in Khandesh I can give your Lordship no adequate idea; that province is a complete desert, all the villages are abandoned and their inhabitants have removed to the camp of Daulat Rao Sindhia, as their only place of refuge from the excesses of the licensed plunderers of the army of that Chief. While the grain was ripe and upon the ground they supported themselves without difficulty, but since it has been cut down and destroyed they have experienced all the miseries of want and famine, numbers of them perish daily, nor can they return to their habitations even if they

had the means of supporting life while this army is in the province, as they would be there continually exposed to the attacks and violence of foraging and marauding parties. The numbers of these inhabitants with the army which is very great, has added much to the general distress and is indeed one cause of the present exorbitant price of grain, the coarsest kind of which is now selling at three seers to a rupee, and there is I fear but slender expectations of receiving any plentiful supplies.

17. Under such circumstances it becomes a matter of astonishment the Sindhia does not detach the majority of his army into Malwa. It is now some time that a large body of his troops have been under orders to proceed to that province. Their march is, I am informed, delayed for want of money, and as this is a want which must every day become more pressing on one part and more difficult to answer on the other, it is likely to prove the source of very serious embarrassment.

18. It is thought by many that the strength of Holkar in Malwa and the recent doubtful conduct of that Chief, are the causes which prevent Sindhia from returning to his capital and make him hesitate in sending part of his army into that province. From this apprehension if it really exists, Daulat Rao can only be relieved by entering into defensive engagements with the British nation ; for the present situation of his affairs is in my opinion such that if he returns to Ujjain without having formed that connection, he must either fall under the power of his rival or admit his influence to an extent that will oblige him to adopt every measure which Holkar may dictate, and the magnitude of the evils which might result from the occurrence of either of these events is such as to make the immediate conclusion of a defensive alliance between the English Government and that of Daulat Rao Sindhia an object of the highest political importance and one essential as far I can judge, to the preservation of that tranquillity which has been so recently established.

ENCLOSURE

Return of the Chiefs and troops of the army present with Daulat Rao Sindhia in the Deccan, to which is subjoined a list of principal Chiefs, and a probable estimate of the forces of that Prince in Malwa and Hindustan, as the whole stood at the conclusion of the treaty of peace, and a list is added of the ministers and principal officers of his government and of the officers of the household, to which is annexed a list of the Bais of the late Mahadji and of Daulat Rao Sindhia.

Names of the principal Chiefs	Subordinate Jamadars	Number of horses			Number of Infantry			Remarks
		Siledar	Paigah	Pindari	Regular	Irregular	Golandaz	
Raja Lachhman Rao ..	Meer Yusuf ..	200	Raja Lachhman Rao Deshmukh, the son of Bala Bai the daughter of Mahadji Sindhia. This boy appears about twelve years of age, as Daulat Rao has no son, he is presumptive heir to the <i>Masnad</i> .
	Lal Singh ..	500	
	Bappoo Haidar ..	300	
	Bara Mahomad Khan ..	200	
	Carried on ..	800	

Names of the principal Chiefs	Subordinate Jamadars	Number of horses				Number of Infantry		Remarks
		Siledar	Paigah	Pindari	Regular	Irregular	Golandaz	
	Brought on ..	800						
Gopal Bhau ..	Shyam Singh .. 200 Men attached to no Jamadars .. 500 Shaikh Behar .. 50 Selar Khan .. 200	2,150				2,000		Gopal Bhau may be considered as the first military chief, he stands high in the estimation of the army, and is in great favour with the Maharaja to whom he is attached. He was badly wounded in the right hand in the battle of Chirgaon.
Yeshwant Rao Sindhia ..		250	200	...	This Chief is a favourite and a constant attendant of the Maharaja.
Sadashiv Rao Bakhshi ..	Mahipat Rao Nimbalkar .. 200 Personal Command 400	3,000	This young man is the nephew of the late Jadu Rao Bhaskar; he commanded the army that was defeated by Holkar at Poona, but appears not to have lost the confidence of his master by that misfortune. He bears a good private character, but is held in no estimation as a soldier.

Anand Rao Nimbalkar ..	Yeshwant Rao Nimbalkar ..	50	700	650	Anand Rao Nimbalkar is a Chief of considerable estimation, and has the reputation of being an active and experienced soldier. Of the 650 infantry in the party of the Chief 150 are Arabs.
	Panduba Nimbalkar	50							
	Sivaba Bayaji	..	100	This officer had formerly the charge of the wardrobe.
Tukoji Ghorpade ..			200	This Chief is respectable from being a <i>markari</i> , and of a distinguished family who were formerly jagirdars of Gutti.
Yeshwant Rao Ghorpade			150	This Chief is of the same family and a man of rank, he is at present <i>Vakil</i> with General Wellesley.
Himmat Bahadur ..			100	Himmat Bahadur, though his command is now reduced, is a Chief of name and character, and has part of the <i>pagah</i> attached to his party when that corps is complete.
	Carried on	

Names of the principal Chiefs	Subordinate Jamadars	Number of horses			Number of Infantry			Remarks
		Siledar	Paigah	Pindari	Regular	Irregular	Golandaz	
Hiri Khan	Brought on ..	50	Hiri Khan, though he has a small force [at] present, has many adherents in Hindustan and is a chief of reputation.
Bhagwant Rao Kadam ..		200	
Bapu Khan		50	Bapu Khan is also a Chief of reputation.
Dadi Khan	Tuhourat Mandaloi ..	100	Tuhourat Mandaloi is the name of a tribe who act without any particular Chief.
	Gobanji Anant ..	50	

Narsingh Rao, etc.	..	700	There are several Chiefs of this party who go under the denomination of the Bara Bhai or twelve brothers.
Bara Bhai	500	500	
Appa Cunra								
Chattar Singh	100	150	Chattar Singh is a very near relation of the Raja of Datta, and though his party is at present small, is a Chief of the first rank in camp.
		50							
		100							
Tukoji Garwa	500	1,500	Tukojee Garwa is a great favorite with Sindhia and is with his party almost always in attendance on that Prince's person.
		75							
Hiroji Puar	75							
Tukoji Puar								
Govindrao Puar	100							
Dhuroji Puar	75							
Jotiba Mane	200							
Anand Rao Puar	50							
Carried on	..	9,250	500	3,000	

Names of the principal Chiefs	Subordinate Jamadars	Number of horses			Number of Infantry		Remarks
		Siledar	Paigah	Pindari	Regular	Irregular	
Appaji Kadam ..	Brought on ..	9,250	500	3,000	...
	Anyba Jadu ..	700	Appaji Kadam the Jagirdar of Edliabad, etc. in Khandesh.
	Dheemgurs of Mundella	150	Dheemghurs of Mundella. This is also the name of a tribe who have no particular chief.
	Sudrao Phalke ..	100	
	Aman Khan ..	50	
	Anwari ..	75	
	Lallaji Babulah ..	300	
	Subbanji Kadam ..	25	
	Vittal Rao Karkun ..	300	This party commanded by his Karkun belongs to Yesoubah the Peshkar of the Bakhshi-Huzoor, to which station he at present does the duty.
	Selbah Moreah ..	150	
	Sauskar ..	200	

Names of the principal Chiefs	Subordinate Jamadars	Number of horses			Number of Infantry			Remarks
		Siledar	Paigah	Pindari	Regular	Irregular	Golandaz	
	Brought on ..	16,080	525			4,500		
	Karim Beg Nandewalla and Hyat Khan ..	25	This party is the remains of the 1st Brigade. It consists of seven battalions, and is under the command of Achal Singh, one of its former native commandants. This officer has little more than the name of the command, the whole being under the authority of a Brahmin <i>karkun</i> of the name of Ballaji Pandit. Colonel Pohlman, the former commandant of this brigade, is in strict confinement.
	Achal Singh	2,400	
	The son of Reza Khan	600	700	
								The corps of <i>golandazes</i> is in high estimation and is the only one that obtains credit with the whole army for having done its duty at the battle of Assaye.

Pindari Chiefs ..	Nasir Bhure Khan Gulab [Gulam?]	2,000	..	This party is composed of Mewatis, the name of a tribe, inhabitants of Mewat. These corps are generally armed with pikes, and the greatest part of them are employed in guarding the Maharaja's tents, baggage, etc.
	Brother of Karim	
	Hiru	
	Chitu	
	Reza	1,000	..	
Small parties attached to <i>huzuris</i> or officers of the presence ..	Dost Mahomed (son of Hiru etc. etc.)	About six thousand of this corps are admirably mounted, and very superior both in the quality of men and horses. The rest are of a very inferior description, and many of them have only <i>tattus</i> . They all serve without pay and enrich themselves by an indiscriminate plunder of every country into which they enter.
	Dewaba	100	..	
	Bhikaji	800	..	
	Madhoji	100	..	
	Bunaji	100	..	
	Sadhu	100	..	

Feb.

Names of the principal Chiefs	Subordinate Jamadars	Number of horses			Number of Infantry		Remarks
		Siledar	Paigah	Pindari	Regular	Irregular	
Small parties attached to the ministers	Brought on ..						
	Vithal Pant Bapu Mahadev Rao Phadnavis ..	100					
	Bapu Chitnavis ..	50					
	Moro Hari Mazumdar ..	100					
		25					
	Total ..	16,380	1,725	10,000	2,400	7,100	700

Note.—The whole of the infantry and most of the Pindaris in the above return are from the northern parts of Malwa and Hindustan. The majority of the *paigah* and *siledar* horse are Marathas and inhabitants of the Peshwah's territories, the generally old Bhonsla when he separated from the Maharaja after the Battle of Assaye, and immediately after that action fifteen thousand *siledar* cavalry, mostly Mahomedans, left the camp of Daulat Rao and returned towards Hindustan. It is reported that most of this body have taken service with Holkar. The Chiefs of that body were Mahomed Khan Afridi, Mahomad Khan and Bahadur Khan, Manou Banjah, Qamar-uddin Khan Mewatia, Samid Khan, Meeranjan Abraham Beg and Ismel Beg and Abas Kooli Khan. The different parties of the *siledar* horse are given in the above return agreeably to their numbers present, which is I am informed, not above half what their amount was previous to the war.

The establishment of *paigah* is ten thousand, there is said to be 3,000 in Malwa and Hindustan which does not make that corps half the amount of its establishment.

Malba Dada, formerly kiledar of Ahmadnagar, may be considered as a sardar in the service of Daulat Rao Sindhia, tho' that corps has lately on the application of General Wellesley written to Malba Dada, that unless he ceases to commit depredations, he shall no longer consider him as a servant.

Sirji Rao Chage may also from his connection be looked upon as an adherent of Daulat Rao Sindhia whose court he was however obliged (by the superior influence of Jadu Rao Bhaskar) to leave a few months previous to the commencement of hostilities. He has since resided to the southward where he has been active in carrying on intrigues.

Vishwas Rao, the brother of Sirji Rao Chage, left Sindhia after the Battle of Assaye with the declared purpose of bringing him some auxiliaries. This Chief afterwards joined Malba Dada, and Sindhia when he wrote to that Chief to desist from his depredation, directed Vishwas Rao to leave him, if he did not obey the orders.

ENCLOSURE B.

Probable Estimate of the Forces of Daulat Rao Sindhia in Malwa and Hindustan.

Names of the principal Chiefs	Subordinate Jamadars	Number of horse			Number of Infantry		Remarks
		Siledar	Paigah	Pindari	Regular	Irregular	
Bapu Sindhia					Golandaz	These Chiefs whose names are in this return are also of the first rank. The horse are almost all <i>siledar</i> , and the regular infantry consists of a weak brigade at Ujjain, and three brigades belonging to Ambaji Ingle.
Gomaji Sindhia						
Madho Rao Phalke						
Bhawan Rao						
Raja Ambaji Ingle						
Gulabji Kadam						
Balhoji Ingle						
Waman Rao Khande						
Total estimated force amounting to		25,000	15,000	...

ENCLOSURE C.

(i) List of the Officers of the Government.

Names	Station	Remarks
Bapu Vitthal Mahadev ..	Prime Minister ..	Bapu Vitthal is a very old servant of the family of Sindhia, he was formerly <i>Khas-navis</i> or Controller of the household, an office of great trust, tho' not of very high rank. Since the death of Jadu Rao Bhaskar he has been entrusted with the office of Prime Minister. He has not yet received the <i>khilat</i> of Diwan, and does not therefore perform the official duties of that office.
Atma Ram ..	Diwan ..	Atma Ram is Diwan and tho' he possesses little of the power generally attached to that Office, continues to perform all its official duties, which are to issue all orders, and to give all papers, deeds, grants, etc., validity by his signature.
Moro Hari ..	Mazumdar ..	The office of Mazumdar is only second to that of Diwan: he checks all orders, deeds, grants, etc., etc.; without his signature, no order will be obeyed or no deed considered valid.
Annah ..	Sikka-navis ..	Annah, the brother of the late Prime Minister Jadu Rao Bhaskar, has little influence, but holds the honourable office of keeper of the seals, and affixes the Maharaja's seal to all papers, deeds, etc., etc.
Madho Rao ..	Fadnavis ..	Madho Rao holds the high office of Fadnavis; his signature is necessary to all orders for money, grants, deeds, etc., etc., in short to all public papers whatever.
Bapu ..	Chitnavis ..	This office is similar to that of a Secretary. It is inferior to a Fad-navis; his duty is writing letters, etc., etc.
Kishnaji Chinchura ..	Pagnavis ..	Pagnavis keeps the accounts of the pay, expenses, etc., etc., of the <i>Paigah</i> or stable horse. It is a trust of special responsibility.
Yesubah ..	Peshkar Bakhshi ..	Yesubah is Peshkar to the Bakhshi Huzur and at present performs the duties of that office which belongs to Krishan Rao—the son of the unfortunate Narain Rao who was put to death at Poona, and the grandson of Jiwba Dada, the former Chief Bakhshce and first Counsellor of the late Maharaja. Sindhia has sent for Krishan Rao to place him in the office of Bakhshi, which is one of the first under the government.

Names	Station	Remarks
Mir Khan Bahadur ..		Mir Khan Bahadur is now in a very reduced situation, but he is esteemed as a man of rank, and resides at Court on the part of the King of Delhi. He is the son of Said Shah who was formerly Nazim of the Subah of Delhi.
Mir Yusuf Ali ..	Physician	
Warris Ali Khan .. Hussain Khan ..	Do.	
Lachhman Rao ..	Munshi	Lachhman Rao is a youth about nineteen : he succeeded to the office by inheritance : he performs none of the duties, but retains the name and station of Munshi.
Kamalnayyan ..	Peshkar Muns	Kamalnayyan though only holding the office of Peshkar or Naib to the Munshi, has long performed all the principal duties, and is held in great estimation, both for his ability and attachment.

(ii) Principal Officers of the presence, or Chief Huzuris.

Names	Remarks
Dewaba This Officer has charge of the wardrobe and jewelry.
Bhikaji Havildar of the <i>Khaspagah</i> , an officer who has when that corps is complete, a command of three or four thousand horse.
Banaji Has a command in the <i>pagah</i> .
Mudhaji Has a command in the <i>pagah</i> and is always stationed over the gate of the Palace.
Khandoji
Dhulaji

(iii) Chief Khidmadgars or officers of the household.

Names	Remarks
Dhondaba A very great favorite.
Yesu Wagah A favorite.
Annah A favorite. This officer is the person generally entrusted with defraying and levying of contributions from the towns and villages of the enemy.
Dudba
Malharba

(iv) Officers not mentioned in the above return.

Names	Remarks
Muku Beg ..	The <i>jamadar</i> of all the <i>daks</i> . This is an office of trust, as reliance is put on the officer in charge for intelligence from distant quarters.
Ranoji Naik ..	<i>Binni wala</i> or Quarter Master General; he has also charge of the <i>harkarabs</i> . Ranoji is a very old and faithful servant of the Maharaja's family.
Bhawani Singh ..	<i>Jamadar</i> of the personal attendants, armour bearers, etc., etc., of the Maharajah.
Man Singh ..	<i>Jamadar</i> of the rocket-men who attend the person of the Maharajah.
Rahim Mewati ..	
Ali Sail ..	
Berban Khan ..	Chief <i>Foujdar</i> of the <i>khas</i> elephants.
Bakana Munu ..	Chief <i>jamadar</i> of the <i>khas</i> camels.
Raju Kasim ..	Chief <i>jamadar</i> of the <i>khas</i> horse.

ENCLOSURE D.

List of the Bais of the late Mahadji Sindhia and of Daulat Rao Sindhia.

Names	Remarks
Lachhmi Bai ..	First wife of Mahadji Sindhia. This Lady is now in camp.
Bhaghirathi Bai ..	Second wife dead.
Yamuna Bai ..	Third wife now in camp.
Bala Bai ..	The eldest daughter of Mahadji Sindhia was married to the late Deshmukh of Poona, by whom she had two children, Raja Lachhman Rao Deshmukh who is mentioned in the return, and one daughter. Bala Bai with both her children are in camp.
Chimna Bai ..	The second daughter of Mahadji Sindhia. She is in camp.
Mina Bai ..	The mother of Daulat Rao Sindhia. She was the wife of Anand Rao the father of Daulat Rao, and the son of Tukoji Baba, the brother of the late Mahadji Sindhia. Mina Bai is in camp.
Durga Bai ..	First wife to Daulat Rao Sindhia.
Rukma Bai ..	Second wife to Daulat Rao Sindhia.
Baiza Bai ..	Third wife to Daulat Rao. Baiza Bai is the daughter of Serji Rao Ghatge and has borne one child (a daughter) to Daulat Rao, with whom she is a great favorite.

No. 96—A defensive alliance having been concluded between Sindhia and the English, Malcolm submits its copies to the G. G. for ratification by him. Malcolm further gives in detail the discussion that preceded its conclusion so as to explain the alterations that had to be made in the original draft to suit the particular circumstances of Sindhia.

**FROM—J. MALCOLM, RESIDENT,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Burhanpur, February 28, 1804.

1. I have the honour to enclose the English, Persian and Marathi copies of a treaty of defensive alliance between this state and the honourable Company which was yesterday sealed and ratified by the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia, which I confidently hope will be honoured with your Excellency's approbation. [See No. 110.]

2. Before I proceed to remark upon the different articles of this treaty it is necessary that I should state in a general manner the circumstances which have occurred to occasion some difference between it and engagements of a similar nature which the English Government has formed with other states.

3. On my arrival at this court I early discovered that although the Maharaja and his ministers were fully aware of the security this state would enjoy from forming a more intimate connection with the British Government and though they were perfectly sensible of the advantageous terms on which a defensive alliance was at this period offered to their acceptance, that they nevertheless entertained great alarm at many of the conditions of the defensive alliance which, they conceived, had a tendency to destroy the independence of this government, and their jealousy was increased by the impression which the events of the war had made of the irresistible power of the British Nation.

4. The existence of such a disposition made the conduct of the negotiation difficult ; as it was under the instructions I received from the honourable General Wellesley my primary duty to tranquillise the minds of this Court in order that the Peace which had been so happily restored might be confirmed and established and I could not but consider that in the present situation of affairs the object of securing the great benefits of the peace, which could alone be accomplished by fixing the confidence of this court, and removing every doubt and apprehension with respect to the future intention of the English Government from the mind of the Maharaja and his ministers was one of more consequence than even the conclusion of the subsidiary alliance, which alliance without it was accepted in the spirit of friendship, and sincerity which the intimacy of its nature demanded, could never be expected to operate in a manner

advantageous to the interests of either government. An attention to such considerations obliged me to manage every discussion on points where the least jealousy or alarm was shown with great care, and reduced me to the necessity of admitting some alterations to be made in the matter, and several in the expressions of the draft of the treaty which I originally presented, and which was made out (as strictly as local considerations would permit) on the model of the treaties of Bassein and Hyderabad, but none of those alterations will I trust, be judged by your Excellency to affect any of those essential principles, which it appears indispensable to maintain in engagements of this nature.

5. The very distracted state in which I found the administration of this government offered very serious obstacles to my progress in the negotiation. To this circumstance I chiefly attribute the various delays which have taken place and also the numerous objections which were suggested to the mind of the Maharaja against different stipulations of the treaty, as each party continued anxious to the last, to oppose every point, the adoption of which was recommended by the other, and the weak, and wavering mind of the Maharaja gave in turn attention to every observation that was offered, and I have little doubt but that this clashing of councils might have ultimately defeated the accomplishment of the alliance, had not the settlement which took place of the 7th article of the treaty of peace (of which I informed your Excellency in my official dispatch No. 9) made the leaders of the different parties at this court sensible that their personal interests would be best promoted by an increase of friendship between this state and the British Government.

6. The arrival in Camp of a vakil from Yeswant Rao Holkar (of which circumstance I before informed your Lordship) was also unfavourable to the success of my negotiation and the ground I had to suspect that he was instructed to use his utmost endeavours to withdraw the Mahraja from the relations of peace into which he had entered with the British Government, made me more anxious than ever to make those relations still more intimate. Not that I supposed it possible after what had past, that Sindhia could ever place sufficient confidence in Yeswant Rao to unite with him in another confederacy against the honourable Company, but I concluded that the latter Chief entertained hostile designs against the British Government which it was the policy of that nation to guard against by every possible precaution, and no measure seemed to me more calculated to check his designs (if they really existed) than the conclusion of a defensive alliance with this state.

7. The information I received of the object of the negotiations of Holkar's vakil was not of a nature on which I could place entire dependence, but the probability of its correctness was strongly corro-

borated by the accounts I received of the equivocal conduct of that Chief from Hindustan and other quarters.

8. Your Excellency will, I trust, see in the causes which I have enumerated sufficient reason for my departure in some instances from the line which was prescribed by former treaties for my observance, and I can give your Lordship the most confident assurances that this treaty as it now stands, is acceptable to all the different parties at this court and that the jealousy and apprehension which was entertained of the designs of the British Government at the commencement of the negotiation has been much, if not wholly, removed in its progress and that the impressions which were made on this court by the generosity and moderation of the British Government at the settlement of the treaty of peace have been by the conclusion of this engagement in its present form, improved, confirmed and strengthened.

9. On the first and second articles of the treaty no remark appears necessary except to call your Excellency's attention to the expression in the latter which states that assistance is to be granted in the event of an attack on this government in compliance with the requisition of the Maharaja. The latter superfluous stipulation is strongly characteristic of the jealousy of this court which ignorantly conceived that without the English Government being bound by such a stipulation it might take advantage of this article to introduce its troops at pleasure into the territories of the Maharaja and to interfere in the affairs of his government without his consent ; what I have already stated will satisfy your Excellency of the causes which made me permit the introduction of this and other expressions of a similar nature.

10. The most essential difference between this and the defensive engagements which have been formed with his Highness the Peshwa and the Subah of the Deccan, is in the 3rd article of the present treaty. Of the objections which were made to the residence of the subsidiary force within the dominions of Daulat Rao Sindhia I have informed your Excellency in my former dispatches. I endeavoured, on finding it impossible to obtain the consent of the ministers to this article, as it originally stood, to persuade them to cede the districts of Champaner and Dohad either in consideration of an augmentation of the subsidiary force or in lieu of an equal partition of territory in some other quarter, and I pointed out the various advantages which would arise from this arrangement which would enable the British Government to fix the subsidiary force at a station from whence it would march in seven or eight days to the capital of the Maharaja. Vitthal Pant and Munshi Kamalnayan, both admitted the truth of what I stated and said they were fully aware of the evils which might arise from the subsidiary corps being at too great a distance from

the capital and that they had urged all the arguments I had stated on that point to the Maharaja, but that it was thought inadvisable to make any further cessions on any consideration whatever, or to disturb by any other arrangement the footing which affairs had been left upon at the conclusion of the treaty of peace, and that they therefore trusted I would consent to a modification of this article. As I knew from the tenor of your Excellency's instructions to Col. Close of the 23rd June, 1802 and those to Col. Collins of the 15th January, 1802, that the point of the residence of the troops within the dominions of the Power by whom they were subsidized, was not considered as an indispensable condition of the alliance, I at last yielded to their request and the article was framed as it now stands in the treaty. The troops are to be stationed where your Excellency shall judge proper and by a stipulation of the 13th article they are to be employed on such services as the Company's Government shall think fit, provided such employment does not interfere with the performance of this treaty, which will give the British Government the use of their force for maintaining order and preserving tranquillity in the province where it is stationed.

11. On the fourth and fifth articles it is unnecessary to make any observation. The ministers of the Maharaja proposed that some of the stipulations of the latter should be reciprocal to which I could see no possible objection.

12. The sixth article is expressed in general terms which leave the Company's Government at liberty to exercise its judgment on the duties which the subsidiary force is liable to be called upon to perform. It was impossible to state in any satisfactory manner the precise services which it is not to be ordered upon; the stipulation, which expresses that it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, would appear sufficiently guarded to prevent any improper application of this force, which is further provided against by the first part of the article which specifies the occasions upon which it will at all times be ready to act.

13. The seventh article amply provides against the admission of any Frenchman or any other European or American into the service of Daulat Rao Sindhia without the consent of the British Government and the condition which that government makes in the same article of not employing or permitting to remain within its territories any person who may hereafter commit crimes or hostilities against the person or government of the Maharaja, is nothing more than what the other stipulations of this treaty would have obliged it to perform.

14. On the eighth and ninth articles of the treaty a very long discussion took place; the ministers of the Maharaja contended for a principle of reciprocity being established in the first and objected

to the full admission of the right of arbitration as recognized in the second, but I succeeded in convincing them that the nature of the alliance and the different relations of the two governments militated against a compliance with their request for a general principle of reciprocity being established where such was, from circumstances, wholly inapplicable, and that the admission of the arbitration of the English Government was indispensable, as it afforded the chief security which that Government had to enable it to guard against the various dangers to which it exposed itself by contracting this alliance.

15. The 10th and 11th articles require no remark. The 12th which I inserted in the original draft in the terms of the 3rd secret and separate article of the treaty of Hyderabad, was a subject of long discussion. The ministers of the Maharaja were anxious to render it minute and specific. They agreed to the admission of the allies of the British Government in the Deccan in the event of a war taking place in that quarter, but wished them to be specifically excluded in the event of a war in Hindustan or in any quarter where they could give no assistance and they also desired that a stipulation should be made by which no other states should ever be permitted to the benefits of this alliance as far as those related to the division of conquests. I did not fail to point out how much such principles were at variance with the great objects of the alliance and how little reconcilable to that spirit of conciliation towards all other states which it professed, and I endeavoured to show the impolicy of introducing any names whatever (into an article of a nature like the present) or inserting any stipulations which either from limitation, or exclusion of claims, might alarm the allies of the contracting parties or cause states unconnected with them to conclude that they harboured designs very different from those set forth in the treaty.

16. From the arguments which were used upon this occasion I could plainly perceive that the strict attention which this court had observed the English Government pay to the interests of the Suba of the Deccan, and the advantages which it had seen that Prince derive from the connection between him and the British nation, were the chief causes which had induced it to propose a treaty of defensive alliance, and I consequently found the ministers more anxious respecting this article than any other of the treaty. I satisfied them at last, with expressing it in the general terms in which it now stands, by which the government of the Maharaja and that of the honourable Company are to share equal, provided that each party fulfils the conditions of this treaty. By this general expression the claims of no state are excluded and the whole this government has a right to demand, is an equal share (if it fulfils its engagements) with the hon'ble Company.

17. The stipulations of the 13th and 14th article are such as will, I have no doubt, meet with your Excellency's approbation, as they are obviously calculated to preserve and maintain tranquillity and good order in the territories of both governments.

18. The 15th article was framed at the express desire of the Maharaja who, at a very early period of the negotiation, expressed great anxiety that the English government should engage to use its influence to secure him that treatment and consideration which was due to his rank, and consistent with usage, from all states with whom it was connected, but particularly from the Peshwa at whose court he expressed a fear that low men would rise to power, and insult him in the confidence that they could not be punished. He also expressed a desire that his rights to countries he held by *sanads* from the Peshwa, and to those he had taken possession of in consequence of orders from that Prince should be recognized in this treaty and that the English Government would, out of friendship for him, endeavour to support as far as they could with propriety, such acts as he or his ancestors had done when vested with full power from the Peshwa, or his ancestors. I opposed for a considerable period the introduction of this article into the treaty, on the ground of its being extraneous to the purport of that engagement, but on finding the Maharaja personally shewed great solicitude upon this point, I determined to adopt it provided the Maharaja consented to certain modification by which I thought it might be rendered advantageous to the English Government, the interests of which, I was satisfied, would be materially advanced by the circumstance of the different Maratha powers of India, with whom it is connected, consenting to employ its influence and mediation in the settlement of their concerns with each other, and recognizing its right of arbitration on the occurrence of disputes and difference.

19. The modifications which I proposed, were after some hesitation agreed to, and by the provisions of the article as it now stands which stipulate for its not operating contrary to the conditions of the treaty of peace which confirms and establishes the right of arbitration of the Company's Government as fixed by the 11th article of that treaty, and which provides against any measure being taken in support of the former acts of Sindhia, and of his ancestors, which militate against the honour or dignity of the Peshwa. Effectual precautions are taken against the interests of the British Government, or those of his Highness suffering from any construction of this article, nor can Sindhia under its stipulations proceed to any act which he was not at liberty to take before it was framed, and in return for the exertion of its influence which he has from the conditions of this article a right to expect from the British Government, he must on all occasions where he solicits its aid and interference, make that

government the judge of his claims, the arbiter of his differences, and the medium of his communication with the court of Poona.

20. By the stipulations of the 16th article your Excellency will observe that I have fixed seventy days as the period within which this treaty is to be given to the Maharaja confirmed and ratified.

21. I shall keep the treaty which Daulat Rao Sindhia has executed in my possession, till a favourable opportunity presents for forwarding it to Fort William.

22. I have the honor to inform your Excellency that Mr. Strachey arrived at this Residency ten days ago. He has been present at every conference and employed in all the negotiations which have taken place since that period and I have derived considerable assistance from his information and ability.

No. 97—Malcolm states the importance Sindhia attaches to the restoration of Gwalior and its adjoining possessions by the English and points out the possible adverse effects of non-restoration on the attitude of Sindhia towards the English.

**FROM—J. MALCOLM, THE RESIDENT WITH SINDHIA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

7th March, 1804.

The private communications which I have lately received from his Excellency the Commander in Chief in Hindustan respecting the equivocal conduct of Yeshwant Rao Holkar made me particularly anxious to ascertain the sentiments of this Court respecting the proceedings of that chief and I was very desirous of seeing the engagement which this court had contracted with him previous to the occurrences of the late war. I had before, as I informed your Excellency, repeatedly requested a perusal of that document but though always promised it was never granted. I last night sent my confidential servant Kishan Rao to the minister to represent the necessity of my seeing that paper previous to my entering upon my discussion respecting the conduct of Yeshwant Rao Holkar and I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's information minutes of Kishan Rao's conversation with Vithal Pant. That part of this conversation which relates to Yeshwant Rao is perfectly satisfactory with respect to the minister's statement of the Maharajah's remark on the non-performance of the treaty of peace on the part of the English Government and on the difference which had arisen about Gwalior and its territories. Kishan Rao, who had received no

instructions to speak on these subjects, contented himself as your Excellency will see, with giving a general answer to Vitthal Pant's extraordinary observations. Though I do not believe it was that minister's intention to convey any idea of the probable dissolution of the present engagement between this state and the British Government I shall nevertheless consider it my duty to speak to him upon the subject and to demand an explanation of the expressions which he had used to Kishan Rao, and I shall, if I find that his intention was to convey such an idea as has been supposed, most explicitly inform him that however ready I may be to state whatever the Maharajah or his ministers may urge on points where a difference with respect to the interpretations of any of the articles of the treaty has arisen, I shall always consider any language which either makes unjust reflections on the good faith of the English Government or which conveys the most distant allusion to a change in those friendly relations which now subsist between this State and the British Nation to be inconsistent with those amicable professions which this Court has for some time past used and incompatible with the continuance of that intimate alliance which it has so recently concluded. From the circumstance of the minister having declared that the continuance of his power and the permanence of his measure rested upon the restoration of Gwalior and its dependencies I am satisfied of the truth of what I stated in a former despatch to your Excellency that he has assured the Maharaja when he obtained his approbation of the treaty of peace that there was no risk of either Gwalior or its adjoining possessions being alienated by that treaty and the indolent disposition of that chief has led him to receive as well grounded the minister's assurances which were probably given in the expectation that Gwalior and its dependencies would not be affected by the 9th Article of the treaty. If the expectations have been encouraged on one part and indulged by the other which I have every reason to think has been the case from the manner in which the minister and Munshi Kamal Nayan have both spoke to me upon the subject, it is evident that a contrary arrangement (and such my late communication has taught them to look for) however consistent with good faith and consonant to the treaty will occasion considerable irritation at this Court. The present minister who may justly be considered as the chief cause of this misunderstanding can under such circumstances only keep his station by persuading the Maharaja that the treaty has been departed from by the English Government, and if he loses it the person who succeeds must come into power upon the declared principle of a disapprobation of the treaty of peace as far at least as that treaty goes to deprive Daulat Rao of the fortress of Gwalior and its dependencies. * * *

No. 98—Gen. Wellesley deems it necessary to reconsider Sindhia's claim for the restoration of Gwalior and Gohad in the light of the fresh matter contained in Malcolm's despatches.

**FROM—MAJ.-GEN. ARTHUR WELLESLEY,
TO—J. MALCOLM, THE RESIDENT.**

Bombay, 17th March, 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 1st instant and I sincerely congratulate you upon the success of your negotiations with Daulat Rao Sindhia. The treaty which you have concluded appears to me to embrace all important objects, and it secures the tranquillity of the possessions of the Company and of those of their allies.

In negotiating this treaty you have displayed all the qualifications which have repeatedly gained for you the approbation of his Excellency the Governor General and from which I have derived so much advantage; and you have established fresh claims to his approbation, and the gratitude of the East India Company and your country.

I have perused and forwarded to be laid before his Excellency the Governor General all your dispatches from the 22nd February. It appears that Sindhia's ministers have given that prince reason to expect that he could retain possession of Gwalior; and I think it possible that considering all the circumstances of the case, his Excellency the Governor General may be induced to attend to Sindhia's wishes upon this occasion. At all events your dispatches contain fresh matter upon which it would be desirable to receive his Excellency's orders, before you proceed to make communication to Sindhia's durbar on the subject of Gwalior.

I therefore beg leave to recommend to you to avoid all discussion upon the subject of that fort, and to delay to communicate his Excellency's intentions respecting it till you will receive his orders subsequent to the receipt of your late dispatches.

No. 99—Sindhia urges that the prohibition of cow-killing be guaranteed by its being included as one of the specific terms of the treaty between the English and him.

**FROM—J. MALCOLM, THE RESIDENT,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Camp Mahal Gorarah, 18th March, 1804.

Enclosed I have the honor to send the Marathi paper of 20 articles which is mentioned in my address no. 10 to his Excellency the Gov-

ernor General, and an abstract of such parts of it as differ from the treaty of peace.

On the article respecting the prohibition of killing cows Sindhia expressed the greatest anxiety; the most urgent requests were repeatedly made to me on this subject by the ministers, and I promised to submit to the consideration of his Excellency the Governor General the great solicitude of the Maharaja and his hopes that the prohibition might be continued.

Enclosure.

An abstract of the parts in which the original demands of Sindhia differed from the peace treaty.

The first sheet of this document has not been seen nor received by the Governor General.

Article 3rd. The subsidiary force to be stationed in the countries ceded to the English by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th articles of the treaty of peace.

Article 4th. The armies of the two contracting parties not to be employed on trifling matters.

Article 6th. The English agree that they will not take into their service any of the enemies of the Maharaja, whether they be Marathas, Hindustannis or Rangras or others, and if any persons of this description are now in their service that they will discharge them, nor will they entertain any of the Maharaja's subjects who may offer their services, nor give them an asylum in their dominions.

Article 7th. It is agreed that neither of the contracting parties shall carry on any correspondence with foreign powers without informing the other.

Article 8th. The condition about arbitration of differences is omitted.

Article 12th. Provides for the maintenance of the former relations between Sindhia and the Peshwa as settled in the 15th article of the subsidiary treaty.

Article 14th. General Perron and Colonel George Hessing who were in the service of the Maharaja, proved treacherous and went away without settling their accounts. The Maharaja wishes that they may be ordered to settle their accounts. The Company therefore engage that the accounts of the said gentlemen for the countries of the Maharaja that were in their charge shall be produced in four months.

Article 15th. The English Government have by the 7th article of the treaty of peace engaged to pay out of the countries ceded to them

by the Maharaja, according to the schedule of the treaty, two lakhs of rupees a year jaghirs for the relations of the Maharaja and fifteen lakhs of rupees a year jaghirs or pensions for the dependants of the Maharaja. Orders for possession of the jaghirs shall be given to such persons as have been specified, and the names of such persons as were before omitted shall be inserted, and the Maharaja wishes that orders for possession of the two lakhs of rupees jaghirs may be given dated from the time of the treaty and orders for the possession of talukas to the amount of 15 lakhs of rupees yearly may be given to the chiefs and servants. The Company therefore agree that they will comply with the wish of the Maharaja.

Article 16th. The Maharaja wishes that cows may not be killed any where. The King has given a *farman* to this effect ; let the Company confirm it ; by doing this the Company will acquire a good name, and will give great satisfaction to Shrimant and to all our chiefs. The Honorable Company agree to the above.

Article 17th. The Maharaja says I hold Mathura Mandal and Mathura Brindaban, two places of Hindu religious worship, by a *farman* from the King ; let them remain with me. This request was made to General Wellesley when the former peace was negotiated and was approved by him. I should have some place on the bank of the River Bhagirathi ; let Hardwar, therefore, be assigned to me, this will afford me the highest satisfaction. The Company therefore agree that to please the Maharaja they will give up Mathura Mandal and Mathura Brindaban which he held by a royal *farman* and also that they will give up Hardwar.

Article 18th. The Maharaja says that *sunads* or grants and *inam* or deeds of gift from Shreemunt and from the King and other papers were lost when the forts of Asir and Ahmednagar were taken. Let them be searched for. Whatever of these papers can be recovered the English will restore to the Maharaja.

Article 19th. The Company agree that whatever guns, muskets, ammunition and military stores may have been removed from the Maharaja's forts since the peace shall be restored, and the Company will not give any protection, or enter into engagements with any petty chiefs, tributaries, collectors of revenue, or Zamindars belonging to the Maharaja, and after the conclusion of the treaty if any Europeans in the service of the Maharaja come into the Company's territories, the Company will give them up with their property to the Maharaja.

Article 20th. Pilgrims bearing the Maharajah's *dastak* to Kashi and Gaya and other places of Hindu worship will be allowed to pass free from all duties.

No. 100—The loss of Gwalior alone, according to Malcolm, was the chief cause of the discontent of Sindhia and his government against the English.

FROM—J. MALCOLM, THE RESIDENT WITH SINDHIA.

Camp near Burhanpur, 3rd April, 1804.

I had this morning a visit from Munshi Kamal Nayan, who came on some current business. After that was settled I entered into private conversation with him on the subject of the 9th article of the treaty of peace and began by informing him that the happy prospects I had indulged of seeing every point of discussion between this state, and the British Government amicably adjusted had been much clouded by the late conduct of Bapu Vitthal who though he continued to profess to me his resolution to cultivate the friendship of the English Nation, pursued a line of conduct little calculated to promote that end; that he had not only persisted in opposition to the most clear evidence, in asserting the right of this state to the fortress of Gwalior and the country of Gohad, but to my knowledge continued to assure the Maharaja that those places could never be alienated but by a departure from the treaty of peace on the part of the English Government. I expected I told the Munshi to receive a letter from your Excellency in two or three days with a list of the Rajas, and Chiefs, with whom treaties had been concluded; and that among these was the name of the Rana of Gohad. My duty would compel me, I informed the Munshi, to present that list the moment it arrived, and to demand it should be recognized by the Maharaja, and any hesitation on the part of that Chief would be very inconsistent with his late conduct, and would give a turn to the discussion on the subject of Gwalior, and Gohad, very different from that which it had been, (as far as it could judge from his language to me) the intention of the Minister to give it. The late ill humor which I had perceived on this point had induced me, I told Kamal Nayan, to hold this private communication with him. As the interest I felt in the welfare of this state made me most anxious that every cause of irritation should be removed and it appeared to me to be equally the duty of the minister and himself as I felt it to be my own to take advantage of the circumstance of our being private friends, previously to discuss in that capacity, without reserve, and with mutual confidence, this, and every other question of magnitude which we were obliged to agitate in our public characters. Such a practice would I said enable us to overcome a thousand difficulties that would otherwise be insurmountable and when I considered that our objects were the same that of promoting the interests of two governments who were now united in the closest union, I could not but anticipate the happiest

effects from these communications provided they were made with that sincerity which their nature, and the object we had in view demanded.

Munshi Kamal Nayan assured me that both the minister and himself would most gladly assent to the proposal. It was not (he was satisfied) Bapu Vitthal's wish to take any measure without my advice, he had full confidence in my private friendship, and it would he said be a satisfaction to me to know that there was no person more impressed with a sense of the regard I had for the interests of this state than the Maharaja himself. The occurrence of the dispute respecting Gwalior and Gohad was a subject of the most serious regret. The loss of these places under the treaty of peace had never been considered possible by either him or the minister. They had given the Maharaja the fullest assurances upon that point both at the period of settling the treaty and subsequent to that event. Both their characters were, he said, pledged and under every result truth and respect for themselves must lead them to declare that though they might have been negligent, they had not been guilty, and that these possessions had been alienated from the authority of Daulat Rao Sindhia, by an article of a treaty which they negotiated without the most remote idea that it ever could have such an operation; they could hold no other language to their master without confessing that they had betrayed his interests, and exceeding those powers with which they were vested, for though these gave them full authority to comply with General Wellesley's demands they had been granted in the conviction that these demands were limited, and went no further than had been stated by Yashwant Rao Ghorpade who specified in all his letters that Gohad, and Gwalior, were to remain to the Maharaja. This government, the Moonshee said, considered itself to have two claims upon this question; one upon the justice, the other upon the generosity of the British Nation. The first turned upon the expression, and meaning of the article, under which the possessions in dispute came. It was capable no doubt of different constructions, but those which this government had put upon it (particularly as they related to the personal pretensions of the person styled the Rana of Gohad and the situation of Gwalior) were not he added unworthy of attention and such he was assured they would meet from your Excellency; but the chief claim (and that which it was the Maharaja's wish to urge) rested upon the generosity of the British State. That government could without doubt, he said, decide this point as it pleased. Its power must prevent any appeal, but that very circumstance which would excite alarm if this discussion had happened with another state, was in the present instance, the cause of increased hope. As it made the claim of the Maharaja upon the generosity of the English Government more forcible, I must

strongly impel that state to act in the present instance in a manner worthy of its great dignity and reputation.

In my reply to what Munshi Kamal Nayan had said, I told him that I could admit of no claim which this state had upon the justice of the British Government. I had, I said at former conferences, refuted all the arguments which either he or the minister had brought forward to support the pretensions which they had urged. The frequent manner in which they had shifted the grounds of their arguments was I said a convincing proof of the weakness of the cause which they had to defend. They had been reduced, I added, to cavil about words, though good sense had at the commencement of this discussion led them very properly to reprobate such a proceeding as unworthy of both States. It must be evident, I added, to the apprehension of any man that as the measures of General Wellesley and those of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief were governed by the orders of a common superior, that the intention of the former in framing the 9th article of the treaty of peace must have been to confirm not to destroy those engagements into which the latter had entered, and this fact was in itself conclusive with respect to the true meaning and spirit of that article as understood by the party by whom it was proposed, and that with respect to the pretensions of the persons with whom these Engagements had been made, that was a point for the British Government to consider previous to their making any contract with them. After that was done the honour and reputation of the state required it should be supported and though I was by no means disposed to admit the assertions of Kamal Nayan and the minister with respect to the pretensions of the Rana of Gohad that he must see that this was a question which the British Government had decided and that there appeared to me no chance of that decision ever being reversed, and that I therefore most earnestly exhorted him to impress the minister with the necessity there was for preparing the mind of the Maharaja upon this subject, and of satisfying that Chief, that the conduct of the British Government was in the present instance directed by an attention to principles from which it could not depart without injury to its reputation, but that it was most sincerely disposed to cultivate the friendship and promote the interest of the Maharaja and that it viewed with regret the occurrence of any event that had the most remote tendency to disturb that harmony and good understanding which had been established between the two governments.

Munshi Kamal Nayan observed that if these sentiments were really felt by your Excellency that he did not conceive there would be any great difficulty in making an arrangement that would maintain the honor, and satisfy the expectations of both states. Neither the Maharaja nor his Minister, he said, was so unreasonable as to desire the

English Government to infringe its faith to whoever that was pledged, but it was their desire and expectation, that this state should neither suffer in its power nor resources by any engagement that was incompatible (in their opinion) with the treaty of peace and which was not in their contemplation (as an event which could possibly occur) at the period they consented to that treaty. The Company's Government possessed ample means, the Munshi added, to satisfy the Maharaja, if such was its object, and at the same time to maintain its faith. Many arrangements (*tadbirat* was his expression) could, he said, be made if a sincere desire of conciliating and establishing this government existed. I requested the Munshi to inform me of the nature of the arrangement to which he alluded. I reminded him that we were speaking at present as private friends, and that though we might benefit from the suggestions imparted to each other, there was no consequence that could attach to what was said by either at this conference. He assented to the truth of this remark and said it was the footing upon which it had been placed that had led him to say so much as he had done at this conference, but that he wished to speak to Bapu Vitthal and to communicate to him what I had said before he entered into a full explanation of his meaning respecting the arrangements which the British Government had it in its power to make to satisfy this state upon the point in discussion.

I next enquired of the Munshi what Bapu Vitthal had said to the hint I gave of the British Government assisting this state with an advance on its granting a lease of the provinces of Dholpur, Bari and Rajakhera: the Minister had (he told me) mentioned the subject to the Maharaja, who though he acquiesced in the impropriety of restoring these provinces to Ambaji, did not approve of the plan I had suggested. I requested the Munshi would recollect that the proposal had originated with myself and that I had no orders to make it, but that I had supposed when the minister came forward to ask me for pecuniary assistance that he had contemplated some adequate security. That with respect to the provinces of Dholpur, &c., they belonged to the Maharaja and he would dispose of them as he thought proper. Under the present state of circumstances, however it appeared to me that they would be found inconvenient and unprofitable possessions to this state and that in the event of their being so, I could only say that I was satisfied there existed so cordial a disposition to accommodation on the part of the British Government that it would either rent those districts or give others more conveniently situated for this state in exchange for them; nor would it in my opinion hesitate (though the measure would be attended with some expense) to station if the Maharaja required it a party of its troops within them for the purposes of maintaining their internal tranquillity. The Munshi said he would mention what I had stated

to the Minister, who it was likely would speak to me again upon this subject.

He next requested I would inform him when Assirgarh was likely to be delivered over to the authority of the Maharaja, whose anxiety upon this subject became every day greater. It was impossible for that Chief, the Munshi said, to doubt the intentions of the British Government, but a number of his adherents who were not equally acquainted with the character of that state made daily endeavours to excite his suspicions on this head, and the influence of Bapu Vitthal was likely to receive serious injury if the assurances he had given the Maharaja on this point were not confirmed.

I told the Munshi I had before informed him of the causes of the delay of which the Maharaja complained. That it was impossible for me to direct the restoration of Assirgarh, &ca, until I received accounts from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that the troops of Daulat Rao Sindhia had evacuated Hindustan, and I had I said that day received a letter from his Excellency stating that all the forts of the Maharaja now in his possession had been taken previous to the conclusion of peace, which was in direct contradiction to the information this court had given me upon that subject.

The Munshi said this court might have been deceived by the reports of its officers but that this was of no consequence to the question. If General Lake was in possession of all the forts of the Maharaja in Hindustan (either by capture or by cession) it was sufficient, Assirgarh & ca, should be restored. I admitted this fact and told him I expected to hear from his Excellency upon the subject in four or five days.

The chief object of my speaking with the Munshi at this conference on the subject of the 9th article was a desire to prepare this court for a communication of the list of chiefs and Rajas with whom the British Government have entered into engagements. It will be obvious to your Excellency that the conduct and temper of this court has put it wholly out of my power to repress the discussions respecting Gwalior and Gohad (which I should have been inclined to do agreeable to the instructions I received from the Honorable Major General Wellesley under date the 17th ultimo) without giving ground for stronger hopes than I conceive myself authorized to do until I receive your Excellency's final orders upon this subject, and it has been my endeavour to keep the question in that state which would admit of your Excellency adopting with advantage whatever measures your wisdom may dictate.

In the various discussions on this point I can always discover that Gwalior is the chief cause of the discontent of this government. To Gohad it attaches no more importance than it would to any other country of equal value, but the loss of Gwalior is conceived to affect

the dignity of the state and I have the best grounds for believing that the personal pride of the Maharaja is so much implicated in the retention of this fortress that it will be difficult if not impossible ever to reconcile him to its alienation and though I am satisfied he will not venture on any immediate renewal of hostilities, he will long continue to listen to every scheme that holds out the most distant prospect of its recovery.

I before informed your Excellency how deeply I believed the present minister Bapu Vitthal to be pledged on this question. The sentiments expressed by Kamal Nayan leave no doubt upon this subject and it is to this cause that I attribute his reluctance to abandon the hope of Gohad and Gwalior being restored to his master's authority or at least the latter and some satisfactory compensation being made for the loss of the former.

Bapu Vitthal at present enjoys uncontrolled sway. The relations and adherents of the late Yadu Rao Bhaskar are all in disgrace, Anna Bhaskar formerly Bakhshi and for some time acting Minister is in confinement, and Bapu Vitthal with a view to extort money from him has (within these few days) exposed him to the sun. His nephew Sadashiv Rao, who was lately appointed Subahdar of Malwa, is I am informed to be seized also, though this is, (from his being at the head of a considerable force) a point of some difficulty.

The minister has lately made several attempts to effect the disgrace of Gopal Bhau, but without success. That chief is protected by his high military reputation and by the personal favor of the Maharaja : the minister has however managed to lessen his command by the artifice of reducing the standard of the pay of the horsemen and of recommending (on consideration of economy) that no exceptions should be made in favour of Pathans of which class most of Gopal Bhau's party consisted. These have in consequence almost all demanded their discharge which has been granted.

Bapu Vitthal is a man of more abilities than I supposed : he is neither destitute of firmness, or energy, and he has the reputation of being an honest servant to his master, but his temper is violent, and his manners unconciliating. He is I have every reason to conclude very favourably disposed to the connection with the British Government, but if Gohad and Gwalior are alienated from the authority of the Maharaja he will only be able to maintain his station by impressing his master, with the most unfavourable sentiments of the conduct of that Government, and under the event of its being your Excellency's determination that this state has no right either to the restoration of those places or to any recompense for their loss, I shall consider the minister's removal as a fortunate occurrence for the British interests.

No. 101.—In this important lengthy despatch Malcolm received the G.G.'s instructions regarding the arguments to be employed against Sindhia's claims for the restoration of the fort of Gwalior and the country of Gohad to him.

FROM—N. B. EDMONSTONE, SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT,
TO—J. MALCOLM, THE RESIDENT.

Fort William, 8th April, 1804.

I am directed by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your Dispatches noted in the margin, on the subject of Daulat Rao Sindhia's pretensions to the possession of Gwalior and the territory of the Rana of Gohad, and to communicate to you the following observations and Instructions for the regulation of your conduct in effecting a final adjustment of the question, on which the ultimate disposal of that Fort and Territory depends.

Copies of the Treaties concluded by his Excellency the Commander in Chief with Ambaji Ingle and with the Rana of Gohad, and ratified by the Governor General-in-Council, and of the Instructions of Government to the Commander-in-Chief, on the subject of occupying the fort of Gwalior, and of maintaining the engagements concluded with the Rana of Gohad, have been already transmitted to you. You have acknowledged the receipt of the letter. With a view, however, to provide for the possible event of the miscarriage of my dispatch enclosing copies of those treaties, I am directed to transmit to you duplicate copies.

The Governor General's original instructions to Major General Wellesley of the 27th June, as well as his Excellency's instructions to Mr. Mercer of the 22nd July, (of which a copy was transmitted to Major General Wellesley on the 3rd August) contain a sufficient intimation of the intention of Government to conclude a treaty with the Rana of Gohad, and to occupy Gwalior. The instructions to Mr. Mercer state in distinct terms the situation of the Rana of Gohad, and of his territory at the commencement of the war, together with the relation of the power of Sindhia and of Ambaji to that district. Reference is made to the same subjects in various passages of the Governor General's instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, of which, copies were regularly transmitted to Major General Wellesley.

The Governor General is not apprised whether these documents were duly received. From the tenor of some expressions in your dispatches, his Excellency-in-Council would have concluded that these documents had never been received by you. I am directed to inform you, that a due attention to those papers would have removed all doubt respecting the objects of this Government with regard to

Gwalior and Gohad and would have established on the clearest grounds, the policy of the treaties concluded with Ambaji and with the Rana of Gohad, as well as the rights of the Company derived from those engagements. Copies also of the treaties concluded with Ambaji ought to have reached you previously to the 21st February, at which time it appears that you had not received any copy of that document.

It is probable that many of the documents enumerated in these paragraphs have miscarried by the irregularity of the *dak*, either between Hyderabad and Major General Wellesley's Camp, or between Major General Wellesley's Camp, and that of Sindhia.

By the Minutes of the Conference which you held with Munshi Kamal Nayan, and Ambaji Ingle's Vakil on the 21st February you appear, however, to be aware of the probable conclusion of the treaty with the Rana of Gohad, and of the obligation of that engagement on the public faith of the British Government; and you properly opposed on that ground the untenable assumption of Sindhia's officer that such engagements were not subject to the operation of the 9th Article of the Treaty of Peace. The arguments also by which you justified under the treaty concluded with Ambaji to Munshi Kamal Nayan in a subsequent conference with him, the prosecution of the siege of Gwalior after the Commander-in-Chief's receipt of intelligence of the conclusion of Peace, were in strict conformity to the actual state of facts.

Although the arguments stated in the instructions of the Governor General-in-Council to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief under dates the 13th and 20th February appear to his Excellency-in-Council to establish our right to maintain the arrangements adopted with respect to the territories of the Rana of Gohad, including Gwalior, by the treaty concluded with that Chieftain, His Excellency the Governor General deems it expedient to enter into a further discussion of that question, with reference to the pretences opposed to your assertion of that right, by the ministers of Daulat Rao Sindhia, in the various conferences which have passed on this subject.

By the tenor of your Dispatches those pretences appear to be,—

1st. That the fort of Gwalior, and the country of Gohad were not comprehended in the cessions directly made to the Company by the treaty of Peace, and therefore could not be alienated under the 9th article.

2ndly. That no such person as the Rana of Gohad exists, and therefore no treaty concluded with any person assuming that character, could be confirmed by the 9th Article of the Treaty of Peace.

3rdly. That neither Ambaji nor the Rana of Gohad are of the description of "Rajahs or others &c." with whom all treaties con-

cluded by the British Government are confirmed under the Treaty of Peace.

4thly. That the ministers of Daulat Rao Sindhia who negotiated the treaty of Peace understood (from) the honourable Major General Wellesley that the fort of Gwalior and the country of Gohad, were to be retained by Daulat Rao Sindhia, and that the treaty of peace was concluded in this confidence.

The 1st and 2nd of these pretences appear to have been properly repelled by your replies to Munshi Kamal Nayan, and Ambaji Ingle's Vakil. It may, however, be observed in addition to your reply to the second ground of argument assumed by these persons, that the person with whom the British Government concluded engagements as the legitimate Rana of Gohad, is acknowledged to be the lineal descendant of the ancient Ranas; that under a promise of an ample provision from the British Government this Chief at the commencement of the war, raised a considerable body of troops with which he successfully opposed the troops of Ambaji, and that he has actively and usefully cooperated with the British troops during the whole course of the war. On the third head of objection, you have also declared with propriety that the state of Ambaji's power and of his relation to Sindhia, admits no doubt that Ambaji is a person of the description stated in the 9th article, and the Rana of Gohad also is unquestionably of the description stated in that article. It is impossible to suppose that the 9th article would have been framed in such terms as should exclude from its operation, treaties concluded with Ambaji or the Rana of Gohad, when the main object of that article must have been, to confirm those particular treaties, of which the importance had been repeatedly stated in the Governor General's instructions, and distinctly declared in the original instructions to Major General Wellesley of the 27th of June. *This objection therefore is a mere fraud*, it is evident from various passages in the conferences as well as from the words of the treaty, that Sindhia's Vakils and ministers considered Ambaji and the Rana of Gohad to be persons of the description stated in the 9th article, and apprehended the necessary operation of that article not only upon the territory of Gohad and the fortress of Gwalior but upon other possessions held by Ambaji to the southward of Gohad. The restrictive clause in the 9th article excluding from the general operation of the article, all districts to the southward of Gohad holden by the tenure described in that clause, is evidently founded upon an apprehension that without such a restriction all the territories occupied by Ambaji might have been alienated under the general terms of the 9th article and no doubt can exist that under the general terms of the article unaccompanied by the restrictive clause, all the territory occupied by Ambaji might have been alienated either to Ambaji or to the British Government.

In your dispatch No. 12, you have stated in detail the attempts of Sindhia's minister to represent that the Rana of Gohad is not of the description of persons comprehended in the 9th Article, but you have not specified your replies to that artful and fraudulent misrepresentation. The Governor General-in-Council is desirous of receiving at the earliest convenient time, a detailed statement of your answer to Bapu Vitthal in the conference of the 23rd February of which conference the particulars are related in your dispatch with the omission of your replies to the disrespectful and false insinuations of that Maratha agent.

You will receive further instructions with reference to the insolent and arrogant tone of menace and defamation recently resumed by some of the Maratha Agents in their conferences with you. The object of such conduct and language is probably connected with the basest purposes of corrupt private interest. But the Governor General-in-Council is resolved not to suffer with impunity in any quarter, the revival of that spirit of wanton insult and barbarous provocation which occasioned the war, and which is incompatible with the relations of peace. The glory of the British arms displayed in the war, and the moderation and generosity of the British Government, evinced by the terms of the peace, and of the defensive alliance, might have taught the Maratha agents the propriety of observing a course more suitable to their condition: but the Governor General-in-Council will enforce the respect due to the great and powerful empire which is committed to his charge, even at the hazard of dissolving all connection with any state, whose counsels shall prove so infatuated as to oppose fraud, falsehood, and insolence, to justice, clemency and public faith.

With regard to the 4th objection, every doubt with respect to the confirmation of the engagements concluded with the Rana of Gohad by the 9th article of the treaty of peace is obviated and every pretence fabricated by the minister of Daulat Rao Sindhia in support of a contrary proposition is confuted by a reference to the minutes of conference between the honorable Major General Wellesley and the Vakils of Daulat Rao Sindhia, during the negotiation of peace.

From the minutes it appears that both the honorable Major General Wellesley and the Vakils, were fully aware of the extent to which the stipulations of the 9th article of the treaty might eventually operate.

Major General Wellesley repeatedly urged to the Vakils the danger to which the interests of Daulat Rao Sindhia were exposed, by a delay on their party, in the adjustment of the terms of peace, under the indispensable necessity of providing in any treaty of peace for the confirmation of all engagements which his Excellency the Commander in Chief might have concluded with the States and Chieftains

of Hindustan and distinctly apprised the Vakils that by delay Sindhia was exposed to the hazard of being deprived of his whole territory, and the Vakils are stated to have observed when the 9th article of the treaty of peace was under discussion "that by agreeing to the demand, the Maharaja might without knowing, cede away half his remaining territories, as the engagements, concluded by the Commander-in-Chief might contain stipulations to grant territory to the south of the line which Major General Wellesley had demanded as a boundary."

The ministers of Daulat Rao Sindhia, however, appear to maintain, that they received from Major General Wellesley, assurances, which justified a confidence, that notwithstanding the distinct provision of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, the territory of Gohad, including Gwalior, would remain in the possession of Daulat Rao Sindhia, but on a reference to the minutes of Conference, no such assurances appear to have been given. Major General Wellesley, in reply to the observation above quoted, assented to the justice of it, but expressed his belief that no treaty had at that time been concluded "by which, territory was granted south of the line mentioned, and that it was not intended to deprive Sindhia of any territory but what Major General Wellesley had claimed."

It is evident that by these declarations Major General Wellesley did not pledge either his own word or the faith of the British Government for Daulat Rao Sindhia's possession of the territory of Gohad after the conclusion of peace. On the contrary Major General Wellesley admitted that the apprehension of the Vakils with respect to the alienation of that territory, might possibly be verified, and merely expressed an opinion that no arrangements involving the alienation of that territory had probably been concluded at that time.

On a subsequent discussion of this question Major General Wellesley is stated to have declared to the Vakils "that it was not intended to demand from the Maharaja territory for any Rajas or Sirdars beyond what had been already granted, and that none of the Maharaja's remaining territories (such as were really his) should be granted away by any treaty made with any Raja or other person."

It is manifest that in this description of territory Major General Wellesley could not mean to include the territories of Gohad and Gwalior, because Major General Wellesley had at a preceding conference acquiesced in the apprehension of the Vakils, that territories south of those to be ceded to the Company might be alienated by the effect of engagements concluded by the Commander-in-Chief, an opinion which at a succeeding conference, Major General Wellesley confirmed in the most explicit terms. On that occasion the Vakils expressed an apprehension that Daulat Rao Sindhia would be

deprived of Jaipur and Gohad by the terms of the 2nd article, as it originally stood: Major General Wellesley replied that "Daulat Rao Sindhia positively would not lose Jaipur and Gohad by the 2nd article of the treaty although he might by another and Major General Wellesley positively refused to insert any thing in the treaty which should tend to defeat the arrangement which might have been made by General Lake with the Rajas of Jaipur, Gohad or others.

From this review of what is stated to have passed at the conferences between the honorable Major General Wellesley and the Vakils of Daulat Rao Sindhia with respect to the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace it is evident—1st. That the Vakils received no assurance from Major General Wellesley of an extent to justify an expectation that notwithstanding the nature of any engagements which might have been concluded by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, with respect to Gohad and Gwalior, that territory and fort would form a part of Sindhia's dominions after the peace. 2ndly That the declaration of Major General Wellesley on which the Vakils must have founded this expectation, although it may have encouraged hope that Gwalior and Gohad might remain in the possession of Daulat Rao Sindhia, plainly states the possible existence of engagements, by which Sindhia must be deprived of Gwalior and Gohad under the 9th article. 3rdly. That Major General Wellesley distinctly declared to the Vakils that any engagements which the Commander-in-Chief might have concluded with any Chief in Hindustan (and particularly with the Rana of Gohad) must be confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

The verbal declarations of Major General Wellesley therefore, far from affecting the operation of that article with respect to the territories guaranteed to the Rana of Gohad, confirm it in the most positive terms.

The strongest presumptive evidence exists to corroborate the tenor of these recorded declarations of the Honorable Major General Wellesley. It could not be supposed that Major General Wellesley would have admitted any construction of the 2nd and 9th articles of the treaty of peace or would have given to the Vakils any assurances by which the confirmation of engagements contracted with the Rana of Gohad would be precluded, because in the Governor General's instructions of the 27th of June by the tenor of which the honorable Major General Wellesley regulated the conditions of the peace, it is distinctly stated that the Rana of Gohad is to be placed in the condition of a tributary to the Company, and that Gwalior is to be occupied by the British troops.

It is evident, therefore, that if Sindhia really be of opinion that the treaty with the Rana of Gohad could not have been confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of peace, the Vakils of Sindhia must have

intentionally deceived him with regard to the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, and to the assurance and declarations of the honorable Major General Wellesley; but the rights of the British Government and the obligation of its pledged faith cannot be affected by the erroneous expectations which Daulat Rao Sindhia has been induced to entertain with regard to the limited operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

In the instructions of the Governor General-in-Council to the Commander-in-Chief of the 13th of February the question of the confirmation of the treaty concluded with the Rana of Gohad under the 9th article of the treaty of peace, is considered principally with reference to the engagement concluded between the British Government and Ambaji by which those territories were ceded to the Company which were subsequently guaranteed to the Rana of Gohad.

If it should be pretended that the engagement concluded with the Rana of Gohad could not be confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of peace, unless the territory guaranteed to the Rana by that engagement had been previously wrested from the dominion of Sindhia, either by conquest or by a just and valid cession, that under actual circumstances we could not justly claim the benefit of the cessions made by Ambaji, and that therefore those territories ought to revert to Daulat Rao Sindhia, you will find this question discussed in the instructions to which the preceding paragraph refers. One material argument, however, in support of our just claim to the benefit of the cessions made by Ambaji having been omitted, I am directed to take this opportunity of supplying it with a view to enable you to meet the pretensions of the Ministers of Daulat Rao Sindhia.

If we had not acquired a proprietary right over those territories, and consequently a right to dispose of them by the engagements with Ambaji, that right must have been obtained by conquest. The Commander-in-Chief was withheld from proceeding to the actual occupation of those territories for the express purpose of ultimately restoring them to the Rana of Gohad agreeably to the Governor General's original plan exclusively by the earnest entreaty of Ambaji and by the conclusion of engagements with Ambaji. The reduction of Gwalior and the territory dependant on it was the declared and intended object of the Commander-in-Chief's military operations after the surrender of Agra and the victory at Laswari. The army was actually moving towards Gohad and Gwalior when the cession of that fortress and territory by the treaty concluded with Ambaji precluded the necessity of directing the march of the army into that country. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, therefore, merely dispatched a small body of troops for the purpose of receiving possession of Gwalior under the terms of the treaty concluded with Ambaji.

It is to be observed at the same time that the Rana of Gohad had been previously to the conclusion of the treaty with Ambaji, actively and successfully employed at the head of a considerable body of forces, which he had levied by the aid of pecuniary supplies furnished by the British Government, in expelling the troops of Ambaji from the territory of Gohad, and that no force of the enemy remained in that territory (excepting in Gwalior) capable of resisting in any degree the complete and immediate occupation of it by the British troops.

The fraud practised by Ambaji with a view to frustrate the just rights and to evade the necessary result of the power of the British Government by artifice and treachery cannot be admitted in aid of the pretences now urged by Sindhia's ministers.

In every point of view, therefore, in which the question can be considered, the right of the British Government to claim the confirmation of the cessions in favor of the Rana of Gohad, appears to be indisputably established. The faith of the British Government is also pledged to maintain the obligation of its engagements with that chieftain, from which we cannot be released, unless the Rana of Gohad shall consent to release us, or shall violate his faith, or unless our original right to form the treaty shall be disproved. In the last case we should be placed in the same situation as that of a failure in the prosecution of the war; we should be deprived by a paramount necessity, of the means of fulfilling our engagements, and although motives of generosity in such a case would dictate the propriety of providing for the Rana of Gohad, he would possess no positive claim upon our public faith. His present rightful claim upon our faith is commensurate with our original right to contract the engagement, and with our present ability to fulfil it and we cannot wantonly yield the just rights of a faithful ally to the interests or prejudices of an enemy in the war.

The ministers of Sindhia may attempt to assert a separate claim to the restoration of the fortress of Gwalior, which is retained by the British Government, together with the subsidy secured to the British Government under the treaty with the Rana of Gohad. But both these advantages are accompanied by corresponding obligations of protection under the guarantee of the Rana's territories and independence, and both are necessary to enable us to fulfil those obligations. Without the full command of Gwalior, we could not be responsible for the security of the district of Gohad, and without the subsidy we should not possess the requisite funds for maintaining the troops which we are bound by the treaty to furnish for the protection of the Rana's country, person and authority.

The Governor General deems it to be an indispensable obligation upon the British Government to fulfil the promises and assurances

made by the honorable Major General Wellesley in the name of the British Government in the extent in which they were intended to operate. His Excellency, however, is decidedly of opinion that the claim described in the preceding paragraphs cannot be justly founded on any of the promises or assurances pretended to have been made by Major General Wellesley to the Vakils of Daulat Rao Sindhia.

The general assurances stated to have been given by Major General Wellesley "that it was not the intention of the British Government to destroy Sindhia's State and that the 9th article of the treaty of peace would be construed in the manner, least injurious to Sindhia, consistently with our public faith", must be limited by Major General Wellesley's more particular declarations as stated in the conferences, and by the positive terms of the treaty of peace founded on Major General Wellesley's instructions, and on the success of our arms.

The evident object and operation of the war and peace were to destroy Sindhia's hostile military power with relation to the British Government and its allies, and especially to exclude Sindhia from all command of our frontier, or of the dominions of our allies, more particularly in the North-Western provinces of Hindustan. The total destruction of Sindhia's state would have been an act of wanton vengeance; but it must never be forgotten that the effectual reduction of his means of reviving an hostile military power, especially on the banks of the Jumma, was the main object of the war and of the peace. Major General Wellesley's declaration was, therefore, undoubtedly made with this limitation; with reference to the particular case of Gohad and Gwalior Sindhia's ministers have drawn from Major General Wellesley's declarations a conclusion equally false and presumptuous. Major General Wellesley expressly declared that by the operation of the 9th article Sindhia might lose the district of Gohad (which includes Gwalior) and that our public faith required that any engagement concluded by General Lake with the Rana of Gohad should be confirmed by the treaty of peace.

The ministers of Sindhia now complain that the alienation of Gohad will destroy Sindhia's state and will establish a construction of the 9th article of a tendency injurious to Sindhia beyond the limits compatible with Major General Wellesley's assurances. But those assurances were accompanied by an express reservation of the particular case on which the Marathas ground their present complaint. Since Major General Wellesley distinctly declared at the same conferences that (although we neither intended the destruction of Sindhia's state nor any injury beyond the express words and necessary operation of the treaty and the indispensable obligations of our public faith, yet that) our public faith required the confirma-

tion of any engagements concluded with the Rana of Gohad and that such engagements under the 9th article might alienate the district of Gohad from Sindhia.

The occupation of the fortress and city of Gwalior by the British troops has already been stated to be intimately and inseparably connected with the objects and purposes of the arrangement concluded with the Rana of Gohad. With regard to the British Government the possession of Gwalior forms a most important part of that comprehensive political arrangement which was planned by the Governor General before the commencement of the war. The post is highly important to the British Government in a military as well as in a political point of view, and cannot properly come under the description of cession demanded exclusively with a view to the extension of our dominion or resources.

We should not be justified by the nature of our engagement with the Rana of Gohad in abandoning without his consent the fortress and city of Gwalior to any power except to that of the Rana himself, and least of all can we justly cede Gwalior without the Rana's consent to that power which usurped the Rana's hereditary dominions and from the oppressive control of which he has been relieved by his own successful exertions in the war cooperating with the British army and by the engagements concluded between him and the British Government.

On the facts and arguments above detailed is founded his Excellency the Governor General-in-Council's conviction of the justice and indispensable necessity of maintaining the obligation of our late engagements with the Rana of Gohad.

The Governor General-in-Council is, however, solicitous on substantial grounds of policy to conciliate the good-will and satisfaction of Daulat Rao Sindhia by every concession which may be practicable consistently with the public faith and honor and with the security of the just objects and purposes of the war and of the peace, and his Excellency is of opinion that under the subsidiary and defensive alliance lately concluded with Daulat Rao Sindhia the extension of his territorial and pecuniary resources beyond the scale on which they are left by the operation of the treaty of peace is not dangerous to the extent which might be apprehended under a different state of circumstances, but the establishment of the Rana of Gohad in his ancient possessions under the protection of the British power and the occupation of Gwalior by the British troops were considered by the Governor General previously to the commencement of the war to be objects of the highest importances and in his Excellency's instructions to the honorable Major General Wellesley of the 11th December, 1803, those objects are among the articles reserved even

in the event of the conclusion of a subsidiary and defensive alliance with Daulat Rao Sindhia.

His Excellency cannot expect that any concessions would reconcile Sindhia cordially to an alliance which he has been compelled to accept exclusively by the extreme exigency of his affairs. Concessions tending to restore any portion of the military power and influence of Sindhia in the North-Western provinces of Hindustan might revive hopes of recovering an ascendancy in that quarter and might furnish the means of renewed war instead of cementing the ties of alliance. The symptoms of a disposition to gratify unreasonable demands might encourage arrogance and rapacity and the treacherous and suspicious character of the Marathas might view in such a policy the indications of weakness and timidity rather than the proof of generosity and moderation.

His Excellency, therefore, would deem it to be highly impolitic even if it were practicable consistently with the obligations of public faith, to restore to Sindhia the possessions of Gwalior or the territory of Gohad, which would again establish the power of Daulat Rao Sindhia in that commanding position in Hindustan, whence after the aggression of the confederates it was a primary object of his Excellency's policy to exclude the Maratha Power.

The rights of the British Government under the treaty of peace having been distinctly stated in this letter, the justice and necessity of asserting those rights must be maintained at the durbar of Sindhia in the most public manner and stated by you directly to Sindhia himself in the most explicit terms.

You will deliver to Sindhia himself attested copies of the Treaties with Ambaji and with the Rana of Gohad. You will accompany these documents by a full statement in writing of the grounds on which is founded the right of the British Government to maintain the treaty with the Rana of Gohad and you will add in the most public and solemn manner such verbal explanations as may appear to be necessary.

You will then signify to Sindhia in the most firm but temperate and amicable language the fixed resolution of the Governor General-in-Council to maintain the rights and interests of the British Government established by the treaty of peace and by the treaty with the Rana of Gohad according to the tenor of those instruments.

His Excellency the Governor General is anxious that all questions connected with the treaty of peace should be finally adjusted with the least practicable delay and his Excellency accordingly directs that you will immediately proceed to the adjustment of those which form the subject of this dispatch upon the principles stated in the preceding instructions.

After the just rights of the British Government under the treaty of peace shall have been duly and formally recognized by Sindhia it may be proper to review the condition of his resources in the amicable spirit of the treaty of defensive alliance. When the Governor General-in-Council shall have been convinced that Sindhia's counsels are actuated by a due sense of the real nature of his situation and of the principles and objects of the alliance every degree of reasonable consideration will be extended by this government to mitigate his distress, and means may be found of affording relief to his resources without injury to our faith or to our public safety, without sacrificing our allies to his wounded pride or our security to his rapacity and ambition.

The nature of those means as well as the mode of applying them will form the subject of future instructions to you. But the preliminaries to these acts of generosity and clemency must be the recognition of our just rights and the manifestation of those sentiments towards us which is due to the superiority of our arms in the war, to our moderation and clemency in the peace, and to our liberality and generosity in the defensive alliance.

Sindhia must remember that he is indebted to the forbearance of the British power for every possession which he retains and even for his existence. He must remember that the British power in the moment of victory and of progressive conquests restored him to whatever resources he now possesses : and after having established the just limits of cession founded upon the success of the war, granted to him the gratuitous protection and guarantee of the arms by which he had been vanquished for the security of the dominions reserved to him by the peace.

This condition under such a settlement is incompatible with a spirit of arrogance and encroachment, nor will the Governor General-in-Council consent to listen to any demands which shall be urged in a tone unsuitable to the relations subsisting between the two States and which shall lead to consequences inconsistent with the principles of the treaties of peace and alliance and with the rights and interests of the Company and its allies.

I am directed to take this opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your letters of the dates and numbers stated in the margin.

The Governor General in Council approves the motives which induced you to postpone further communications with Sindhia's durbar on the subject of Gwalior and Gohad according to the statement contained in your dispatch (of the 16th March), and his Excellency-in-Council will also approve any delay which you may have interposed on the same subject in consequence of the instructions of Major General Wellesley of the 17th March which the Governor General-in-Council deems extremely prudent and proper.

No. 102.—Objections are raised by Kamal Nayan against the treaties concluded by the English with the Rulers of Jodhpur and Gohad, and apprehensions are expressed that the recognition of the treaty with Gohad might adversely affect Sindhia's claim for the restoration of Gwalior and Gohad.

**FROM—J. MALCOLM, THE RESIDENT WITH SINDHIA,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Camp near Burhanpur, 10th April, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Edmonstone under date the 12th ultimo conveying to me your Excellency's instructions upon several points connected with the treaty of peace.

I immediately on receipt of the above dispatch sent for Munshee Kamal Nayan and shewed him the list of chiefs (signed by your Lordship-in-Council) with whom the British Government had concluded treaties and engagements and told him it was my wish to present the said list at as early a period as possible to the Maharaja from whom I should expect a full recognition of the independence of the persons named in the list and an explicit renunciation of all claims upon them, and it was desirable, I informed the Munshi, that this should be given in writing under the seal of the Maharaja, and the most unexceptionable terms to express in such a paper would be (in my opinion) the precise words of the 9th article which related to the point to be settled.

The Munshi offered several objections to the name of the Rana of Gohad, the acknowledgement of whose title might, he said, be hereafter construed into an abandonment of the Maharaja's claims (under the treaty of peace) to the fortress of Gwalior and the territory of Gohad. He also expressed surprise at the name of the Raja of Jodhpur being in the list which this Court had, he said, but little reason to expect from the tenor of very late letters from that chief, and he requested I would inform him of the terms of the treaties which the British Government had contracted with these states.

To the objection which he made respecting the name of the Rana of Gohad, I replied by calling his attention to what passed at our last conference and by informing him that I should sincerely regret the circumstance of this government hesitating from such considerations as he had offered to receive and acknowledge a paper which was in fact a part of the treaty of peace, and which must be received and acknowledged if this court did not mean to depart from that treaty, which could not be said to be fulfilled in one of its most important articles till this affair was settled. I took no further notice of the surprise which the Munshi had expressed about the Raja of Jodh-

pur's name being in the list except by observing that its being so, precluded the necessity of any remark on this subject. In reply to his request to be informed of the terms of the engagements which the British Nation had contracted with the different chiefs named in the list, I told him I had no orders to make any such communication, that I believed they were of a defensive nature and that this government should rest satisfied with an assurance that none of them could have any operation which was in any way injurious to its interests. The Munshi promised to report what I had said to the minister and to the Maharaja and to urge the appointment of an early day, for the delivery of the list of treaties. Some discussion was, he said, from the present temper of the court to be expected upon this subject, but he had no doubt it would be settled as I wished. He should, he stated, point out to the Maharaja's attention the great solicitude which the British Government shewed in a case where its faith was concerned and he doubted not but that Chief would draw from this an inference highly favourable to the future promotion of his own interests.

I urged the Munshi at this meeting to explain what he meant by the expressions he used at our last conference which related to an arrangement for the satisfactory settlement of the difference which had arisen between the two states respecting the construction of the 9th article of the treaty of peace. He appeared desirous to evade the subject, but on being pressed said he had not spoken to the minister, but that he conceived it would be consistent both with the principles of good faith and justice for the British Government to make full enquiry into the rights and pretensions of the family of the Rana of Gohad and these would (he was assured) be found so limited, that the resolution of the Company's Government to support the person it had raised (?) to be the representative of that family would not interpose a very serious obstacle against the complete reconciliation of both governments on this point.

I told the Munshi that this proposition appeared so extraordinary after what had passed that I could not believe it possible to be that which he had in contemplation at our former conference. The nature of his reply (to this remark) which was general and evasive, satisfied me that he had after our last meeting stated his ideas upon the subject of the arrangements to which he had alluded, to Bapu Vitthal, who had disapproved of them, and that he had in consequence taken this method of getting rid of the question.

I communicated to the Munshi at this interview the letter from Ambaji Ingle to Kamgar Khan which was enclosed in Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's dispatch and pointed out the very insolent terms in which Ambaji in that letter had dared to speak of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The Munshi admitted the insolence of the

letter and said he would mention the subject to the Maharaja who would be much irritated against Ambaji, of whom he had now so many *causes of complaint that nothing but absolute necessity could oblige* him for a moment to wear the appearance of regard to that chief. On my afterwards stating your Excellency's resolution to permit no authority acting under your orders to have any communication with Ambaji Ingle or any of his dependants, the Munshi said that he was satisfied the Maharaja would assent to the perfect propriety of your Lordship's determination on this point, as he had, upon my representing on a former occasion the causes which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief had to complain of the conduct of Ambaji Ingle, abandoned every idea of employing that chief as a medium of communication with that officer; and with respect to his being named to receive charge of Dholpur, &c., the fact was as he (the Munshi) had once before mentioned to me, that this state was more inclined to strip Ambaji of the provinces he possessed than to give him others as it had as little confidence in him as the British Government. As I had (as my dispatches under date the 23rd and 28th ultimo will shew) fully anticipated your Excellency's orders respecting Dholpur, Bari and Rajakhara, I did not think it advisable to make any mention of these provinces at this interview as I was satisfied my reviving the subject after what had past, would excite suspicions unfavourable to the accomplishment of your Lordship's wishes respecting them.

It is two days since I had this conference with the Munshi; and the day I am to deliver the list of treaties has not yet been fixed, I am told it will be tomorrow. I have not failed to importune the durbar upon this subject and to point out the unfavourable impressions which this dilatory and hesitating conduct is likely to make upon your Lordship. I can entertain no doubt but this court will recognize the treaties which the British Government has entered into with the chiefs specified in the list transmitted in Mr. Edmonstone's letter and believe the delay which has taken place has been solely caused by its apprehension of the effect such recognition might have on the claims of the Maharaja to Gohad and Gwalior, on which subject I am concerned to state it becomes daily more obstinate and discontented.

No. 103—Sindhia's troops stationed in Malwa are ordered to advance under the command of Bapuji Sindhia.

**FROM—J. MALCOLM, THE RESIDENT,
TO—N. B. EDMONSTONE, SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT.**

Camp near Burhanpur, 18th April, 1804.

I have the honor to transmit for the information of his Excellency the Most Noble The Governor General a copy of a letter which I

have this day addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief with a translation of a Marathi letter from the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia to Bapuji Sindhia.

I have also the honor to transmit a list of the Chiefs and troops in Malwa which have been directed to assemble under the command of Bapuji Sindhia. The whole force included in this list is I am led to believe ordered to advance with that Chief with the exception of two battalions of infantry under the command of Jacob which are to remain for the protection of Ujjain.

LIST OF THE TROOPS OF DAULAT RAO SINDHIA IN MALWA

Names			Station	Number of Horses	Number of Infantry	Remarks.
Vitthal Rao	Malwa	8,000	3 Battn.	Exact place not known.
Sadashiv Rao Mahadev	Rajgarh	5,000		
Bapojee Sindhia	Rajgarh	3,000		
Waman Khande Rao	Kota	3,000		
Ram Rao Phalke	Narwar	500		
Satwaji Phalke	Malwa	500	8 Pultn. 2 Battn.	Exact place not known.
Gulab Rao Kadam	Kota	500		
Jean Baptiste	Rajgarh			
Jacob	Ujjain			
Total				20,500	13 Battn.	

Enclosure. Bapuji Sindhia, the commander of Sindhia's force is ordered to march in the direction of Jaipur and to act under the instructions of General Lake.

**FROM—J. MALCOLM, THE RESIDENT,
TO—GENERAL LAKE, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.**

*Camp near Burhanpur, 18th April, 1804.
Not printed here.*

No. 104—Malcolm receives the memorandum of Sindhia's grievances against Holkar.

**FROM—J. MALCOLM, THE RESIDENT,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Mahal Gorarah, 23rd April, 1804.

In my official dispatch to his Excellency the most noble the Governor General under date the 29th ultimo I stated my having expressed a desire to the minister Bapu Vitthal to be furnished with a memorandum of the causes of complaint which the Maharaja

had against Jaswant Rao Holkar in order that the British Government might endeavour to mediate an accommodation of such points as it could notice upon the principles of truth and justice and by that means give stability to any settlement which was effected.

The enclosed is the memorandum which has been sent me. The grievances stated in it have I believe all occurred subsequent to the date of the engagement between Yaswant Rao Holkar and Daulat Rao, copy of which I enclosed in my official dispatch of the 10th ultimo but previous to the conclusion of the defensive alliance between the latter Chief and the British Government.

The enclosed memorandum is of a very loose and general nature. The losses of this state are no doubt much exaggerated though the minister declares to me they are not, he however admits that many of them are of a description which it is not easy to calculate, and for which it would be difficult to exact remuneration. The document has its chief importance from shewing the great and almost irreconcilable causes of difference which exist between this state and Yeshwant Rao Holkar.

Enclosure.

Memorandum of the causes of complaint which the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia has against Yeshwant Rao Holkar.

1st, After the Maharaja had given up to Holkar all his country, the latter levied contribution on and plundered the country of the Maharaja.

In the pargana of Hatwa to the amount of	50,000
Sarkar of Handia	50,000
Pargana of Unchod, Sonkachh, Zora, Waraho and Yoklia	1,00,000	
Tappah Baglie levied on the principal men	45,000
Pargana of Mandsaur, Khachrod and Unhel	10,00,000
Pargana of Nolai	1,00,000
Tuppa Neori, and Pargana of Battah Tupai	50,000
Pargana of Ujjain	50,000
Pargana of Shajapur	50,000
Pargana of Barode, &ca.	1,00,000
Pargana of Bhilsa	2,00,000
Pargana of Udaipure Basoda	50,000
In the Pargana Sarekur, Dummunt Wanoo Umgair		
Wurbeckum &ct.	5,70,000
		25,00,000
Besides in these countries what has been plundered, burnt		
and destroyed amounts to	25,00,000
		<hr/> 50,00,000

2nd, In Mewar, the plundering and destroying of the country tributary to the Maharaja together with what he has levied forty lakhs.

3rd, In Kulalwakul the contributions he has raised are:—

Pargana of Jawad, Jiran, Neemuch, &c.	2,00,000
Taluka of Singoli, Becheric &c. and the Pargunna of Begun	75,000
Purgana of Bedlee, Tana, Bechoree, Segolee Zaat &c. with what has been burnt plundered &c. in these countries			4,00,000
			7,50,000

4th—On coming to the fort of Ajmer he plundered the town and the country in that Pargana Bonaia Kekdi &c. ... 10,00,000

5th—He must restore the countries and possessions of the Maharaja and his tributaries which he has seized and also repair their losses.

6th—Nagoji-Wagji and Meer Khan plundered and levied contribution in the Parganas of Alampur, Ingrawun, Pori &c. to the amount of ... 5,00,000

72,50,000

Until some adjustment of these causes of complaint takes place, there can be no friendship between the two States.

No. 105—Sindhia continues to offer objections to receiving the list of treaties sent by the Governor General. Malcolm rejects draft Memorandum sent by Bapu Vitthal and repeats his assertion that the objections raised by Sindhia are wholly groundless.

**FROM—J. MALCOLM, THE RESIDENT,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Camp near Burhanpur, 28th April, 1804.

1. In my last dispatch under date the 23rd instant I transmitted the translation of a memorandum which I had presented to the minister Bapu Vitthal Pant in consequence of the Maharaja's having offered objections to receive the list of treaties which your Excellency had transmitted.

After that memorandum had been under consideration for some days I received a message from the minister intimating that if I would withdraw it and present one agreeable to a draft which he (the minister) would send me, that he would satisfy the Maharaja of the propriety of receiving the list and of granting the recognition which I had demanded. In answer to this proposition I desired to see the

draft and at the same time assured the minister that I should adopt it if I found I could do so with propriety.

I yesterday received a letter from Munshi Kamal Nayan of which I have the honor to enclose a translation and with it was transmitted for my perusal the draft proposed by Bapu Vitthal. I enclose a translation of this extraordinary paper which I have returned to the minister accompanied by a letter to Munshi Kamal Nayan, translation of which I have also the honor to send for your Excellency's information. [Both these infructuous letters are omitted in this book].

The minister becomes every day more intractable upon the question of the rights of the Maharaja to Gwalior and Gohad and I have but faint hopes of any good being produced by my letter to Munshi Kamal Nayan. I however deemed it my duty to write that letter and I shall transmit any answer he may give the moment I receive to your Excellency.

It appears probable from several circumstances and particularly from the enumeration of talukas in the draft among which Gohad and one or two others of trifling value are omitted, that it is the intention of this court to contend that neither the fort of Gwalior nor any of those talukas specified in the draft have ever belonged to the family of the Rana of Gohad though they might have (from success as plunderers) enjoyed casual possession of them for one or two years, and that the fort of Gwalior and most of the provinces are actually to the southward of the country termed that of the Rana of Gohad which (I know they pretend) is very confined in its limits. On this subject though I have not all the information I could wish, I trust I have sufficient to answer any objections which they can raise.

A Vakil has lately arrived from the Bhonsle, and the minister last night informed Kishan Rao that he was entrusted with communications which shewed that the Raja of Berar was as little satisfied as the Maharaja with the conduct of the British Government since the conclusion of the treaty of peace. The minister after making this observation enjoined Kishan Rao not to report it to me, but I am well satisfied he meant it should be stated in order that an impression should be made upon my mind favourable to the Maharaja's interests in the pending question respecting Gwalior, &c. and it is to the same design that I attribute several interviews which have lately taken place between the minister and Khandu Pant Bapu the Vakil of Yashwant Rao Holkar. These appearances have made me judge it more necessary to assert the full rights of the British Government under the 9th article, whenever these rights have been brought into discussion, as I have been satisfied my doing so was indispensable to give effect to any arrangement which your Excellency may please

to adopt for the final settlement of the existing dispute between the two States.

Translation of a letter from Major Malcolm to Munshi Kamal Nayan dated 28th April, 1804.

I have received your letter enclosing two papers and a memorandum from Hari Pant Babu Chitnavis respecting his property at Benares which I will answer hereafter; the other a draft in the Marathi language of a memorandum which I understand from the report of Kishan Rao it is Babu Vitthal's wish I should give to the Maharaja instead of the paper which I presented a few days ago. As my object is to promote the friendship between the two States, in pursuit of that I can have no hesitation in acting contrary to form. I was therefore prepared to have adopted the memorandum sent by Babu Vitthal, in preference to the one I had drawn out, if I had found it was of a nature calculated to obviate difficulties and to reconcile differences, but to my surprise on perusing it I discovered it to be quite the contrary, and to be a paper every way objectionable; and I now return it and beg you will give it to Babu Vitthal and at the same time tell him from me that it is with great regret I observe that he continues to pursue a line of conduct which appears to me so incompatible with his professions of desiring to improve and cultivate the harmony and friendship which he has been so instrumental in establishing between the two states.

Though I do not mean to enter again into the arguments which I have repeatedly had with you and the minister respecting Gwalior and Gohad, I must, my friend, offer some observations on this memorandum which I request you will particularly impress on the minister.

It is, my friend, perfectly true that the 9th article states that none of the personal possessions of the Maharaja to the southward of the countries of the Raja of Jodhpur, of the Raja of Jaipur and of the Rana of Gohad shall be alienated from the Maharaja by any treaties concluded by the English Government with Rajas and others. This stipulation will never be departed from, but it never can apply to the countries which have been guaranteed to the Rana of Gohad, and I have several times before told you I was satisfied the Governor General would never permit the least infringement of the faith which the English Nation had pledged to the Rana. The countries of which that Chief has possession were in the possession of his ancestors, and therefore most certainly those, which are meant by the country of the Rana of Gohad in the treaty of peace. If there was no such person as the Rana of Gohad or no country which is called the country of the Rana of Gohad, why did not you and Babu Vitthal object at the time of your negotiating the peace to the insertion of the name of this person and country in the treaty of peace where it

is mentioned no less than three times in a manner which sufficiently indicates that it was the intention of General Wellesley to consider this country in a light as distinct from the Maharaja's other possessions as he did either Jaipur or Jodhpur.

It is true that no *Chhor Chittis* were given for the country known under the name of the country of the Rana of Gohad nor were any necessary. That country was not granted by the Maharaja to the English Government but it came specifically under the 9th article of the treaty of peace, and therefore if it was alienated in consequence of an engagement between a Raja or other person and the English Government, the Maharajah is bound by 9th article of the treaty to recognise such engagement.

It is stated in the memorandum that the English Government had no right under the treaty to give away the ancient personal possessions of the Maharaja. They had it is true no right to give away any such as were to the southward of the line mentioned in the 9th article, but their right to give away those that are upon that line is fully established by that article, else where was the use of the stipulation?

This applies to the country known under the name of the country of the Rana of Gohad, which is part of the line stated in the treaty.

General Wellesley's remark to Bapu Vitthal and you alluded to in the memorandum is perfectly in my recollection. I have it written down, it was in general words as stated in the draft or memorandum. It was made when the terms of the 9th article were under discussion and it was expressly confined by the General at the period it was made to those personal possessions of the Maharaja which were to the southward of the country of the Rajas of Jodhpur and Jaipur and the Rana of Gohad and therefore never can apply to any possessions which are within that country. In support of this I must mention a conversation which took place between General Wellesley, you and Bapu Vitthal two days subsequent to the one alluded to in the memorandum. You and Bapu Vitthal objected to the words of the 2nd Article. You said that if Jodhpur was mentioned as a boundary, you apprehended the Maharaja might lose Jaipur and Gohad. You then proposed that the Chambal river might be the boundary, that every thing to the northward should belong to the Company, every thing to the southward to the Maharaja. The General replied that the Maharaja positively could not lose Jaipur and Gohad by the 2nd article though he might by another (the 9th) and he positively refused to insert any thing in the treaty which should tend to defeat the arrangement which might have been made by General Lake with the Raja of Jaipur, the Rana of Gohad or others. I have this conversation written down as well as the other, and it must be perfectly within your recollection and that of Bapu Vitthal.

I have stated all these facts to you before, but the nature of the memorandum sent by Bapu Vitthal made it necessary I should repeat them. It is useless to go into further argument upon this subject. All you have stated has been faithfully represented by me to the Governor General and he will decide agreeable to principles of liberality and justice. An affair of this nature between two great states can never remain for any period as a cause of difference; it must be settled in an amicable and satisfactory manner provided both parties continue bent on friendship and are guided by reason. I am a sincere well-wisher to both states and have pursued a course which I am satisfied is calculated to promote the interests of both. The minister has not been pleased to attend to my advice upon this occasion or he would not have delayed so long in fixing a day for the delivery of the list of treaties to the Maharaja after I had pointed out to him the importance of that measure and after I had assured him both verbally and in writing that the Maharaja's receiving that list and giving a recognition of the treaties which had been concluded would not in any degree affect the point in reference to the Governor General respecting the claims of this state under the 9th article of the treaty. The minister is no doubt the best judge of his own actions, but he should have been satisfied from the whole tenor of my conduct that I was a sincere well-wisher of the Maharaja and that I had no desire but that of strengthening the friendship which exists between him and the British Nation and which is so calculated to promote the prosperity of both states. At present I can do nothing but represent what has past to his Excellency the Governor General.

I have sincere hopes that you and Vitthal Pant who have hitherto exerted yourselves to establish union and harmony between the two governments, will reflect seriously on what I have written and adopt a proceeding on this occasion calculated to banish doubt, and to confirm the friendship between the two states.

No. 106—Malcolm explains why he agreed to the inclusion of the phrase "States and principal Powers" in the treaty with Sindhia.

**FROM—J. MALCOLM, THE RESIDENT,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.**

Camp near Burhanpur, 29th April, 1804.

I have this instant received Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's dispatch of the 23rd ultimo in which was enclosed the treaty of defensive alliance between this state and the British Government ratified by your Excellency-in-Council.

I am informed by Mr. Edmonstone that my conduct in the negotiation of the defensive alliance has been honored by your Excellency's

full approbation and that by the conclusion of the treaty I have rendered a public service of the highest description. I cannot but consider such flattering expressions as more than a reward for the success which has attended my exertions in the execution of your lordship's orders and I beg leave to offer with every sentiment of respect and gratitude my acknowledgements to Your Excellency for the distinction with which you have been pleased to notice my services upon this occasion.

The expression of "States and *principal* Powers" alluded to in the 12th paragraph of Mr. Edmonstone's letter was I conceived a correct translation of the phrase *Sarkar Umda u Kallan* in the Persian transcript of the treaty. I objected at first to the introduction of the word *Kallan* or principal; but the same motives of apprehension and jealousy which actuated the ministers of the Maharaja throughout the whole negotiation, made them conceive that its omission would give the British Government a latitude to interfere with the tributaries of the Maharaja and to control the exercise of his authority over these petty states from whom he occasionally levied contributions. They proposed that the names of the states alluded to in the treaty should be specified and gave in a list of those whom they considered as the persons designed by the appellation of principal powers. This list I declined for obvious reasons inserting in the treaty, but as I found that every State which can be deemed independant in India or to which I could suppose it was your Excellency's intention to extend the operation of the 8th article was included in it, and as I was satisfied that we both understood the article in the same sense, I judged it unnecessary to contend further on the subject or indeed to notice it in my address to your Excellency, as I conceived it at the moment to be a point of no consequence.

I trust the explanation I have given will satisfy your Excellency upon this point on which I should hope there is little reason to apprehend any difference ever arising between the two States, and I should fear the renewal of the negotiation at this period respecting an alteration in the expression alluded to in Mr. Edmonstone's letter would, from the causes which I have stated, excite very uneasy sensations in this court.

No. 107—The Treaty of Bassein with the Peshwa.

TREATY of perpetual and General Defensive Alliance between the honorable English East India Company and his Highness the Peshwa Baji Rao Raghunath Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur, his children, heirs, and successors, settled by Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, Resident at the Court of his Highness, by virtue of the powers delegated

to him by his Excellency the most noble Richard, Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious Order of St. Patrick, one of his Britannic Majesty's most honorable Privy Council, Governor-General-in-Council, appointed by the honorable Court of Directors of the said honorable Company, to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies.

Whereas, by the blessing of God, the relations of peace and friendship have uninterruptedly subsisted, for a length of time, between the honorable English East India Company and his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur, and have been confirmed at different periods by treaties of amity and union, the powers aforesaid, advert-ing to the complexion of the times, have determined, with a view to the preservation of peace and tranquillity, to enter into a general defensive alliance, for the complete and reciprocal protection of their respective territories, together with those of their several allies and dependants, against the unprovoked aggressions or unjust encroachments of all or any enemies whatever.

ARTICLE 1. The peace, union, and friendship, so long subsisting between the two States, shall be promoted and increased by this treaty and shall be perpetual. The friends and enemies of either shall be the friends and enemies of both ; and the contracting parties agree that all the former treaties and agreements between the two states, now in force, and not contrary to the tenor of this engagement, shall be confirmed by it.

ARTICLE 2. If any power or state whatever shall commit any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against either of the contracting parties, or against their respective dependants or allies, and after due representation shall refuse to enter into amicable explanation, or shall deny the just satisfaction or indemnity which the contracting parties shall have required, then the contracting parties will proceed to concert and prosecute such further measures as the case shall appear to demand.

For the more distinct explanation of the true intent and effect of this agreement, the Governor General-in-Council, on behalf of the honorable Company, hereby declares that the British Government will never permit any power or state whatever to commit with impunity any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights and territories of his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur, but will at all times maintain and defend the same in the same manner as the rights and territories of the honorable Company are now maintained and defended.

ARTICLE 3. With a view to fulfil this treaty of general defence and protection, his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur agrees to receive, and the honorable East India Company to furnish, a permanent subsidiary force of not less than six thousand regular native

infantry, with the usual proportion of field pieces and European artillerymen attached, and with the proper equipment of warlike stores and ammunition, which force is to be accordingly stationed, in perpetuity, in his said Highness' territories.

ARTICLE 4. For the regular payment of the whole expense of the said subsidiary force, his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur hereby assigns and cedes, in perpetuity, to the honorable East India Company, all the territories detailed in the schedule annexed to this treaty.

ARTICLE 5. As it may be found that certain of the territories ceded by the foregoing article to the honorable Company may be inconvenient from their situation, his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur, for the purpose of rendering the boundary line of the honorable Company's possession a good and well-defined one, agrees that such exchanges of *talukas* or lands shall be made hereafter, on terms of a fair valuation of their respective revenues, as the completion of the said purpose may require. And it is agreed and convented that the territories to be assigned and ceded to the honorable Company by the 4th article, or in consequence of the exchange stipulated eventually in this article, shall be subject to the exclusive management and authority of the said Company and of their officers.

ARTICLE 6. Notwithstanding the total annual expense of the subsidiary force is estimated at twenty-five lakhs of rupees, his said Highness hath agreed to cede, by article 4, lands estimated to yield annually the sum of twenty-six lakhs of rupees, the additional lakh being intended to meet possible deficiencies in the revenues of the said lands, and save the honorable Company from loss.

ARTICLE 7. After the conclusion of this treaty, and as soon as the British Resident shall signify to his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur, that the honorable Company's officers are prepared to take charge of the districts ceded by article 4, his Highness will immediately issue the necessary *parwanas* or orders to his officers, to deliver over charge of the same to the officers of the honorable Company. And it is hereby agreed and stipulated, that all collections made by his Highness' officers subsequently to the date of the treaty, and before the officers of the honorable Company shall have taken charge of the said districts, shall be carried to the credit of the honorable Company, and all claims to balances from the said districts, referring to periods antecedent to the conclusion of this treaty, shall be considered as null and void.

ARTICLE 8. All forts situated within the districts to be ceded as aforesaid shall be delivered to the officers of the honorable Company with the said districts; and his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur engages that the said forts shall be delivered to the honor-

able Company without being injured or damaged, and with their equipment of ordnance, stores, and provisions.

ARTICLE 9. Grain, and all other articles of consumption, and provisions, and all sorts of materials for wearing apparel, together with the necessary numbers of cattle, horses, and camels, required for the use of the subsidiary force, shall be entirely exempted from duties ; and the Commanding officer and officers of the said subsidiary force shall be treated in all respects in a manner suitable to the dignity and greatness of both states. The subsidiary force will, at all times, be ready to execute services of importance, such as the protection of the person of his Highness, his heirs, and successors, the overawing and chastisement of rebels, or excitors of disturbance in his Highness' dominions, and the due correction of his subjects or dependants, who may withhold the payment of the *sarkar's* just claims ; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor like *sebandi* to be stationed in the country to collect the revenues, nor against any of the principal branches of the Maratha Empire, nor in levying contributions from Maratha dependants in the manner of *mulkgiri*.

ARTICLE 10. Whereas much inconvenience has arisen from certain claims and demands of the Maratha State affecting the city of Surat, it is agreed that a just calculation shall be made of the value of the said claims by his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur and the government of Bombay and in consequence of the intimate friendship now established between the contracting parties, his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur agrees, for himself, his heirs and successors, to relinquish, for ever, all the rights, claims, and privileges of the Maratha State affecting the said city of Surat, and all collections on that account shall cease and determine from the day on which this treaty shall be concluded ; in consideration of which act of friendship the honorable East India Company agrees that a piece of land, yielding a sum equal to the estimated value of the said claims of the Maratha State, shall be deducted from the districts ceded by article 4 ; and on the same principle, and from similar considerations, his Highness further agrees, that the amount of the collections made for the Poona State, under the title of *nakabandi*, in the *parganas* of Chaurasi and Chikhli, shall be ascertained by an average taken from the receipts for a certain number of years, or by such other mode of calculation as may be determined on, and his said Highness doth further agree, for himself, his heirs and successors, to relinquish for ever the *nakabandi* collections aforesaid, and they shall accordingly cease from the conclusion of this treaty. And it is agreed and stipulated that a piece of land, yielding a sum equal to the amount of the said *nakabandi* collections, shall be deducted from the districts ceded by article 4, in the same manner as stipulated in regard to the *chauth* of Surat.

ARTICLE 11. Whereas it has been usual for his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur to enlist and retain in his service Europeans of different countries, his said Highness hereby agrees and stipulates, that in the event of war breaking out between the English and any European nation, and of discovery being made that European or Europeans in his service, belonging to such nation at war with the English, shall have meditated injury towards the English, or have entered into intrigues hostile to their interest, such European or Europeans, so offending, shall be discharged by his said Highness, and not suffered to reside in his dominions.

ARTICLE 12. Inasmuch as, by the present treaty, the contracting parties are bound in a general defensive alliance, for mutual defence and protection against all enemies, his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur consequently engages never to commit any act of personal hostility and aggression against his Highness the Nawab Asaf Jah Bahadur, or any of the honorable Company's allies or dependants, or against any of the principal branches of the Maratha Empire, or against any power whatever, and in the event of difference arising, whatever adjustment the Company's government, weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice, may determine, shall meet with full approbation and acquiescence.

ARTICLE 13. And whereas certain differences, referring to past transactions are known to subsist between the *sarkar* of his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur and the *sarkar* of his Highness the Nawab Asaf Jah Bahadur, and whereas an amicable adjustment of those differences must be highly desirable for the welfare and benefit of both the said *sarkars*, his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur, with a view to the above end, agrees and accordingly binds himself, his heirs and successors, to fulfil and conform to the stipulation of the Treaty of Mahad ; and his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur further agrees, that on the basis of the fulfilment of the said treaty of Mahad, and of the claims of his Highness the Nawab Asaf Jah Bahadur to be totally exempted from the payment of *chauth*, the honorable Company's government shall be entitled to arbitrate and determine all such points, as may be in doubt or difference between the *sarkars* of their Highnesses aforesaid; and his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur further agrees, that in the event of any differences arising between his government and that of his Highness the Nawab Asaf Jah Bahadur, at any further period, the particulars of such differences shall be communicated to the honorable East India Company, before any act of hostility shall be committed on either side, and the said honorable Company interposing their mediation, in a way suitable to rectitude, friendship and union, and mindful of justice and established usage, shall apply themselves to the adjustment of all such differences, conformable to propriety and truth, and shall

bring the parties to a right understanding. And it is further agreed, that whatever adjustment of any such differences the Company's government, weighing things in the scale of truth and justice, shall determine, that determination shall, without hesitation or objection, meet with the full approbation and acquiescence of both parties. It is however agreed, that this stipulation shall not prevent any amicable negotiation which the honorable Company and the courts of Poona and Hyderabad respectively, may be desirous of opening, provided no such negotiation shall be carried on between any of the three parties without full communication thereof to each other.

ARTICLE 14. Whereas a treaty of friendship and alliance has been concluded between the honorable Company and Raja Anand Rao Gaikwad Bahadur, and whereas the said treaty was mediated and executed, without any intention that it should infringe any of the just rights or claims of his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur affecting the *sarkar* of the said Raja, his said Highness adverting thereto, and also to the intimate alliance now established between the contracting parties, doth hereby formally acknowledge the existence of the said treaty between the honorable Company and Raja Anand Rao Gaikwad Bahadur ; and inasmuch as, by reason of certain unfinished transactions, the conclusion of which has been suspended from time to time, various demands and papers of accounts are found to subsist between the government of his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur and the *sarkar* of the Raja aftermentioned, his said Highness, placing full reliance on the impartiality, truth, and justice of the British government, doth hereby agree that the said government shall examine into and finally adjust the said demands and papers of accounts, and his said Highness further stipulates and binds himself, his heirs and successors to abide by such adjustment as the British government shall accordingly determine.

ARTICLE 15. The contracting parties will employ all practical means of conciliation to prevent the calamity of war, and for that purpose will, at all times, be ready to enter into amicable explanations with the other states, and to cultivate and improve the general relations of peace and amity with all the powers of India, according to the true spirit and tenor of this defensive treaty. But if a war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other power whatever, then his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur engages, that with the reserve of two battalions of sepoys, which are to remain near his Highness' person, the residue of the British subsidiary force, consisting of four battalions of sepoys with their artillery, joined by six thousand infantry and ten thousand horse of his Highness' own troops, and making together an army of ten thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, with the requisite

train of artillery, and warlike stores of every kind, shall be immediately put in motion, for the purpose of opposing the enemy; and his Highness likewise engages to employ every further effort in his power, for the purpose of bringing into the field, as speedily as possible, the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions, with a view to the effectual persecution and speedy termination of the said war. The honorable Company, in the same manner, engage on their part, in this case to employ in active operations against the enemy, the largest force which they may be able to furnish over and above the said subsidiary force.

ARTICLE 16. Whenever war shall appear probable, his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur engages to collect as many *banjaras* as possible, and to store as much grain as may be practicable in his frontier garrisons.

ARTICLE 17. As by the present treaty the union and friendship of the two states is so firmly cemented that they may be considered as one and the same, his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur engages neither to commence nor to pursue, in future, any negotiations with any other power whatever, without giving previous notice and entering into mutual consultation with the honorable East India Company's government; and the honorable Company's government, on their part, hereby declare that they have no manner of concern with any of his Highness' children, relations, subjects, servants with respect to whom his Highness is absolute.

ARTICLE 18. Inasmuch as by the present treaty of general defensive alliance, the ties of union are, with the blessing of God, so closely drawn, that the interests of the two states are become identified, it is further mutually agreed, that if disturbances shall at any time break out in the districts ceded to the honorable Company by this agreement, his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur shall permit such a proportion of the subsidiary troops as may be requisite to be employed in quelling the same within the said districts. If disturbances shall, at any time, break out in any part of his Highness' dominions contiguous to the Company's frontier, to which it might be inconvenient to detach any proportion of the subsidiary force, the British government, in like manner, if required by his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Bahadur, shall direct such proportion of the troops of the Company as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose, to assist in quelling the said disturbances within his Highness' dominions.

ARTICLE 19. It is finally declared that this treaty which, according to the foregoing articles, is meant for the support and credit of his said Highness' government, and to preserve it from loss and decline, shall last as long as the sun and moon shall endure.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Bassein, the 31st of December, Anno Domini 1802, or the 5th of Ramzan, Anno Hijri 1217.

(Sd.) B. CLOSE.

Resident at Poona.

The seal of
Pandit Pradhan

(The Peshwa's signature).

SCHEDULE of the territories ceded in perpetuity by his Highness Baji Rao Raghunath Pandit Pradhan Bahadur to the honorable English East India Company, agreeable to the fourth article of the annexed treaty.

1st—From the province of GUJRAT and territories south thereof:—
Dhandhuka, together with Chuda, Ranapur and Gogo Rs. 1,05,000
Cambay *chauth*, and Napad 60,000

South of the Tapti.

Parner	27,000
Bhutsar	6,200
Buhari	8,800
Balsar	85,000
Parchol	1,07,000
Supa	51,000
Sarbhon	30,000
Valod	30,000
Bardoli <i>kasba</i>	7,900
Bansda <i>chauth</i>	7,000
Dharampuri <i>chauth</i>	9,000
Surat <i>chauth</i>	42,100
Customs	83,000

Between the Tapti and Narbada.

Olpad	3,16,000
Hansot	85,000
Ankleswar	78,000
Nanderi [Mandvi]	65,000

Total south of the Tapti and between

Tapti and Narbada 10,38,000

Deduct 20 per cent, on account of

decrease of revenue 2,07,600

8,30,400

<i>Nakabandi</i> of Chaurasi and Chikhli	...	20,000	
Phulpar, Kumbharia and Katargam	...	5,000	
		<hr/>	25,000

2nd—From the territories NEAR THE TUNGBHADRA:—

Savanur, 26 <i>talukas</i>	10,22,838	
From Bankapur	5,56,762	
			<hr/>	15,79,600

Grand total ... 26,00,000

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Bassein, the 31st December, Anno Domini 1802, or the 5th Ramzan, Anno Hijari 1217.

The Seal of
Pandit Pradhan]

(The Peshwa's signature)
B. CLOSE.

Ratified by the Governor-General-in-Council on 11th February, 1803.

No. 108—Partition treaty of Poona concluded with Baji Rao, the Peshwa, 14th May, 1804.

Treaty for the settlement of general peace in Hindustan and the Deccan, and for the confirmation of the friendship subsisting between the honourable English East India Company and its allies,, his Highness the Subahdar of the Deccan and his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan Peshwa Bahadur, settled between the said honourable Company and the said allies by Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, Resident at the Court of his Highness the Peshwa, in virtue of the powers delegated to him by his Excellency the most noble Richard, Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious Order of St. Patrick, one of his Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, Governor-General in Council of all the British possessions, and Captain-General of all the British land forces in the East Indies.

Whereas, by the terms of the Treaties of Peace concluded by Major-General the honourable Arthur Wellesley, on the part of the honourable Company and its allies, with Maharaja Sena Sahib Subah, Raja of Berar, at Deogaon, on the 17th of December 1803, and with Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia at Sarji Anjangaon, on the 30th of that month, which treaties have been duly ratified by the Governor-General-in-Council, and by the allies of the British Government, certain forts and territories have been ceded by Maharaja Sena Sahib Subah, and by Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia, to the honourable

Company and its allies, the following articles of agreement, for the settlement of the said forts and territories, have been concluded by the British Government and the said allies:—

ARTICLE 1. The province of Cuttack, including the port and district of Balasore and all cessions, of every description, made by the 2nd article of the treaty of Deogaon, or by any treaties which have been confirmed by the tenth article of the said treaty of Deogaon, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to the honourable English East India Company.

ARTICLE 2. The territories of which Maharaja Sena Sahib Subah formerly collected the revenues in participation with his Highness the Subadar of the Deccan, and those formerly possessed by Maharaja Sena Sahib Subah to the westward of the river Wardha, ceded by the 3rd article of the treaty of Deogaon, and the territory situated to the southward of the hills on which are the forts of Narnala and Gawilgarh, and to the westward of the river Wardha, stated by the 4th article of the treaty of Deogaon to belong to the British Government and its allies, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to his Highness the Subahdar of the Deccan, with the exception of the districts reserved to Sena Sahib Subah in the 5th article of the said treaty of Deogaon.

ARTICLE 3. All the forts, territories, and rights of Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia in the Doab, or country situated between the Jamuna and Ganges, and all his forts, territories, rights, and interests in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajas of Jaipur, and Jodhpur, and of the Rana of Gohad, ceded by the 2nd article of the treaty of Sarji Anjangaon, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to the honorable Company.

ARTICLE 4. The Fort of Broach and territory depending thereon, ceded by the 3rd article of the treaty of Sarji Anjangaon, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to the honorable Company.

ARTICLE 5. The fort and city of Ahmadnagar, together with such part of the territory depending thereon, as is ceded by the 3rd article of the treaty of Sarji Anjangaon to the honorable Company and its allies, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to his Highness the Peshwa.

ARTICLE 6. All the territories which belonged to Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia before the commencement of the late war, situated to the southward of the hills called the Ajanta hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapur, the town and district of Gandapur, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavari, ceded by the 4th article of the treaty of Sarji Anjangaon to the honourable Company and its allies, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to his Highness the Subahdar of the Deccan.

ARTICLE 7. All cessions made to the honorable Company by any treaties which have been confirmed by the 9th article of the treaty of Sarji Anjangaon, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to the honorable Company.

ARTICLE 8. This treaty, consisting of eight articles, being this day, 14th of May 1804 A.D., corresponding with the 3rd of Safar, 1219 A.H., settled and concluded at Poona, by Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, Resident, with His Highness the Peshwa, Lieutenant-Colonel Close has delivered to his said Highness a copy of the same in English, Persian, and Marathi, under the seal and signature of the said Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, and His Highness the Peshwa has delivered to the said Lieutenant-Colonel Close another copy, also in Persian, Marathi, and English, bearing His Highness' seal, and Lieutenant-Colonel Close aforesaid has engaged to procure and deliver to his said Highness, without delay, a copy of the same, duly ratified by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General-in-Council, on the receipt of which by his said Highness, the present treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on the honorable the English East India Company and on his Highness, and the copy of it now delivered to his said Highness shall be returned.

Ratified by the Governor-General-in-Council on 4th of June, 1804.

No. 109—Treaty of peace and friendship concluded with Daulat Rao Sindhia at Sarji Anjangaon, 30th December, 1803.

TREATY of PEACE between the honorable English East India Company and their allies, on the one part, and the Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia, on the other : settled by Major-General the honourable Arthur Wellesley, on the part of the honourable Company and their allies, and by Vitthal Mahadev, Munshi Kamal Nayan, Jaswant Rao Ghorpade Amir-ul-Umrah and Naro Hari, on the part of the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia, who have each communicated to the other their full powers.

ARTICLE 1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the honorable Company and their allies, on the one part, and the Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia, on the other.

ARTICLE 2. The Maharaja cedes to the honourable Company and their allies, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories, and rights in the Doab, or country situated between the Jamuna and Ganges, and all his forts, territories, rights, and interests in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur, and of the Rana of Gohad, of which territories, etc., a detailed list is given in the accompanying schedule. Such countries formerly in the possessions of the Maharaja, situated between Jaipur and Jodhpur, and to the southward of the former, are to belong to the Maharaja.

ARTICLE 3. The Maharaja likewise cedes to the honorable Company and their allies, in perpetual sovereignty, the fort of Broach and territory depending thereon, and the fort of Ahmadnagar and territory depending thereon; excepting those lands which it is agreed, by the eighth article of this treaty, that the Maharaja is to retain.

ARTICLE 4. The Maharaja likewise cedes to the honorable Company and their allies all the territories which belonged to him previous to the breaking out of the war, which are situated to the southward of the hills called the Ajanta hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapur, the town and district of Gandapur, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavari.

ARTICLE 5. The Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia, for himself, his heirs and successors, hereby renounces all the claim to the forts, territories, rights, and interests, ceded by the second, third and fourth articles; and all claims, of every description, upon the British Government and their allies, the Subedar of the Deccan, the Peshwa, and Anand Rao Gaikwad.

ARTICLE 6. The fort of Asirgarh, the city of Burhanpur, the forts of Pawangarh and Dohad, and the territories, in Khandesh and Gujrat, depending on these forts, shall be restored to the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia.

ARTICLE 7. Whereas the Maharaj Daulat Rao Sindhia has represented that his family have long held in *inam*, as a gift from the Kings of Hindustan, the districts of Dholpur, Bari, and Raja-Kheda, which are situated to the northward of the countries of the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur, and the Rana of Gohad, and that lands in Hindustan, ceded by the second article of this treaty to the honourable Company, and their allies, are held in *jagir* by persons of the family of the late Mahadji Sindhia and others by principal sardars in his service, all of whom would suffer distress if deprived of the advantages they enjoy in those countries: it is agreed that the Maharaja shall continue to hold and enjoy in *inam* the lands of Dholpur, Bari, and Raja-Kheda, and that Bala Bai Sahib, and Mansur Sahib, Munshi Kamal Nayan, Bugaji Jamdah, Amraji Jadhv and Vardahchari, shall continue to hold their lands in *jagir* under the protection of the honorable Company. And further, in order that no individual may incur loss or suffer distress in consequence of this arrangement, it is agreed that the honorable Company shall either pay pensions or grant lands in *jagir*, according to the option of the British Government, to certain other sardars and others to be named by the Maharaja, provided that the total amount of the sums paid, or jagirs granted or held, does not exceed seventeen lakhs of rupees per annum, including the annual value of the lands, which it is agreed by the article that Bala Bai Sahib, Mansur Sahib, Munshi Kamal Nayan,

Bugaji Jamdah, Amraji Jadhv, and Vardahchhari are to continue to hold ; and provided that no troops in the service of the Maharaja are to be introduced into Dholpur, Bari, and Raja-Keda, or the other lands held in *jagir*, under the pretence of collecting the revenue, or any other pretence whatever.

ARTICLE 8. Whereas the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia has represented that his family have long held in *inam* certain lands, villages, etc., in the territories of Rao Pandit Pradhan, viz. :—

Shrigonda Pargana		Six villages in Poona	Pargana
Jamgaon		Two villages in Wai	"
Ranjangaon		Six villages in Patutood [Partur]	"
Half of Shevgaon	Pargana	Five villages in Pandipergaum	"
Six villages in Ambad	"	Five villages in Pagood	"
Five villages in Paithan	"	Two villages in Parner	"
Five villages in Nevasa	"		
Five villages in Kurla	"		

which have lately been taken possession of by the British Government and their allies ; it is agreed, that those lands and villages shall be restored to him, provided that no troops shall ever be introduced into those lands and villages under pretence of collecting the revenues or any other pretence whatever.

ARTICLE 9. Certain treaties have been made by the British Government with Rajas and others, heretofore feudatories of the Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia. These treaties are to be confirmed ; and the Maharaja hereby renounces all claim upon the persons with whom such treaties have been made and declares them to be independent of his government and authority, provided that none of the territories belonging to the Maharaja, situated to the southward of those of the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur and the Rana of Gohad, of which the revenues have been collected by him or his *amildars*, or have been applicable, as *saranjami*, to the payment of his troops, are granted away by such treaties. Lists of the persons with whom such treaties have been made will be given to the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia, when this treaty will be ratified by his Excellency the Governor-General.

ARTICLE 10. No person whatever is hereafter to be molested on account of the part which he may have taken in the present war.

ARTICLE 11. It is agreed that the rights of his Highness the Peshwa to certain lands in Malwa and elsewhere shall be established as heretofore ; and in case any difference should arise respecting those rights, it is agreed that the honorable Company shall mediate, arbitrate, and decide, according to the principles of justice, between his Highness and the Maharaja, and whatever shall be thus decided will be agreed to by both parties, and will be carried into execution.

ARTICLE 12. The Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia hereby renounces all claims upon his Majesty Shah Alam, and engages, on his part, to interfere no further in the affairs of his Majesty.

ARTICLE 13. The Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia engages never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the Government of which may be at war with the British Government ; or any British subject, whether European or native of India, without the consent of the British Government.

ARTICLE 14. In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the governments, it is agreed that accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other.

ARTICLE 15. The honorable Company being bound by treaties of general defensive alliance with his Highness the Subadar of the Deccan and his Highness Rao Pandit Pradhan, to which the Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia is desirous of acceding, he is to be admitted to the benefits thereof ; and the honourable Company with a view to the future security of the Maharaja's territories engage, in the event of his agreeing to the treaty abovementioned, in two months to furnish him with a force consisting of six battalions of infantry, with their complement or ordnance and artillery, and usual equipments of military stores, etc., and the expense of this force is to be defrayed out of the revenues of the lands ceded by the second, third, and fourth articles. But it is agreed, that in case it should suit the interests of the Maharaja's Government to decline to enter into the Treaty abovementioned, such refusal shall not affect any of the other stipulations of this treaty of Peace, which are, in every respect, to be binding on the contracting parties, their heirs and successors.

ARTICLE 16. This treaty is to be ratified by the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia in eight days from this time, and the ratification is to be delivered to Major-General Wellesley.

Major-General Wellesley engages that it shall be ratified by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council, and the ratification shall be delivered to the Maharaja in three months or sooner, if possible.

The orders for the cession of the territories shall be delivered to Major-General Wellesley at the same time with the ratification of the treaty of peace ; but the forts of Asirgarh, Pawangarh, and Dohad are not to be delivered up till accounts will have been received that the territories ceded have been evacuated by the Maharaja's officers and troops.

Done in Camp at Sarji Anjangaon, this 30th of December, 1803, answering to the 15th Ramzan, 1213 Fasali.

(Sd.) Arthur Wellesley.
 „ Vitthal Mahadev.
 „ Kamal Nayan.
 „ Naro Hari.
 „ Jaswant Rao Ghorpade.

Ratified by the Governor-General in Council, 13th February, 1804.

Ratified by His Highness the Nizam, on 20th April, 1804.

Ratified by the Peshwa, on 14th May, 1804.

ENCLOSURE.

MEMORANDUM* of the *Jaidads* belonging to the AMILS
 of ZAFAR YAB KHAN, the son of SAMRU
 In the Doab.

Pargana of	Palm [? Ailam in Kairana]	...	Rs.	1,39,665
Do	Budhana	1,48,646
Do	Barnawa	1,32,755
Do	Annilpur Bairat [Baraut]	1,00,875
Do	Jharu Sama [? Shamli]	50,000
Do	Sardhana	2,07,750
Do	Jewar Jahangirpur	1,42,000
Do	Kutana	1,32,300
Do	Doghatgaon	12,400
Do	Nirpura	9,425

Belonging to Ajit Singh and Hira Singh Jat, to the west
 of the River Jamuna.

Pargana of	Faredabad	1,26,500
Do	Faujdari Delhi	6,000

Lands under the Khalsa [Emperor's] *Mutsaddis*, to the
 west of the River Jamuna.

Pargana of	Budhpur	6,000
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Belonging to Mirza Akbar Shah, the heir-apparent, to the
 west of the River Jamuna.

Pargana of	Kot Kasim	40,000
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The Zamindari of Ranjit Singh in the Doab.

Husainganj and Panigaon	6,000
To the west of the River Jamuna	13,23,370

* There is no schedule attached to the original treaty, but this Memorandum, which is attached to a copy of the treaty in the Foreign Office, is supposed to be the Schedule referred to in article 2.—*Aitchison*. [*The Karnal District Gazetteer* of 1883, adds 'The whole list is extraordinarily incorrect,' p. 35 n.]

Belonging to Madho Rao Katri.				
Villages in the Doab	5,000
Belonging to Madho Rao Phalké.				
In the Doab	2,25,834
Belonging to Satwaji Phalké.				
In the Doab	84,938
Kutoba Bysakh.				
To the west of Jamuna	73,284
Bapuji Sindhia, to the west of the Jamuna.				
Panipat	99,478
Mungothla [?]	50,000
Govardhan	10,000
Gulab Rai Kadam.				
3 Mahals in the Doab	1,30,251
Gangadhar Bugaram.				
2 Mahals in the Doab	1,22,568
Yashwant Rao Sindhia and Raghoji Kadam, 2 Mahals to the west of the Jamuna				
Narnaul and Kanti	1,64,000
Lands assigned to the postmaster.				
In the Doab	33,750
Gurdatt Singh.				
In the Doab Mahal Jhinjhana	36,554
Bhag Singh				
In the Doab	57,968
Seth [? Sant] Singh Sikh.				
Karnal, to the west of the river Jamuna	14,000
Ahmad Ali Khan.				
In the Doab	57,000
Nijabat Ali Khan, in the Doab.				
Pargana of Behat	22,000
Do Phugna	20,000
Do Durni	7,000
Do Salakhera	7,000

Sarmast Khan.

In the Doab	62,000
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Faiz Talab Khan, to the west of the Jamuna.

Pargana of Rohtak	2,93,208
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Mahomad Ali Khan.

In the Doab	32,000
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Arab Ali Khan.

In the Doab	18,968
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Resumed Jagirs, etc., in the Doab, and to the west of the Jamuna, belonging to General Perron.

Pargana of Nohjhil, to the west of the River Jamuna	...	1,15,000
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Duties collected at the ghat of Shahdara, opposite to Agra	5,248
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ditto Bhukar	60,300
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Nibohra	14,850
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Kirapur	1,67,000
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Bhumas	8,200
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Jubeli	4,650
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Talukas in the Doab.

Jugsan	15,000
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Bucha	15,000
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Bahapur	18,000
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Duties collected at Hansirganj	36,047
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To the west of the Jamuna.

Sonsa	20,000
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Badargarh and Hasangarh	25,000
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Bahora	20,400
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The Suba of Saharanpur.

Haweli Saharanpur	51,627
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Malhaipur	9,900
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Sultanpur	25,600
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Nauabas	15,200
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Bidauli	32,605
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Nanauto	17,791
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Titrawara [? Titron]	10,070
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Sukrar Khera [? Sakrauda]	10,202
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Subes, etc.	25,000
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Lands belonging to Bahramand Khan	3,100
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Paharkhera	48,000
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Ganga Daspore	36,000
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Moglearpore	3,200
Ambahta, in part	5,493
Bhogpur	10,000
Barsat and Faridpur	35,000
Raulapur, etc.	89,901
The fair and jagir of Hardwar	50,000

Under George Thomas, on the right of the Jamuna

Pargana of Jhajjar	1,51,930
Beri and Mudau	76,505
Badli	62,982
Lahori and Patauda	15,000

Belonging to Shah Nizam-ud-din, in the Doab.

Shamli	38,000
Chephuli	53,000
Islamabad	33,000
Tehar	25,000
Buwara	56,223
Bhusunra	32,000

Belonging to Mr. John Baptiste, to the west of the
River Jamuna.

Rewari	1,41,200
Tijara	44,349
Taoru	35,000
Pataudi	38,374
Bawal	28,610
Firozpur Jhirka	19,864
Taluka of Sursum	15,000

Designed for the expenses of his Majesty's establishment.

Talpat, in the Doab	1,72,425
Baran, in the Doab	1,04,895
Puth and Siyana	1,75,235
Parichhatgarh	77,200
Loni, Jalalabad, in the Doab	1,90,201
Haweli Palam, in the kasba of Delhi	1,89,533
Rahuli Gujar, in the Doab	1,08,896
Surwa and Khurkauda, in the Doab	64,434
Sikandarabad, in the Doab	75,625
Shikarpur, to the west of the Jamuna	25,300
Khasra, in the Doab	72,064
Kairana, in the Doab	32,700
Najafgarh, to the west of the Jamuna	1,10,760
Datiani	4,000

Kiver	20,000
Mint of the city of Delhi	26,000
From the office of Karori	1,25,601
Taxes from the shop-keepers of Delhi	17,000
Duties from the mahals of the city	40,000
From the collection of export duties	1,500
Houses in Delhi, etc., becoming the property of the Crown from the death of persons without heirs	4,900

Ranjit Singh Jat.

Kaman, Kawari, Pahari, to the west of the River Jamuna	1,00,000
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Amildaris under the charge of Waman Khande Rao,
to the west of the River Jamuna.

Kanaud	73,918
Ratia Mandawar	29,756
Ismailpur	8,337
Nimrana	12,001
Kot Putli	40,042
Daderi	53,001
Sarai Sabha Chand	1,401
Bijwad	2,500
Khudana	7,500
Gunali Nahurjal	26,641

Under the charge of Krishnaji Appa, the fort
of Kishangarh.

Bundara	1,324
Bambora	17,238
Khairthal	1,712
Nurnagar	2,500
Harsauli	10,000
Fatehabad	8,000
Tatarpur	7,000
Ambaji Inglé, Mathura, and the Customs collected in Nohjhil	55,000

Memorandum of the Mahals in Hindustan formerly
belonging to General De Boigne.

Koil	1,70,000
Atrauli	3,01,500
Dibhai	60,000
Khurja	1,40,000
Danpur	5,000
Jellaspore [Jalesar]	2,15,000
Khalilganj	62,500

Khandauli	87,088
Garh Mukteswar	70,000
Jewar	84,000
Mat	1,41,500
Firozabad	4,00,176
Sadabad	2,02,088
Hassur	1,40,000
Chandausi	85,000
Khijr	1,15,000
Shikarpur	41,500
Ambahita and Kamalpur	57,894
Sahpau	40,000
Raya	45,000
Ahar	18,000
Bairampur	31,000
Hathras	1,88,000
Mursan	1,20,000
Beswan	12,000
Mahaban	21,424
Mewat	1,41,617

To the west of the River Jamuna.

Pargana of Palwal	2,72,375
Nuh	1,05,687
Nadeem	45,725
Sohna	1,20,000
Sakras	15,634
Nownabil Chor [Nai Bichhor?]	60,053
Hodal	77,620
Hattin	1,78,258
Bahadimat Jehandawar	1,56,500

Under Raja Ambaji Inglé, to the west of the river Jamuna.

Pargana of Fatimabad	1,24,175
„ Achanera	1,30,000
Farrah	12,600
Kosi	1,98,553
Shergarh	28,989
Hasangarh	1,50,000
Gorai	25,315

In the Doab.

Pargana of Daryapur	15,000
Maheria	30,000
Meerut	2,03,855

Dasna	1,90,680
Barauli	27,000
Hasayan	55,000

Under Colonels George and John Hessing to the
west of the River Jamuna.

Collections of the Customs and Mint at Agra	82,500
Pargana of Karahra	79,697
„ Sarendhi	36,001
„ Jagnair	45,238
„ Malpura	1,20,145
„ Khairagarh	70,135
„ Kiraoli	72,778
„ Fatchpur Sikri	80,734
„ Iradatnagar	60,000
„ Shamsabad	1,12,104
„ Lohmandi	1,36,425
„ Naharganj	60,205

Talukas in the Doab belonging to the same persons
in Saharanpur.

Gangoh	30,000
Jara and Gunget [Jauli-Janset?]	13,550
Purchhapar	34,892
Lakhnauti	15,000
Gangera [Ganaur]	6,932
Chausath Kheri	7,000
Sumalia	6,642
Shikarpur Khurda	61,883
Khatauli	80,917
Kandhla	47,641
Sonepat	39,348
Gohana	1,16,329

**No. 110—Treaty of Defensive Alliance concluded with Daulat Rao Sindhia
at Burhanpur, 27th February, 1804.**

Treaty of alliance and mutual defence between the honourable the East India Company and the Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia Bahadur, and his children, heirs and successors, settled by Major John Malcolm, on the part of the honourable Company, and by Babu Vitthal Pant, and Munshi Kamal Nayan, on the part of the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia, after having communicated to each other their full powers, the said Major John Malcolm being deputed to the court of Daulat Rao Sindhia by Major-General the honourable Arthur Wellesley; the honourable Major-General aforesaid being

invested with full powers and authority from his Excellency the most noble Richard, Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious order of Saint Patrick, one of his Britannic Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, appointed by the honourable Court of Directors of the said Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies.

Whereas, by the blessing of God, the relations of friendship and union have been happily established between the government of the honourable Company, and that of the Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia Bahadur by a recent treaty of peace, the two governments aforesaid adverting to the complexion of the times have now determined, with a view to the preservation of peace and tranquillity to enter into this treaty of general defensive alliance for the reciprocal protection of their respective territories together with those of their several allies and dependants, against unprovoked aggression and encroachments of all or any enemies whatever.

1. The friendship and union established by the former treaty between the two states shall be promoted and increased by the treaty and shall be perpetual ; the friends and enemies of either state shall be the friends and enemies of both and their mutual interests shall henceforward be inseparable.

2. If any power or state whatever shall commit any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against either of the contracting parties, and after due representation shall refuse to enter into amicable explanation or shall deny the just satisfaction or indemnity which the contracting parties shall have required, then the contracting parties will proceed to concert and prosecute such further measures as the case shall appear to demand ; for the more distant explanation of the true intent and effect of this article the Governor General in-Council in behalf of the honourable Company hereby declares that the British Government will never permit any power or state what ever to commit with impunity, any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights and territories of the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia, but will at all times, in compliance with the requisition of the Maharaja, maintain and defend the same, when such requisition is made, in the like manner as the rights and territories of the honourable Company are now maintained and defended.

3. With a view to fulfil this treaty of mutual defence the Maharaja agrees to receive and the honourable East India Company to furnish a subsidiary force of not less than six thousand regular native infantry with the usual proportion of artillery and with the proper equipment of warlike stores and ammunition. The force is to be stationed at such place near the frontier of Daulat Rao Sindhia, as may hereafter be deemed most eligible by the British Government, and it will be held in readiness at such station to proceed as soon

as possible for the execution of any service on which it is liable to be employed by the conditions of this treaty.

4. And it is further agreed that in conformity to the stipulations of the 15th article of the treaty of peace concluded by Major General Wellesley on the part of the honourable Company and by Bapu Vitthal, Munshi Kamalnayan, etc., on the part of the Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia, that all charges and expenses of the six battalions abovementioned, and of their ordnance, artillery, military stores, equipment shall be defrayed by the honourable Company out of the produce of the revenues of the territories ceded by the Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia to the said Company by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th articles of the aforementioned treaty of peace, which territories are specified in a statement annexed to that treaty.

5. Grain and all other articles of consumption and provisions, and all sorts of materials for wearing apparel, together with the necessary number of cattle, horses and camels required for the use of the subsidiary force, shall, whenever the aforesaid force is within the territories of the Maharaja in consequence of his requisition, be entirely exempt from duties, and whenever any further force of the honourable Company shall, in consequence of war with any other state, be in the dominions of the Maharaja, they shall, in like manner as the subsidiary force, be exempt from all duties upon the aforesaid articles of necessary use and consumption, and it is also agreed that whenever any part of the army of the Maharaja is in the territories of the honourable Company for purposes connected with the fulfilment of this treaty, that no duties on grain, camels, wearing apparel, etc., as stated above which the party of the army of the said Maharaja may require shall be collected, and it is further agreed that the officers of the respective governments while they are (in the fulfilment of the articles of this treaty) either with the army or in the territories of the other shall be treated with that respect and consideration which is due to their rank and station.

6. The subsidiary force will at all times be ready on the requisition of the Maharaja to execute services of importance such as the care of the person of the Maharaja, his heirs and successors, the protection of the country from attack or invasion, the overawing and chastisement of rebels or excitors of disturbance in the Maharaja's dominions ; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions.

7. Whereas it is agreed, in the 13th article of the treaty of peace that the Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia shall never take or retain in his service any Frenchman or the subject of any other European or American power, the government of which may be at war with Great Britain, or any British subject whatever, European or native of India without the consent of the British Government, the Maharaja now further engages that he will hereafter never employ

in his service or permit to reside in his dominions any European or American whatever, without the consent and acquiescence of the British Government: the said British Government on its part engaging that it never will employ or permit to reside in its dominions any person or subject of the Maharaja or others who shall hereafter be guilty of crimes or of hostility against the person or government of the aforesaid Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia.

8. As by the present treaty, the union and friendship of the two states are so firmly connected that they may be considered as one and the same, the Maharaja engages never to commence nor to pursue in future any negotiation with any states or principal powers without giving previous notice, and entering into mutual consultation with the honourable East India Company's Government, and the honourable Company's Government on their part declare that they will have no manner of concern with any of the Maharaja's relations, dependants, military chiefs or servants, with respect to whom the Maharaja is absolute and that they will on no occasion ever afford encouragement, support or protection to any of the Maharaja's relations, dependent chiefs or servants, who may eventually act in opposition to the Maharaja's authority, but on the contrary (at the requisition of the Maharaja) they will aid and assist to punish and reduce all such offenders to obedience. And it is further agreed that no officers of the honourable Company shall ever interfere in the internal affairs of the Maharaja's Government.

9. As the chief object and design of the present defensive alliance is the security and protection of the dominions of the contracting parties and their allies and dependants from all attack whatever, the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia engages never to commit any act of hostility or aggression against any state or chief in alliance with the honourable Company, or against any other state or principal power, and in the event of differences arising, whatever adjustment the honourable Company's Government weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice may determine, shall meet with his full approbation and acquiescence.

10. The contracting parties will employ all practicable means of conciliation to prevent the calamity of war, and for that purpose will at all times be ready to enter into amicable explanations with other states or principal powers, and to cultivate and improve the general relations of peace and amity with all the principal powers of India according to the true spirit and tenor of this treaty; but if a war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other state or power whatever, then the Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia engages that the English force consisting of six battalions with their guns etc., joined by a detachment of his army consisting of six thousand of the Maharaja's infantry, ten thousand

of his *pagah* and *siledar* cavalry (which force the Maharaja engages always to keep ready), shall be immediately put in motion for the purpose of opposing the enemy; and the Maharaja also engages to employ every further effort for the purpose of bringing into the field the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions with a view to the effectual prosecution and speedy termination of the said war. The honourable Company in the same manner engages on their part (on such events occurring) to employ in active operations against the enemy as large a force as the service may require over and above the said subsidiary force.

11. Whenever war shall appear probable the Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia engages to collect as many *Banjaras* as possible and to store as much grain as may be practicable in the frontier garrisons. The Company's Government also with a view to the effectual prosecution of the war engages to adopt similar measures in their frontier garrisons.

12. The contracting parties entertain no views of conquests or extension of their respective dominions, nor any intention of proceeding to hostilities against any state or principal power unless in the case of unjust and unprovoked aggression and after the failure of their joint endeavours to obtain reasonable satisfaction, through the channel of pacific negotiation according to the tenor of the preceding treaty. If contrary to the spirit and object of this defensive treaty, war with any state should hereafter appear unavoidable (which God avert) the contracting parties will proceed to adjust the rule of partition of all such advantages and acquisitions as may eventually result from the success of their united arms. It is declared that in the event of war, and of a consequent partition of conquests between the contracting parties the shares of each government shall be equal in the division of any territory which may be acquired by the successful exertion of their united arms, provided, that each of the contracting parties shall have faithfully fulfilled all the stipulations of the treaty.

13. The interests of the contracting parties being identified by this defensive alliance, it is agreed that the honourable Company's Government shall be at liberty to employ the whole or any part of the subsidiary force established by the treaty in the quelling of any disturbances which may arise within their territories, or on the performance of any other service which may be required by the said honourable Company's Government, provided such service shall not interfere with any other duties on which the said subsidiary force is liable to be employed under the conditions of this treaty, and if disturbances shall at any time break out in any part of the Maharaja's dominions which lay contiguous to the frontier of the honourable Company and to which it might be inconvenient to detach any pro-

portion of the subsidiary force, the British Government, in like manner, if required by Daulat Rao Sindhia, shall direct such of the Company's troops as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose of assisting in quelling the said disturbances within the Maharaja's dominions: and if disturbances shall at any time break out in any part of the dominions of the British Government which lay contiguous to the frontier of the Maharaja, the Maharaja if required by the British Government shall direct such of his troops as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose to assist in quelling the said disturbances within the dominions of the British Government.

14. In order to strengthen and confirm the friendship established between the two states, it is agreed that neither of the two contracting parties shall enter into any alliance or have any concern with the tributaries or Chiefs of the other, and in order to support the independent authority of both governments, it is agreed and declared that hereafter neither of the contracting parties will give protection or countenance to the rebellious tributaries and subjects of the other; but they will use their utmost endeavours for the apprehension of such rebels in order that they may be brought to punishment.

15. The honourable Company agree to exert their influence to maintain the observance of such usages on matters of form and ceremony and other customs as shall appear to have been fixed on all points of intercourse and communication between the Peshwa and his ancestors and the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia and his ancestors; and the English Government also agree to recognise the right of Daulat Rao Sindhia to all possessions he holds whether by written *sanads* or grants of the Peshwa, or by the unwritten authority of that Prince according to former usage, provided such *sanads* do not interfere with the faithful fulfilment of the treaty of peace, and provided also that in all cases where disputes may arise on the subject of possessions held by unwritten authority the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia agrees to refer to the sole arbitration of the said British Government who will decide (with reference to former usage) on the principles of truth and justice. The English Government further agrees to use its endeavours to prevent any acts which have been done by Daulat Rao Sindhia or his ancestors under the authority reposed in him or them by the Peshwa or his ancestors from being subverted, provided their being supported is strictly consistent with the preservation of the honour and dignity of his Highness the Peshwa and of the stipulations of the treaty of peace.

16. This treaty consisting of 16 articles being this day settled by Major Malcolm on the part of the honourable Company and by Viithal Pant and Munshi Kamalnayan on the part of Daulat Rao Sindhia, Major Malcolm has delivered one copy thereof in Persian

and Marathi and English signed and sealed by himself, to the said Maharaja, who on his part has also delivered one copy of the same duly executed by himself ; and Major Malcolm by virtue of special authority given him in that behalf by Major General the honourable Arthur Wellesley (himself vested with full powers as before stated), hereby declares the said treaty to be in full force from the date hereof and engages that a copy of the same from the Governor General in Council in every respect a counterpart of that executed by himself shall be delivered to the Maharaja Alijah Daulat Rao Sindhia in the space of two months and 10 days, and on the delivery of such copy, the treaty executed by Major Malcolm shall be returned.

Done at Burhanpur, this twenty-seventh day of February in the year of our Lord, one thousand, eight hundred and four, or fourteenth of Zilqad in the Hijri year one thousand two hundred and eighteen.

Company's
Seal

(Sd.) WELLESLEY.

Ratified by the Governor-General in Council on 23rd March, 1804.

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